Yaeger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

COMPLETE LOGISTICAL CIVIL ACTION

SERVICES, LLC

VERSUS NO. 24-826

PAUL YAEGER SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 10). For

the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Complete Logistical Services, LLC brings this action seeking to

obtain a declaratory judgment holding that it is not liable to Defendant Paul

Yaeger for additional maintenance and cure payments. Plaintiff, a temporary

staffing company based in Louisiana, employed Defendant as a Captain on

various occasions after he applied to work with Plaintiff in January 2020. On

October 25, 2021, while working for Plaintiff aboard the M/V GO AMERICA,

Defendant had an asthma attack and required medical treatment. Defendant

was diagnosed with pneumonia, and Plaintiff provided Defendant with

maintenance and cure benefits. Defendant returned to work on January 17,

2022 without restrictions, and in April 2022, the United States Coast Guard

(“USCG”) certified that he was medically fit for duty. Defendant continued to

periodically work for Plaintiff until April 2023. On June 9, 2023, Defendant

notified Plaintiff that he needed a lung transplant and requested additional

maintenance and cure benefits, claiming his 2021 bout of pneumonia caused

the damage to his lung.

Plaintiff then filed this action pursuant to the Court’s maritime

jurisdiction on April 2, 2024. Defendant was served on June 10, 2024 at his

residence in Texas, but failed to make an appearance. At Plaintiff’s request,

the Clerk of Court entered default against Defendant on December 6, 2024.

Plaintiff now moves for the entry of default judgment against Defendant

declaring that it owes him no additional maintenance and cure.1

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes the clerk to make an

entry of default against defendants who fail to answer or otherwise defend a

plaintiff’s complaint within the required time period.2 An entry of default

results in a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations being deemed admitted.3

Nevertheless, a defendant against whom a default has been entered “is not

held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”4

Following the entry of default, a plaintiff may move for default judgment

against the defendant in default.5 “[A] defendant’s default does not in itself

warrant the court in entering a default judgment” as “[t]here must be a

1 As the instant Motion did not address the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over

Defendant, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a supplemental briefing on the issue by

February 27, 2026. Doc. 12. Pursuant to that Order, Plaintiff timely filed its Memorandum

Regarding the Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendant, Paul Yaeger. Doc. 13.

2 FED. R. CIV. P. 55.

3 Meyer v. Bayles, 559 F. App’x 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Nishimatsu Const. Co. v.

Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).

4 Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.

5 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).

2

sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.”6 Although

judgments by default are “generally disfavored,”7 the decision to enter default

judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court.8

The Court is entitled to consider several factors when determining

whether to enter a default judgment, including, “whether material issues of

fact are at issue, whether there has been substantial prejudice, whether the

grounds for default are clearly established, whether the default was caused by

a good faith mistake or excusable neglect, the harshness of a default judgment,

and whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the

defendant’s motion.”9

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff requests a default judgment against Defendant, claiming that

he has failed to answer in the proper time and has not requested an extension

as required by Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant

has failed to file responsive pleadings or appear in this case, and default has

been entered against him.10

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court must first examine its jurisdiction over this subject matter

and the parties before proceeding to the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default

Judgment.11

6 Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.

7 Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000).

8 Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345

(5th Cir. 1977)).

9 Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).

10 Doc. 7.

11 See Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V VIKTOR KURNATOVSKIY, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th

Cir. 2001).

3

A. Subject matter jurisdiction

This action arises under the general maritime law of the United States,

and subject matter jurisdiction is premised upon this Court’s maritime

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.12

B. Personal jurisdiction

Next, the Court must consider personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Defendant is alleged to be a resident of Mississippi.13 In admiralty cases,

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is thus proper when “(1) the forum

state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and

(2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment.”14 In the instant case, “these two inquiries

merge into one because Louisiana's long-arm statute permits service of process

coterminous with the scope of the due process clause.”15

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a

corporation, as it does an individual, against being made subject to the binding

judgments of a forum with which it has established no meaningful ‘contacts,

ties, or relations.’”16 A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-

resident defendant when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of

the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum

contacts” with the forum state; and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the

12 Defendant is a seaman claiming maintenance and cure benefits for injuries he allegedly

sustained while serving aboard the M/V GO AMERICA in the navigable waters of the

United States.

13 Doc. 1 at 1.

14 Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 343, (5th Cir. 2004).

15 Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 786 (5th Cir. 1990); see also LA. REV. STAT.

§ 13:3201.

16 Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.2d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).

4

defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.”17

1. Minimum contacts

“Minimum contacts” can be established through specific jurisdiction or

general jurisdiction.18 Specific personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant

has purposely directed its activities, or availed itself of the privileges of

conducting its activities, toward the forum state and the controversy arises out

of or is related to those activities.19 General personal jurisdiction exists when

the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic activities in the forum

state, regardless of whether such activity is related to the plaintiff’s cause of

action.20

As Defendant is an individual and a non-resident, the Court does not

have general personal jurisdiction over him.21 To establish specific personal

jurisdiction, Plaintiff must prove that: “(1) there are sufficient (i.e., not ‘random

fortuitous or attenuated’) pre-litigation connections between the non-resident

defendant and the forum; (2) the connection has been purposefully established

by the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or is related

to the defendant's forum contacts.”22 If Plaintiff meets its burden, Defendant

“can then defeat the exercise of specific jurisdiction by showing (4) that it would

17 Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at

316).

18 Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000).

19 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 262, 472 (1985).

20 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).

21 Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358–59 (2021) (“In what we have

called the “paradigm” case, an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of

domicile.”).

22 Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 221.

5

fail the fairness test, i.e., that the balance of interest factors show that the

exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.”23

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant: lived in Louisiana at the time he

contracted with Plaintiff; contracted with Plaintiff, a Louisiana-based

employer; “accepted 15 jobs for companies based in, and or/operating out of

Louisiana,” during his employment with Plaintiff; joined or launched vessels

out of Louisiana cities during his employment; and communicated regularly

with Plaintiff’s Louisiana-based employees regarding his employment.24

Defendant also “sought and received pre-employment medical evaluations in

Louisiana.”25 Plaintiff avers that Defendant’s purposeful availment is evinced

by the nature of their relationship in that Defendant sought employment with

Plaintiff in Louisiana and that Defendant could decline to work on

Louisiana-based jobs without repercussion. Further, the duty to pay

maintenance and cure benefits arises out of Defendant’s employment-based

contacts with Louisiana.26 Accordingly, Plaintiff has met his burden to show

that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

2. Fairness

As Defendant has not appeared, the Court will review whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would be unreasonable or

unfair. “If a nonresident defendant has sufficient related or unrelated

minimum contacts with the forum, we must then consider whether the

23 Id. at 221–22.

24 Doc. 13 at 8.

25 Doc. 13 at 16.

26 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938) (“The duty [to pay maintenance and

cure] . . . arises from the contract of employment.”).

6

‘fairness’ prong of the jurisdictional inquiry is satisfied.”27 The fairness inquiry

is determined by analyzing several factors: (1) the burden upon the

nonresident defendant of litigating in the forum state; (2) the interests of the

forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief; (4) the judicial

system’s interest in obtaining an efficient resolution of controversies; and (5)

the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social

policies.28 Given Defendant’s substantial employment-based contacts with

Louisiana and the fact that Defendant currently resides in Texas, the task of

litigating this matter in Louisiana would not be unduly burdensome.29

Further, Plaintiff is a local employer and has a legitimate interest in litigating

labor disputes with its employees working in the state.30 Thus, the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over Defendant would not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the Court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over Defendant.

C. Venue

Likewise, the Court must determine that the action was brought in an

appropriate venue. A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this judicial district. Plaintiff is Defendant’s

employer, is based within this district, and the dispute arises from Defendant’s

employment in this district. Further, Defendant completed his pre-

27 Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior

Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987)).

28 Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).

29 Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Norris, No. 16-8247, 2016 WL 7097383, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec.

5, 2016) (holding the exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable “particularly given

that [the defendants] enjoyed being in the employ of a Louisiana-based company for

multiple years”).

30 Id.

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employment medical evaluation in this district. Therefore, this is a proper

venue for this action.

II. Availability of Declaratory Relief

As this Court has jurisdiction, the Court must now decide whether

declaratory relief is appropriate. The Fifth Circuit has established a three-step

inquiry for determining whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over

a declaratory action. A court must consider: “(1) justiciability . . . (2) authority

(i.e., whether issuing a declaration will be tantamount to enjoining an ongoing

state-court proceeding, in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, which triggers

‘mandatory’ abstention); and, if the case survives the first two steps, (3)

discretion.”

A. Justiciability

Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the text of the Declaratory

Judgment Act forbid federal courts from “issu[ing] a declaratory judgment

unless there exists an ‘actual controversy.’”31 “As a general rule, an actual

controversy exists where ‘a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy

and reality [exists] between parties having adverse legal interests.’”32

“Whether particular facts are sufficiently immediate to establish an actual

controversy is a question that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”33

“The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint raising the issue of whether an

employer is legally obligated to continue to provide an employee with

maintenance and cure benefits is a justiciable controversy, even if the

31 Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 1998).

32 Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (citing Middle South Energy, Inc. v. City

of New Orleans, 800 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1986)).

33 Id.

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employee has not made formal demand for such payments.”34 Thus, the Court

finds that this matter is justiciable.

B. Authority to grant declaratory judgment

Next, the Court must determine whether it has the authority to grant

the declaratory relief sought.35 The Fifth Circuit has held that “when a state

lawsuit is pending, more often than not, issuing a declaratory judgment will be

tantamount to issuing an injunction—providing the declaratory plaintiff an

end run around the requirements of the Anti–Injunction Act.”36 Accordingly, a

court does not have authority to consider a declaratory action “when: (1) the

declaratory defendant previously filed a cause of action in state court; (2) the

state case involved the same issues as those in the federal court; and (3) the

district court is prohibited from enjoining the state proceedings under [the

Anti-Injunction Act].”37 The Fifth Circuit has further held that “the absence of

any of the three factors defeats mandatory abstention, and the district court

has broad discretion over whether to grant declaratory relief.”38 None of the

34 Diamond B. Indus., LLC, v. Bancroft-Brownlee, No. 6:17-cv-1169, 2018 WL 3469747, at *3

(W.D. La. June 29, 2018) (citing Rowan Co., Inc. v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1989)),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:17-cv-1169, 2018 WL 3469596 (W.D. La. July

18, 2018).

35 Orix, 212 F.3d at 895.

36 Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed., Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing

Texas Emps.’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). The

Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an

injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by act of

Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its

judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

37 Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Tom’s Welding, Inc., No. 11-3101, 2012 WL 2064451, at *5 (E.D. La. June

7, 2012) (citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty., 343 F.3d 383, 388 n.1 (5th Cir.

2003)).

38 Sealed v. Sealed, No. 94-30148, 1994 WL 487245, at *2 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Torch, Inc. v.

LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 1991)).

9

factors are relevant here, meaning that this Court has the authority to

adjudicate this matter.

C. Discretion

As “Federal courts have great discretion to entertain, stay, or dismiss a

declaratory judgment action,” the Court “must consider whether to exercise its

discretion to grant declaratory judgment.”39 In Brillhart v. Excess Insurance

Co. of America, the United States Supreme Court identified several factors to

determine if abstention is appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act.40

In St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Trejo, the Fifth Circuit distilled these factors into

a nonexclusive list:

1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the

matters in controversy may be fully litigated, 2) whether the

plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the

defendant, 3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in

bringing the suit, 4) whether possible inequities in allowing the

declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums

exist, 5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the

parties and witnesses, 6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal

court would serve the purposes of judicial economy, and, [7)]

whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state

judicial decree involving the same parties and entered by the court

before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is

pending.41

The Fifth Circuit has noted that the Trejo factors may be reduced to three

aspects of analysis: federalism, fairness, and efficiency.42

39 RSDC Holdings, LLC v. Steinberg, No. 16-9381, 2017 WL 117314, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 12,

2017) (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282–83 (1995)).

40 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942).

41 St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590–91 (1994).

42 Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 391.

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Here, Plaintiff asserts that there is no pending state action regarding

Defendant’s demand for maintenance and cure, and the Court has no reason

to believe otherwise. Thus, there are no federalism concerns.

As to fairness, there is no indication that this action is anticipatory in

nature, was brought in this district for the purposes of forum shopping, or that

Plaintiff “is attempting to gain precedence in time or to change forums.”43

Plaintiff was simply “filing a declaratory judgment action in a federal court

with jurisdiction to hear it,” which is not improper anticipatory litigation or

abusive forum shopping.44 Additionally, the applicable law for Defendant’s

maintenance and cure claim would be the same whether in federal or state

court.45

Regarding efficiency, the Court must consider whether the federal court

is a convenient forum for parties and witnesses and whether retaining the

lawsuit would serve purposes of judicial economy.46 While there may be

alternative forums where this matter could have been brought, Defendant is

not unduly burdened by defending this action in this forum as he had

substantial employment-related contacts with this state, was a former resident

of this state, and now resides in an adjacent state. Further, Plaintiff is located

here, and Defendant obtained his pre-employment physical in this district,

meaning relevant witnesses are also located here.47

43 Bridgfield Cas. Ins. Co. v. River Oaks Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-1665, 2015 WL 137248, at *2

(E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2015) (citing Trejo, 39 F.3d at 591).

44 Sherwin Williams, 343 F.3d at 391.

45 See River Oaks Mgmt, 2015 WL 137248 (stating that since Louisiana law applied to the

policy regardless of whether it was litigated in federal or state court, the court was not

inclined to find that the plaintiff was forum shopping).

46 Trejo, 39 F.3d at 591.

47 Doc. 10-2.

11

The Trejo factors all weigh in favor of the Court exercising jurisdiction.

Thus, this matter is justiciable, this Court has authority, and it shall use its

discretion to exercise jurisdiction over this action for declaratory judgment.

III. Default Judgment

Having established that this Court may grant Plaintiff declaratory relief,

the Court turns to whether Plaintiff has set forth a sufficient basis to support

default judgment.48 Plaintiff’s Motion argues that the McCorpen defense

absolves it from its maintenance and cure obligations because Defendant failed

to disclose his history of asthma. Plaintiff further argues that, in any event, it

owes no maintenance and cure to Defendant because his injuries did not

manifest while he was in service to a vessel. Because the Court holds that

Plaintiff’s McCorpen defense provides a sufficient basis to enter default

judgment against Defendant, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s alternative

argument.

“An employer owes damages for maintenance and cure to any seaman

who suffers injury during his employment on a vessel, regardless of fault.”49 “A

seaman’s employer may, however, rely on certain legal defenses, such as the

‘McCorpen defense,’ to deny claims for maintenance and cure.”50 In McCorpen,

the Fifth Circuit held that an employer is relieved of the obligation to pay

maintenance and cure when the seaman conceals or misrepresents the facts of

a prior condition or injury in connection with an application for employment.51

48 As the Clerk has entered default against Defendant, Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual

allegations are deemed admitted. Bayles, 559 F. App’x at 313.

49 Foret v. St. June, LLC, No. 13–5111, 2014 WL 4539090, at *2 (citing Johnson v. Cenac

Towing, Inc., 544 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2008)).

50 Dauzat v. Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 14-3008, 2016 WL 3167662, at *2 (E.D. La. June 7,

2016).

51 McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 549; see also Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166,

170–71, 173 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 549 (“[W]here the [employer]

12

To prevail on this defense, “an employer must show that (1) the claimant

intentionally misrepresented or concealed medical facts; (2) the non-disclosed

facts were material to the employer’s decision to hire the claimant; and (3) a

connection exists between the withheld information and the injury complained

of in the lawsuit.” This Court will address each element in turn.

A. Intentional concealment

To satisfy the “intentional concealment” prong of the McCorpen defense,

the Court need not make a finding of subjective intent.52 “[A] prospective

employee’s ‘[f]ailure to disclose medical information in an interview or

questionnaire that is obviously designed to elicit such information . . . satisfies

the intentional concealment requirement.’”53 Here, Plaintiff attaches

Defendant’s USCG Application for Medical Certificate (“USCG Application”)

and pre-assignment questionnaire.54 On the USCG Application, Defendant

denied presently or ever having or requiring treatment for a lung disease of

any type, including asthma.55 Likewise, Defendant denied having any medical

conditions on his pre-assignment questionnaire.56 However, Defendant’s

medical records indicate that he has a history of asthma dating back to his

childhood and uses an albuterol inhaler.57 Notably, Defendant’s medical

requires a seaman to submit to a pre-hiring medical examination or interview and the

seaman intentionally misrepresents or conceals material medical facts, the disclosure of

which is plainly desired, then he is not entitled to an award of maintenance and cure.”)).

52 Brown, 410 F.3d at 174.

53 Martinez v. Crosby Dredging, LLC, 686 F. Supp. 3d 479, 485 (E.D. La. 2023) (citing Brown,

410 F.3d at 174 (quoting Vitcovich v. Ocean Rover O.N., No. 94-35047, 1997 WL 21205, at

*3 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1997))).

54 Doc. 10-2 at 5–16.

55 Id. at 8. Defendant filled out the USCG Application as part of his pre-employment physical.

Id. at 1.

56 Id. at 16.

57 Doc. 10-3 at 3, 5.

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records indicate that four days before he boarded the M/V GO AMERICA he

sought medical care for the exact same symptoms he experienced while aboard

that vessel.58 Because Defendant failed to disclose his history of asthma on his

USCG Application and pre-employment questionnaire, Plaintiff has met its

burden to show that Defendant intentionally concealed medical information.

B. Materiality

For the McCorpen defense to apply, the concealed or nondisclosed facts

of a plaintiff’s medical history must be material to the employer’s decision to

hire the seaman.59 “The fact that an employer asks a specific medical question

on an application, and that the inquiry is rationally related to the applicant’s

physical ability to perform his job duties, renders the information material for

the purpose of this analysis.”60 Failing to disclose respiratory conditions, such

as asthma, is material where a seaman was asked to disclose his history of

breathing conditions pre-employment.61

Here, Plaintiff provides the Court with the declaration of Spencer Sens

(“Sens”), Plaintiff’s Chief Executive Officer. Sens states that “[k]nowledge of

Yaeger’s history of asthma would have been material to [Plaintiff’s] decision to

hire him as a contract worker because he would be expected to work offshore

58 Doc. 10-4 at 2 (documenting Defendant’s recent “asthma exacerbation,” wheezing

symptoms, and history of asthma).

59 See Brown, 410 F.3d at 171.

60 Id. at 175.

61 Bergeron v. B & J Martin, Inc., No. 04-3190, 2005 WL 3542898, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 17,

2005) (“[T]he omission of any reference to his breathing problems from any of the forms

required in the hiring process is a misrepresentation that was material to the hiring

decision.”); Kidd v. Candy Fleet, LLC, No. 16-71, 2016 WL 6892886, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov.

23, 2016) (holding that questions regarding a seaman’s history of chest, lung, and

respiratory conditions were material to the employer’s decision to hire a seaman with a

history of breathing problems).

14

and away from easy access to medical attention as a captain.”62 According to

Sens, “[i]f Yaeger had disclosed his history of asthma, [he] would have required

additional medical information, including medical records and further

evaluation of his ability to perform his duties before deciding to hire him as a

contract worker.”63 Sens also attests that “[k]nowledge of Yaeger’s asthma

history and current complaints of wheezing and a need for an inhaler would

have been relevant to [Plaintiff’s] decision to hire him for this job” aboard the

M/V GO AMERICA.64 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s failure to

disclose his breathing difficulties were material to Plaintiff’s decision to hire

him.

C. Connection Between Injuries

Finally, Plaintiff must show a connection between the non-disclosed

injuries and the injuries complained of here. To present a successful McCorpen

defense, a party “need not submit any proof that the [seaman’s] omission

caused the injury.”65 The party need only “prove that the old injury and the

new injury affected the same body part.”66 Here, Defendant’s pre-existing

asthma affected his lungs and respiratory system. The pneumonia he

contracted after his asthma attack aboard the M/V GO AMERICA and the

subsequent lung damage also affected Defendant’s lungs. Thus, there is a

connection between the non-disclosed condition and the injuries claimed.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient basis to enter declaratory

judgment against Defendant precluding his recovery of further maintenance

62 Doc. 10-2 at 2.

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 Johnson v. Cenac Towing, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing

Brown 410 F.3d at 176).

66 Id.

15

and cure payments based on Plaintiff's successful McCorpen defense.®? Having

determined that Plaintiff has successfully presented its McCorpen defense, the

Court finds that default judgment is warranted given Defendant’s lengthy

failure to appear.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is

GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered against Paul Yaeger declaring that

Complete Logistical Services, LLC is not liable for additional maintenance and

cure benefits, with each party to bear its own costs.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of March 2026.

&,

g TRICHE LF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

67 Plaintiff's Complaint prays for attorney’s fees and costs. Despite Plaintiffs entitlement to

declaratory judgment, Plaintiff cannot recover attorney’s fees and costs. See Ingram Barge

Co. LLC v. Caillou Island Towing Co. Inc., 622 F. Supp. 3d 240, 246-55. (E.D. La. 2022); see

also Dolmo v. Galliano Tugs, Inc., No. 09-3976, 2011 WL 6817824 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011).

16