LUBAMBA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

SAMUEL T. LUBAMBA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 2:26-cv-00102-JAW

)

DERRICK STAMPER, in his )

official capacity as Chief Patrol )

Agent of Houlton Sector, U.S. Border )

Patrol, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen without a hearing violates

due process, the court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and

orders the government to provide the noncitizen a bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge within fourteen days of this order.

I. BACKGROUND1

Samuel T. Lubamba, a twenty-three-year-old resident of Lisbon, Maine, is a

citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo who fled to the United States in 2019

when he was about sixteen, after his family experienced political persecution in his

home country. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶¶ 1, 16-

20 (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). Mr. Lubamba’s father, Martin Nsapu Lubamba, was arrested,

interrogated, and tortured by the Congolese government due to his promotion of

1 For the purposes of Mr. Lubamba’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court reviews the

relevant facts as pleaded in his verified petition, verified response, and the exhibits to each.

human rights in The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), id. ¶ 16, and Martin

Lubamba fled the DRC in 2014. Id. ¶ 17. After his father’s escape, DRC government

agents continued to target the Lubamba family, kidnapping and torturing Mr.

Lubamba’s mother in an attempt to locate Martin Lubamba. Id. ¶ 18. In 2019, Mr.

Lubamba, his mother, and siblings fled the DRC, flew to Brazil, and ultimately came

to the United States, where Martin Lubamba was living. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.

On March 20, 2019, Mr. Lubamba and his family attended a U.S. Customs and

Border Protection (CBP) One appointment, where CBP granted Mr. Lubamba and

his family humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which he

maintains set no conditions requiring assurances that he would appear at his

hearings. Id. ¶¶ 21-24; Attach. 2, Parole Document. Thereafter, Mr. Lubamba and

his family moved to Maine, where they have resided ever since. Id. ¶ 25. Before Mr.

Lubamba arrived in the United States, his father had filed an asylum application and

in July 2019, his mother filed her own asylum application. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Mr.

Lubamba is included as a derivative applicant on each of his parent’s pending asylum

applications. Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 31-33. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

initiated removal proceedings against him when CBP paroled him into the United

States, but an Immigration Court terminated those removal proceedings on June 17,

2024 because of a defective charging document. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29; Attach. 3, Notice to

Appear; Attach. 4, Order of the Immigration Judge. The DHS did not appeal the

termination of the proceedings or file an amended charging document. Id. ¶ 30.

On February 26, 2026, CBP agents arrested Mr. Lubamba while he was

making a delivery for work. Id. ¶ 41. He remains in CBP custody in Somerset County

Jail, in Madison, Maine. Id. ¶ 43; Min. Entry (ECF No. 8). That same day, Mr.

Lubamba filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing his detention

violates the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) and his due process rights under the

Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 49-83. He seeks a writ

of habeas corpus ordering his immediate release or, in the alternative, an order

requiring an Immigration Judge to provide him a bond hearing as soon as possible.

Id. at 15. Upon docketing Mr. Lubamba’s petition, the Court issued a seventy-two-

hour emergency order, enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr. Lubamba

outside the District of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of Removal

(ECF No. 3) (Emer. Order).

At the teleconference of counsel on February 27, 2026, Respondents confirmed

Mr. Lubamba was in their custody in Somerset County Jail, in Madison, Maine at the

time Mr. Lubamba filed his petition, clarifying there were no issues of personal

jurisdiction or venue for the Court to consider. Min. Entry. The parties also agreed

to extend the Court’s emergency order blocking Mr. Lubamba’s transfer outside the

District of Maine until the Court’s resolution of its forthcoming order to show cause.

Id. Immediately following the teleconference, the Court ordered Respondents to show

cause why Mr. Lubamba’s petition should not be granted, O.S.C. (ECF No. 9), and,

consistent with the parties’ agreement, extended the emergency no-transfer order

until the Court issues its ruling on the order to show cause. Order (ECF No. 10).

On March 5, 2026, Respondents filed their response to the order to show cause,

opposing Mr. Lubamba’s petition. Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 11) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n). On March 6, 2026, Mr. Lubamba

filed his reply.2 Pet’r’s Verified Reply in Supp. of Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF

No. 14) (Pet’r’s Reply).

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

Mr. Lubamba alleges his detention violates the INA and his due process rights

under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 49-83. Mr.

Lubamba maintains he is illegally categorized as a mandatory detainee pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than a discretionary detainee under § 1226(a) who is

entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Id. ¶¶ 75-83. Mr. Lubamba

argues that his detention without a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment due

process rights. Id. ¶¶ 49-74. He seeks, among other remedies, a writ of habeas corpus

ordering his immediate release or, in the alternative, an order requiring an

Immigration Judge to provide him a bond hearing as soon as possible. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.

In their opposition, Respondents maintain Mr. Lubamba is properly

categorized as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling

agency precedent. Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2. However, Respondents acknowledge that

“caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s

2 On March 5, 2026, Mr. Lubamba filed a verified reply in support of his petition. Pet’r’s Verified

Reply in Supp. of Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 12). The next day, March 6, 2026, Mr.

Lubamba filed a notice stating his March 5, 2026 reply was filed in error, and, shortly thereafter, he

refiled his reply. Notice of Docket Entry Modification (ECF No. 13); Pet’r’s Verified Reply in Supp. of

Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 14).

interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Lubamba’s petition is not

substantially distinguishable from that line of caselaw. Id.

In his reply, Mr. Lubamba argues that Respondents have failed to show cause

why his petition should not be granted. Pet’r’s Reply at 7-11. Consistent with the

body of caselaw within this District, combined with Respondents’ concession that Mr.

Lubamba’s petition is not substantially distinguishable from that line of cases, Mr.

Lubamba argues he is entitled to immediate release pending his bond hearing before

an Immigration Judge. Id. at 11-12. Should the Court not order his immediate

release, he maintains that, in the alternative, he is still entitled to a bond hearing

before an Immigration Judge. Pet’r’s Reply at 12.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.

Lubamba’s habeas petition. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief

‘within their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to

relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always

been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting

Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). Furthermore, under habeas law,

jurisdiction in a particular district attaches when a petitioner is physically present

in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf. Rumsfeld,

542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952). Here, the

Court retains jurisdiction over this matter, because Mr. Lubamba filed his habeas

petition when he was in custody in the District of Maine.

B. The Merits

Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar

facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Lubamba, and he is

therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond

hearing before an Immigration Judge.

1. Statutory Framework

a. Mandatory Detention under Section 1225(b)(2)

Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen

“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two

categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings

v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (plurality opinion). Relevant here is

§ 1225(b)(2).3 Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall

be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,

3 Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially

determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to

expediated removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).

Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,

if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of

persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),

(B)(iii)(IV). Mr. Lubamba is an asylum applicant, and Respondents assert only that Mr. Lubamba is

subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1225(b)(1).

§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297

(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond

hearings”). As other courts have recognized, this language requires that “several

conditions must be met” to impose mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Lopez

Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Specifically, the

noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not

clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Id.; Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.

Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025).

b. Discretionary Detention under Section 1226(a)

By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary

hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591

U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue

an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or

release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

Section 1226(a) thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework for

noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 269 (D. Mass. 2025)). However,

§ 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one exception: immigration authorities

“shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved in certain enumerated criminal

activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those criminal activities is at issue here.

Once arrested under § 1226(a), immigration authorities make an

individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to

release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer

that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien

is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). If the

immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of

that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)

(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and

convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by

preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-

Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). An immigration judge’s decision to

continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).

In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between

the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain

certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes

the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.

at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the

country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).

c. Parole Pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A)

“Parole pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A) serves a unique function.”

Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

233224, at *34 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). Although § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not grant

admission to the United States, it allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to

permit certain noncitizens “on a case-by-case basis” to enter or remain in this country

only for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. For example, § 1182(d)(5)(A) is

simultaneously the only method of parole for those subject to mandatory detention

under § 1225(b), but it also covers asylum applicants who obtain advance parole to

travel into and out of the United States. Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *16 (D. Me. Oct. 28, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(f)).

However, parole is “not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien[,] and

when the purposes of such parole . . . have been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) mandates

that “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he

was paroled.” Id. Thereafter the parolee’s case “shall continue to be dealt with in the

same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Id.

In other words, parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) “employs a legal fiction whereby non-

citizens are physically permitted to enter the country but are nonetheless ‘treated,’

for legal purposes, ‘as if stopped at the border.’” Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 215

(quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139).

2. Applicable Statutory Basis for Detention

The parties agree Mr. Lubamba was paroled into the United States pursuant

to § 1182(d)(5)(A), and neither party disputes that Mr. Lubamba is “an applicant for

admission” or that he is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”

Instead, the question here, as with many immigration habeas cases to reach the

district courts in recent months, is whether Mr. Lubamba is “seeking admission” such

that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First

Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of

§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See

Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,

n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have

prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by

over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the

United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)

mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));

Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (collecting cases).

Here, there are two independent lines of recent caselaw supporting Mr.

Lubamba’s claim that he is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), rather

than mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). First, as a noncitizen continuously

residing in the United States since March 20, 2019, Mr. Lubamba is not “seeking

admission,” and he is therefore not subject to mandatory detention under

§ 1225(b)(2). See Moraes v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00583-JAW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234386,

at *9-10 (D. Me. Dec. 2, 2025); Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D.

Me. 2025). Rather, as a noncitizen “already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings,” Mr. Lubamba is subject to discretionary detention under

§ 1226(a), Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, and he is entitled to a bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.

A second line of recent caselaw holds that, as a § 1182 parolee released into the

country in advance of filing his asylum claim, Mr. Lubamba is not “seeking

admission,” even though his parole has already expired. See Montiel v. Raycraft, No.

1:25-cv-1610, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1726, at *8-9 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026); see also

Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *30-35

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (rejecting the argument that § 1182(d)(5)(A)’s prescription

that a noncitizen be returned to the “custody” from which they were paroled requires

a return to the detention authority to which they would have been subject prior to

any grant of parole); Rodriguez v. Rokosky, No. 25-17419 (CPO), 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 250239, at *4-6 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025) (same); see also Walizada v. Trump, No.

2:25-cv-00768, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *38-39 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (calling

absurd the idea that the expiry of petitioner’s parole now placed him in the “perpetual

status” of an “arriving alien”); Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *16

(“However, it does not necessarily follow that all those paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A)

were detained under § 1225 in the first instance”); Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-

06783-RFL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173976, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2025)

(“termination of parole does not generally require treating noncitizens as if they had

never been paroled in the first place”); Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem,

805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 90-91 (D.D.C. 2025) (“a noncitizen ‘arriving’ in the United States

would be one who is in the process of reaching his or her destination (the United

States) and making an appearance here,” not “someone who previously reached the

United States via a port of entry, underwent inspection at that port of entry, and then

was paroled into the United States”).

Mr. Lubamba, having been paroled into the country by CBP in March 2019, is

already present in the United States with a pending asylum application and therefore

cannot be considered “seeking admission.” Moreover, the expiration of his parole does

not require him to return to a port of entry and undergo a new inspection or screening.

See Walizada, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *26-28; Qasemi, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 261199, at *18-19, 30-35. Neither do Respondents argue that Mr. Lubamba

is required to undergo a new “credible fear” interview upon the termination of his

parole. Qasemi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *18-19; see also Caiza, 2025 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *14-19 (analyzing the circumstances of the initial grant of

§ 1182 parole to determine whether § 1226(a) and 1225(b) applied after expiration).

Furthermore, Mr. Lubamba pursued a lawful pathway to asylum. He applied

for and attended his CBP One application appointment before entering the United

States, waiting for approximately one month in Mexico before receiving § 1182 parole.

Pet’r’s Reply ¶¶ 6-9. His parents lodged asylum applications, naming Mr. Lubamba

as a derivative applicant, before his parole expired. Pet. ¶¶ 28, 31-33; Pet’r’s Reply

¶ 15-16, 20-22; Attach. 3, Req. to Add Dependent. He also maintains that his parole

set no conditions requiring assurances he would appear at his hearings and

Respondents do not dispute or argue any violations of his parole conditions. Pet. ¶ 24.

Moreover, although his parole has expired, Mr. Lubamba’s parents continue to

pursue their asylum application on their own and his behalf. Pet. ¶¶ 28, 31-33; Pet’r’s

Reply ¶ 15-16, 20-26. Furthermore, the facts of Mr. Lubamba’s case are readily

distinguishable from Caiza, in which this Court held that the “circumstances of [an

expired § 1182 parolee’s] initial encounters with immigration authorities” indicated

he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), in part because the

government paroled him due to detention capacity, rather than to parole him in

advance of filing an asylum application. Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *15

(“[P]arole under § 1182 does not by itself demonstrate that he was initially detained

under § 1225(b)(2)”).

Therefore, any determination as to Mr. Lubamba’s detention must be

conducted under the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a), which

“governs the process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have already entered

the United States pending their removal,” including expired parolees within the

United States pending the adjudication of their asylum claim. Tumba v. Francis, No.

25-cv-8110 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025)

(quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288).

3. Due Process

Because Mr. Lubamba is currently in the United States, he is “entitled to the

full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”

Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 30 (D. Mass. 2025), which provides that he will

not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an

alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause

applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their

presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). As the petitioner,

however, Mr. Lubamba bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the

evidence that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8

(D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.

2025) (collecting authority)).

To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply

the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Chafla,

804 F. Supp. 3d at 262-64 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to the

detention of noncitizen held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test); Sampiao,

799 F. Supp. 3d at 30-34 (same); Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28 (same). Under

Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1) “the private interest that

will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

a. Private Interest

In his petition, Mr. Lubamba asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—

the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom

from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process

Clause] protects”). A noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due

process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the

government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen

poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence

that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their

removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. Here, Respondents have

refused Mr. Lubamba the bond hearing § 1226(a) provides him and have failed to

meet their burden for his continued detention as due process requires. Mr. Lubamba

has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in his favor.

b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk

of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing

that Mr. Lubamba presents any public safety or flight risk. Accordingly, the second

Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.

c. Government Interest

Finally, the third Mathews factor considers the “Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. Respondents do

not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Lubamba’s continued detention

without a bond hearing. See Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (identifying governmental

interest in favor of immigration habeas petitioners’ continued detention without a

hearing as an “across-the-board application of an inapplicable statute”). In fact, the

public interest weighs against detention without a hearing. See Hernandez-Lara, 10

F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens “imposes substantial

societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor weighs against Respondents and in

favor of Mr. Lubamba.

The Court concludes that Respondents’ detention of Mr. Lubamba without a

bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates his due process rights.

C. Current Status

Mr. Lubamba filed his petition on February 26, 2026, Pet., and immediately

following his filing, the Court issued an emergency order, ordering Respondents not

to transfer him outside the District of Maine for at least seventy-two hours. Emer.

Order at 1. On February 27, 2026, the Court held a telephone conference of counsel

in which Respondents confirmed that Mr. Lubamba is being held at the Somerset

County Jail in Madison, Maine, and the Court extended the emergency order

enjoining Respondents from transferring him outside the District of Maine “until the

Court issues its ruling on the order to show cause.” Order.

Given that the Court is ordering Respondents to provide Mr. Lubamba with a

bond hearing, if his presence at the bond hearing requires him to travel outside the

District of Maine, his travel would technically violate the current geographic

restriction in the order of the Court. Therefore, the Court amends its Order dated

February 27, 2026 as follows:

The Court therefore ENJOINS Respondents from removing Samuel T.

Lubamba outside the District of Maine pending further order of the

Court. However, if his presence at the ordered bond hearing requires

him to be outside the District of Maine, the Court ORDERS that

Respondents may remove him from the District of Maine solely for the

purpose of attending the hearing and to return him to the District of

Maine immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing, if bond is denied.

In the interim, the Court ORDERS that Respondents not remove Samuel T. Lubamba

outside the District of Maine, except if necessary to attend any scheduled bond

hearing, pending further order of the Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

Finding Respondents’ continued detention of Mr. Lubamba without a bond

hearing violates federal law and the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, the Court GRANTS Samuel T. Lubamba’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (ECF No. 1) and enjoins Respondents from denying Mr. Lubamba a bond

hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to him and further ORDERS

Respondents shall provide Mr. Lubamba a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the date of this order.

If an Immigration Judge grants Mr. Lubamba bond, the Court ORDERS

Respondents to return any of Mr. Lubamba’s personal property that Respondents

have in their possession at the time of Mr. Lubamba’s release, including but not

limited to Mr. Lubamba’s phone, keys, wallet, employment authorization document,

social security card, and other identification documents.

Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within five days

of Mr. Lubamba’s bond hearing, stating whether Mr. Lubamba has been granted

bond, and, if his request was denied, the reasons for that denial.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 6th day of March, 2026