Fritsche

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

__________________________________________

RANDY SMITH, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Civil No.: 5:25-cv-05743-JMG

:

OFFICER DAVID FRITSCHE, et al. :

Defendants. :

__________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gallagher, J. January 30th, 2026

Plaintiff Randy Smith (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants Officers Fritsche, Funk, and

McCabe (collectively “Defendants”) used excessive force and conspired to deprive him of his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure when they apprehended Plaintiff at a

traffic stop. Plaintiff has brought claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

excessive force, and conspiracy. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint. Defendants’ Motion

is denied in part and granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 19, 2025, Defendants Fritsche and Funk conducted a traffic stop of the

Plaintiff in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania, near Bridgeton Road and Colebrook Drive, based on an

alleged wide right turn. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 7–8. During the interaction, Defendant Fritsche observed

a prescription pill bottle within the vehicle while the Plaintiff was obtaining his driver’s license.

Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Fritsche then returned to his patrol vehicle to check the Plaintiff’s license, during

which time the Plaintiff remained in his car with the door closed. Id. ¶ 10. Upon returning to the

car, Defendant Fritsche opened the door and gripped the Plaintiff’s left arm with both hands to

remove him from the vehicle, while the Plaintiff’s seatbelt was still buckled. Id. ¶ 11.

When the Plaintiff inquired about the situation, Defendant Fritsche drew his taser, placed

it against the Plaintiff’s face, and threatened to tase him. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff requested to unbuckle

his seatbelt, and after doing so, was pulled from the vehicle by his left arm by Defendant Fritsche.

Id. ¶ 14. Additional officers, including Defendant McCabe, subsequently arrived at the scene. Id.

¶ 15. After the Plaintiff was out of the car, Defendants Fritsche, Funk, and/or McCabe placed him

against the vehicle, moved his arms back, and held his head and neck down, while stating they

would break his arms if he moved. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Plaintiff alleges that he was compliant and did

not offer physical resistance during after being pulled from the car. Id. ¶ 18.

As a result of this incident, the Plaintiff was treated for a wrist injury and two fractured

ribs. Id. ¶ 19. His medical treatment included a recommendation for physical therapy and pain

management. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that despite following his treatment plan, he continues to

experience physical pain that affects his daily activities, along with mental and emotional distress.

Id. ¶¶ 21–22.

Plaintiffs filed suit on October 6, 2025. See generally id. On December 15, 2025,

Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition

on December 29, 2025. ECF Nos. 10, 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). “Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement,

it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555). A court is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,

or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Wheeler v. Wheeler, 639 F. App’x 147, 149

(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Qualified Immunity Defense

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “‘[T]he qualified-immunity

defense shields government agents from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Boyden v. Twp. of Upper Darby, 5 F. Supp. 3d 731, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996)). Qualified immunity shields officials from suit

itself, not merely from liability, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that questions

of immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation. See id.; see also Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

However, the Third Circuit has found that “it is generally unwise to venture into a qualified

immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast

majority of cases.” Boyden, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 736 (citing Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App’x. 788,

791 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2009)). The “fact-intensive nature of qualified immunity makes it often a bad fit

for Rule 12(b)(6).” Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 87 (3d Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).

Thus, “because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends on the facts of the case, a

complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds . . . but

rather at summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted).

Thus, this Court will not address the merits of a qualified immunity defense at this stage of

the litigation.1

b. Plaintiff Has Adequately Stated a Claim for Relief Against Defendants

Defendants argue that individual liability under § 1983 requires an “affirmative link”

between each defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation, as well as personal

involvement in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. ECF No. 10-3 at 6. They contend that Plaintiff

fails to plead the Defendants’ personal involvement with sufficient particularity and therefore has

not stated a claim against them. Plaintiff responds that the Complaint alleges that Officers Fritsche,

Funk, and/or McCabe slammed him against his vehicle, forced his arms behind his back, and

pressed his head and neck down onto the car. Plaintiff explains that the conduct is pleaded in the

alternative because the Defendants were positioned behind him, preventing him from seeing which

officer committed each specific act, and that this does not render the allegations vague or

conclusory. ECF No. 11 at 5. The Court agrees. The Complaint sufficiently alleges the personal

involvement of each of the Defendants. The fact that Plaintiff does not presently know which

1 Were the Court to evaluate qualified immunity at this juncture, Defendants would not meet

their burden of establishing that the alleged use of excessive force, accepted as true, did not

violate a federal right or that the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation. See

e.g. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).

defendant slammed him against the car, forced his arms behind his back, or pressed his head and

neck down onto the vehicle does not render the allegations inadequately pleaded. Plaintiff alleges

that each of the Defendants participated in the use of force, and discovery will permit Plaintiff to

determine the specific actions taken by each defendant.

c. Plaintiff’s Claim for Conspiracy (Count II) is Dismissed

To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) the

existence of a conspiracy involving state action; and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance

of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.” Gaskins v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:25-CV-

01187, 2025 WL 2857498, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing Oliver v. City of Philadelphia, No.

CV 25-197, 2025 WL 1902298, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2025)). This standard requires factual

allegations showing an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, including the “how, why, or when” of the alleged conspiracy. See id.

Plaintiff fails to meet this standard. The Complaint does not allege any facts describing

how the alleged conspiracy was formed, why Defendants purportedly agreed to violate Plaintiff’s

rights, or when such an agreement occurred. Instead, Plaintiff offers only the conclusory assertion

that “Defendants Fritsche, Funk, and McCabe conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, including the use of excessive force.” ECF No.

1 ¶ 29. Such a bare and conclusory allegation is insufficient to plausibly allege the existence of an

agreement or meeting of the minds. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claim must be

dismissed.

However, in the Third Circuit it is a well-accepted principle that “in civil rights cases

district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a

case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee

Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Mullin v. Balicki, 875

F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend the Complaint as

to Count II.

d. Plaintiff Punitive Damages Claims Against Defendants Survives

“‘A jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the

defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless

or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Smith v. McKinney, No. 2:22-

CV-02983-JDW, 2023 WL 6543531, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2023) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.

30, 56 1983)). The standard is disjunctive, such that a jury may award punitive damages upon

finding that the defendants acted, “at a minimum, reckless or callous.” Id. (citation omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for Punitive Damages must be dismissed because

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any action by Defendants showing extreme and outrageous

behavior. ECF No. 10-3 at p. 12. Taking all allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true, a jury could

find that Defendants threatening to tase Plaintiff, threatening to break his arms, and using enough

force to fracture his ribs during a routine traffic stop, rises to the level of acting recklessly or

callously. See Smith, 2023 WL 6543531, at *11(finding punitive damages to be a jury question

where officers used profane and disparaging language during the stop and arrest, ignored plaintiffs

complaints of pain, and the video evidence could support a finding of anger, malicious motive, or

reckless disregard for his right to be free from excessive force). Thus, this Court will not dismiss

Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is denied in part

and granted in part. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John M. Gallagher

JOHN M. GALLAGHER

United States District Court Judge