The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Verizon Pennsylvania LLC and :
Verizon North LLC, :
Petitioners :
:
v. :
:
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, : No. 1379 C.D. 2025
Respondent :
:
Broadband Communications :
Association of Pennsylvania, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, : No. 1388 C.D. 2025
Respondent : Argued: February 4, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: March 6, 2026
Verizon Pennsylvania LLC and Verizon North LLC (collectively,
Verizon) and Broadband Communications Association of Pennsylvania
(Broadband) (collectively, Petitioners) petition this Court for review of the
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board’s (Board) September 22, 2025 order denying
Verizon’s grievance (Grievance). There are five issues before this Court: (1)
whether the Board erred as a matter of law by determining that the Secretary of Labor
and Industry (Secretary) duly authorized the Bureau of Labor Law Compliance
(Bureau) to act as her deputy or representative to discharge her duty imposed by the
General Assembly at Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (Act);1 (2)
whether the Board erred as a matter of law by determining that the Secretary may
act unilaterally, without consulting the Prevailing Wage Advisory Board (Advisory
Board); (3) whether the Board erred as a matter of law by determining that the
Secretary did not abuse her discretion when she set the electric lineman rate as
prevailing for deployment and splicing of low-voltage fiber optic cable, rather than
promulgating teledata linemen and other teledata worker wage rates; (4) whether the
Board erred as a matter of law by refusing to consider prior determinations of the
Secretary and the Board; and (5) whether the Board made material findings of fact
based on substantial record evidence.2 After review, this Court affirms.
In 2023, the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic
Development’s (DCED) Broadband Development Authority (Authority)3 advertised
the Pennsylvania Broadband Infrastructure Program (BIP). BIP’s intent was to build
out broadband fiber optic networks to unserved and underserved areas of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth). The projects were funded in
part by federal money received through the COVID-19 American Rescue Plan Act
1
Act of August 15, 1961, P.L. 987, as amended, 43 P.S. § 165-7 (relating to the duty of
the Secretary).
2
In its Statement of Questions Involved, Verizon included an additional issue of whether
the Board erred as a matter of law by determining that Verizon “failed to carry [its] burden of
proof” demonstrating that the Secretary exercised discretion she did not possess and/or abused any
discretion she may have had. Verizon Br. at 34; see also id. at 49. Because that issue is subsumed
in the other issues, this Court addresses it accordingly herein.
3
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) created the Authority as an
independent authority under DCED to engage statewide broadband expansion plans and distribute
federal and state funds to support broadband expansion projects in unserved and underserved areas
of the Commonwealth. See Sections 6111 and 6122 of the Public Authorities and Quasi-Public
Corporations Act, 64 Pa.C.S. §§ 6111, 6122.
2
of 2021 (ARPA)4 grant to the Commonwealth and required at least a 25%
contribution from the awardees. Although federal funds used for public projects
typically require a prevailing minimum wage to be set consistent with the federal
Davis Bacon Act,5 the ARPA program excluded the broadband program from federal
prevailing wage requirements, allowing state law to control the issue. However, the
guidance prepared for the BIP reflects that prevailing wage may apply. Since then,
the Commonwealth has determined that prevailing wage will apply to the BIP.
On April 18, 2024, the Authority awarded BIP work related to 53
broadband projects to entities in 42 counties across the Commonwealth, including
to Petitioners. The Authority did not seek prevailing wage determinations related to
the broadband expansion work on that date. Instead, on April 24, 2024, for projects
the Authority awarded to Verizon, the Bureau issued Wage Determination 24-04164
for Warren County. On May 15, 2024, the Bureau issued Wage Determinations 24-
04911 through 24-04923 for Clearfield, Jefferson, Pike, Centre, and Somerset
Counties. On June 7, 2024, the Bureau issued Wage Determination 24-05667 related
to Carbon County. In each Determination, the Bureau found that the appropriate
prevailing wage for the BIP projects was for an electric lineman. The Bureau also
issued prevailing wage determinations based on the electric lineman rate for projects
awarded to members of Broadband and Connect Holding II, LLC d/b/a Brightspeed
(Brightspeed).
Petitioners provided additional information to the Secretary and the
Bureau to seek a change in the prevailing wage determination to include a prevailing
wage for teledata linemen and other teledata workers. The Bureau refused to include
a prevailing wage for teledata linemen and other teledata workers. On May 22, 2024,
4
15 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013.
5
40 U.S.C. § 3142.
3
Verizon filed the Grievance with the Board in response to the Secretary’s failure to
recognize the prevailing wage for teledata linemen and other teledata workers. On
July 1, 2024, Broadband filed a petition to intervene in the Grievance in support of
Verizon, which the Board granted on July 16, 2024. Communications Workers of
America (CWA) and Brightspeed also filed petitions to intervene in the Grievance
in support of Verizon, which the Board granted on July 16, 2024. The International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) filed a petition to intervene against the
Grievance in support of the Bureau, which the Board granted on June 20, 2024. On
September 22, 2025, the Board denied the Grievance. Petitioners appealed to this
Court.6, 7
Initially,
[t]he statutory language of the [] Act is the starting point.
When examining statutory language, [this Court]
follow[s] the rules of statutory construction in the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory
Construction Act), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501-1991. As our
Supreme Court has recently explained:
6
By November 13, 2025 Order, this Court consolidated Petitioners’ appeals.
7
This Court’s review of an administrative agency’s order determines
whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,
whether constitutional rights have been violated, and whether the
determination is in accordance with law. Bologna v. Dep[’t] of
Lab[.] [&] Indus[.], 816 A.2d 407, 410 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
[This Court’s] review of questions of law is plenary. Tomaskevitch
v. Specialty Rec[s.] Corp[.], 717 A.2d 30, 32 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
Th[is] Court will not overturn an exercise of administrative
discretion unless the agency has abused its discretion or acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. Int[’l] [Bhd.] of Elec[.] Workers v.
Dep[’t] of Lab[.] [&] Indus[.], Prevailing Wage Appeals [Bd.], 816
A.2d 1220, 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
PSP NE, LLC v. Pa. Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd., 292 A.3d 1175, 1178 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).
4
[Section 1921(a) of] [t]he Statutory Construction
Act provides that the object of all statutory
interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. C.S. §
1921(a). Generally, the plain language of the
statute provides the best indication of
legislative intent.” Miller v. [Cnty.] of [Ctr.], . . .
173 A.3d 1162, 1168 ([Pa.] 2017). If the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous in
setting forth the intent of the General Assembly,
then “[this Court] cannot disregard the letter of
the statute under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.” Fletcher v. [Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar.
Ass’n], . . . 985 A.2d 678, 684 ([Pa.] 2009) (citing
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)). In this vein, “[this Court]
should not insert words into [a statute] that are
plainly not there.” Frazier v. Workers’ [Comp.]
Appeal [Bd.] (Bayada Nurses, Inc.), . . . 52 A.3d
241, 245 ([Pa.] 2012).
....
Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act,
which provides that “when the words of a statute
are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit,” is crucial to our analysis
here. If the statute or rule . . . are not ambiguous,
then [this Court] cannot apply the
presumptions set forth in Section 1922 of the
Statutory Construction Act. “A statute is
ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable
interpretations of the text under review.”
Warrantech Consumer [Prods. Servs.], Inc. v.
Reliance [Ins.] Co. in Liquidation, . . . 96 A.3d
346, 354-55 (2014). “[The Pennsylvania
Supreme] Court has consistently held that . . .
interpretive rules of statutory construction are
to be utilized only where the statute [or rule] at
issue is ambiguous.” [Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v.
Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd.], 863 A.2d [432,] 436
[(Pa. 2004)].
Commonwealth v. Green, . . . 291 A.3d 317, 327-28 ([Pa.] 2023).
5
Hommrich v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 344 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (emphasis
added).
Verizon first argues that the Board erred as a matter of law by
determining that the Bureau was duly authorized to discharge the duties imposed by
the General Assembly upon the Secretary. Specifically, Verizon contends that the
record below is devoid of any evidence that the Secretary ever duly authorized the
Bureau to step into her shoes and discharge the duty the legislature imposed on her
through Section 7 of the Act. Verizon asserts that the General Assembly imposed
the duty on the Secretary, who Section 2(6) of the Act defines as “the Secretary . . .
or [her] duly authorized deputy or representative.” 43 P.S. § 165-2(6).
Broadband similarly argues that there is no evidence that the Bureau is
the Secretary’s duly authorized representative to administer and enforce the Act.
Broadband contends that the record evidence is clear, and it is uncontested that the
Secretary did not participate in the prevailing wage determination at issue; instead,
from the inception of this matter, the Bureau referred to itself as the Secretary’s
designee for making such determinations. Broadband further asserts that there is no
dispute that the Secretary may select a duly authorized representative to make
prevailing wage decisions under the Act; however, the Act does not authorize the
Bureau to be the Secretary’s designee. Broadband claims that in order to lawfully
appoint the Bureau as her designee, there must be an express authorization of such
appointment; merely creating a bureau, without more, does not result in a duly
authorized representative or even a delegation of authority.
The Bureau rejoins that the General Assembly authorizes the Secretary
to administer and enforce the Act, and the Act defines “Secretary” as “the Secretary
. . . or [her] duly authorized deputy or representative.” 43 P.S. § 165-2(6). The
Bureau retorts that consistent with that definition and the Secretary’s authority to
create bureaus “as may be required for the proper conduct of the work of [the
6
Department of Labor and Industry (Department)],” 71 P.S. § 72, the Secretary
created a division to assist her in the administration of the Act shortly after the Act
was created. The Bureau asserts that the Department’s Regulations also established
that the Secretary’s chosen division administered the Act. See Section 211.1 of the
Department’s Regulations, 34 Pa. Code § 211.1. The Bureau proclaims that, over
time, the Secretary renamed the division as the Bureau of Labor Law Compliance.
The Bureau maintains that the Secretary created the Bureau as an entity within the
Department to handle certain administrative and enforcement duties related to the
Act on her behalf and as such, over decades, the Bureau has acted as the Secretary’s
agent for purposes of Act administration, from investigations to enforcement actions
and, as here, to prevailing wage determinations.
Section 7 of the Act provides, in relevant part: “The [S]ecretary shall,
after consultation with the [A]dvisory [B]oard, determine the general prevailing
minimum wage rate in the locality in which the public work is to be performed for
each craft or classification of all workmen needed to perform public work contracts
during the anticipated term thereof[.]” 43 P.S. § 165-7 (emphasis added). Section
2(6) of the Act defines Secretary as: “[T]he Secretary of Labor and Industry or h[er]
duly authorized deputy or representative.” 43 P.S. § 165-2(6) (emphasis added).
Petitioners assert that the Secretary did not duly authorize the Board as her
representative. However, Section 211.1 of the Department’s Regulations mandates
that the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure apply to the
Department’s Prevailing Wage Division, see 34 Pa. Code § 211.1, and Section 212
of the Administrative Code of 19298 instructs:
The heads of the several administrative departments,
except the Auditor General and the State Treasurer and the
several independent administrative boards and
8
Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 51-732.
7
commissions shall, subject to the approval of the
[e]xecutive [b]oard, establish such bureaus or divisions
in their respective departments, boards, or commissions,
as may be required for the proper conduct of the work
of such departments, boards[,] or commissions.
71 P.S. § 72 (emphasis added). Thus, because the Secretary was authorized to
establish the Bureau to conduct the Department’s work, and it established the Bureau
to do so, the Bureau is the Secretary’s duly authorized representative. Accordingly,
the Board properly determined that the Secretary duly authorized the Bureau to act
as her representative to discharge her duty imposed by the General Assembly at
Section 7 of the Act.
Verizon next contends that the record below demonstrates that the
Bureau, for years, has excluded the Advisory Board from prevailing wage
determinations, which breaches Section 7 of the Act, i.e., the duty imposed on the
Secretary. Verizon contends that this was the Commonwealth’s first large-scale
public broadband infrastructure project and consulting with the Advisory Board
would have led to a more reasoned determination from the Secretary because the
Advisory Board must include industry insiders (contractors and labor unions). See
Section 2.1(c) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 165-2.1(c);9 see also 43 P.S. § 165-7.
Broadband likewise argues that Section 7 of the Act mandates that the
Secretary must consult with the Advisory Board. Broadband further contends that
Section 2.1(e)(2) of the Act indicates that the Advisory Board shall have the power
to “advise and assist the [S]ecretary in carrying out the duties provided for h[er] by
[S]ection 7 of the [Act].” 43 P.S. § 165-2.1(e)(2). Broadband asserts that such
language denotes that the Act requires the Advisory Board to advise and assist the
Secretary; it is not optional or at the Secretary’s discretion.
9
Section 2.1 of the Act was added by Section 3 of the Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 653.
8
The Bureau rejoins that Petitioners’ argument that the Secretary is
required to consult with the Advisory Board on each of the more than 11,000
prevailing wage determination requests she receives each year is not in accordance
with the Act’s text and would lead to the absurd result of halting public work
construction in the Commonwealth. The Bureau further retorts that, in 1963, the
General Assembly amended the Act to create the Advisory Board to assist the
Secretary in administering the Act. See 43 P.S. § 165-2.1. The Bureau asserts, to
that end, the Advisory Board has the power and duty to: (1) consult with the
Secretary at her request concerning any matter arising under administration of the
Act; (2) advise and assist the Secretary in carrying out her duties in Section 7 of the
Act; and (3) promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the duties the
Act placed upon the Board. See 43 P.S. § 165-2.1(e)(1-3). The Bureau proclaims
that the most reasonable reading of Section 7 of the Act merely sets out an order of
operations for the Secretary if, and when, she chooses to seek out the Advisory
Board’s advice and assistance. The Bureau submits that, as the plain meaning of
Sections 2.1 and 7 of the Act state, the General Assembly did not create the Advisory
Board to trump the Secretary, or otherwise assume authority previously provided to
the Secretary on questions of the Act’s administration; instead, the Advisory Board
is what its name suggests - a board that advises the Secretary. The Bureau claims
that the Board’s advice is not binding, and the discretionary authority of setting
prevailing wages and classifications under the Act remains solely within the
Secretary’s area of responsibility and authority.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Green Analytics North, LLC
v. Pennsylvania Department of Health, 343 A.3d 1086 (Pa. 2025): “When
interpreting a statute, [this Court] should not read the provisions in isolation, but
instead understand each provision in the context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at
1094. “Under these circumstances, [this Court] must determine not only what rights,
9
powers, and duties the Act grants or imposes on the [Secretary], but also what rights,
powers, and duties the Act grants or imposes on [the Advisory Board].” Id. at 1096.
As stated above, Section 7 of the Act provides, in relevant part: “The
[S]ecretary shall, after consultation with the [A]dvisory [B]oard, determine the
general prevailing minimum wage rate in the locality in which the public work is
to be performed for each craft or classification of all workmen needed to perform
public work contracts during the anticipated term thereof[.]” 43 P.S. § 165-7 (bold
and italic emphasis added). However, Section 2.1(e) of the Act describes:
The Advisory Board shall have the power and duty to--
(1) Consult with the [S]ecretary at h[er] request
concerning any matter arising under the administration of
th[e] [A]ct.
(2) Advise and assist the [S]ecretary in carrying out the
duties provided for h[er] by [S]ection 7 of th[e] [A]ct.
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the duties placed upon the [B]oard by th[e] [A]ct.
43 P.S. § 165-2.1(e) (bold and italic emphasis added).
Taken as a whole, “the plain language of the [above provisions]
provides the best indication of legislative intent[,]” and the plain language makes
clear that it is within the Secretary’s discretion whether to consult with the Advisory
Board. Hommrich, 344 A.3d at 131 (quoting Green, 291 A.3d at 327). This Court
agrees with the Bureau that Section 7 of the Act merely sets out an order of
operations for the Secretary if, and when, she chooses to seek out the Advisory
Board’s advice and assistance.10 Accordingly, the Board properly determined that
the Secretary was not required to consult with the Advisory Board.
10
“[B]ecause [Petitioners] reached a different conclusion does not automatically mean that
Section [702 of the Act] is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and, therefore, is
ambiguous. For all the reasons stated herein, [Petitioners’] interpretation . . . of Section [702 of
the Act] is not reasonable.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 311 A.3d 1034, 1048 n.20 (Pa. 2024).
10
Verizon next asserts that the Bureau never investigated nor determined
whether work covered by the IBEW commercial construction agreements, on which
the Bureau relied when setting prevailing wages for broadband expansion, had ever
been performed in the localities where the broadband expansion would occur.
Verizon contends that the Secretary and the Bureau simply deferred to electric
lineman rates found in IBEW’s and CWA’s commercial agreements, claiming below
that those agreements were the most relevant collective bargaining agreements
(CBA) used to decide prevailing wages. Verizon claims that is not the process the
legislature mandated and, thus, was an abuse of discretion.
Broadband also argues that the Secretary’s determination that the
electric lineman rate was the prevailing wage for workers who deploy and splice
low-voltage fiber optic or coaxial cable along telecommunications networks was an
abuse of discretion. Broadband contends that neither the Secretary nor the Bureau
relied on any rational basis for its decision related to the BIP projects; to the contrary,
the basis for the prevailing wage determinations for the BIP projects included an
irrelevant electric lineman note for unrelated projects, unrelated CBAs, and a
complete ignorance of broadband buildout projects. Broadband further asserts that
neither the Secretary nor the Bureau conducted a continuing program for obtaining
and compiling wage rate information reflecting wage rates paid to workmen in the
various types of construction in the locality. See Section 9.105(d) of the
Department’s Regulations, 34 Pa. Code § 9.105(d). In addition, Broadband submits
that the Secretary did not determine prevailing wages for varying project types
within the entire range of work performed by the building and construction industry,
nor did the information submitted reflect the specified wage rate or rates paid to a
particular craft in the locality or the type or types of construction on which the wage
rate or rates have been paid. See id.
11
IBEW rejoins that in determining the prevailing wage in a particular
craft or classification, the Secretary may only consider rates existing in the building
and construction industry. See 34 Pa. Code § 9.105(d). IBEW retorts that, based on
the record, Verizon, which does not contract with any company to work on its own
system, is not primarily (or even substantially) engaged in the building and
construction industry; rather, Verizon’s business is primarily directed towards
customer service and the maintenance of its existing system, including connecting
and disconnecting service to its millions of users. IBEW submits that Verizon’s
main witness, Senior Director of Labor Relations Craig Brewster, agreed that
Verizon’s primary business purpose is to offer telecommunications services to
customers. IBEW also counters that, given that Verizon is not even a construction
employer under the Department’s Regulations relating to the establishment of
prevailing wage classifications, see 34 Pa. Code § 9.105(d), it was patently
reasonable for the Secretary to follow the Department’s Regulations and refuse to
promulgate classifications or prevailing wages based on Verizon’s workforce.
The Bureau rejoins that the Secretary acted within her lawful discretion
under the Act when, after fully considering all relevant information, she denied a
request to create new prevailing wage job classifications. The Bureau further retorts
that in assessing the record supporting the Secretary’s decision, Petitioners cannot
demonstrate that the Secretary’s denial of Verizon’s request was arbitrary and
capricious or was unsupportable on any rational basis because there was no evidence
upon which the action may be logically based. The Bureau asserts that the Secretary
followed the Act’s letter and spirit, including using the discretionary decision-
making authority the General Assembly granted her, when considering Verizon’s
request, i.e., after Verizon submitted its requests for new telecommunication-
specific classifications, along with supporting information, the Secretary weighed
that evidence, as well as evidence that supported the Department’s longstanding
12
position. The Bureau maintains that, in addition to Verizon’s multiple submissions
over many months, the evidence the Secretary considered included the Department’s
historical practices and classification decisions of other states, as well as the
possibility for adverse consequences, including the downstream effect of previously
unrecognized job classifications increasing the likelihood of worker
misclassification and underpayment. The Bureau insists that the Secretary’s denial
of Verizon’s request was within the bounds of her lawfully authorized discretion and
was rationally based.
Initially, “[t]he determination of prevailing wages is an act largely
committed to the Secretary’s legislative authorized discretion. The Secretary’s
exercise of discretion is not subject to reversal, absent proof of fraud, bad faith[,] or
a blatant abuse of discretion.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,
Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd., 816 A.2d 1220, 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citation
omitted). “Th[is] Court will not overturn an exercise of administrative discretion
unless the agency has abused its discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.” PSP NE, LLC v. Pa. Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd., 292 A.3d 1175, 1178
n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).
Section 9.105(d) of the Department’s Regulations provides:
The Secretary will conduct a continuing program for
obtaining and compiling of wage rate information and
shall encourage the voluntary submission of wage rate
data by contractors, contractors’ associations, labor
organizations, public officials[,] and other interested
parties, reflecting wage rates paid to workmen in the
various types of construction in the locality. Rates shall
be determined for varying types of projects within the
entire range of work performed by the building and
construction industry. Information submitted shall
reflect not only the specified wage rate or rates paid to a
particular craft in the locality but also the type or types of
construction on which the wage rate or rates have been
paid. If the Secretary deems that the data at hand is
13
insufficient to make a determination with respect to the
crafts or classifications necessary to perform the proposed
public work, [s]he may have a field survey conducted by
h[er] staff representative for the purpose of obtaining
additional information upon which to make a
determination of the wage rates, and also the customs,
usages and practices as to the type of work to which the
wage rates apply and the size of available force of
qualified workmen within the locality in which the public
work is to be performed.
34 Pa. Code § 9.105(d) (emphasis added).
According to the Bureau’s website:11
The Bureau . . . updated its Pennsylvania Building
Journeyperson Laborer Notes to clarify existing tasks
performed throughout the Commonwealth. The “Building
Laborer Notes” link on the Bureau’s website provides a
list of those tasks that should be read in conformity with
custom and usage of the construction industry in the
geographic region in which they are utilized.
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dli/resources/compliance-laws-and-regulations/labor-
management-relations/labor-law/prevailing-wage (last visited March 5, 2026).
The Bureau updated “Notes for Electric Lineman” on September 19,
2018, and described it as including:
Assembling, installation, erection, operation,
maintenance, repair, control, inspections of all apparatus
devices, wires, cables, supports, insulators, conductors,
ducts, raceways, conduits including temporary,
permanent, maintaining or restoring electrical service
when part of outdoor lighting and wiring when fed from
the street and controlled from the street.
All work consisting of wood poles, concrete or metal (or
substitutes therefor[]) poles or towers, including wires,
11
“This Court may take judicial notice of public information on an official government
website.” Cunningham v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 330 A.3d 20, 23 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2025).
14
cables or other apparatus supported therefrom. Installing
and maintaining the catenary and trolley work on railroad
property and bonding of rails.
All outdoor substations, electrical connections and
grounding including the setting of transformers and
connecting the buses thereto, windmills and solar
installations.
Installation and maintenance of roadway lighting and
traffic signals systems electronic signs, and intelligent
transportation systems.
https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-
pagov/en/dli/documents/individuals/labor-management-relations/llc/prevailing-
wage/documents/notes-for-electric-linemen.pdf (last visited March 5, 2026).
Here, the Board explained:
The Bureau’s determination of “Electric Lineman” as the
proper classification for this work predates the filing of
this [G]rievance. Traditionally, the Bureau issued wage
determinations on broadband public work projects with
the understanding that the “Electric Linem[a]n”
classification would cover the installation of
telecommunication cables. The Bureau used wage rates
from IBEW Local 1319’s CBA and IBEW Local 126’s
CBA, depending on the location of the project, for the
“Electric Lineman” classification.
Several years ago, the Bureau started receiving complaints
that some contractors were paying the lower-paying
[l]aborer classification for completion of some tasks. The
Secretary, her deputies, and the Bureau met with several
interested parties on the issue of proper classification of
this work. In 2018, the Bureau developed a note to clarify
any misunderstandings of its position that the installation
of cable was considered the work of the “Electric
Lineman” classification, which was made publicly
available on the Bureau’s website. The Bureau did not
receive any grievances on this issue before the current one.
With the anticipation of federal funding for broadband
expansion, the Bureau conducted outreach to interested
parties and answered “hundreds” of questions concerning
broadband expansion projects. Representatives from
[Broadband] discussed the BIP and [broadband expansion
15
access development] funding concerning prevailing wage
requirements with the Secretary, her deputies, and the
Bureau. In July 2023, Todd Eachus [(Mr. Eachus)],
President of [Broadband], sent a letter to the Secretary
requesting the creation of three new classifications for
telecommunications work. He included several
attachments, such as wage rate determinations from
outside of Pennsylvania and excerpts from other IBEW
locals. The Secretary and [the] Bureau reviewed these
materials and responded in August 2023, but declined to
create the requested classifications. Thereafter, Mr.
Eachus continued his discussions with Executive Deputy
Secretary William Trusky about the new[ly] requested
classifications.
Bd. Op. at 24-26 (internal record citations omitted).
According to the Board:
On or about April 1, 2024, CWA Vice-President Michael
Davis sent the Bureau a letter requesting three new
telecommunications specific classifications. . . . The
Bureau deliberated the new information internally, but still
declined to create the requested new classifications.
In April 2024, [Verizon] filed rate requests with the
Bureau for 15 projects. In the application for wage rates,
[Verizon] requested that the Bureau create new
telecommunication classifications for the projects. The
Bureau again refused to create the new requested
classifications because it “had enough information based
off of already established note [sic] for the classification
of work.”
In November 2024, [Verizon] submitted 16 additional rate
requests with the Bureau, again reiterating their request for
new classifications. . . . The Bureau issued the wage rates
without the requested classifications. The Bureau later
reviewed the submitted information internally, but again
decided not to add the requested classifications.
Bd. Op. at 26-27 (internal record citations omitted).
The Board concluded:
The record is clear that [Verizon] and [CWA, Broadband,
and Brightspeed (]aligned Intervenors[)] submitted a
substantial amount of information to the Secretary and
16
Bureau. It is also clear that after reviewing the materials,
the Secretary decided to maintain the status quo and not
create new classifications for the work. While there may
be disagreement on what the Secretary should have
decided, there is no doubt that she considered the
submitted information on several occasions and each
time chose to continue recognizing that the proper
classification for this work is the “Electric Lineman,”
based on her understanding of the custom and usage of
the industry in the localities of the [p]rojects.
Accordingly, the Secretary’s decision was based on a
rational reason and was not arbitrary or capricious.
Bd. Op. at 27 (emphasis added). Likewise, this Court cannot hold that the Secretary
“abused [her] discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” PSP NE,
LLC, 292 A.3d at 1178 n.2. Accordingly, the Board properly determined that the
Secretary did not abuse her discretion.
Verizon next maintains that the Board refused a request from Verizon
to supplement the record to include or take official notice of certain prior Board
decisions. Verizon asserts that, on August 1, 2025, Intervenors Broadband and
Brightspeed joined it in requesting that the Grievance record include, or the Board
take official notice of, the January 17, 2002 Board decision in PWAB-2A-2001
(Local 98), which was relevant to the Grievance. Verizon argues that it and aligned
Intervenors also requested that the Board include in the record below, or take official
notice of, the Final Decision and Order of the Secretary docketed at 00-003, which
was also relevant to the Grievance. Verizon contends that in both cases, the
Secretary designated the requested classifications. Verizon insists that the
Secretary’s and the Board’s failure to rely on their earlier decisions or even to
distinguish them in light of the similar facts and issues in this appeal was an abuse
of discretion.
Broadband similarly argues that those previous adjudications and
determinations are relevant to the Board’s decision-making process. Broadband
17
asserts that the facts underlying this appeal show there are at least four CBAs
recognizing a separate class of workmen as teledata workers, including teledata
linemen and teledata splicers, and which apply to the localities subject to the awards
under the BIP. Broadband insists that the facts of the current case are even stronger
than those in the 2002 and 2006 Board decisions referenced above. Broadband
emphasizes that there is no record evidence in the current case that electric linemen
are experienced in or performing broadband infrastructure buildouts as required for
the BIP. Broadband submits that, in the previous determinations, the existence of
teledata CBAs and the class of workers performing the work was determinative of
the outcome supporting prevailing wages for the teledata class of workers.
Broadband proclaims that the record in the current matter shows that there are
applicable CBAs for teledata workers doing the same type of work contemplated by
BIP projects in the locales of the awarded projects.
The Bureau rejoins that Petitioners incorrectly suggest that the Board’s
ruling in Local 98, and the Department’s briefs filed in 2003, require a different
result or otherwise require the Board to follow, distinguish, or overrule its own
precedent; however, Local 98 did not establish any such apposite precedent or
otherwise establish a policy that binds the Secretary and this Court for future
classification cases. The Bureau retorts that in Local 98, as noted by the Board at
the time, the Department had conducted a wage survey in 1996, resulting in a conflict
between a local union of electricians and a local IBEW union, and after one of the
parties failed to respond to Departmental requests for information, the Secretary
utilized her discretion to create a new classification. The Bureau maintains that to
hold that the Secretary is bound to add a classification to heavy and highway work,
that has been recognized in a completely different setting and involving different
types of work and skill, would be to rewrite the Act to require homogenous
classification lists for all work categories.
18
While it is within the Board’s discretion to permit a party to supplement
the record, it does not appear that such a request would be required in order for
Petitioners to argue that the prior Board decisions support their positions.
Notwithstanding, this Court cannot hold that the Secretary and/or the Board abused
their discretion by not addressing those cases. Accordingly, the Board did not err
by not addressing the Secretary’s and the Board’s prior determinations.
Lastly, Verizon argues that in rendering its decision and equipped with
a voluminous record that covered nine hearing days and included dozens of
documentary exhibits, the Board erred by making no findings of material fact that
are central to the dispute. Verizon asserts that the Board only made 52 findings of
fact in its decision, the first 46 of which were largely immaterial background facts
that the Board cut and pasted from the Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts
submitted by the parties before the hearing commenced. Verizon contends that the
Board’s other six factual findings were immaterial to the questions of: (i) whether
the Secretary duly authorized the Bureau to discharge her statutory duty; (ii) whether
the Secretary may act unilaterally, without consulting the Advisory Board, and
contrary to the legislative mandate set forth at Section 7 of the Act; and (iii) whether
the Secretary abused her discretion when setting the electric lineman rate as
prevailing for deployment and splicing of low-voltage fiber optic cable, without any
evidence that such workers have ever performed such work in the relevant localities
into which broadband service is being expanded. Verizon insists that the Board
ignored substantial evidence that supported Verizon’s and aligned Intervenors’
positions, including the prior official rulings of the Board and the Secretary.
Concerning the above-stated issues that Verizon contends that the
Board failed to make material findings of fact thereon, the first two issues are
questions of law involving statutory interpretation and, thus, findings of fact are not
required. Relative to the third issue, Verizon did not specifically present it to the
19
Board and therefore there were no specific findings of fact therefor. However, the
Board issued a 30-page opinion addressing the specific issues Verizon did raise
before it. Based thereon, this Court cannot hold that the Board inferred facts that
are unsupported or contradicted by substantial record evidence. Accordingly, the
Board did not err by failing to make findings of fact.
For all of the above reasons, the Board’s order is affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision in this matter.
20
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Verizon Pennsylvania LLC and :
Verizon North LLC, :
Petitioners :
:
v. :
:
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, : No. 1379 C.D. 2025
Respondent :
:
Broadband Communications :
Association of Pennsylvania, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, : No. 1388 C.D. 2025
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2026, the Prevailing Wage Appeals
Board’s September 22, 2025 order is affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Verizon Pennsylvania LLC and :
Verizon North LLC, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 1379 C.D. 2025
:
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, :
Respondent :
:
Broadband Communications :
Association of Pennsylvania, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 1388 C.D. 2025
:
Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, :
Respondent : Argued: February 4, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: March 6, 2026
I agree with the Majority that the Bureau of Labor Law Compliance
(Bureau) is the Secretary of Labor and Industry’s (Secretary) duly authorized
representative. I part ways with the Majority, however, on the question of whether
the Secretary may unilaterally render a prevailing wage determination without first
consulting the Prevailing Wage Advisory Board (Advisory Board). Because Section
7 of the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (Act)1 unambiguously sets forth a
procedural two-step that requires the Secretary to consult with the Advisory Board
before rendering a prevailing wage determination, I respectfully dissent.
The Majority begins with a cogent explanation of principles of statutory
construction, highlighting the threshold tenet that the object of all statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of our General Assembly.
See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Green Analytics North, LLC v. Dep’t of Health, 343 A.3d
1086, 1093 (Pa. 2025). Generally, the plain language of the statute provides the best
indication of legislative intent and “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); Hommrich v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 344 A.3d
121, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025). If a statute is free and clear from ambiguity, this Court
is precluded from applying the presumptions set forth in Section 1922 of the
Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922. Hommrich, 344 A.3d at 131. Those
tools of construction are reserved to resolve ambiguities in the text. Id. “A statute
is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text under
review.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Despite accurately stating these well-settled
principles, the Majority goes on to misapply them.
The language at issue appears in Section 7 of the Act, and provides, in
relevant part:
The secretary shall, after consultation with the advisory
board, determine the general prevailing minimum wage
rate in the locality in which the public work is to be
1
Act of August 15, 1961, P.L. 987, as amended, 43 P.S. § 165-7.
MSW-2
performed for each craft or classification of all workmen
needed to perform public work contracts during the
anticipated term thereof[.]
43 P.S. § 165-7. In my view, this language unambiguously sets forth the following
two-step process for issuance of a prevailing wage rate determination: (1) Secretary
consults with the Advisory Board; (2) Secretary issues determination.
Without analyzing the specific words of Section 7, the Majority points
to Section 2.1(e) of the Act (Advisory Board, powers and duties) and ultimately
concludes that Section 7’s “after consultation with the advisory board” language is
optional. Verizon Pennsylvania LLC v. Prevailing Wage Appeals Board (Pa.
Cmwlth., Nos. 1379, 1388 C.D. 2025, filed March 6, 2026) (Majority), slip op. at
10. Section 2.1(e) states:
(e) The Advisory Board shall have the power and duty
to--
(1) Consult with the secretary at his request concerning
any matter arising under the administration of this act.
(2) Advise and assist the secretary in carrying out the
duties provided for him by section 7 of this act.
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the duties placed upon the board by this act.
43 P.S. § 165-2.1(e).2 Based on these two provisions, the Majority summarily holds
that “the plain language makes clear that it is within the Secretary’s discretion
whether to consult with the Advisory Board” and “agrees with the Bureau that
Section 7 of the Act merely sets out an order of operations for the Secretary, if, and
2
Section 2.1 was added by the Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 653.
MSW-3
when, she chooses to seek out the Advisory Board’s advice and assistance.”
Majority, slip op. at 10 (emphasis in original).
“[I]n determining whether language is clear and unambiguous, we must
assess it in the context of the overall statutory scheme, construing all sections with
reference to each other, not simply examining language in isolation.” Whitmoyer v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mountain Country Meats), 186 A.3d 947, 954 (Pa.
2018). While the Majority finds that Section 2.1(e) renders the Secretary’s Section
7 obligation to consult the Advisory Board optional, a plain reading of Section 2.1(e)
supports the exact opposite conclusion. While Section 2.1(e)(1) requires the
Advisory Board to consult with the Secretary regarding any matter arising under the
Act at the Secretary’s request, Section 2.1(e)(2) specifically directs the Advisory
Board to advise and assist the Secretary in carrying out his duties under Section 7
and contains no “at his request” caveat. This makes good sense, and lines up
seamlessly with the legislative directive contained in Section 7 – that the Secretary
heed the advice and assistance of the Advisory Board before rendering a prevailing
wage determination. If the legislature intended the Advisory Board to assist the
Secretary only upon request, the language of Section 2.1(e)(1) would sufficiently
effectuate that goal, rendering Section 2.1(e)(2) superfluous. See 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(a)
(“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”).
The conclusion that consultation with the Advisory Board is only
required if and when the Secretary so chooses cannot be squared with a plain
language reading of Section 7 or Section 2.1(e). To reach this result, the Majority
essentially writes out the words “after consultation with the advisory board” in
Section 7 and either adds “at his request” to Section 2.1(e)(2), or writes subsection
(e)(2) out completely. We can neither add nor subtract statutory language. See
MSW-4
Hommrich, 344 A.3d at 131 (“we should not insert words into [a statute] that are
plainly not there”); see also Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 334 A.3d 288, 311 (Pa.
2025) (“[a]s a matter of statutory interpretation, although one is admonished to listen
attentively to what a statute says [;][o]ne must also listen attentively to what it does
not say”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Because I find the language in Section 7 free and clear of all ambiguity,
I would hold that the Board erred in concluding that the Secretary’s duty to consult
with the Advisory Board before issuing a prevailing wage determination is optional.
Accordingly, I would vacate the Board’s order and remand for further proceedings
that adhere to the process set forth by our General Assembly.
_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
Judges McCullough and Wallace join.
MSW-5