Lazarus

CLERKS OFFICE US DISTRICT

AT ROANOKE, VA

FILED

March 04, 202

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT sauman □□□□ ec

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ay: /s/ M. Poff

ROANOKE DIVISION DEPUTY CLERK

BISHOP LELAND LAZARUS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:25CV00312

)

V. ) OPINION AND ORDER

)

WARDEN D.W. ZOOK, et al., ) JUDGE JAMES P. JONES

)

Defendants. )

Bishop Leland Lazarus, Pro Se Plaintiff; Cristina E. Agee, Assistant Attorney

General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE & PUBLIC SAFETY

DIVISION, Richmond, Virginia, for Defendants Zook, Wingfield, Martin, Kinley,

Cabell, and Tucker.

The plaintiff, a Virginia inmate, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that

the defendants violated his rights by refusing to provide a Sunday Pentecostal

worship service. Lazarus seeks injunctive and monetary relief. Before me are the

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Lazarus’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction. Upon careful review, the motions will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND.

Lazarus’s pro se pleading alleges that, on September 17, 2024, defendant

Layne denied his request for a Pentecostal worship service to be held on Sundays.

The next day, Lazarus filed a written complaint arguing that the denial of Sunday

services violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA, especially

as other religious groups were permitted to worship on their respective observation

days. In response, defendant Wingfield stated that “[t]he Pentecostal services would

begin on 10-8-24, from 1:30–3:00 p.m.” Compl. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 1-3. Because

October 8, 2024, was a Tuesday, Lazarus deduced that Pentecostal services would

not be held on Sundays. Lazarus followed up with a regular grievance on the issue.

Defendant Kinley initially denied the grievance because Lazarus had not identified

how he was personally affected.

On appeal, the Regional Ombudsman overturned the intake decision and

advised Lazarus that the original documentation was forwarded to the grievance staff

for logging or investigation. On review, however, the grievance was determined to

be unfounded. The Level I response by defendant Zook provided as follows:

Further investigation reveals after speaking with Chaplain S. Layne and

F. Martin, Institutional Programs Manager, you have requested this day

as a personal preference. Policy indicates that the Chaplain or designee

will provide the time and space for religious activity and program

scheduling is determined with staffing in mind. You may however

participate in informal religious discussions in areas such as the

dayroom and recreation yard if they do not interfere with security

operations.

Your grievance is governed by Operating Procedure 841.3, Inmate and

CCAP Probationer/Parolee Religious Programs. Operating Procedure

841.3 states, “The Chaplain or designee will determine the frequency

i.e., weekly, bi-weekly, monthly of each religious activity based on the

total number of religious activities at the facility, available space and

time, security needs, and staff supervision. Once the Chaplain or

designated staff receive the minimum number of two Facility Requests

for the same religious activity, the Chaplain or designee will provide

time and space for the religious activity, at the same frequency as all

other religious activities, to meet.”

Compl. Ex. E, Dkt. No. 1-3 (emphasis omitted) Lazarus then appealed the response,

emphasizing his need to worship on Sundays and citing related Bible verses. At

Level II, defendant Tucker, on behalf of defendant Cabell, upheld the Level I

decision and indicated that Lazarus had exhausted his administrative remedies.

Based on the foregoing, Lazarus claims that the defendants have violated his rights

to religious freedom under RLUIPA and the Constitution.

Lazarus now seeks injunctive and monetary remedies. In conjunction with

the Complaint, he has filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction. Dkt. No. 4. Lazarus argues that he is threatened with

irreparable harm and that the relief sought will serve the public interest. He asks the

court to enter an interlocutory order requiring that he receive weekly Sunday

Pentecostal services and be protected from any retaliation by the defendants.

Following service of process, defendants Zook, Wingfield, Martin, Kinley,

Cabell, and Tucker filed the Motion to Dismiss at issue. Defendant Layne has not

answered the Complaint.1 Lazarus filed a response to the motion, and the matter is

ripe for my review.

1 In response to the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Lazarus “reserves the right to

pursue claims against Layne separately.” Pl.’s Resp. 2, Dkt. No. 22.

II. DISCUSSION.

A. Standard of Review.

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests

only the sufficiency of a complaint.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir.

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

“[t]he district court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true

and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Langford v. Joyner, 62

F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023). A complaint must plead facts sufficient to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim includes factual content that “allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[C]ourts are obligated to

liberally construe[] pro se complaints, however inartfully pleaded.” Booker v. S.C.

Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

B. Constitutional Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Lazarus brings this cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes

liability on any person who, under color of state law, deprives another person “of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To

state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured

by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, Lazarus asserts that the defendants violated

his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 I will address each in turn.

1. Free Exercise Claim.

Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, “Congress shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. As the Fourth Circuit has recently explained,

“[t]o state a free exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege ‘(1) that he holds a sincere

religious belief and (2) that his religious practice has been substantially burdened by

the prison policy or practice.’” Hammock v. Watts, 146 F.4th 349, 365 (4th Cir.

2025) (quoting Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 114 (4th Cir. 2023)). A

substantial burden is defined as:

[O]ne that “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his

behavior and to violate his beliefs” . . . or one that forces a person to

“choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting

[governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the

precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.”

2 Although Lazarus initially claimed that his Fifth Amendment rights were also

violated based on the defendants’ conduct, it appears that he has abandoned that claim in

his Response to the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, I will not address the

adequacy of such claim.

Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of

Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404

(1963)). Once the plaintiff makes this “threshold” showing, the burden shifts to the

defendants to “offer[] penological interests that justify its infringement on free

exercise rights . . . .” Hammock, 146 F.4th at 365 (citations omitted). Then, “[i]f

the prison adequately alleges a penological interest, a plaintiff can still prevail if the

policy is not reasonably related to that interest.” Id. It is not until that point in the

analysis that the factors outlined in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) are

examined.3 Hammock, 146 F.4th at 365.

The defendants do not focus their argument on contesting that Lazarus holds

a sincere religious belief. Instead, the defendants argue that Lazarus has not

sufficiently alleged that his inability to participate in formal religious services on

Sundays substantially burdened the exercise of his religion, pointing out that

3 The Turner test asks:

(1) [W]hether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the

prison regulation or action and the interest asserted by the

government, or whether this interest is “so remote as to render the

policy arbitrary or irrational”; (2) whether “alternative means of

exercising the right . . . remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what

impact the desired accommodation would have on security staff,

inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there

exist any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation or

action.

Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200).

Pentecostal services would begin on October 8, 2024, from 1:30–3:00 p.m. and that

Lazarus could utilize the day room and recreation yard for daily informal religious

practices. However, despite the availability to worship on a Tuesday, or informally

any day, Lazarus claimed that “Sunday commemorated the Day of Pentecost when

the Holy Spirit descented [sic] and birth the Lord’s spiritual church (Acts 2),” and

that “Sunday is a biblical holy day . . . where Pentecostal Christians gather for prayer

and worship (Acts 20:7; 1 Corinthians 16:20).” Compl. 3, Dkt. No. 1. In his

Response to the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Lazarus emphasized that the denial

of Sunday services specifically has “[p]revented communal worship central to

Pentecostal doctrine,” among other things. Resp. 2, Dkt. No. 22.

Lazarus has satisfied the second prong where he has adequately pled that the

inability to gather to worship communally on Sundays substantially burdened his

religious practice. See Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018) (“A

practice or policy places a substantial burden on a person’s religious exercise when

it ‘put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate

his beliefs.’”) (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718

(1981)); see also Cavin v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir.

2019) (determining that a Wiccan inmate demonstrated a substantial burden when

he was denied group worship on a specific day, considering that Wiccans worship

communally).

Because Lazarus has made this threshold showing, it is the defendants’ turn

to show penological interests that justify the infringement on Lazarus’s free exercise

rights. However, the defendants have skipped that step in the analysis and jumped

to the plaintiff’s “burden of disproving the validity of the challenged regulation or

action,” under the Turner test. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10, Dkt. No. 20 (citing

Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015)). The Fourth Circuit has made

clear that “[t]he prison bears the burden of offering the interests that support its

policy . . . which it must present . . . to the district court in the first instance.”

Hammock, 147 F.4th at 365 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In

prematurely placing the burden on the plaintiff to question its validity, the

defendants contend that the policy is, in fact, “rationally connected to the interest of

controlling available space and time, security needs, and staff supervision,” relying

on Exhibit E to the Complaint.4 Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10, Dkt. No. 20.

However, at the motion to dismiss phase, it is improper to consider the contents of

Exhibit E as true, where Lazarus did not incorporate the exhibit for its truthfulness.

See Hammock, 147 F.4th at 366–67 (finding it improper at the motion to dismiss

stage to consider a document that a plaintiff incorporated into his complaint for the

purpose of showing that the defendants denied his request and not for showing the

4 Although the defendants cite Exhibit F after quoting the policy, it appears that

they intended to cite Exhibit E where Exhibit F does not include the policy’s language.

“truthfulness” of the defendants’ justification for the denial). Exhibit E is the Level

I Response to Lazarus’s grievance, which, in part, includes the language of the

prison’s religious program policy. Lazarus included this exhibit to show that his

request for Sunday Pentecostal worship services was denied — not to demonstrate

any truthfulness in the defendants’ reasoning for denying his request.

Even if I could consider Exhibit E to evaluate the contents of the policy, the

defendants have not described how the interests of “controlling available space and

time, security needs, and staff supervision as expressed in the language [of the

policy]” support the burden on Lazarus’s religious expression. Mem. Supp. Mot.

Dismiss 10, Dkt. No. 20. Instead of arguing that “Plaintiff has not alleged what

impact having a Sunday service would have on the security staff, inmates, and the

allocation o[f] prison resources,” id., it was the defendants’ burden to offer

explanations for denying Pentecostal services on Sundays before shifting the burden

to Lazarus. As Lazarus points out in his Response, “other groups received Sunday

services under the same policy,” Pl.’s Resp. 3, Dkt. No. 22, and the defendants have

not stated why Pentecostal worship services must be held on a different day. Indeed,

“it is not the courts’ role to simply invent possible objectives that Defendants have

not even claimed were the basis for their policy.” Hammock, 146 F.4th at 366

(quoting Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 169 (4th Cir. 2017)). Therefore, I cannot

move on to undertake an analysis under Turner to determine if the defendants’

actions were unconstitutional. See id. (determining that it is “premature” to assess

whether the defendants’ actions were unconstitutional under Turner when the

penological interest offered by the defendants was insufficient). Such a

determination may be more appropriate on a motion for summary judgment where

the defendants can present the policy and any justifications for their actions in

accordance therewith.5

2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim.

Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o

State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. As the Fourth Circuit has explained:

To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first

demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom

he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of

intentional or purposeful discrimination. Once this showing is made,

the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can

be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.

Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Considering that review

of prison policies must be “tempered by the recognition that [l]awful incarceration

brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,”

5 In Lazarus’s Response to the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, he requests relief

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and to engage in limited discovery if the court

converts the Motion to one for summary judgment. I have considered the defendants’

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and have not converted it to a

summary judgment motion. Therefore, the parties may hereafter cooperatively engage in

discovery for purposes of trial or the filing of a separate motion for summary judgment.

a “prison regulation [that] impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights . . . is valid if

it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and not an exaggerated

response to a particular concern.” Id. at 654–55 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Here, Lazarus has adequately claimed that he was treated differently from

others who are similarly situated. He has specifically stated that “Seventh-Day

Adventists and the Sunni Muslims . . . are afforded weekly holy day observances,”

while Pentecostals, “who have similar enrollment numbers as those groups,” are not.

Compl. 4, 5, Dkt. No. 1. While the defendants argue that Lazarus has not shown

how these groups are similarly situated, it is clear that a Pentecostal prisoner would

be similarly situated to other religious prisoners. See Burke v. Clarke, 842 F. App’x

828, 838 (4th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (determining that a Rastafarian prisoner “is

similarly situated to all other religious prisoners in [Virginia Department of

Corrections (VDOC)] facilities, as they are all subject to the same VDOC policies

regarding such religious practice.”).

Lazarus further asserts that the unequal treatment was intentional6 by relying

on the VDOC’s observance of Eid al-Fitr marking the end of Ramadan for Sunni

6 I note that Lazarus does not specifically label the conduct at issue as “intentional”

until his Response to the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Pl.’s Resp. 3, Dkt. No. 22.

However, under my obligation to hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards,” I will

liberally construe his filings together. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Muslims and Roman Catholic services for Good Friday and Easter. Courts have

determined that “[i]n most cases, a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of intentional

discrimination, and he therefore will try to rely on evidence that two groups received

different treatment, which can support an inference that the decisionmaker

purposefully engaged in discrimination.” Lee v. Boyd, 799 F.Supp.3d 507, 513

(W.D. Va. 2025) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 531 (5th Cir. 2004).

Based on the circumstantial comparator evidence incorporated into his Complaint,

Lazarus has met his burden at this stage of the proceedings.

The defendants do not take the next step in the analysis and argue that the

disparity in treatment is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In

any event, as I previously stated, the prison’s policy cannot be analyzed for its truth

at this stage in the proceedings, and the defendants have not offered a penological

interest that supports the burden on Lazarus’s religious expression.

C. RLUIPA Claims.

Under RLUIPA,

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even

if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the

government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that

person —

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “Congress has expressly mandated that RLUIPA be

construed ‘in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise.’” Greenhill v. Clarke,

944 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting § 2000cc-3(g)). Although RLUIPA

“incorporates and exceeds the Constitution’s basic protections of religious exercise”

by “prescribing strict scrutiny” as opposed to reasonableness, it is similar to a Free

Exercise claim in that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants’ policies

impose a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 186,

198. The term “substantial burden” has the same meaning in the RLUIPA context

as it does in the First Amendment context. Greenhill, 944 F.3d at 250. Under

RLUIPA, “once the inmate makes the requisite initial showing, the burden shifts to

the government to show that the prison policy is the least restrictive means of

furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Id.

The defendants combine their RLUIPA and Free Exercise arguments in their

present motion. A Free Exercise claim under the First Amendment “affords less

protection to inmates’ free exercise rights than does RLUIPA.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d

at 199–200. Therefore, because I have already determined that Lazarus’s Free

Exercise claim survives, so too must his RLUIPA claim.

According to the defendants, Lazarus has failed to allege that his inability to

participate in formal religious services on Sundays substantially burdened his

exercise of religion. At the pleading stage, Lazarus has made this requisite initial

showing, as explained above. Thus, the burden shifts to the defendants to show that

the prison policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

governmental interest. The defendants have not carried their burden given that their

motion is devoid of any argument that the policy is the least restrictive means of

furthering a compelling government interest. Instead, they have improperly placed

the burden on Lazarus to first disprove the policy’s validity and argue that he has

not “pled any obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation.” Mem. Supp. Mot.

Dismiss 10, Dkt. No. 20. Although the defendants state that the policy is rationally

connected to the interest of controlling available space and time, security needs, and

staff supervision, this argument requires analysis of evidence extrinsic to the

Complaint and thus is more appropriate for the summary judgment or trial stage of

the case. Am. Chripractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th

Cir. 2004) (“[A]s a general rule, extrinsic evidence should not be considered at the

12(b)(6) stage . . . .”).

D. Relief Sought.

The defendants first argue that Lazarus is not entitled to monetary damages

under RLUIPA. However, in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Lazarus

clarifies that, under RLUIPA, he seeks injunctive relief only. See Wall v. Wade, 741

F.3d 492, 496 n.5 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that damages are unavailable under

RLUIPA and a “plaintiff’s only potential remedies under RLUIPA are equitable.”).

Next, they argue that Lazarus is not entitled to monetary damages against the

defendants in their official capacities under § 1983. Lazarus concedes that money

damages are barred regarding his claims against the defendants in their official

capacities. Indeed, it is well established that a plaintiff cannot recover monetary

damages under § 1983 from state officers sued in their official capacities. Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its

officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).

The defendants further argue that Lazarus is not entitled to injunctive relief

against the defendants in their individual capacities. In his Response to the Motion

to Dismiss, Lazarus clarifies that under his §1983 claims, only damages are sought

for claims against the defendants in their individual capacities. See Goodmon v.

Rockefeller, 947 F.2d 1186, 1187 (4th Cir. 1991) (determining that officials may be

sued for money damages “in their individual capacities” under § 1983) (emphasis

omitted).

Therefore, under RLUIPA, Lazarus’s claims for injunctive relief survive, and

under § 1983, Lazarus’s claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their

individual capacities survive.

E. Qualified Immunity.

The defendants insist that Lazarus has failed to state a claim for personal

liability and that they are entitled to immunity given that the allegations against them

revolve around their participation in the inmate grievance process. I disagree. As

the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[d]efendants have the burden of demonstrating

qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, and their entitlement to it must

appear on the face of the complaint.” Hammock, 146 F.4th at 367 (citations omitted).

“The pertinent question is whether ‘the unconstitutionality of the officers’ conduct

was clearly established.’” Id. at 364 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

227 (2009)). However, because more evidence is needed to analyze Lazarus’s

constitutional claims, the defendants cannot show that they are entitled to qualified

immunity at this time. See id. at 368 (“[A]s Defendants have not presented any

penological interest . . . and [the plaintiff’s] right was clearly established, we hold

that Defendants have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity at this

motion to dismiss stage ‘before any of the evidence is in.’”) (quoting Thorpe v.

Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 930 (4th Cir. 2022); Wall, 741 F.3d at 502 (determining that

defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity when it was established that

decisions related to the application of a religious services policy were

unconstitutional); Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 131 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims

for equitable relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

F. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.

Finally, along with the Complaint, Lazarus filed a Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. He argues that he is threatened with

irreparable harm based on the “continuing deprivation” of his constitutional rights.

Mot. Prelim. Inj. 2, Dkt. No. 4. He further argues that the relief sought “will serve

the public interest because it is always in the public interest for prison officials to

obey the law, especially the Constitution.” Id.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must state facts clearly showing “that

he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555

U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of

irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court’s] characterization of

injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22.

Lazarus has not satisfied the four factors set forth by Winter. Rather, he only

asserts that he is threatened with irreparable harm and that relief will serve the public

interest, failing to address the other two factors. In any event, I disagree with

Lazarus’s argument that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of court

intervention at this time, particularly where the status quo is maintained by the

current religious services arrangement, and more evidence is needed to determine

whether the defendants have violated the Constitution. See Di Biase v. SPX Corp.,

872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing a preliminary injunction as an

“extraordinary remedy intended to protect the status quo and prevent irreparable

harm during the pendency of a lawsuit.”). Therefore, Lazarus’s motion will be

denied.7

III. CONCLUSION.

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, Dkt. No. 19, and Lazarus’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. No. 4, are DENIED. The defendants may file a

motion for summary judgment no later than 60 days from the date of entry of this

Opinion and Order, and if not so filed, the case will be set for trial.

ENTER: March 4, 2026

/s/ JAMES P. JONES

Senior United States District Judge

7 Lazarus also requests a temporary restraining order. Temporary restraining orders

are issued rarely, when the movant proves that he will suffer injury if relief is not granted

before the adverse party could be notified and have opportunity to respond. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(b). This order would only last until a hearing on a preliminary injunction could be

arranged. Because Lazarus is not entitled to a preliminary injunction, there is no basis

upon which to grant him a temporary restraining order.