HAWKINS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

)

)

Plaintiff ) SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

“_ ) United States District Judge

. )

y ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

)

Report and Recommendation on

OLIVER, et al ) Rep

cr a ) Plaintiffs Second Amended

Defendants ) Complaint

)

ECF NO. 61

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

L Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Nicole Hawkins’ claims against

the following Defendants be dismissed from this action, without prejudice, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e): Overmyer, Graves, Heckler, Boylan, Ace, Wetzel, Oliver,

Wagner, John Doe (physician), Correctional Industries, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the United States Postal Service, the DOG, the Medical Ethics License

Board, the Psychiatry Ethics Board, and the Licensed Cosmetology Board.

It is further recommended that Hawkins’ claims against the following be

severed and dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant. to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure: Senz, Wiltanger, Webster, Shahada, Anderson, Obeng, Mahalski,

and Rockwood.

Finally, it is recommended that Hawkins be permitted to proceed in this action

with the deliberate indifference and retaliation claims against Brown, Sommosky,

and Edwards set forth at pages 29-32, 65-66, and 72 of her Second Amended

Complaint [ECF No. 61], assuming she complies with the Court’s instruction to file

an amended complaint providing more factual detail as to those claims.

Il. Report

A. Procedural background

Plaintiff Nichole Hawkins, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. That motion was granted on July 29, 2024. ECF No.

37. Hawkins filed an Amended Complaint on August 14, 2014, ECF No. 52, and a

Second Amended Complaint — the currently operative pleading — on September 27,

2024. ECF No. 61.

B. Standards

Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to

the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).1 Among other things, that statute

requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the

action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

! Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded.” must be held to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover,

under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations

in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).

granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed. Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d

Cir. 2018). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably

meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based

upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual

scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327

(1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D’Agostino v.

CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed. Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough,

184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) permits the permissive

joinder of parties in an action where the claims arise from the “same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact

common to all defendants will arise in the action.” However, the policy underlying

Rule 20 — the promotion of trial convenience and efficiency — “is not a license to join

unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit.” Brodie v. Thompson, 2024 WL

759016, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2024) (quoting Williams v. Clark, 2018 WL 5983380,

at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2018) (additional quotation and quoting source omitted)).

Rather, “it is well-settled that a litigant may not ‘raise unrelated claims in an effort

to avoid the statutory filing fee required to initiate a new lawsuit.” Jd. (quoting

Sledge v. Erie County Prison, 2021 WL 2073798, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2021)).

Indeed, Rule 20 “takes on additional importance” in cases brought by pro se inmates

because “a prisoner-plaintiff who is permitted to combine separate, independent

claims into one complaint is able to circumvent the PLRA’s filing fee requirements

and [its] potential ‘three strikes’ limitation.” Jd. (quoting sources omitted).

C. Factual Background

Hawkins is a prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (DOC). At all relevant times, she was incarcerated at SCI-Cambridge

Springs. ECF No. 61 at p. 6.. Rather than present her claims in single, coherent

narrative, Hawkins has structured her pleading in the form of twenty-nine separate

micro-pleadings, each addressing a single Defendant. Many contain minimal factual

allegations, and several are completely incoherent. She provides few dates and times

and often cross-references claims between multiple defendants in a circular manner

that makes it difficult to ascertain the underlying conduct. Critically, there does not

appear to be a common thread or core issue woven throughout her allegations.

Nevertheless, the Court will attempt to parse through her allegations and determine

whether any actionable misconduct is alleged.

At some unidentified time, Defendant Brown, a psychologist, engaged in

“unethical practices” and “violated her professional oath” while treating Hawkins. Id.

at pp. 29-30. According to Hawkins, she “requested professional assistance and

therapeutic counseling” from Brown in connection with a prior sexual assault but

Brown “withheld treatment, refusing to see the Plaintiff.” Id. at p. 30. She also

egordinated with Hawkins’ unit manager, Senz, to “chang[e] the Plaintiff's mental

health record to make the Plaintiff appear violent against authority and peers anda

danger to society, by changing [her] diagnosis to make [her] ‘unfit’ to renter society.”

Id. at p. 82.

In April 2024, Hawkins was placed in a therapy program for victims of sexual

abuse under the leadership of another psychologist, Sommosky. Id. at p. 65. Because

Hawkins initially found the program enormously beneficial, she began to view the

program as a “safe space” where she could confidentially share traumatic issues. Id.

at pp. 65-66. At some point during the third month of the program, however, she

shared one of her “deep rooted triggers” and began to experience flashbacks and

trauma related to her sexual assault in prison and childhood abuse. Id. at p. 66.

Rather than treat that information with sensitivity, the program performed “a skit”

at a community gathering that triggered her trauma and caused her to suffer a

psychotic break. Id. It is unclear whether Sommosky was directly involved in the

skit or merely oversaw the program.? After Hawkins filed a grievance, Sommosky’s

boyfriend, Edwards, retaliated against Hawkins by cancelling her medical

appointment with an oncologist. Id. at p. 72.

Another medical provider, Anderson, “intentionally imposed ... unethical

practices . .. upon the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff was lied to in a face to face conversation

with Mr. Anderson regarding the Plaintiff (needing surgery).” Jd. at p. 83. No other

details are provided. .

A prison mailroom employee, Wiltanger, is accused of “collectively viewing

2 It is also unclear whether the skit directly referenced Hawkins’ trauma.

photos of [Hawkins’] family” and “having conversations [with other DOC employees]

about [Hawkins]... children and... family.” Id. at p. 49. Hawkins also accuses

Wiltanger of refusing to let her have those same photos. Id. at p. 50. She maintains

that this amounts to mental torture. Id. No date is provided.

In December 2021, corrections officers Webster and Shahada confiscated

Hawkins’ religious hijab, $700 worth of her personal property, and broke the screen

on her tablet during a cell search. Id. at pp. 52, 56-57. They refused to return the

confiscated property despite being ordered to do so. Id. at p. 53. When Hawkins

complained about the missing property, Shahada told her to shut up. Id. at p. 56.

Mahalski, the prison’s former cosmetology teacher, allegedly refused to provide

hair services to Hawkins for several years. Id. at p. 104. She also is accused of

damaging Hawkins’ hair by “using relaxer and hair dye that was (outdated by 7

years).” Id. at p. 104. A Physician’s Assistant, Rockwood, purported to treat the

chemical burn caused by Mahalski’s use of outdated hair products but instead

“injected a foreign dose of poison into [her] scalp.” Id. at p. 107.8

An entity identified as “Correctional Industries” is accused of racial and ethnic

discrimination based on a “refusal to provide products to allow all ethnic races the

opportunity to have products that are not harmful to cause damage to their skin or

hair (texture).” Id. at p. 87. From the context of Hawkins’ allegations, it appears that

Correctional Industries supplies items for sale in the prison’s commissary. Id. at p.

88. .

review of Hawkins’ grievances indicates that she was receiving Kenalong injunctions due to hair loss. ECF No.

-1atp. 16. .

6 .

Former Superintendent Oliver is accused of “direct supervisory liability” based

on an incident that occurred in 2018 after Hawkins took a polygraph test. Id. at p.

17. Oliver apparently ordered a prison counselor, identified as Hull, to remove

Hawkins from her caseload “as a punishment and retaliation regarding the contents

of the polygraph test.” Id. at p. 18.

In 2010 and 2020, Hawkins informed Senz that she had a “no air-conditioning

order” in her file because cold air and bad weather caused her pain. Id. at p. 38.

Hawkins accuses Senz of engaging in “intentional infliction of emotional distress” and

“direct supervisory liability” by ignoring the no air-conditioning order in Hawkins’

file. Id. at p. 87; ECF No. 61-1 at pp. 1, 12. Dr. Obeng later removed the no air-

conditioning order after deeming it medically unnecessary. ECF No. 61-1 at p. 17.4

Several additional claims involve individuals who do not appear to be state

actors. At an unknown time, Hawkins was taken to an outside hospital for a

colonoscopy. Id. at p. 40. The physician who performed her procedure engaged in

“medical malpractice” in an undescribed manner. Jd. Based on this malpractice,

Hawkins “began experiencing numerous physical problems” after being returned

from the hospital “which couldn’t be explained by the medical staff [at SCI-Cambridge

Springs].” Jd.

A physician at UPMC Hospital, identified as Dr. Wagner, engaged in

unspecified “medical malpractice, HIPPA law violations, constitutional violations,

4 Obeng is also accused of committing unspecified “violations against the Plaintiff.” ECF No. 61 at p. 81. No

specifics are provided other than that Obeng engaged in “unethical practices” and “personally violated [the] HIPPA

law confidentiality clause., and caused the Plaintiff a very large amount of psychological and emotional distress.”

Id. at p. 80.

ethical oath violations, [and] Eighth Amendment violations” in connection with an

unidentified surgery. Id. at p. 85. No other facts are provided.

Hawkins’ remaining claims are all premised entirely on supervisory liability.

Former Superintendent Overmyer is accused of failing “to reprimand all of the

defendants for their violations against the Plaintiff in her (authoritive position) thus

making [her] directly liable and personally involved.” ECF No. 61 at p. 25.

Superintendent Graves neglected to investigate or review video footage of a

“psychological disturbance” that occurred while Hawkins was receiving care in the

prison’s sexual abuse program. Id. at p. 60. Principle Heckler refused to issue a

reprimand despite being informed that Mahalski was using out-of-date hair products

and denying Hawkins cosmetology services. Id. at p. 54. Grievance Coordinator

Boylan engaged in “illegal practices in handling grievance response[s]” and failed to

adequately investigate grievances. Id. at p. 58. Security Captain Ace denied

Hawkins’ grievances against Webster, Shahada, Senz, and Mahalski, refused to allow

her to “write a statement” concerning misconduct by Senz, and “refus[ed] to

reprimand the actions of Ms. Senz, Ms. Shahada, [and] Ms. Webster” despite being

in a “supervisory position” where he could have “provided the Plaintiff with relief in

all of the incidents.” Id. at pp. 78-79. Finally, Secretary Wetzel failed to directly

intervene or investigate Hawkins’ claims despite being “the boss of each employee

and Director over all the Prisons in Pennsylvania.” Jd. at p. 35.

In addition to the individual supervisory Defendants, Hawkins has also sued

several agencies, organizations, and regulatory bodies based on their perceived

□

supervisory and regulatory authority. She identifies the DOC as being responsible

for unspecified “constitutional violations and clinical violations ethically suffered by

the Plaintiff while in [DOC] custody . . . thus making the [DOC] civilly lable.” Id. at

p. 15. The FBI and deceased former director J. Edgar Hoover are accused of “refusing

to do a full on investigation into (all) of the Lycoming County Court Judges who

refused to (properly investigate) all of the evidence and facts” surrounding Hawkins’

accusation of sexual assault by a state employee at an unidentified time. Jd. at pp.

45-47. Hawkins maintains that the “Medical Ethics License Board,” “Psychiatry

Ethics Board,” and “Licensed Cosmetology Board” are each vicariously responsible

for any injuries caused by the licensed physicians, psychologists, and cosmetologists

who provided services to Hawkins. Id. at pp. 91-99, 101-102, 105-106. Finally,

Hawkins contends, apropos of nothing; that the United States Postal Service is “fully

responsible for the constitutional violations and the governmental oath of anyone

working [as] a representative of the U.S. Postal Service on behalf of (mail delivery).”

Id. at p. 100.

D. Analysis

1. Screening pursuant to § 1915(e)

Hawkins asserts dozens of causes of action throughout her pleading, many of

which do not exist as independent grounds for relief.5 Construing her allegations

liberally, Hawkins appears to be asserting First and Eighth Amendment claims

5 For example, she asserts claims against the DOC for “supervisory acquiense, direct supervisory liability,

intentional infliction, discrimination, bias, prejudice, ethnic discrimination, retaliation, negligence, physical and

psychological abuse and intentional mental anguish, [and] Eighth Amendment/Cruel and Unusual Punishment.”

ECF No. 61 at p. 15. .

9 .

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and medical malpractice. She seeks $465,000,000,000 in damages

against each Defendant.

As discussed below, many of her claims are non-starters. Additionally, many

of the individuals and entities she has identified as Defendants cannot be sued under

§ 1983 or are entitled to immunity. It is recommended that the following be removed

from this action based on the Court’s authority to screen in forma pauperis pleadings.

a. Personal involvement

Hawkins attempts to hold a host of individuals and entities liable under § 1983

for the alleged misconduct of others based on their supervisory roles in the DOC

prison system or other state agencies. None of these allegations is sufficient to state

a claim.

It is axiomatic that a § 1983 plaintiff “must show that each and every

defendant was ‘personal ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan,

2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an

“affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a §

1983 suit ... [aJbsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358

Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a

defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal

is appropriate. ‘See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013)

10

(dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set

forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative

part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).

These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising

prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)

(noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (8d Cir.

2005) (“{Ljiability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a

supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and

discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights: by his or her

subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (8d Cir. 1986); Brown v.

Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is “well established that

the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for

a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin

v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski,

508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104 (8d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer’s review of, or failure to

investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal

involvement.”). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with

deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,

practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated

11

in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional

conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d

Cir. 2004).

In the instant case, Hawkins’ only factual averments concerning Overmyer,

Graves, Heckler, Boylan, Ace, Wetzel, and Oliver (collectively, the “Supervisory

Defendants”) relate to their failure to take corrective action when allegedly informed

of misconduct by other actors. The specific allegations against the Supervisory

Defendants include failing to uphold grievances, refusing to investigate accusations

of misconduct, and declining to issue reprimands to wrongdoers. It is apparent from

these allegations that Hawkins is attempting to hold these individuals responsible

for the unconstitutional actions of other individuals based entirely upon their

supervisory role in the prison system and their response to her grievances or other

informal complaints. As described above, this type of averment is insufficient to

establish personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g.,

Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104 (8d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer’s review

of, or failure to investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the

requisite personal involvement.”); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL 4609144, at *4 (W.D.

Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made aware of several

issues of the plaintiffs and . . . failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim for

reliefs) participation in an administrative appeal process); Rogers v. United States,

696 F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official's only involvement is

12

investigating and/or ruling on an inmate’s grievance after the incident giving rise to

the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of

that official.”), The Supervisory Defendants should be dismissed from this action,

with prejudice.®

b. Section 1983's “Person” Requirement

A second deficiency in Hawkins’ pleading stems from § 1983’s requirement that

a viable defendant must be a “person” within the meaning of the statute. To prevail

on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d

1199, 1204 (8d Cir. 1996) (quoting source omitted). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is

well-settled, however, that neither a state nor its agencies are considered a “person”

as that term is defined under the statute. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27, (1991).

The DOC and the parties identified as the “Medical Ethics License Board,”

“Psychiatry Ethics Board,” and “Licensed Cosmetology Board”? are each

Commonwealth agencies and, as such, cannot be sued under § 1983.8 See, e.g., Ceasar

° To the extent that Hawkins asserts an intentional infliction of emotional distress (ITED) claim against the

Supervisory Defendants, she has failed to allege conduct that was “so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency [and] to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” as □

would be required to state a claim. Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226, 256-57 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2009).

In addition to being largely conclusory, her allegations that Defendants failed to investigate and resolve her

grievances to her satisfaction fall well short of the requisite standard for an ITED claim under Pennsylvania law.

7 Hawkins appears to be referring to the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine, State Board of Psychology, and

State Board of Cosmetology.

As an independent basis for dismissal, each of these Defendants is also immune from suit for monetary damages

under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Lavia v. Penn. Dept. of Corr., 224 F.3d 190,

195 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the DOC “shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity”), Glunk

v. Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine, 687 Fed. Appx. 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2017) (State Board of Medicine is

“immune from a suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment”).

13

v. Penn. Dept. of Corr., 2020 WL 2092420, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2020) (DOC is not

a “person” amenable to suit under § 1988); Lloyd v. Pennsylvania, 2025 WL 2447795

(E.D. Aug. 25, 2025) (state licensing boards are not “persons” under § 1983).

Consequently, the DOC, the Medical Ethics License Board, the Psychiatry Ethics

_ Board, and the Licensed Cosmetology Board should be dismissed from this action,

with prejudice.

c. State actor requirement

Another requirement of a viable § 1983 claim is that the alleged constitutional

violation must be attributable to a state actor. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (8d

Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Generally, anyone whose conduct is “fairly attributed

to the state” can be sued as a state actor under § 1983. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S.

377, 383 (2012) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). For

liability to attach, the state actor must have “exercised power possessed by virtue of

state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority

of state law.” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dept., 635 F.3d 606, 609 (8d Cir. 2011)

(quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (8d Cir. 1998)). Conversely, “private

actors do not act under color of state law [and] thus are not liable under Section 1983.”

Gerhart v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 2018 WL 6589586, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14,

2018) (quoting Luck v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, 901 F.Supp.2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2012)).

It is evident from the complaint and the allegations therein that Dr. Wagner,

a physician at UPMC hospital, and the unidentified John Doe doctor who performed

Hawkins’ colonoscopy at an outside hospital are private medical professionals rather

14 .

than state actors. As such, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against these private actors must

be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Massey v. Crady,

2018 WL 4328002, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018) (“Private citizens, such as

[defendants] are not state actors, and therefore ... any § 1983 claims against [them]

should be dismissed.”); Little v. Hammond, 2016 WL 7324593, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec.

16, 2016) (same). -

The same is true of Correctional Industries, a private corporation that supplies

products for sale in the prison commissary. Courts have widely recognized that

“vendors ... who sell products to prisoners, are not acting under color of state law.”

Berry v. Sellers, 2023 WL 2647089, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2023) (collecting cases).

See also Butler v. Wetzel, 2024 WL 268554, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2024) (dismissing

§ 1983 claim against prison vendor because “a private corporation” does not satisfy

the state actor requirement). Correctional Industries should be dismissed, with

prejudice.

d. Federal defendants

Hawkins has also sued the FBI and the United States Postal Service (USPS),

although she has failed to provide a coherent factual narrative to support either

claim. Because the FBI and USPS are federal agencies rather than state actors, the

Court construes these allegations as an attempt to assert a claim pursuant to Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 399 (1971).9

Although Congress established a damages remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials for violations of

the federal constitution, it did not create an analogous statute for damages against federal officials. In Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, however, the Supreme Court “recognized for the first time

an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional

rights.”. Corr, Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).

15

It is well-settled, however, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes Bivens

claims against federal agencies such as the FBI and the USPS. FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, □□□ (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal

Government and its agencies from suit.”); Keo v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,

2025 WL 4069770, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2025) (sovereign immunity precludes

Bivens action against the FBI); Goldstein v. United States Postmaster General, 2022

WL 2467565, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2022) (USPS “enjoys sovereign immunity absent

a specific waiver”). Accordingly, the FBI and USPS should be dismissed from this

action, with prejudice.

e. Summary

For the reasons described above, the following Defendants should be dismissed

from this action, with prejudice, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2): Overmyer, Graves, Heckler,

Boylan, Ace, Wetzel, Oliver, Wagner, John Doe (physician), Correctional Industries,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Postal Service, the DOC, the

Medical Ethics License Board, the Psychiatry Ethics Board, and the Licensed

Cosmetology Board.

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)

Having pared this action down considerably, the Court must next consider

whether any of Hawkins’ remaining factual allegations give rise to a plausible

entitlement to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Before doing so, however, the Court

notes that Hawkins is attempting to join “disparate and unrelated claims against

16

numerous different defendants” in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

20(a)(2). Those claims include the following:

- Brown withheld therapeutic counseling and refused to provide psychiatric

treatment after Hawkins was sexually assaulted at another institution.

[ECF No. 61 at pp. 29-32]

- Hawkins was traumatized by an offensive skit performed after she shared

sensitive information concerning her personal trauma during a therapy

program overseen by Sommosky. [Id. at pp. 65-66]. Sommosky’s

boyfriend, Edwards, then cancelled Hawkins’ medical appointment with

an oncologist after she complained about Sommosky. [Id. at p. 72].

- Senz placed Hawkins in an air-conditioned cell despite a “no air-

conditioning” order in Hawkins’ medical file. [Id. at pp. 37-38]

- Wiltanger viewed photos of Hawkins’ family that arrived in the mail,

shared them with other prison employees, and refused to let Hawkins

have them. [Id. {{ 121-24]

- Webster and Shahada confiscated several items of Hawkins’ personal

property and refused to return them. [/d. at pp. 52-57]

- Medical providers Anderson and Obeng provided inadequate medical

treatment in some manner. These claims are sparsely articulated and

mostly incomprehensible. [Id. at pp. 80-84.]

- Mahalski refused to provide cosmetology and hair services to Hawkins

and damaged her hair by using outdated hair products. (Td. at p. 104]

- PA Rockwood mistreated a chemical burn on Hawkins’ scalp by injecting

her with poison. [Id. at p. 107]

Most of these claims are conclusory, poorly articulated, and short on factual detail.

More critically, there is no discernable nexus between most of these discrete and

unrelated claims. As courts have often noted, a plaintiff cannot circumvent the Prison

Litigation Reform Act by filing one lawsuit alleging every perceived wrong by dozens

of DOC officials over a lengthy timeframe. McKee v. Department of Corrections, 2024

17

WL 711615, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2024); Brodie v. Tompson, 2024 WL 759016, at

*3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2024). Because Hawkins’ claims do not arise out of the “same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” or share a

“question of law or fact common to all defendants,” they cannot be permissively joined

together in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B); McKee, 2024 WL 711615 at *3.

See also Washington v. Gilmore, 2018 WL 3913453, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2018)

(“Contrary to Rule 20, Plaintiff's Complaint includes an array of unrelated claims

against various Commonwealth Defendants for events that allegedly occurred over

the course of seven months in 2017.”). The appropriate remedy, under such

circumstances, is to “add or drop a party or sever any claims.” Brodie, 2024 WL

759016, at *3. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at

any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim

against a party”); Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 663 Fed. Appx. 156, 159

(3d Cir. 2016) (affirming severance of unrelated claims against discrete defendants).

That course is recommended here.

As far as the Court can tell, the heart of Hawkins’ pleading — or, at least, the

set of allegations most likely to give rise to a plausible claim for relief — concerns the

psychiatric and therapeutic care that Hawkins received from Brown and Sommosky

after she was sexually assaulted and the retaliation she experienced from Edwards

after complaining about the same. Those claims, outlined at pages 29-32, 65-66, and

72, should be permitted to proceed at the current case number. However, given the

paucity of specific factual detail supporting her allegations, Hawkins should be

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directed to file an amended complaint articulating these claims in greater detail. This

means that Hawkins should be directed to identify the rights under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States that have been violated, name and identify the

individual officials responsible for those alleged violations, and provide specific

factual details as to how each individual was involved in the deprivation of his

civil rights. She should be as specific as possible about the particulars of the event

and include references to relevant dates, times, and locations. Hawkins should

also explain how she has been injured and what she is seeking by way of relief.

As to her remaining claims against Senz, Wiltanger, Webster, Shahada,

Anderson, Obeng, Mahalski, and Rockwood, each should be dismissed, without

prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). If Hawkins wishes to pursue those

unrelated claims in federal court, she must file separate § 1983 actions and pay the

filing fee for each case.

III. Conclusion

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court recommends the following:

1, Hawkins’ claims against Overmyer, Graves, Heckler, Boylan, Ace, Wetzel, □

Oliver, Wagner, John Doe (physician), Correctional Industries, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Postal Service, the

DOC, the Medical Ethics License Board, the Psychiatry Ethics Board, and

the Licensed Cosmetology Board should be dismissed, with prejudice,

pursuant to the Court’s screening authority under § 1915(e)(2).

2. Hawkins’ claims against Senz, Wiltanger, Webster, Shahada, Anderson,

Obeng, Mahalski, and Rockwood should be dismissed, without prejudice,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). If Hawkins wishes to pursue those

unrelated claims in federal court, she should be directed to file separate §

1983 actions and pay the filing fee for each case.

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3. Hawkins’ deliberate indifference claim against Brown and Sommosky and

her retaliation claim against Edwards, outlined at ECF No. 61 pages 29-

32, 65-66, and 72, should be permitted to proceed at the current case

number. However, Hawkins should be directed to file an amended

pleading as to those claims within a reasonable time after the adoption of

this Report.

IV. Notice

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may

seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and

Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and

Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days

from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See

Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d

187 (8d Cir. 2007).

DATED this 28) day of January, 2026.

RICHARD A. LANZFLLO

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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