The opinion
NANCY ALONSO * NO. 2025-CA-0626
VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
NEW ORLEANS AVIATION *
BOARD FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2025-00583, DIVISION “L-6”
Honorable Kern A. Reese
******
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha
Ervin-Knott)
Eulis Simien, Jr.
SIMIEN & SIMIEN, L.L.C.
7908 Wrenwood Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Lawrence G. Pugh, III
Alexander J. Brewster
PUGH ACCARDO, LLC
1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3600
New Orleans, LA 70163
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
MOTION TO REMAND GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED
March 5, 2026
NEK
RML
DNA
Appellant, Nancy Alonso, appeals the district court’s July 23, 2025
judgment granting the Appellee’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal and dismissing
her suit against Appellee without prejudice. During the pendency of this appeal,
the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand, requesting the matter be remanded and
reconsidered by the district court. For the following reasons, we grant the Joint
Motion to Remand, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand the case back
to the district court for reconsideration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from the district court’s granting of the Appellee’s Motion
for Involuntary Dismissal based on Appellant’s failure to pay the required service
fee and effectuate service within ninety days of filing her petition.
Appellant, Nancy Alonso (“Ms. Alonso”), filed her petition for damages
against Appellee, the City of New Orleans by and through the New Orleans
Aviation Board (the “City”), on January 23, 2025. At the conclusion of her
petition, she requested service on the City. However, because Ms. Alonso failed to
remit payment to the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff’s Office”) to
effectuate service, the Sheriff’s Office did not attempt service.
1
On May 13, 2025, over three months after the petition had been filed, Ms.
Alonso’s counsel contacted the Orleans Clerk of Court’s Office to inquire about
service and then learned that the Sheriff’s Office never attempted service due to the
nonpayment of the service fee. As soon as Ms. Alonso’s counsel discovered this,
her counsel requested that citation and service be reissued, and he remitted
payment of the required fee. The City was finally served on May 28, 2025, 125
days after the petition was filed.
The next day, the City filed a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal on the basis
that Ms. Alonso failed to properly request service within ninety days of the filing
of the petition, as required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C), because she did not pay
the required service fee when she made the request. Following a hearing on July
11, 2025, the district court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Ms. Alonso’s
suit without prejudice. The district court issued its written judgment on July 23,
2025, and this timely devolutive appeal followed.
While this appeal was pending, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand,
wherein the parties agreed that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence controls the
outcome of this appeal. The motion to remand was deferred to the appellate panel,
and we now rule as follows.
DISCUSSION
Both parties in their joint motion and appellate briefs direct this Court’s
attention to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in DaRouse v. P.J.’s Coffee of
New Orleans, LLC, 2025-00078 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So. 3d 885. DaRouse is
similar to the present case in that the plaintiff had requested service but failed to
timely remit payment of the Sheriff’s Office fees. However, unlike the present
case, the district court denied the defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal,
2
finding that the payment of fees is not required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). In
reviewing the language of La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) on appeal, the Louisiana
Supreme Court determined, “A plain reading of the statutory provisions reveals
that all that is required for compliance is that service be requested. . . . The
pertinent statutory provisions do not provide that payment of any related filing fees
and costs must be made within a stipulated time period.” DaRouse, 2025-00078, p.
4, 421 So. 3d at 887-88 (quoting Jenkins v. Larpenter, 2004-0318, pp. 1-2 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So. 2d 656, 659 (Guidry, J., dissenting)). Ultimately, the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s judgment and ruled that the
payment of fees is not required by La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). See id. at pp. 6-7, 421
So. 3d at 889-90.
At the time the district court ruled on the City’s Motion for Involuntary
Dismissal, the Louisiana Supreme Court had not yet issued its opinion in DaRouse.
In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling and the parties’ Joint Motion to
Remand, we vacate the district court’s July 23, 2025 judgment and remand this
case for the district court to reconsider the motion in light of the DaRouse ruling.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the parties Joint Motion to Remand,
vacate the district court’s July 23, 2025 judgment granting the City’s Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal, and remand this matter back to the district court for
reconsideration.
MOTION TO REMAND GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED
3