Opinion

United States v. Andrew Francois Martin

Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Mar 5, 2026
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
NEW
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

The opinion

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11031

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANDREW FRANCOIS MARTIN,

a.k.a. Drew

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20556-RKA-6

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After Andrew Francois Martin pleaded guilty to conspiracy

to commit Hobbs Act robbery, the district court sentenced him to

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

210 months’ imprisonment with the sentence to run consecutively

to a Florida robbery sentence that Martin was already serving. On

appeal, he challenges the district court’s decision imposing a con-

secutive sentence. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I.

A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Martin

and others with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in vio-

lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The indictment alleged that the con-

spiracy ran from May 2016 through December 2017 and that the

object of the conspiracy was to steal controlled substances, money,

jewelry, and other property. For this crime, Martin faced a maxi-

mum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

Martin pleaded guilty. He agreed that if the case had gone to

trial, the government would have proven beyond a reasonable

doubt that from May 2016 through December 2017 he conspired

with co-defendants Palacio Valdes Farley, Joassaint Aristil, Jr., and

others to commit Hobbs Act robbery.

He further agreed that the government would have proven

beyond a reasonable doubt that three robberies occurred. Martin

admitted to being involved in the first robbery, which occurred in

May 2016 when members of the conspiracy stole marijuana from

two drug suppliers, Justin Ziegler and William Merle, in Van Nuys,

California. Members of the conspiracy arranged to purchase

25 pounds of marijuana from Ziegler and Merle at Ziegler’s apart-

ment. Before the meeting, Martin and Farley traveled together by

airplane from Orlando to Van Nuys. During the meeting at

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 3

Ziegler’s apartment, one member of the conspiracy left to retrieve

money from his car to purchase the drugs. Moments later, he re-

turned with another man, and they immediately began shooting.

Both Ziegler and Merle sustained gunshot wounds. Members of

the conspiracy stole more than 12 pounds of marijuana and fled

from the apartment. On the day of the robbery, a contact messaged

Martin that he had no more of a particular marijuana product. Mar-

tin responded that he was on his “way back down” to Florida “with

it.” Doc. 203 at 3. 1 The next day Martin flew back to Florida.

Martin admitted to committing a second robbery with Far-

ley in April 2017 in Daytona Beach, Florida. While in the parking

lot of a restaurant, they spotted Vladimir Gutierrez, a professional

baseball player, with his wife Yanetsi Cordova. Farley and Martin

noticed Gutierrez’s jewelry and expensive car, determined that he

was wealthy, and decided to rob him. They approached the couple

with their guns drawn. They took Gutierrez’s gold necklace, gold

pendant, watch, and wallet. During the robbery, the restaurant

owner came out with a gun. He shot at Martin and Farley, hitting

Martin in the left leg. Martin fired back at the owner, and Farley

and Martin fled from the scene.

Martin also admitted that co-conspirators committed a third

robbery in December 2017 in Orange County, California. Farley

and others robbed Stephen Keane, a drug supplier. During the rob-

bery, they bound and gagged Keane and his wife and stole

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

marijuana, cash, jewelry, watches, and other items. Although Mar-

tin agreed that the government would have proven beyond a rea-

sonable doubt that this robbery occurred, he did not admit to par-

ticipating in it.2

The district court accepted Martin’s guilty plea. At the time

of his plea, Martin was in state custody serving a sentence imposed

by a Florida court for the Daytona Beach robbery. In the state case,

Martin was convicted of robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon and received a total sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. In

the plea agreement in the federal conspiracy case, Martin acknowl-

edged that the district court could direct that his federal sentence

run consecutively to the state sentence.

Before Martin’s sentencing hearing, a probation officer pre-

pared an initial presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR

reported that the offense conduct included the Van Nuys robbery,

the Daytona Beach robbery, and the Orange County robbery. It

stated that Martin participated in the Van Nuys and Daytona Beach

robberies but not the Orange County one.

The PSR also identified a fourth robbery as part of the of-

fense conduct. It stated that in August 2016 Farley, Martin, Aristil,

Emmanuel White, and others carried out a plan to impersonate

2 In a recent opinion affirming Farley’s and Aristil’s convictions, we described

each of the three robberies in greater detail. See United States v. Nattiel, No. 24-

10954, 2026 WL 22065, at *3–7 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2026) (unpublished).

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federal law enforcement agents; kidnap drug dealer Gregory Tis-

dale; and then gain access to a stash house used by Tisdale and Eric

McNair, another drug dealer.

According to the PSR, to carry out this plan, the conspirators

purchased a tracking device that they attached to Tisdale’s Range

Rover. Late one night, they used the device to track Tisdale to an

apartment complex in Fort Lauderdale. They drove to the apart-

ment complex and found Tisdale sitting in the Range Rover’s

driver’s seat with a woman, Tiara Register, in the passenger’s seat.

Farley, Martin, and others ran to the Range Rover pretending to be

federal agents who were arresting Tisdale. Farley pointed a gun at

Tisdale and pulled him from the Range Rover’s driver’s seat to its

backseat. Martin jumped into the driver’s seat. Other co-conspira-

tors, including White, pulled Register from the Range Rover and

forced her into their vehicle.

Martin, with Farley and Tisdale in the backseat, drove the

Range Rover to the apartment that McNair and Tisdale used as a

stash house. Along the way, he picked up White. When they ar-

rived at the apartment, McNair was outside. He spotted them and

ran back inside the apartment. Tisdale attempted to flee. Farley and

White shot at Tisdale and then left him for dead. Farley, Martin,

and White chased McNair into the apartment. Tisdale, who was

still alive, crawled away, hid under bushes, and survived.

Farley, Martin, and White found McNair inside the apart-

ment. Farley killed McNair by shooting him. Farley, Martin, and

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

White stole approximately $30,000 in cash and half a kilogram of

cocaine from the apartment.

After robbing the apartment, Farley, Martin, and White met

up with the other co-conspirators, who still had Register as a cap-

tive. When Farley saw Register, he handed Martin a gun and told

him to take her to a dead-end street near a canal and kill her. Reg-

ister was later found dead with two gunshot wounds to the head.

After its detailed narrative of the four robberies that made

up the offense conduct, the PSR computed Martin’s offense level.

To calculate the offense level, the PSR considered Martin’s conduct

in the May 2016 Van Nuys robbery, the August 2016 stash house

robbery and murders of Tisdale and Register, and the April 2017

Daytona Beach robbery. It reported that Martin’s total offense level

was 43.

The PSR also recounted Martin’s criminal history. Before he

turned 21, Martin had sustained three separate adult criminal con-

victions in Florida state court for: (1) attempted burglary of an oc-

cupied dwelling, (2) carrying a concealed weapon, and (3) robbery

without a firearm or weapon. Based on the sentences Martin re-

ceived for these convictions, the PSR assigned him a total of seven

criminal history points.

In addition, the PSR reported that Martin had 2017 Florida

criminal convictions for robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, all arising out of the Daytona Beach robbery. Although Mar-

tin received a total sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment for these

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 7

crimes, the PSR assigned the sentence zero criminal history points

because the sentence was imposed for conduct that was part of the

instant offense. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(1).

With a total of seven criminal history points, the PSR assigned Mar-

tin to criminal history category IV.

Given a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history cate-

gory of IV, the PSR reported that Martin’s guidelines range was life

imprisonment. Because the statutory maximum sentence for con-

spiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was 20 years, the PSR re-

duced his guidelines range to 240 months.

The PSR then addressed whether, under the Sentencing

Guidelines, Martin’s federal sentence should run concurrently or

consecutively with his 25-year Florida sentence. The PSR con-

cluded that because the Daytona Beach robbery was relevant con-

duct for the federal offense, § 5G1.3 of the Guidelines advised that

the sentences should run concurrently.

Both the government and Martin objected to the PSR. The

government challenged the PSR’s application of the Guidelines. It

asserted that because the Daytona Beach robbery was not relevant

conduct for the federal offense, § 5G1.3 was inapplicable, and the

Guidelines did not recommend a concurrent sentence.

The government alternatively argued that even if § 5G1.3

recommended a concurrent sentence, the court should exercise its

discretion, and, based on the sentencing factors set forth at

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 3 impose a consecutive sentence. It urged the

court to consider Martin’s conduct from August 2016 when he

robbed Tisdale and McNair’s stash house and murdered Register.

It argued that Martin was a “cold-blooded killer” who executed

Register by shooting her twice in the head simply because she was

an “innocent witness, who was in the wrong place at the wrong

time.” Doc. 293 at 8. It also pointed out that after murdering Reg-

ister, Martin continued to engage in criminal activity with Farley

when he participated in the Daytona Beach robbery and shot at the

restaurant owner. The government argued that several of the

§ 3553(a) factors—including the circumstances of the offense as

well as the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, af-

ford adequate deterrence, and protect the public—supported im-

posing a consecutive sentence.

3 Under § 3553(a), a district court is required to impose a sentence that is “suf-

ficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the

statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the

seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punish-

ment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future

criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. Id.

§ 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the

offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences

available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of

the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-

parities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).

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Martin objected to the PSR’s paragraphs that described the

August 2016 robbery of Tisdale and McNair’s stash house and the

murders of Tisdale and Register. He argued that this incident did

not qualify as relevant conduct for the federal conspiracy offense

and noted that the factual proffer that was part of the plea agree-

ment made no reference to this incident.

Martin further argued that the § 3553(a) factors did not sup-

port a consecutive sentence. He acknowledged that the court had

discretion to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence. He

urged the court to impose a concurrent sentence so that he would

not be “sentenced twice” for the Daytona Beach robbery. Doc. 301

at 5.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered the

parties’ objections. It began with whether the Daytona Beach rob-

bery qualified as relevant conduct under the Guidelines. The court

had presided over Farley and Aristil’s criminal trial. Based on its

observations from their trial, the court found that the Daytona

Beach robbery was not part of the conspiracy charged in the case.

It stated that Martin and Farley “spontaneously” came up with the

plan to rob Gutierrez when they saw him exiting a restaurant

“wearing a lot of very expensive jewelry and driving a very fancy

car.” Doc. 434 at 7. The court determined that this robbery was not

relevant conduct for the federal offense, which involved a different

conspiracy “to steal from drug dealers.” Id.

After concluding that the Daytona Beach robbery was not

relevant conduct, the court considered the government’s

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

objections to the PSR’s recommendation that under § 5G1.3 Mar-

tin’s federal sentence should run concurrently with his state sen-

tence. The court sustained the objection, stating § “5G1.3 just

doesn’t apply here, because the Daytona Beach robbery is a totally

separate course of conduct.” Id. at 8. But the court stated that it

would consider the Daytona Beach robbery when weighing the

§ 3553(a) factors. In addition, because the Daytona Beach robbery

was “not part of the instant offense,” the court concluded that Mar-

tin’s Florida sentence arising out of the robbery scored three crim-

inal history points. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 As a result, Martin’s criminal

history score was 10, and he was in criminal history category V.

The court then addressed Martin’s objection that it could

not consider the August 2016 incident involving the stash house

robbery and the murders of McNair and Register when calculating

his guidelines range. The government introduced documentary ev-

idence, including witness statements from Aristil and others, to es-

tablish that Martin participated in the planning and carrying out of

the stash house robbery and shot Register. The court found that

the government established by a preponderance of the evidence,

but not beyond a reasonable doubt, that Martin was party to a con-

spiracy to rob the stash house and shot Register. After making these

findings, the court announced that it would not consider this inci-

dent when calculating Martin’s guidelines range but would con-

sider the incident when weighing the § 3553(a) factors.

After making these rulings and resolving other objections,

the court calculated Martin’s revised guidelines range without

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considering either the Daytona Beach robbery or the August 2016

stash house robbery and murders. It determined that Martin’s total

offense level was 29 and his criminal history category was V, which

yielded a guidelines range of 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment.

After calculating the guidelines range, the court returned to

§ 5G1.3. It reiterated that because the Daytona Beach robbery was

“not a part of this conspiracy” and “not relevant conduct,” § 5G1.3

did not apply. Doc. 434 at 14. But even if this provision recom-

mended a concurrent sentence, the court explained that it retained

discretion, which it intended to exercise, to impose a consecutive

sentence. After stating that it intended to impose a consecutive sen-

tence, it acknowledged that the parties had not yet addressed the

§ 3553(a) factors, saying “we’ll get to that later.” Id. at 24.

Later in the hearing, the court gave the parties an oppor-

tunity to address the § 3553(a) factors. The government requested

a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum,

with the sentence to run consecutively to Martin’s state sentence.

Both Register’s mother and McNair’s sister addressed the court,

speaking about their deceased loved ones and how the murders im-

pacted their families.

Martin’s attorney asked the court to impose a sentence of

175 months, which was within the applicable guidelines range. He

asked the court to consider that Martin had been controlled and

manipulated by Farley. He also argued that Martin should receive

a sentence below the statutory maximum because, unlike his co-

defendants, he had accepted responsibility by pleading guilty.

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

When discussing the § 3553(a) factors, Martin’s attorney acknowl-

edged that the court had already stated that the federal sentence

would run consecutively to the state sentence. The court said that

it had considered giving a concurrent sentence, but it was “just not

going to do it.” Id. at 47.

The court gave Martin an opportunity to allocute. He apol-

ogized. He stated that he had spent the past seven years in state

prison for the Daytona Beach robbery and described how, while

incarcerated, he had participated in rehabilitation programs and

was trying to improve himself.

After Martin spoke, the court announced that it was impos-

ing a 210-month sentence, which would run consecutively to the

state sentence. It addressed at length the § 3553(a) factors. It ex-

plained that Martin’s criminal conduct in the charged conspiracy

was “very serious.” Id. at 49. It focused on the circumstances of the

Van Nuys robbery, which included a dangerous shooting. The

court found, based on the “vivid and gruesome testimony” from

the trial of Martin’s codefendants, that Martin was present and

shooting during the robbery. Id.

The court then addressed Martin’s history and characteris-

tics. It reviewed his criminal history, including the Florida state

court conviction for the Daytona Beach robbery. The court de-

scribed Martin’s conduct during this robbery, which included Mar-

tin shooting at the restaurant owner, as “very serious.” Id. at 51.

The court also discussed the August 2016 stash house robbery and

murders of McNair and Register. It found Martin had shot and

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 13

killed Register. 4 It stated that the 210-month sentence was “driven

mostly by [Martin’s] criminal history, including the robbery in Day-

tona Beach and also the robbery in . . . Van Nuys and the two

shootings in those two cases.” Id. at 52. The court also explained

that it “cannot ignore the . . . robberies of McNair and Tisdale and

the killings of [] Register and [] McNair.” Id.

The court discussed the need for specific deterrence and to

protect the public from Martin’s future crimes. It stated that he had

engaged in a “repeated course of violent conduct” and observed

that “several times state court judges have been lenient with [him],

placed him on probation, and he has repaid that leniency by con-

tinuously violating the terms of his probation.” Id.

The court also considered the need to provide for general

deterrence, just punishment, and promote respect for the law. It

stated that it was “important for people in our community to know

that these crimes, especially when coupled with a criminal history

category of this seriousness, are serious, that they are unacceptable,

and that if you are caught and convicted, you will be punished.” Id.

at 53.

The court addressed the need to avoid unwarranted sen-

tencing disparities. It explained that, unlike his codefendants, Mar-

tin had pleaded guilty. Given the plea, the court determined that

4 The court found that Farley had shot and killed McNair.

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

he should receive a sentence shorter than the statutory maximum

of 240 months.5

The court explained why it rejected Martin’s request for a

175-month sentence. It found this sentence too short “given the ex-

treme degrees of violence [and] repeated course of criminal con-

duct that [] Martin has displayed through the years.” Id. at 53–54

After announcing the sentence, the court stated that even if

its computation of the guidelines was wrong and even if it did not

consider the August 2016 stash house robbery and murders of Reg-

ister and McNair when weighing the § 3553(a) factors, it would

have “come up with the exact same sentence.” Id. at 57. It explained

that it would have imposed the same sentence based solely on Mar-

tin’s conduct in the Van Nuys and Daytona Beach robberies. After

the court announced the sentence, Martin raised no objection to

the court’s findings of facts or the way the sentence was pro-

nounced.

This is Martin’s appeal.

II.

“We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentenc-

ing Guidelines and application of the Guidelines to the facts de

5 On the same day Martin was sentenced, the court sentenced Farley and Aris-

til. The court sentenced Farley to 240 months’ imprisonment with the sen-

tence to run consecutively to a separate 14-year sentence he was already serv-

ing. And it sentenced Aristil to 200 months’ imprisonment with the sentence

to run consecutively to a separate 122-month sentence he was already serving.

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 15

novo, and we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear

error.” United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628 (11th Cir.

2015).

We review sentencing issues raised for the first time on ap-

peal for plain error. United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1037

(11th Cir. 2019). To establish plain error, a defendant must show:

(1) an error, (2) that is “plain,” (3) that “affects substantial rights,”

and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public repu-

tation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada,

319 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified)

III.

On appeal, Martin argues that the district court erred when

it ordered his sentence to run consecutively, not concurrently, with

his Florida sentence for the Daytona Beach robbery. He says that

the district court erred in concluding that the Daytona Beach rob-

bery was not relevant conduct in the federal conspiracy case and

that the Sentencing Guidelines did not recommend a concurrent

sentence. He also argues that the district court erred because it

failed to give him an opportunity to allocute before announcing

that it was imposing a consecutive sentence. We address each issue

in turn.

A.

When a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment

and is “already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment,”

a court may direct that the new term of imprisonment will “run

concurrently or consecutively” with the earlier sentence. 18 U.S.C.

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16 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

§ 3584(a). As the Supreme Court has explained, judges have “dis-

cretion to select whether the sentences they impose will run con-

currently or consecutively with . . . [sentences] that have been im-

posed in other proceedings, including state proceedings.” Setser v.

United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 (2012).

The Sentencing Guidelines provide guidance to a district

court faced with deciding whether to impose a concurrent or con-

secutive sentence. Section 5G1.3 states that if “a term of imprison-

ment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the

instant offense of conviction” under § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines, “the

sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed . . . to run concur-

rently to the remainder of the undischarged term of imprison-

ment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).

When a defendant is currently serving a state criminal sen-

tence, a district court must consider § 5G1.3. United States v. Henry,

1 F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2021). But even when § 5G1.3(b) rec-

ommends a concurrent sentence, the district court retains discre-

tion to order the federal sentence to run consecutively to the state

sentence. After all, § 5G1.3, like all Guidelines provisions, is advi-

sory. See id. at 1326 (“Courts must consider the advice of

§ 5G1.3(b)(1), of course, but they have no obligation to impose a

sentence consistent with that section’s directive.”).

Here, Martin challenges the district court’s application of

§ 5G1.3(b). As an initial matter, he asserts that the district court

failed to conduct the analysis required under § 5G1.3. We disagree.

The record reflects that the court considered § 5G1.3 and

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 17

concluded that it did not apply because Martin’s state sentence

arose out of the Daytona Beach robbery, which was not relevant

conduct for the federal offense.

Martin also argues on appeal that the district court’s

§ 5G1.3(b) analysis was flawed. He says that the Daytona Beach

robbery qualified as relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guide-

lines and thus § 5G1.3(b) advised that his federal sentence should

run concurrently with the state sentence.

We need not decide whether the district court erred in con-

cluding that the Daytona Beach robbery was not relevant conduct

for the conspiracy in this case and that § 5G1.3(b) did not apply be-

cause any error was harmless. It is well-established that when “a

decision either way” on a sentencing issue “will not affect the out-

come,” it is unnecessary for us to decide it. United States v. Keene,

470 F.3d 1347, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006). We need not review a sentenc-

ing issue when “(1) the district court states it would have imposed

the same sentence, even absent an alleged error, and (2) the sen-

tence is substantively reasonable.” United States v. Goldman,

953 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2020).

Here, the parties agree that the district court made a Keene

statement. As Martin acknowledges, the court stated on the record

that it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had re-

solved the guidelines issue in his favor. We thus must consider the

substantive reasonableness of Martin’s 210-month consecutive sen-

tence.

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18 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

“We review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or

significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Henry, 1 F.4th at 1327 (citation mod-

ified). When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sen-

tence, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In imposing a sentence, the district

court must consider all the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

“but it may give greater weight to some factors over others or even

attach great weight to a single factor.” United States v. Gruskho,

50 F.4th 1, 19 (11th Cir. 2022). We will vacate a sentence only if we

are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) fac-

tors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reason-

able sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey,

612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified).

It is well established that a court may vary from the Sentenc-

ing Guidelines based on the § 3553(a) factors. See Gall, 552 U.S. at

49–50. When deciding to vary from the Guidelines, a district court

“may consider conduct that [it already] considered in calculating

the defendant’s advisory guidelines range.” United States v. Moran,

778 F.3d 942, 983 (11th Cir. 2015). It also may consider uncharged

conduct that was not relied upon in calculating the guidelines

range. United States v. Owens, 96 F.4th 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024).

As we have recognized, “uncharged conduct can be directly ger-

mane to several § 3553(a) factors,” including “the history and char-

acteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to pro-

mote respect for the law, afford adequate deterrence to criminal

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 19

conduct, and protect the public from further crimes of the defend-

ant.” Id. (citation modified). A district court may consider un-

charged conduct “so long as the government proves such conduct

by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Wilson,

788 F.3d 1298, 1317 (11th Cir. 2015).

After evaluating the record in this case, we are not left with

the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a

clear error of judgment when it weighed the § 3553(a) factors and

imposed a consecutive, not concurrent, sentence. Here, the district

court carefully, thoughtfully, and thoroughly addressed the

§ 3553(a) factors and explained why they supported a consecutive

sentence. The court’s findings from the sentencing hearing show

that Martin committed three robberies that involved dangerous

shootings. First, he participated in the Van Nuys robbery where

Ziegler and Merle were robbed and shot. Second, he participated

in the Daytona Beach robbery in which he and Farley robbed

Gutierrez, and he shot at the restaurant owner. Third, he partici-

pated in the August 2016 robbery of McNair and Tisdale’s stash

house. After this robbery was complete, he shot Register twice in

the head, killing her. 6 This evidence shows that Martin repeatedly

participated in dangerous and violent robberies that involved

shootings and in one instance murder. Given this record, it was

6 On appeal, Martin has not challenged the district court’s factual finding that

the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he shot Reg-

ister. And the district court clearly was permitted to consider this conduct

when weighing the § 3553(a) factors. See Wilson, 788 F.3d at 1317.

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-11031

reasonable for the district court to impose a consecutive sentence.

Accordingly, any error in the district court’s analysis of § 5G1.3(b)

was harmless.

B.

Martin also raises a second issue on appeal: that the district

court erred by failing to give him an opportunity to allocute. “Al-

locution is the right of the defendant to make a final plea on his

own behalf to the sentencer before the imposition of a sentence.”

United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2002). The

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that before imposing

the sentence the district court “address the defendant personally”

and allow him to “speak or present any information to mitigate the

sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). When a district court im-

poses a sentence before giving a defendant an opportunity to allo-

cute, we must vacate the sentence and remand so that the district

court may give the defendant a chance to speak. United States v.

George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1207–09 (11th Cir. 2017). On remand, the

district court must give the defendant a chance to speak, but the

defendant generally is not entitled to “an entirely new resentenc-

ing—he may not reassert or reargue any of his objections to the

PSR, file new objections to the PSR, or file a new sentencing mem-

orandum.” Id.

Here, Martin argues for the first time on appeal that the dis-

trict court erred at sentencing by denying him an opportunity to

allocute before the court first announced that it would be imposing

a consecutive sentence. But at the time the court made this

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24-11031 Opinion of the Court 21

announcement, it was not imposing the sentence. And Martin does

not dispute that after the court initially stated that it was going to

impose a consecutive sentence, he was given an opportunity to al-

locute. Indeed, the record shows that he addressed the court before

it imposed the sentence.

Martin nevertheless argues that when the court first an-

nounced that it intended to have his federal sentence run consecu-

tively to his state sentence, he had no meaningful opportunity to

allocute. Because Martin raises this issue for the first time on ap-

peal, we review for plain error. See Corbett, 921 F.3d at 1037. He

cannot show that any error was plain. Certainly, a district court

plainly errs when it fails to give a defendant a chance to allocute

before imposing a sentence. See George, 872 F.3d at 1207. But he has

cited no published case holding that a district court errs when, be-

fore giving the defendant a chance to allocute, it announces its in-

tent to impose a consecutive sentence but then allows him to allo-

cute before it imposes the sentence. We thus cannot say that the

district court plainly erred here. We affirm as to this issue.

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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