DEGARDEYN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

ABRAM OLIVER DEGARDEYN, )

)

) Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-00267

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Senior United States District Judge

) Nora Barry Fischer

COMMONWEALTH OF )

PENNSYLVANIA, ) United States Magistrate Judge

) Christopher B. Brown

)

Respondent. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation

This matter was initiated by the filing of a pro se Notice of Removal filed by

Abram Oliver DeGardeyn. ECF No. 1. The Notice was received without the filing

fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner, Abram Oliver

DeGardeyn, is the subject of criminal proceedings currently pending before the

Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County at Case No. CP-26-CR-0002157-2025.

Id., see also ECF No. 1-1. The Notice has been reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1455(b)(4). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended the matter be

summarily remanded to the state courts for further proceedings.

II. Report

A. Background

Based on the notice and attached exhibits, as well as the publicly available

state court docket, to which the Court takes judicial notice, DeGardeyn was charged

by Information with two misdemeanor counts of Stalking – Repeatedly Commit Acts

to Cause Fear, occurring on July 21, 2025, in violation of 18 P.S. § 2709.1 §§ A1. See

publicly available docket at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/

CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-26-CR-0002157-2025. On January 6, 2026, the

Fayette County Public Defender’s Office entered an appearance for DeGardeyn and

waived formal arraignment. That same day, a surety bond in the security amount

of $10,000.00 was posted on DeGardeyn’s behalf. On January 12, 2026, Judge

Nancy D. Vernon issued an Amended Order for Competency Evaluation.

DeGardeyn claims Fayette County Court of Common Pleas has denied his

rights under the United States Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities

Act, in the following respects:

A. Violation of the 14th Amendment (Due Process)

and Pa.R.Crim.P. 543: The magisterial District Court

docket for December 8, 2025, explicitly confirms that the

preliminary hearing was held in absentia while the

Petitioner was not present and had not provided a waiver.

This “Held for Court” disposition is a structural error that

invalidates the transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of

Common Pleas.

B. Obstruction of Self-Representation (6th

amendment): The state court has consistently ignored

Petitioner’s dismissal of the Public Defender’s Office and

his assertion of pro se status. By continuing to serve and

recognize “shadow counsel” against Petitioner’s express

refusal, the court has constructively abandoned the

Petitioner's right to be heard and to conduct his own

defense.

C. Weaponized Competency and ADA Retaliation

(42 U.S.C. § 12203): The state court, under Judge Nancy

D. Vernon, has issued multiple “Amended Orders for

Competency Examination” without a predicate motion,

hearing, or evidence. These orders are being utilized as a

retaliatory mechanism to suppress the Petitioner's filings

regarding ADA Title II auxiliary aids and to suspend his

civil rights under the pretext of mental health evaluation.

ECF No. 1 at 2.

B. Discussion

Title 28, United States Code, section 1455, sets out the procedure for removal

of criminal prosecutions from state court to federal court. It provides as follows:

(a) Notice of removal. -- A defendant or defendants

desiring to remove any criminal prosecution from a State

court shall file in the district court of the United States

for the district and division within which such prosecution

is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a

short and plain statement of the grounds for removal,

together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders

served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

(b) Requirements. -- (1) A notice of removal of a

criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than 30 days

after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time

before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good

cause shown the United States district court may enter an

order granting the defendant or defendants leave to file

the notice at a later time.

(2) A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall

include all grounds for such removal. A failure to state

grounds that exist at the time of the filing of the notice

shall constitute a waiver of such grounds, and a second

notice may be filed only on grounds not existing at the

time of the original notice. For good cause shown, the

United States district court may grant relief from the

limitations of this paragraph.

(3) The filing of a notice of removal of a criminal

prosecution shall not prevent the State court in which

such prosecution is pending from proceeding further,

except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered

unless the prosecution is first remanded.

(4) The United States district court in which such notice

is filed shall examine the notice promptly. If it clearly

appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits

annexed thereto that removal should not be permitted,

the court shall make an order for summary remand.

(5) If the United States district court does not order the

summary remand of such prosecution, it shall order an

evidentiary hearing to be held promptly and, after such

hearing, shall make such disposition of the prosecution as

justice shall require. If the United States district court

determines that removal shall be permitted, it shall so

notify the State court in which prosecution is pending,

which shall proceed no further.

(c) Writ of habeas corpus.—If the defendant or

defendants are in actual custody on process issued by the

State court, the district court shall issue its writ of habeas

corpus, and the marshal shall thereupon take such

defendant or defendants into the marshal's custody and

deliver a copy of the writ to the clerk of such State court.

28 U.S.C. § 1455.

The substantive grounds for removal of a criminal prosecution are set out in

28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, and 1443. See Pennsylvania v. Williams, No. 3:15-CV-

1022, 2015 WL 3440273, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2015). Section 1442 allows for

removal of criminal prosecutions in certain instances against federal officers or

agencies, and section 1442a allows for removal of criminal prosecutions in certain

instances against members of the armed forces. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1442a.

Section 1443 allows for removal in two situations. Section 1443(1) authorizes

the removal of a state law civil or criminal action “[a]gainst any person who is

denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing

for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the

jurisdiction thereof[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). Under this provision, “a state court

defendant must demonstrate both (1) that he is being deprived of rights guaranteed

by a federal law ‘providing for. . . equal civil rights’; and (2) that he is ‘denied or

cannot enforce’ that right in the courts’ of the state.” Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d

1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966)).

Under the first requirement, the defendant must allege a deprivation of

rights guaranteed by a federal law “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms

of racial equality.” Id. Under the second requirement, removal is available where

the defendant's federal civil rights would “inevitably be denied by the very act of

being brought to trial in state court.” New Jersey v. Thomas, 344 F. App'x 727, 728

(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047, 1049) (citations

omitted).

Section 1443(2) permits removal of a state law civil or criminal action “[f]or

any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or

for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2). This provision “confers a privilege of removal only upon

federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in

affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil

rights[,]” or upon state officers who refuse to enforce racially discriminatory laws.

City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966).

Here, DeGardeyn satisfies none of the substantive criteria for removal of a

criminal prosecution. He is not a federal officer, a state officer, or a member of the

armed forces, leaving only § 1443(1) as a possible substantive ground for removal.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, 1443(2).

As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has summarized,

the removal permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1443[(1)] is narrow.

. . . Where the party seeking removal asserts the violation

of his constitutional rights phrased in terms of general

rights applicable to all citizens, rather than provisions

couched in the specific language of racial equality, there is

no basis for removal of an action to federal court. Thus, a

defendant seeking to remove a case under § 1443(1) must

demonstrate that the rights claimed arise under a

provision of the Constitution or federal law specifically

designed to promote racial equality, and must also

specifically allege that he has been denied or cannot

enforce in the state court the right that was created by

the civil rights law under which he seeks protection. The

allegation of illegal or corrupt acts of individual state

officials that might be corrected by the state judiciary, or

the mere possibility of an unfair trial in state court, will

not justify removal to the federal court under § 1443(1).

Pennsylvania v. Brown-Bey, 637 F. App'x 686, 688 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing

Peacock, 384 U.S. at 829–30; Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792; Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047)

(emphasis added).

Although DeGardeyn asserts his Fourteenth and Sixth amendment rights

under the Constitution and his rights under the ADA have been violated, he has not

demonstrated his claims arise under a provision of the Constitution or federal law

specially designed to promote racial equality. As our Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he

allegation of illegal or corrupt acts of individual state officials that might be

corrected by the state judiciary, . . . will not justify removal to the federal court

under § 1443(1).” Brown-Bey, 637 . App’x at 688.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that:

1. This matter be summarily REMANDED forthwith to the Court of Common

Pleas of Fayette County where it is docketed as Commonwealth v. Abram Oliver

Degardeyn, at Case No. CP-26-CR-0002157-2025; and

2. The Clerk be directed to mark this case as CLOSED.

DeGardeyn is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and

Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, DeGardeyn, must file

written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by March 13, 2026.

DeGardeyn is cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will

waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir.

2011)(quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v.

City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of

appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to

review for plain error).

DATED this 24th day of February, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: ABRAM OLIVER DEGARDEYN

511 Prospect Street EXT

Point Marion, PA 15474

(via U.S. First Class Mail)