Riley

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

Cordero Riley,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24-cv-1567-MLB

v.

Clayton County, Georgia, et al.

Defendants.

________________________________/

OPINION & ORDER

In April 2022, Plaintiff Cordero Riley spent six days in the Clayton

County jail. Other inmates beat him severely, the medical staff provided

minimal care, and he left the jail with a fractured rib and collapsed lung.

Plaintiff sued several Clayton County officials and an outside contractor

for violating his constitutional rights. (Dkt. 176.) Some Defendants move

to dismiss. (Dkts. 187, 197, 198.) Plaintiff moves to add additional

parties and claims and for judicial notice of certain facts. (Dkts. 196,

218.) The Court grants the motions to dismiss in part, denies the motion

for judicial notice, and stays the motion to add parties.

I. Background

Plaintiff entered the jail on April 19, 2022 for violating probation.

(Dkt. 176 ¶ 163.) Jail staff placed him in Housing Unit 7, a “max security

pod” for violent offenders. (Id. ¶ 178.) He was one of 189 inmates housed

in the unit that night. (Id. ¶ 189.) Defendant Stokes Williams was the

only officer in the unit’s observation tower. (Id. ¶¶ 191–92.)

Around 10:30 p.m., an inmate entered Riley’s cell and demanded

his flip-flops. (Id. ¶¶ 196–97.) Riley refused, and the inmate left but

returned with several others. (Id. ¶ 199.) The group beat Riley for about

ten minutes, knocked him unconscious, and moved him to another cell.

(Id. ¶¶ 200, 215.) Riley remained in that cell—“beaten, swollen, and

bloodied”—until a guard found him early the next morning. (Id. ¶¶ 238–

241.)

Guards took Riley to the jail infirmary. (Id. ¶¶ 242–49.)

CorrectHealth, a private medical care contractor, operated the infirmary

and employed its nurses. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 64–75.) Despite Riley saying he

needed to go to the emergency room, nurses treated him with Motrin and

ice. (Id. ¶¶ 255–59.) Two days later, he sought more medical assistance,

telling the nurses he was having difficulty breathing, thought he had a

collapsed lung and broken ribs, and wanted to go to the emergency room.

(Id. ¶¶ 267–71.) Again, they gave him only Motrin and ice. (Id. ¶ 275.)

Despite continuing to complain about his condition, the jail provided no

further treatment. (Id. ¶ 280.) When the jail released him on April 25,

Plaintiff went to a hospital and learned he had a broken rib, a collapsed

lung, and hydropneumothorax (fluid in the lungs). (Id. ¶¶ 290-293.)

Riley sued 39 Defendants (including 11 unnamed parties) under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights and Georgia state

law. (Dkt. 1.) He filed an amended complaint, and the Court dismissed

it as a shotgun pleading. (Dkts. 102, 173.) Riley then filed his second

amended complaint, dropping eight Defendants and adding six others.

(Dkt. 176.) Relevant to this motion, Plaintiff claims his cell door should

have been locked on the night he arrived at the jail, the inmates who beat

him should have been locked in their cells, but the jail had an on-going—

and well known—problem with broken or “rigged locks” that allowed

inmates to leave their cells without permission, chronic understaffing,

and rampant violence. (Id. ¶ 201, 335-37, 342-43, 363, 394.) He says the

jail staff’s failure to address those problems led to his assault. (Id.)

Defendants Clayton County, Interim Sheriff Roland Boehrer (the

Clayton County Sheriff at the time), Sheriff Levon Allen (the current the

Sheriff), Major Brandon Criss (Commander of the Sheriff’s

Administrative Operations Division), and Officer Williams move to

dismiss.1 (Dkts. 187, 197, 198.)

II. Standard of Review

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-78

(2009). A court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. At the stage of a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded facts

are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are

1 A note to Plaintiff: Plaintiff’s opposition briefs contain pages of single-

spaced text in violation of Local Rule 5(C)(2). (See, e.g., Dkt. 205 at 5–6;

Dkt. 209 at 5–7; Dkt. 210 at 4–11.) Had his briefs been properly spaced,

they would have exceeded the Court’s page limitations. See Local Rule

7.1(D). The Court will strike his brief if he does this again.

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado

Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice

Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court may

take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute” because

it “(1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction;

or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).

But the taking of judicial notice is “a highly limited process” because it

“bypasses the safeguards which are involved with the usual process of

proving facts by competent evidence in district court.” Shahar v. Bowers,

120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus “the kinds of things about which

courts ordinarily take judicial notice are (1) scientific facts: for instance,

when does the sun rise or set; (2) matters of geography: for instance, what

are the boundaries of a state; or (3) matters of political history: for

instance, who was president in 1958.” Id.

Six months after Defendants moved to dismiss—and almost four

months after briefing ended—Plaintiff filed a Motion Requesting Judicial

Notice of Certain Facts, asking the Court to take judicial notice of 56 facts

contained in a verified complaint Sheriff Allen filed against the Clayton

County Board of Commissioners in September 2025. (Dkt. 218.) He

includes facts about infrastructure problems at the jail (including failing

locks), overcrowding and understaffing, poor medical services, and the

Board of Commissioner’s alleged awareness of those problems. (Id.)

Despite Sheriff Allen having filed a “verified complaint,” the

allegations are unproven and disputed. They certainly are not “generally

known” or “accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” as Federal Rule of Evidence

201 requires. Moreover, the Court may only “take judicial notice of a

document filed in another court [] for the limited purpose of establishing

the existence of such litigation … and not for the truth of the matter

asserted.” O’Neal v. Allstate Indem. Ins. Co. Inc., 2021 WL 4852222, at

*5 (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553

(11th Cir. 1994) (“a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in

another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other

litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related

filings.”). Yet Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of the truth

of Sheriff Allen’s allegations and use them to “draw the reasonable

inference that the [Defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged.”

(Dkt. 218 at 12.) The Court cannot do that.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice.

IV. Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss’s Motion to Dismiss

In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major

Criss violated his Eight Amendment rights by being deliberately

indifferent to the dangerous conditions of confinement at the jail that led

to his injuries.2 (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 387–415.)3 Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss

contend qualified immunity shields them from this claim.

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual

public officials performing discretionary functions insofar as their

2 Plaintiff relies on the Eighth Amendment, but it is the Fourteenth

Amendment that protects against mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial

detainees in custody. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th

Cir. 1996). His oversight, however, is of no consequence because the

Court “may properly analyze [Plaintiff’s] claim under the Eighth

Amendment as certainly states may not impose on pretrial detainees

conditions that would violate a convicted prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

rights.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995).

3 In Counts 14 and 16, Plaintiff brought § 1983 and state law claims

against Officers Anwar Fullerton and Kevin Roper. They moved to

dismiss those claims as part of the motion filed by Sheriff Boehrer, Major

Criss, and Officer Williams. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed those claims

in his response brief, removing them from this case. (Dkt. 209 at n. 1.)

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sherrod v.

Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2012). The qualified immunity

doctrine is generous—“it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743

(2011). The qualified immunity analysis begins with the threshold

question of whether Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss were “acting within

[their] discretionary authority” during the events in question. Skop v.

City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does not

dispute claims by Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss that they were acting

within their discretionary authority in maintaining the jail. So, to avoid

qualified immunity, Plaintiff must present evidence that these

Defendants violated his statutory or constitutional rights and that it was

“clearly established at the time” that their conduct did so.

A. Constitutional Violation

Restrictive, harsh, or unsafe prison conditions only “rise to the level

of an Eighth Amendment violation [] when they involve the wanton and

unnecessary infliction of pain.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289

(11th Cir. 2004). To assert an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions

of confinement (or a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to conditions of

pretrial confinement), a plaintiff must show the conditions “pose[d] an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his [or her] future health” or

safety. Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)); Hale v.

Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (courts consider

conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees—

protected by Fourteenth Amendment—under Eighth Amendment

framework). That requires a plaintiff to show the conditions are “so

grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose

anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. Put differently, a plaintiff “must

show that the risk of which he [or she] complains is not one that today’s

society chooses to tolerate.” Id. This is called the “objective component”

of an Eighth Amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement.

A plaintiff must also show the prison officials “acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind” with regard to the condition at issue.

Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. “The proper standard is that of deliberate

indifference.” Id. A prison official is deliberately indifferent to a

dangerous condition of confinement when he or she “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he [or she] must also draw

the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The

deliberate indifference standard requires more than simple or even gross

negligence by the prison official. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. This is

called the “subjective element” of an Eighth Amendment claim.

A prisons official who knows of a substantial risk to an inmate’s

health or safety can avoid liability for deliberate indifference by

responding reasonably to abate that risk, even if his or her efforts fail.

Farmer, 511 U.S. Id. at 844. Finally, to succeed on an Eighth

Amendment claim, a plaintiff must also show the prison official’s

deliberate indifference caused his or her injuries. Goodman v.

Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff argues his complaint alleges a “confluence” of several

dangerous conditions that satisfies the objective component of his Eighth

Amendment claims. This includes his allegations of “unlockable cells,

makeshift weapons, inmate-on-inmate violence and extortion, the lack of

a formal security plan, overcrowding, understaffing, poor officer training,

and a poor (or poorly enforced) inmate classification system.” (Dkt. 209

at 15; Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 390–96.) Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss don’t

challenge Plaintiff’s contention that these conditions created an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health while incarcerated. So

the Court assumes they do and finds Plaintiff plausibly alleges the

“objective component” of his claim.

Plaintiff also argues he has presented evidence to show Sheriff

Boehrer and Major Criss knew of these dangerous conditions before his

confinement in April 2022. (Dkt, 176 ¶¶ 390–96.) As part of this, he

points to internal jail communications he attached to his complaint. The

documents include an August 2021 email from a correctional officer to

the jail’s “Command Staff,” explaining “[officers in the jail] have low

security awareness,” “multiple doors in [a housing unit] aren’t fixed [and]

inmates are able to go in and out as they please and pop a door and attack

someone,” “weapons are constantly being found on inmates,” “and “there

still hasn’t been a major shake down of the facility after multiple weapons

and stabbing incidents.”4 (Dkt. 176-4.) The officer concludes the email

4 Though Boehrer and Criss’s names are not explicitly listed as recipients

of the email, it is reasonable to infer they received the email—or at least

notice of it—as two of the top officials on the “Command Staff” overseeing

the facility. See St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th

by repeating that “multiple housing units have doors that are rigged and

or broken allowing inmates to come and of out of cells as they please” and

warning “the jail is not a safe place right now.” (Id.)

He also includes an August 2021 email addressed to Sheriff Boehrer

and Major Criss in which a jail official reported that a nurse feared for

her safety while helping an inmate in Unit 1 because—after a guard left

her in the unit—several inmates began “popping out of their cells.”5 (Dkt.

176-3 at 2.) In an email chain from October 2021 that Plaintiff also

attached, Sheriff Boehrer recognized the danger and prevalence of

inmates “popping out.” In a discussion of the need for officers to close

and lock doors, a correctional officer wrote that when he had gone into

the housing units he “noticed a lot of inmates popping out of the cells”

and that “this [is] starting to become a regular thing.” (Dkt. 176-7 at 2.)

Sheriff Boehner responded to all command staff—including Major

Cir. 2002) (In reviewing motion to dismiss, the Court must draw all

reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s favor). Boehrer and Criss also do

not suggest they did not see the email.

5 The Complaint explains that “popping” or “sheeting” is “when an inmate

jams something into hinges or the locking mechanism of the cell door to

prevent it from locking.” (Dkt. 176 ¶ 99.)

Criss—that “[i]f any door is left open the potential for rigging and

tampering is always a possibility … the popping occurs when cell doors

are not being shut and inmates have rigged those cell door locks by

jamming paper or other items into the locking mechanism. That’s why

we must shut doors!” (Dkt. 176-7 at 1.) Sheriff Boehrer also attached a

previous email he sent on June 6, 2021, reminding his command staff to

“shut, secure or lock all doors … if a door cannot be secured, send

notification and get it fixed immediately!” (Id. at 3.)

These emails plausibly establish that Sheriff Boehrer and Major

Criss were on notice that inmates were capable of “popping” their

cell-door locks and roaming free—an obvious security issue. Sheriff

Boehrer and Major Criss hardly grapple with these exhibits or otherwise

argue they did not know about the dangerous conditions at the jail,

particularly the ability of inmates to pop doors and roam free. Instead,

they contend they were not deliberately indifferent because they knew

nothing about Plaintiff specifically. (Dkt. 198-1 at 9; Dkt. 215 at 6–7.)

Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss maintain they could not have known

Plaintiff faced any danger because he was booked into the jail between

9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. and attacked around 10:30 p.m., leaving too

little time for them to become aware of any risk he faced. (Id.) The

Eleventh Circuit foreclosed a similar line of reasoning in Hale. 50 F.3d

at 1583. In that case, a defendant sheriff argued that, despite evidence

he knew about generally dangerous conditions at a prison, he was not

deliberately indifferent because he did not know the specific plaintiff

feared an attack from specific inmates. Id. The Eleventh Circuit

explained a jailer “may not escape liability merely by showing that he [or

she] did not know the claimant was likely to be assaulted” or that “a

specific inmate would commit an assault.” Id. Rather, a plaintiff can

establish the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim by

showing the jailer “had subjective knowledge of a generalized,

substantial risk of serious harm from inmate violence” and took no

reasonable steps to abate the risk. Id. (internal citations omitted).

Considering the allegations in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff—and in the absence of any real engagement by Sheriff Boehrer

and Major Criss—the Court concludes the emails attached to the

complaint and Plaintiff’s other allegations reasonably infer that both

Defendants knew cell doors were highly susceptible to tampering,

inmates frequently “popped out” of their cells to roam the housing units,

the defective locks gave rise to inmate violence, prison officials did not

feel safe operating within the facility, and all of this created “an excessive

[and intolerable] risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837.

Plaintiff claims he has plausibly alleged Sheriff Boehrer and Major

Criss failed to respond reasonably to this substantial risk. He points to

his complaint allegations that Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss, despite

knowing about the dangerous conditions failed to increase staffing, create

a formal security plan, implement new training, institute policies to

combat the possession and making of shanks, or request funding to fix

cell-door locks and hinges. (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 399–405.) Again, Sheriff

Boehrer and Major Criss neither dispute these allegations nor seriously

argue they responded to the dangerous conditions of confinement in a

reasonable manner. (Dkt. 198-1 at 9.) They pay only lip service to this

element of Plaintiff’s claim, arguing—in a single conclusory sentence—

that Plaintiff “fails to show that they responded in an objectively

unreasonable manner, as required.” (Dkt. 198-1 at 13.) Taking Plaintiff’s

allegations as true—and noting Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss cursory

response—the Court finds Plaintiff plausibly alleged these Defendants

failed to address reasonably the dangerous conditions.

Finally, causation. Taking his allegations as true, Plaintiff would

not have been beaten but for the broken or popped locks that allowed

other inmates to get out of their cells and enter his, lax supervision over

inmates roaming freely throughout cell blocks, and unchecked inmate

violence—all risks he claims Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss

deliberately ignored. See Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014,

1029 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Conditions ... where violent prisoners are allowed

free reign of a [prison] with easy access to weapons without proper

supervision by guards could be found to have caused the assault.”). Once

more, Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss do not dispute Plaintiff’s

allegations or argument on causation, and the Court finds Plaintiff

satisfies this element.

Plaintiff plausibly alleges Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss violated

his Fourteenth Amendment rights through their deliberate indifference

to dangerous conditions of confinement at the jail.

B. Clearly Established Right

To establish a violation of clearly established law, a plaintiff must

show preexisting law was so clear that, under the facts at issue “every

reasonable official” would have understood that what he or she was doing

violated the Constitutional right at issue. Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d

1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018). “[T]he clearly established law must be

particularized to the facts of the case” and not “defined at a high level of

generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). A plaintiff can meet

this burden by “(1) citing case law with indistinguishable facts that

clearly establishes the constitutional right; (2) pointing to a broad

statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that

clearly establishes the constitutional right; or (3) alleging conduct so

egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the

total absence of case law.” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Georgia, 69 F.4th

1277, 1300 (11th Cir. 2023).

When a plaintiff relies on case law to demonstrate a clearly

established right, “the critical inquiry is whether the law provided the

[defendant official] with fair warning that [his or her] conduct violated”

a constitutional right. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir.

2011). “Fair warning is most commonly provided by materially similar

[binding] precedent from the Supreme Court, [the Eleventh Circuit], or

the highest state court in which the case arose.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296.

The materially similar standard is met when the specific circumstances

facing the defendant officials are “enough like the facts in the precedent

that no reasonable, similarly situated official could believe that the

factual differences between the precedent and the circumstances facing

the [defendant] official might make a difference to the conclusion about

whether the official’s conduct was lawful or unlawful, in the light of the

precedent.” Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir. 2015).

“Exact factual identity with a previously decided case is not required,”

Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013, but “[m]inor variations between cases may

prove critical,” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff relies on Marsh v. Butler County, Ala. and Hale v.

Tallapoosa County to show Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss violated

clearly established law by subjecting him to the conditions at the jail.

Hale came first. In that case, a pretrial detainee sued a sheriff and a

jailer for violating his Eighth Amendment rights after he was attacked

by another detainee. 50 F.3d at 1580. He presented evidence that

“[o]vercrowding had existed at the jail for about two years at the time of

[the plaintiff’s] detention,” “inmate-on-inmate violence was occurring on

a regular basis during [the month the plaintiff was detained] and other

periods of overcrowding,” and plaintiff shared a cell “with assorted other

detainees and inmates, who were not segregated based on their proclivity

for violence or the reasons for their confinement.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1581–

83. He also presented evidence the sheriff and jailer were aware of this

“generalized, substantial risk of serious harm,” took no reasonable steps

to abate the condition, and the condition caused the plaintiff’s injury. Id.

at 1584-85. The Eleventh Circuit found that evidence sufficient to avoid

summary judgment on plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Id.

Then came Marsh. In that case, two inmates claimed the sheriff’s

deliberate indifference to unreasonably dangerous conditions at the jail

allowed other inmates to assault them, thus violating their Eighth

Amendment rights. 268 F.3d at 1023. To establish the dangerous

conditions, the plaintiffs presented evidence nearly identical to the

evidence at issue here. Specifically, the Marsh plaintiffs showed “the

locks on the cell doors were not functional, allowing inmates to roam

freely at all hours of the day;” “homemade weapons were readily available

by fashioning weapons from material torn from the dilapidated structure

of the jail;” “the jail was routinely understaffed;” and “there was no

segregation of nonviolent inmates from violent inmates, [or] pretrial

detainees from convicted criminals.” Id. at 1029. The Marsh court

concluded those allegations “presented an objectively substantial risk of

harm.” Id. at 1029. The plaintiffs also presented evidence the sheriff

was “aware of the risks,” that she “did nothing to alleviate the conditions”

at the jail, and that the dangerous conditions caused the plaintiffs’

injuries. Id. Turning to qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit—citing

Hale and other cases—determined the sheriff violated clearly established

law. Id. at 1034. The Court of Appeals explained “it was clearly

established in this Circuit [at the time of the case] that it is an

unreasonable response for an official to do nothing when confronted with

prison conditions—like the conditions alleged in this case—that pose a

risk of serious physical harm to inmates.” Id. Denying qualified

immunity, the Court of Appeals explained “plaintiffs adequately allege

facts which (if true) show that, at the time of the incident, the sheriff's

acts were not even arguably reasonable in the light of the clearly

established law.” Id. at 1034.

In the light of these cases, the Court finds Plaintiff alleges Sheriff

Boehrer and Major Criss violated clearly established law in failing to take

reasonable steps to abate the substantial and dangerous jail conditions

that they knew about. Plaintiff—like the plaintiff in Marsh—alleges,

among other dangerous conditions, that cell-door locks were

nonfunctional, inmates roamed freely in Unit 7, lax conditions allowed

prisoners easily to obtain and use weapons, the jail was overcrowded and

understaffed, and nonviolent inmates were not reliably separated from

violent ones. (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 387–415.) He further alleges Sheriff Boehrer

and Major Criss knew of these conditions and failed to act on that

knowledge. (Id.) The alleged conditions and response by Sheriff Boehrer

and Major Criss, taken as true, are sufficiently similar to those alleged

in Marsh and Hale to conclude they had “fair warning” that their conduct

violated clearly established law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

(2002); see also Brown v. Dunn, 760 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1337–8 (M.D. Ala.

2024) (relying on Hale and Marsh, finding plaintiff plausibly alleged

defendant violated clearly established right where he allegedly failed to

remedy understaffing, faulty locks, the proliferation of makeshift

weapons, and poor supervision.).

Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss make no meaningful effort to

distinguish Hale or Marsh from this case or offer any contrary precedent.

They include only one sentence in response: “although Plaintiff relies

heavily on Marsh and Hale, both of those cases involved far more serious

circumstances than what Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss faced at the

Clayton County jail on April 19, 2022.” (Dkt. 215 at 11.) They don’t

explain that, and the Court can’t do the work for them. But, factual

identity is not required, what matters is “fair warning.” Hope, 536 U.S.

at 741. The similarities between Hale and Marsh and this case—

particularly with regards to the broken locks, free-roaming inmates, and

prevalence of inmate violence—are strong enough to place any

reasonable officer on warning that his or her failure to take reasonable

steps to abate the dangerous conditions at the jail violated the inmates’

rights. And Sheriff Boehrer’s and Major Criss’s single-sentence response

neither undermines the substantial similarities Plaintiff identifies nor

helps the Court understand how a “reasonable, similarly situated official

could believe that the factual differences between [Hale and Marsh] and

the circumstances [at issue here] might make a difference to the

conclusion about whether” Defendants’ conduct was unlawful. Merricks,

785 F.3d at 559. So Plaintiff has carried his burden of showing Sheriff

Boehrer and Major Criss violated clearly established law.

The Court determines Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss are not

entitled to qualified immunity on Count 2 at this time and denies their

motion to dismiss that count.

V. Officer Williams’s Motion to Dismiss

As explained, Officer Williams was the only corrections officer in

the observation tower on Unit 7 when the other inmates attacked

Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 191–92.) In Count 11, Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams

violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene in his beating.

In Counts 12 and 13, he brings state law claims against Officer Williams

for failing to intervene and for failing to properly monitor the other

inmates. Officer Williams moves to dismiss.

A. Count 11: Failure to Intervene Against Officer Williams

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officer Williams argues he is entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s federal failure-to-intervene claim in count 11. (Dkt. 198-1 at

2.) He says he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority

when he allegedly failed to intervene in Plaintiff’s assault while on duty

in the observation tower. (Dkt. 198-1 at 5–6.) To determine whether he

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the Court must

“assess whether [the acts in question] are of a type that fell within [his]

job responsibilities.” Hollomon ex rel. Hollomon v. Harland, 370 F.3d

1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Since Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams was

assigned to monitor the inmates in Unit 7 when he allegedly violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the Court concludes he was acting within

the purview of his job responsibilities when he allegedly watched, or

failed to watch, or failed to intervene. See Howard v. Gee, 538 F. App’x

884, 887 (11th Cir. 2013) (correctional officer was acting within his

discretionary authority while supervising inmates and maintaining

security).6 This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show qualified immunity

does not apply.

Plaintiff fails to carry his burden. Although he contends he

plausibly alleged Officer Williams violated his constitutional rights,

Plaintiff makes no argument or allegation that those rights were “clearly

6 The Court recognizes Howard is unpublished and not binding. The

Court cites it and other unpublished decisions nevertheless as

instructive. See Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1355

n.5 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Unpublished cases do not constitute binding

authority and may be relied on only to the extent they are persuasive.”).

established.” (See Dkt. 209 at 20–21.) He doesn’t even address Officer

Williams’s claim that he is entitled to qualified immunity.7 Plaintiff

cannot overcome Officer Williams’s qualified immunity and count 11 is

dismissed.8

7 It’s possible Plaintiff failed to address Officer Williams’s assertion of

qualified immunity because Officer Williams only gives cursory attention

to it. The Court, however, finds he did enough to make the threshold

showing that he was engaged in a discretionary function and thus shift

the burden to Plaintiff. Defendants’ motion to dismiss twice says all the

moving Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity—necessarily

including Officer Williams. (Dkt. 198-1 at 2, 5.) And the Motion also

states “these Defendants” acted within the scope of their discretionary

authority, including Officer Williams, and provides authority for that

claim. That was enough to put Plaintiff on notice Officer Williams was

claiming qualified immunity and that he needed to address the issue.

8 Because the Court finds Plaintiff did not carry his burden of

demonstrating a “clearly established” right, it need not address whether

he alleged a constitutional violation by Officer Williams. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the district courts and

the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

particular case at hand.”).

B. Count 12 and 13: State Law Claims Against Officer

Williams

Counts 12 and 13 assert state law claims against Officer Williams.

(Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 480–94.) Under Georgia’s doctrine of official immunity,

state officers “are subject to suit only when they negligently perform or

fail to perform their ministerial functions or when they act with actual

malice or intent to cause injury in the performance of their [discretionary]

functions.” Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007); see

Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 485–86 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff never

alleges Officer Williams acted with “actual malice or intent to cause

injury.” Instead, he seeks to avoid official immunity on Counts 12 and 13

by alleging Officer Williams negligently failed to perform ministerial

duties and that his negligence caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Specifically, in

Count 12, he alleges Officer Williams saw inmates entering his cell, saw

them beating him, and failed to stop the attack or end it sooner. (Dkt.

176 ¶¶ 481-89.) He claims Officer Williams thus violated a ministerial

duty under Georgia law “to stop the unauthorized movement into and

out” his cell by other inmates and “to stop the attack” on him. (Id. ¶ 487.)

In Count 13, he alleges Officer Williams failed adequately to monitor

inmates on Unit 7, did not see the inmates enter his cell, and thus did

not intervene to stop the attack. (Id. ¶ 493-94.) He says Officer Williams

thus violated a ministerial duty under Georgia law to monitor visually

the movement of inmates by available cameras and observation windows.

(Id. ¶ 492.) Officer Williams moves to dismiss, arguing he was exercising

discretion in monitoring the housing unit and (in the absence of malice)

is entitled to official immunity. (Dkt. 198-1 at 24.)

A ministerial function is “simple, absolute, and definite, arising

under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the

execution of a specific duty.” Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ga.

2007). A discretionary function on the other hand requires “the exercise

of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining

the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not

specifically directed.” Id. For detention officers, “the acts of following

established policies of inspecting and monitoring detainees are

ministerial tasks.” Brantley v. Jones, 871 S.E.2d 87, 96 (Ga. Ct. App.

2022) (emphasis added). “The determination of whether the acts or

omissions of [Williams] were ministerial or discretionary is a legal

question for the court.” Kelly v. Lewis, 471 S.E.2d 583, 586 (Ga. Ct. App.

1996)

Officer Williams fails to address Plaintiff’s claim in Count 12 that

he violated a “ministerial duty under Georgia decisional law” to stop the

“unauthorized movement . . . and to stop the attack.” (Dkt. 176 ¶ 487.)

While he argues Plaintiff has not alleged malice, he does not argue he

performed a discretionary function in this regard. (Dkt. 198-1 at 23.)

But, under Georgia law, he must show “that the specific acts he

performed were discretionary” to obtain immunity. Howell v. Willis, 729

S.E.2d 643, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). Officer Williams’s only arguments

regarding a discretionary function appear in the context of Count 13, not

Count 12. He makes no other arguments regarding Count 12 (other than

a reference to a nonexistent section of his motion). He thus has not

carried his burden of showing official immunity applies as to Count 12.

For Count 13, Plaintiff relies on the Sheriff’s Standard Operating

Procedure (SOP) 4.06(3) which states that “Central Control shall visually

monitor the inmate(s) movement through the facility by available camera

monitors and observation windows.” (Dkt. 209 at n. 14; Dkt. 176-24.)

Plaintiff says this is an “established policy,” rendering Officer Williams’s

supervision of inmates a ministerial function. (Dkt. 176 ¶ 491.) Although

not stated clearly, Plaintiff seems to suggest Officer Williams would have

been carrying out SOP 4.06 on the night in question and that policy

created a ministerial duty because it was “simple, absolute, and definite

… requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.” Murphy, 647 S.E.2d

at 57.

There are two problems with Plaintiff’s argument. First, Plaintiff

has not plausibly alleged the SOP applied to Officer Williams on the night

in question. The provision upon which Plaintiff relies directs the conduct

of “Central Control,” but Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams was stationed

in the “Control Tower” for Unit 7, never alleging this was part of Central

Control. (Dkt. 176 ¶ 191.) The Court does not know—and Plaintiff does

not explain—whether his location was part of Central Control.9 Building

9 Plaintiff contends the issue of whether SOP 4.06 applied to officers (like

Williams) in the Unit 7 control tower and not just to officers in the

Central Control tower is a question of fact. (Dkt. 209 at 21.) While the

Court takes the facts Plaintiff alleges plausibly as true, he has not done

so with regards to this one. Plaintiff argues SOP 4.06 requires “Central

Control to monitor inmate movement through camera monitors and

observations windows,” and because “the inmates in Unit 7 can only be

observed through the ‘observation windows,’” this is somehow “evidence

that the term “Central Control in SOP 4.06 refers to all the control

towers.” (Id.) This conclusion does not follow. In fact, his reasoning cuts

against his conclusion; if the inmates in Unit 7 can only be observed

through observation windows, that would suggest a policy requiring

supervision via “camera monitors” would not apply to that tower. This

assertion also directly contradicts Plaintiff’s allegation that Williams

on that, SOP 4.06—attached to Plaintiff’s complaint and thus subject to

consideration at this stage—seems to address the intended movement of

inmates throughout the facility, not a process for monitoring inmates

when they are supposed to be locked in their cells (as happened here). It

starts with a policy that the jail “shall ensure inmate movement through

the facility is accomplished with a minimum disruption to the daily

operations” and that “[d]uring inmate movement the staff shall also

strive to maintain a safe environment for all employees and inmates.”

(Dkt. 176-24.) It then sets “Procedures” for accomplishing that, including

officers telling “Central Control” when they are moving inmates outside

a housing unit, requiring inmates who are being moved “to walk in a

single file line with their hands behind their back[s] without speaking

and on the right side of the hallway,” and requiring officers to “escort

inmates known to be extremely violent or considered an escape risk”

whenever those inmates leave their housing area. (Id.) The duty for

“Central Control” to monitor inmate movement is included among these

could monitor security cameras from Unit 7 control tower. (Dkt. 176 ¶

206.) All of this shows he has not plausibly alleged Officer Williams

observation tower was part of “Central Control.”

other procedures—suggesting this is a process for the orderly, safe, and

intentional movement of inmates throughout the jail. This suggests

Central Control is not the same as an observation tower in one housing

unit and the procedure was not applicable to Officer Williams’s conduct

when he was supposed to be monitoring the unit on the night in question

while the inmates were supposed to be in their cells.

Second, even if it applied to Officer Williams, SOP 4.06 is not “a

written policy … [that is] so clear, definite and certain as merely to

require the execution of a relatively simple, specific duty” at least not in

regards to Officer Williams’s conduct on that night. Roper v. Greenway,

751 S.E.2d 351, 353 (Ga. 2013). The procedure does not explain how often

the officers in “Central Control” must visually monitor inmates, the

manner in which they must do so, or which inmate movements must be

monitored. It simply does not explain how an officer is supposed to

monitor against inmates popping their doors and leaving their cells

without authorization. These omissions leave ample room for “the

exercise of personal deliberation and judgment” that are inconsistent

with ministerial duties. See Murphy, 647 S.E.2d at 57. Comparable jail

operating procedures that Georgia courts have found to create

ministerial duties typically prescribe specific inmate-monitoring

schedules and leave much less room for interpretation. See, e.g., Lundy

v. Hancock Cnty., 890 S.E.2d 92, 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023) (prescribing

highly detailed suicide prevention procedures including requirement that

officers observe inmates designated “Close Observation . . . at staggered

intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes” and those designated “Constant

Observation . . . on a continuous, uninterrupted basis.”); Brantley v.

Jones, 871 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) (inmate monitoring regimen

that mandates “in-person surveillance of at least every 15 minutes” for

certain inmates); Clark v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 572 S.E.2d 342, 348

(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (policy required prison guards to “inspect[] the cells

in the unit according to the prescribed schedule and document[]

detainees’ location and status.”).

The Court concludes both that Plaintiff has failed to allege

plausibly the procedure at issue in Count 13 applied to Officer Williams’s

conduct on the night in question and that SOP 4.06 is too general to

create a “simple, absolute, and definite” duty. See Murphy, 647 S.E.2d at

57. Accordingly, Officer Williams was performing a discretionary

function while monitoring the housing unit and is entitled immunity

under Georgia law as to Count 13.

VI. Sheriff Allen’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff brings three claims against Sheriff Allen in his official

capacity.10 In Count 1, he alleges Sheriff Allen was deliberately

indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm to inmates because he

knew about problems with the “compromised locks” but failed to tell the

County Commissioners about the problems or otherwise address them.

(Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 377–386.) In Count 2, he alleges Sheriff Allen was

deliberately indifferent to all the dangerous conditions of confinement at

the jail, including (among other things) the broken locks and hinges,

increased inmate violence and weapon possession, an inmate extortion

ring, understaffing, poor training, and overcrowding. (Id. ¶¶ 387–415.)

Finally, in Count 15, he alleges Sheriff Allen was deliberately indifferent

to inmates’ medical needs by contracting with a medical provider known

10 Though Plaintiff refers to the “Sheriff’s Office” in these counts and not

Sheriff Allen, he clarifies he is suing the latter. (Dkt. 210 at 14.) He used

this term because Sheriff Allen was not Sheriff at the time of Plaintiff’s

assault. The Court will call him “Sheriff Allen”—because that is who

moves to dismiss—but notes the relevant conduct is that of the Sheriff’s

Office prior to Allen’s arrival.

to deliver inadequate care. (Id. ¶¶ 503–14.) Sheriff Allen contends he is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on all three claims. (Dkt.

197-1 at 8–20.)

“Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought in federal

court when the State itself is sued and when an ‘arm of the State’ is sued.”

Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). “To receive

Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant need not be labeled a ‘state

officer’ or ‘state official,’ but instead need only be acting as an ‘arm of the

State,’ which includes agents and instrumentalities of the State.” Id.

Sheriff Allen was acting as “an arm of the state” when he allegedly

engaged in the conduct at issue in counts 1, 2, and 15.

As relevant to counts 1 and 2, a Georgia county sheriff functions as

an arm of the State—not of the county—“when promulgating policies and

procedures governing conditions of confinement” at a county jail. Purcell

ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir.

2005); see also Andrews v. Biggers, 996 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2021) (relying

on Purcell, finding sheriff immune in challenge to policy of “cross-gender

supervision of inmates” at county jail); Holloway v. Pritchett, 2024 WL

5701788 (N.D. Ga. August 8, 2024) (relying on Purcell, finding sheriff

immune to conditions of confinement and medical deliberate indifference

claims where inmate complained of “brutal attacks by other inmates”);

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1343 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (sheriff

immune where plaintiff challenged policies of inadequate training and

understaffing at county jail). The allegations in counts 1 and 2 flow

directly from Sheriff Allen’s administration of the jail—particularly his

alleged “implement[ation] [of] a custom of deliberate indifference to jail

maintenance.” (Dkt. 210 at 21.) This fits the bill of a “polic[y] or

procedure[] governing conditions of confinement” at the jail. See Purcell,

400 F.3d at 1325.

A Georgia sheriff also acts as an “arm of the state and is entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the particular function

of providing medical care” to pretrial detainees. Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1296;

see also McDaniel v. S. Corr. Med. LLC, 2024 WL 4471063, at *4 (11th

Cir. Oct. 11, 2024) (reaffirming Myrick). So Sheriff Allen’s decision to

select a medical provider he believed could deliver cost-effective care—

the decision Plaintiff attacks in Count 15—is precisely the sort of conduct

for which he “wears a state hat.” 69 F.4th at 1296; see also England v.

Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 2025 WL 4058244 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2025)

(relying on Myrick, finding Eleventh Amendment immunity, and

dismissing deliberate indifference to medical need claim where plaintiff

alleged substandard care by CorrectHealth).

Plaintiff does really dispute Sheriff Allen’s argument that Purcell

and Myrick support a finding of Eleventh Amendment Immunity on

Counts 1, 2, and 15. He instead insists Purcell misread the Eleventh

Circuit’s en banc opinion in Manders when it concluded “a sheriff acts as

an arm of the State when promulgating policies and procedures that

govern the conditions of confinement at a county jail.” (Dkt. 210 at 14–

19.) He insists Manders was not that expansive and Purcell should be

overruled. In support of this argument, he points to concurring opinions

in Andrews v. Biggers—one asserting Purcell was “incorrectly decided”

and the other calling for the Eleventh Circuit to “reevaluate” its

application of Eleventh Amendment immunity and “in particular [its]

decision in Purcell.” Andrews, 996 F.3d at 1236–43 (Wilson, J., and

Rosenbaum, J., separately concurring). But the Eleventh Circuit panel

in Andrews recognized the continued viability of those decisions. See id.

at 1236 (“[Plaintff] wants Purcell overruled and our Court to revisit the

factors discussed in Manders … Of course, we as a panel cannot overrule

Manders or Purcell”). Certainly this Court cannot overrule Eleventh

Circuit precedent. See McDaniel, 2024 WL 4471063, at *4 (“Indeed,

[plaintiff] devotes almost the entirety of his reply brief to arguing that

Myrick was wrongly decided. Of course, only a decision by this court

sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court can overrule a

prior panel decision.”).

Finally, in a last-gasp effort to avoid dismissal of counts 1, 2, and

15, Plaintiff argues Ҥ 1983 clearly abrogated Eleventh Amendment

immunity.” (Dkt. 210 at 16.) He is incorrect. The Supreme Court has

long held that Ҥ 1983 does not ... abrogate the Eleventh Amendment

immunity of the States.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); see

also Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.

1990) (“Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in

section 1983 cases.”).

Because Sheriff Allen is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

as to Counts 1, 2, and 15, the Court dismisses those claims against him

without prejudice.11

11 The parties dispute whether the Court should dismiss these claims

with or without prejudice. (Dkt. 210 at 17; Dkt. 214 at 6.) The law

VII. Clayton County’s Motion to Dismiss

“The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal

liability under § 1983.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329

(11th Cir. 2003). A county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on

the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Indeed, a county is liable only when the county’s

“official policy” causes a constitutional violation. Id. A plaintiff can

establish an official policy of a county by identifying (1) an officially

decreed policy, (2) an unofficial custom or practice that is so well settled

and widespread that it constitutes a custom with the force of law, or (3)

a county official with final policymaking authority who made a decision

that violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Chabad Chayil, Inc. v.

Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff seeks to hold Clayton County liable—via the “final

policymaker” avenue—for the Sheriff Office’s alleged custom of deliberate

indifference to prison maintenance (Count 1) and for CorrectHealth’s

requires dismissal without prejudice. See Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999,

1008 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Because the dismissals were based on sovereign

immunity grounds, the jurisdictional nature of the dismissal requires it

to be entered without prejudice.”).

alleged custom of deliberate indifference to inmate health (Count 15).

(Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 344–86, 502–14.). Clayton County contends it cannot be

held liable for either. The Court agrees.

A. Count 1: Failure to Maintain Prison

A key concept in municipal liability is that “local governments [such

as counties] can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those

[officials] whom the local government has no authority to control.” Grech,

335 F.3d at 1331. That’s a problem for Plaintiff because Clayton County

did not have “direct control” over the Sheriff’s Office’s actions in

administering or maintaining the jail. See id. (“The inquiry [] ask[s]

which government body, under state law had direct control over how the

sheriff fulfilled the duty at issue.”) As discussed above, the Sheriff acted

as an “arm of the state”—not of Clayton County—when he allegedly

“implement[ed] a custom of deliberate indifference to jail maintenance.”

(Dkt. 210 at 21.) The Sheriff’s “authority and duty to administer the jail

in his jurisdiction flows from the State, not [Clayton] County.” Manders,

338 F.3d at 1315. This makes sense—“Georgia’s Constitution [] makes

the sheriff’s office a constitutional office independent from the county

entity itself, precludes all county control, and grants only the State

control over sheriffs.” Id. at 1312. Because Clayton County does not

exercise control over the Sheriff—much less “direct control”—in

“promulgating policies and procedures governing conditions of

confinement” at the jail, he is not a “policymaker” for whom Clayton

County can be liable on the facts alleged in Count 1. See Purcell, 400

F.3d at 1325; see also Nimmons v. Gwinnett Cnty., Ga., 2014 WL

4230914, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2014) (“To the extent that Plaintiff

seeks to attribute … [sheriff’s] actions (or inaction), to Gwinnett County,

Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the County under Section 1983

because the County does not exercise control over the Sheriff’s personnel

decisions, or the policies and procedures established by the Sheriff that

governed the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement.”); Youngs v. Johnson,

2008 WL 4816731, at *9 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008) (finding county not

liable under Monell for prison policies of sheriff because, under Purcell,

sheriff was acting on behalf of the state); Robinson v. Houston Cnty., 2010

WL 2464901, at *8 (M.D. Ga. June 14, 2010) (same).

Though the parties largely focus on whether various Georgia

statutes impose a non-delegable duty on Clayton County to maintain the

jail, the Court need not delve into those arguments. They address the

wrong question for Monell purposes. To determine whether the Sheriff’s

Office was a “policymaker” acting on behalf of the County, the question

is not whether Georgia law statutorily confers some—or even most—

responsibility on Clayton County to maintain the jail. Rather, the

question is whether, under Georgia law, Clayton County exercised “direct

control” over the Sheriff when he engaged in the alleged conduct at issue.

See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331–32. (“Thus, the appropriate § 1983 inquiry

under federal law is whether defendant Clayton County, under Georgia

law, has control over the Sheriff in his law enforcement function.”). As

discussed, the County did not.

The Court dismisses Count 1 as to Clayton County.

B. Count 15: Inadequate Medical Care

In Count 15, Plaintiff alleges Clayton County, through

CorrectHealth as a final policymaker, “implemented a custom of

deliberate indifference to inmate health.” (Dkt. 205 at 20; Dkt. 176

¶¶ 502–14.) Clayton County raises two arguments for dismissal of this

count. First, it argues it satisfied its statutory duty under O.C.G.A. § 42-

5-2 to “maintain the inmate” by simply funding medical care at the jail

and that only the Sheriff can be liable for the policies of CorrectHealth

because, under Georgia law, the Sheriff has exclusive authority to select

medical contractors for the county jail. (Dkt. 213 at 10–15 (citing Bd. of

Comm’rs of Spalding Cty. v. Stewart, 668 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. 2008).)

Second, the County argues Plaintiff’s isolated incident, standing alone, is

insufficient to establish CorrectHealth maintains a custom of deliberate

indifference to inmate health. (Dkt 187-1 at 17.) Because the Court

agrees with Clayton County’s second contention, it does not address the

first.

Plaintiff fails to allege plausibly that CorrectHealth (even if a final

policymaker) had a custom of deliberate indifference to inmate health.

Plaintiff argues the Court can discern CorrectHealth’s custom from just

two instances—his own plight in April 2022 and that of another inmate

who allegedly received inadequate medical care from CorrectHealth in

January 2023. (Dkt. 205 at 20.) As an initial matter, the Court cannot

consider the January 2023 incident because that information appears

neither within the four corners of the Second Amended Complaint nor as

an exhibit attached to it.12 Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 584 n. 27

(11th Cir. 2023) (“In general, courts only consider the four corners of a

complaint and the complaint’s attached exhibits when analyzing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). And even if the Court did consider it,

CorrectHealth’s subsequent conduct, postdating Plaintiff’s incident by

nine months, cannot plausibly suggest a custom of deliberate indifference

existed at the time Plaintiff was treated by CorrectHealth. See Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 n. 7 (2011) (“[C]ontemporaneous or

subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of violations that would

provide notice to the cit[y] and the opportunity to conform to

constitutional dictates ....”).

That leaves just Plaintiff’s isolated incident as the basis for finding

CorrectHealth maintained a custom of deliberate indifference to inmate

health. But the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] single incident of a

constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a policy or custom.” Craig

v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011); see Grech, 335

12 Though the January 2023 incident is referenced in an exhibit attached

to Plaintiff’s original Complaint (Dkt. 1-2), he removed that exhibit when

he amended it. So, it is not properly before the Court.

F.3d at 1330 n.6 (“A single incident would not be so pervasive as to be a

custom.”). In Craig, the plaintiff—like Plaintiff here—sought to hold a

Georgia county liable for a private contractor’s alleged “custom of

deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees”

in a county jail. Id. at 1308. The plaintiff’s “proof of a policy or custom

rest[ed] entirely on a single incident of alleged unconstitutional

activity”—his own medical care while incarcerated. Id. at 1312. The

Eleventh Circuit held that was not enough to establish the private

contractor had a policy for which the county could be liable under

Monell.13 This Court follows suit.14

13 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “[the

contractor] had a policy or custom of using the least costly means of

treating patients and that this custom deprived him of his constitutional

right.” Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312. Plaintiff makes more or less the same

allegation in Count 15. (Dkt. 176 ¶ 551.) The Eleventh Circuit expressed

doubt that such a policy—similar to CorrectHealth’s alleged “cost

containment policy”—was constitutionally violative: “[E]ven on the

highly questionable assumption that the alleged policy or custom would

amount to a constitutional violation, Craig again relies on his experience

alone to prove a policy or custom.” Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312.

14 The Court recognizes “municipal liability may be imposed for a single

decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.”

Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997). But

Plaintiff does not travel under this theory, instead insisting it was

CorrectHealth’s policy or custom of “cost containment”—not a one-off

Plaintiff fails to allege CorrectHealth had a custom or practice of

deliberate indifference to inmates’ medical needs. See id. Accordingly,

the Court dismisses Count 15 as to Clayton County.

VIII. Punitive Damages and Attorneys’ Fees

In addition to the underlying claims against them, Defendants

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and attorneys’

decision—that led to the violation of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. 176

¶¶ 508–13; Dkt. 205 at 16 (“[Riley] has plausibly pleaded facts showing

that CorrectHealth had a custom that constituted deliberate indifference

to his constitutional rights. Since this custom of CorrectHealth may

fairly be said to represent official policy of the County, it is also the

County’s custom of deliberate indifference.”)

And even if Plaintiff did go the “single decision” route, he does not allege

facts that would support it. A county can only be liable for the decisions

of a final policymaker when that official’s decisions are not subject to

“meaningful administrative review.” See Chabad-Chayil, 48 F.4th at

1230. Further, whether an official has final policymaking authority is

determined by state law and, where the “party at issue [] is a corporation

contracting with the state, the relevant ‘state law’ for policymaking

determinations are the contracts between [the corporation], the state,

and [the corporation’s] employees.” Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 724

(11th Cir. 1991). Neither Plaintiff’s complaint nor opposition brief

address whether the challenged decisions of CorrectHealth were subject

to “meaningful administrative review” or whether CorrectHealth’s

contract with the Sheriff’s Office gave it final policymaking authority on

behalf of Clayton County. Thus, even if Plaintiff did allege Clayton

County was liable for a single decision of CorrectHealth as its final

policymaker, his claim in Count 15 would still fall short.

fees. (Dkt. 187-1 at 14; Dkt. 197-1 at 20; Dkt. 198-1 at 24.) Because the

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s underlying claims against Sheriff Allen and

Clayton County, his claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees

against those Defendants are dismissed as well. See Popham v.

Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 798 S.E.2d 257, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)

(“[A]wards of punitive damages and attorney fees are derivative of

underlying claims, where those claims fail, claims for punitive damages

and attorney fees also fail.”). However, because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

will proceed against Sheriff Boehrer, Major Criss, and Officer Williams,

his claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees remain viable against

them.

IX. Motion to Add Parties

The final matter the Court must address is Plaintiff’s Motion to Add

Defendants (Dkt. 196). He seeks to amend his complaint—for a third

time—to add six jail officials as defendants and an additional seven

counts. (Id. at 5–6.) Defendants argue against the addition of these

parties and claims on the grounds they are time-barred. The Court,

however, believes Plaintiff may be able to proceed under Georgia’s crime-

victim exception, which tolls the statute of limitations for claims “that

may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the

facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime

... until the prosecution of such crime ... has become final or otherwise

terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years.” O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-99.15

Nevertheless, the Court has concerns with how Plaintiff wishes to

proceed with this case. Although he may generally prosecute the case as

he sees fit, the Court fears Plaintiff is simply trying to throw the “kitchen

sink” at Defendants in a manner that will burden both the parties and

the Court and unnecessarily delay the resolution of this matter.

Importantly, many of the proposed claims are subsumed by or duplicative

of the claims against Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major Criss in Count

2. Because the Court finds those claims survive dismissal, it offers

Plaintiff the opportunity to re-evaluate whether he believes it necessary

to bring all—or even some—of the claims against the prospective

defendants. To that end, the Court STAYS Plaintiff’s Motion to Add

15 Even if the statute of limitations does not bar the new claims, the

requirements of Rule 15 might. The Court reserves judgment on that

question pending the hearing discussed below.

Parties (Dkt. 196) pending a hearing on the matter. At that hearing, the

parties will discuss the most efficient and just path forward. The Court

SETS the hearing for March 31, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., in Courtroom 1906,

Richard B. Russell Federal Building, 75 Ted Turner Drive, SW, Atlanta,

Georgia 30303.

X. Conclusion

Here’s where things stand. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion

for Judicial Notice (Dkt. 218). The Court GRANTS Clayton County’s

Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 187) and Clayton County is DISMISSED from

this action. The Court also GRANTS Sheriff Allen’s Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt. 197) and Sheriff Allen is DISMISSED from this action. The Court

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Interim Sheriff Boehrer,

Major Criss, and Officer Williams’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 198). Counts

11 and 13 against Officer Williams are dismissed, while Count 12 may

proceed. Count 2 may proceed as to Interim Sheriff Boehrer and Major

Criss. Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Parties (Dkt. 196) is STAYED and

ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED pending the hearing on the

matter.

SO ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2026.

Ma L. BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

49