Estate of Elmer Gordon Waggoner v. Anonymous Health System, Inc.

FILED

Mar 04 2026, 2:04 pm

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 26S-CT-71

Shantel Waggoner, Individually and as Executrix of

the Estate of Elmer Gordon Waggoner,

Appellant (Plaintiff below),

–v–

Anonymous Health System, Inc., et al.,

Appellees (Defendants below).

Argued: September 25, 2025 | Decided: March 4, 2026

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court

No. 82D01-2308-CT-3727

The Honorable Leslie C. Shively, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 24A-CT-469

Opinion by Justice Goff

Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.

Goff, Justice.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, our state and federal

governments declared a state of emergency to prevent the spread of the

virus. To protect healthcare workers at the frontlines, the legislature

enacted statutes to immunize them from civil liability in certain cases

where a patient’s injury arose from actions taken in response to COVID-

19. Here, a patient was medically immobilized and placed on a ventilator

as part of his COVID-19 treatment. He developed a bed sore and

ultimately died from the wound. His estate filed a proposed complaint

under the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) against over eighty Healthcare

Providers (or just the Providers), alleging negligence. In response, the

Providers argue they are immune from liability under statute. The issues

here are (1) whether the trial court can make a preliminary determination

on immunity without expert opinion from a medical-review panel, and (2)

whether the Providers are entitled to statutory immunity. Concluding that

the court can make a preliminary determination on immunity and that

Providers are immune here, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary

judgment for the Providers.

Facts and Procedural History

On March 6, 2020, Governor Eric Holcomb issued Executive Order 20-

02, declaring the COVID-19 pandemic a state public-health emergency

under Indiana Code subsection 10-14-3-12(a). The emergency was

rescinded on March 3, 2022. Exec. Order 22-09. Similarly, the Secretary of

the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

issued a federal public-health emergency on March 17, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg.

15198, 15198 (Mar. 17, 2020). The public-health emergency under the

Public Health Service Act was rescinded on May 11, 2023, with some

liability protections under the Public Readiness and Emergency

Preparedness Act (PREP Act) extending longer. 89 Fed. Reg. 99875, 99876,

99882 (Dec. 11, 2024).

In January 2022, while the state and federal health emergencies were

still in effect, Elmer Waggoner was hospitalized in Kentucky after testing

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 2 of 15

positive for the COVID-19 virus and developing pneumonitis. As his

symptoms worsened, he was transported to a second Kentucky hospital

where he was intubated and put on a ventilator. Then, on January 27, he

was transferred to Anonymous Hospital 1 in Indiana where he was

medically paralyzed and kept on a ventilator. The ventilator was briefly

removed in early February but replaced within four days. On February 10,

2022, Elmer developed a pressure wound, also known as a bed sore, on his

lower back and began wound care.

On March 3, 2022, Elmer was still on a ventilator but was not testing

positive for the COVID-19 virus when he was transferred to Anonymous

Hospital 3, also in Indiana. The same day, Governor Holcomb rescinded

the COVID-19 state of emergency. The federal public-health emergency

was still in effect. Elmer’s bed sore continued to worsen and showed signs

of necrosis. On March 17, Elmer was transferred back to Anonymous

Hospital 1 where he died twelve days later.

Elmer’s death certificate listed his cause of death as cardiopulmonary

arrest with the following conditions leading to the arrest: acute hypoxic

and hypercapnic respiratory failure, sepsis, and necrotizing fasciitis.

When he died, Elmer’s bed sore spanned from the outside of his left thigh

to his lower back.

In March 2023, Elmer’s wife and the executrix of his estate, Shantel

Waggoner (the Estate), filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana

Department of Insurance. The Estate alleged that over eighty proposed

defendants, including hospitals and doctors, had committed medical

malpractice while treating the bed sore. In May 2023, the federal

government rescinded its declaration of a public-health emergency for

COVID-19. In July 2023, one of the Providers requested the formation of a

medical-review panel. In August 2023, before the panel could be

established, Providers filed a petition for preliminary determination and

motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from

liability under Indiana Code chapter 34-30-13.5 (the Healthcare Immunity

Act), Indiana Code chapter 34-30-32 (2022) (expired December 31, 2024)

(the Premises Immunity Act), and 42 U.S.C. section 247d-6d (the PREP

Act) (collectively, the Immunity Statutes). Providers argued they were

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 3 of 15

immune from liability because they provided medical care to Elmer

during the COVID-19 emergency, and all his care was in treatment of his

COVID-19 infection and its complications.

The Estate moved to dismiss or stay the Providers’ petition, arguing

that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make a

preliminary decision on immunity. The Estate argued that the Providers’

motion for summary judgment required the trial court to address medical

causation, which falls within the medical-review panel’s subject-matter

jurisdiction under the MMA.

The trial court issued an order granting Providers’ motion for summary

judgment and dismissing the complaint with prejudice after finding the

Providers entitled to statutory immunity. The trial court found that

immunity was an issue for the court, not the medical-review panel. The

trial court then determined the Providers were immune under the

Immunity Statutes because Elmer’s care arose from the COVID-19

emergency, even though he received some care after the state-emergency

order expired. The Estate appealed.

In a unanimous, published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed,

holding that whether the Providers are entitled to immunity is an issue

reserved for the medical-review panel. Waggoner v. Anonymous Healthcare

Sys., Inc., 250 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Although Elmer was

originally hospitalized and treated for his COVID-19 symptoms, the court

explained, the Estate’s expert opined that Elmer’s death was caused by

inadequate treatment of the pressure wound, not by his COVID-19

symptoms. Id. at 1099. Therefore, the court concluded that “the question of

causation should be left to the medical review panel,” and it was “too

early in the proceedings to determine” whether the Immunity Statutes

immunized the Providers. See id. at 1100. The Governor also rescinded the

state disaster emergency during Elmer’s treatment, so the court concluded

the Healthcare Immunity Act did not immunize treatment after that date.

Id. at 1099.

Providers petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the

opinion of the Court of Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 4 of 15

Standards of Review

We will grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We will draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d

1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). We review a trial court’s summary-judgment ruling

under a de novo standard. Id. In addition, the scope of the trial court’s

preliminary-determination jurisdiction and interpretation of the Immunity

Statutes are legal questions we review de novo. See Gierek v. Anonymous 1,

250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025); see ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police

Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016).

Discussion and Decision

Because it is undisputed for summary-judgment purposes that the

alleged negligent treatment arose from COVID-19, we conclude that the

trial court can make a preliminary determination on immunity by

interpreting the relevant statutes without the opinion of the medical-

review panel. We also conclude the Providers here are immune from

liability under the Immunity Statutes because Elmer’s treatment arose

from COVID-19.

I. The MMA permits the trial court to assert

jurisdiction on the threshold question of

immunity.

Under the MMA, a medical-review panel typically must first “render

an opinion on a claimant’s proposed complaint before the claimant can

sue a health-care provider in court.” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 394 (quoting

Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 376 (Ind. 2022)).

Although a “claimant may commence an action in court for malpractice at

the same time the claimant’s proposed complaint is being considered by a

medical review panel,” Ind. Code § 34-18-8-7(a), the trial court has

“limited authority to assert jurisdiction over threshold issues while a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 5 of 15

proposed complaint is pending before the medical review panel,” Lorenz

v. Anonymous Physician #1, 51 N.E.3d 391, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing

I.C. § 34-18-8-7(a)(3)). “[A]n issue that does not require expert opinion is

not reserved to the medical review panel and may be subject to

preliminary determination by the trial court.” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 396

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The limited authority under the MMA to assert jurisdiction over

threshold issues permits the trial court to “preliminarily determine an

affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily

determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure.” Id. at 394 (quoting I.C.

§ 34-18-11-1(a)(1)). But the MMA prohibits a trial court from issuing a

preliminary determination on “any affirmative defense or issue of law or

fact reserved for written opinion by the medical review panel.” I.C. § 34-

18-11-1(b). This can include opinions on whether the “defendants failed to

comply with the appropriate standard of care” and whether the “conduct

complained of was or was not a factor of the resultant damages.” Id.; I.C.

§§ 34-18-10-22(b)(1), (4). In other words, questions about the standard of

care and causation are generally reserved for the medical-review panel.

The Estate argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the trial court

cannot make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity here

because the medical-review panel needs to first opine on the cause of

Elmer’s death. Providers, on the other hand, argue that the trial court can

make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity because it does

not require expert opinion.

We agree with the Providers.

Asserting the affirmative defense of immunity “assumes negligence but

denies liability.” Putnam Cnty. Sheriff v. Price, 954 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Ind.

2011). By arguing they are immune, the Providers, for purposes of the

preliminary determination, admit the Estate’s essential allegation that

Elmer died from negligent treatment of an infected bed sore and related

complications. Assuming Elmer died from the bed sore, there is no need

for expert opinion to determine whether Providers’ treatment of the bed

sore was related to COVID-19. See Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, 998

N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding the trial court had

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 6 of 15

jurisdiction to preliminarily determine the issue of immunity where expert

opinion was not necessary to the determination); Ashley v. Anonymous 1,

245 N.E.3d 658, 2024 WL 4142508, * 3 (Ind. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2024) (mem.)

(holding that, given the admission a patient developed bed sores while

being treated for COVID-19, “no expert opinion was required to

determine whether [the patient’s] injury was related to the actions taken

by [p]roviders (i.e., placing him on a ventilator for an extended period of

time) to treat him for complications of COVID-19”), trans. denied. In other

words, while expert opinion would have been necessary if the Immunity

Statutes required COVID-19 to be the cause of Elmer’s death, no expert

opinion is needed here to determine if treatment of the bed sore was related

to COVID-19. See infra Section II. So, expert opinion from the medical-

review panel is not needed, and the court can interpret the relevant

statutes to make a preliminary determination on immunity.

Having concluded that a court can make a preliminary determination

on immunity here, we turn to the Immunity Statutes.

II. The Providers are immune from civil liability

under state and federal law.

Providers are immune from liability under the state Healthcare

Immunity Act and state Premises Immunity Act because Elmer’s

treatment arose in response to the state disaster emergency for COVID-19.

Likewise, Providers are also immune from liability under the federal

PREP Act because Elmer’s death arose from use of a covered

countermeasure, a ventilator, to treat COVID-19.

A. Providers are immune from civil liability under state

law.

The Providers are immune from civil liability for Elmer’s death under

the Healthcare Immunity Act and Premises Immunity Act because his

treatment arose from COVID-19.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 7 of 15

The Healthcare Immunity Act was enacted as part of broader

legislation to insulate and protect areas of public life at risk from the

COVID-19 pandemic. See Mellowitz v. Ball State Univ., 221 N.E.3d 1214,

1218–19 (Ind. 2023). The Healthcare Immunity Act provides in pertinent

part that a healthcare provider “may not be held civilly liable for an act or

omission relating to the provision or delay of health care services or

emergency medical services arising from a state disaster emergency

declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-30-13.5-

1(b)(1) (emphases added). Damages arising from a state disaster emergency

means an injury or harm “caused by or resulting from an act or omission

performed in response to a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-

14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19,” and “arising from COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-

6-2.1-13 (formerly codified at I.C. § 34-6-2-10.5 (2022)) (emphasis added).

“Arising from COVID-19” means an injury or harm caused by “services,

treatment, or other actions performed for COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-6-2.1-

14(b)(2) (formerly codified at I.C. § 34-6-2-10.4(b)(2) (2022)). This

immunity applies “during a period of a state disaster emergency declared

under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster

emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1,

2022.” I.C. § 34-30-13.5-1(b).

Furthermore, the Premises Immunity Act protects healthcare providers

from civil liability for providing services during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Under the Premises Immunity Act, “a person is immune from civil tort

liability for damages arising from COVID-19: (1) on the premises owned

or operated by the person” or “(2) on any premises on which the person or

an employee or agent of the person provided property or services to

another person.” I.C. §§ 34-30-32-6(1), (2) (2022). Damages “arising from

COVID-19” means “an injury or harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the

actual, alleged, or possible exposure to or contraction of COVID-19” or

“(2) services, treatment, or other actions performed for COVID-19.” I.C. § 34-

30-32-2 (2022) (emphases added). Although it expired on December 31,

2024, the Premises Immunity Act applies to causes of action that accrued

on or after March 1, 2020. I.C. §§ 34-30-32-1, -11 (2022).

Here, the Estate argues that Elmer’s death did not arise from a state

disaster emergency or arise from COVID-19 because he was not testing

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 8 of 15

positive for COVID-19 when he died, and instead, his death was caused

by Providers’ failure to treat his bed sore. Appellant’s Br. at 22;

Appellant’s App. Vol. 4, pp. 88–89 (sworn affidavit of Elmer’s wife);

Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 109 (the Estate’s expert opining that Elmer’s

bed sore progressed to necrotizing fasciitis which “caused and hastened

his death”). The Estate therefore also argues that the medical-review panel

needs to decide if Elmer’s death was caused by COVID-19, the bed sore, or

something else. But assuming the facts alleged in the complaint are true—

Elmer developed a bed sore and then died—Elmer’s treatment still arose

from COVID-19, making the Providers immune under the state immunity

statutes.

At least two decisions from the Court of Appeals support our

conclusion. In Ashley, the Court of Appeals held that medical providers

were immune from liability when the patient developed bed sores during

his treatment for COVID-19. 2024 WL 4142508 at *1–*2. The court

concluded that the patient’s injuries arose from services provided for

COVID-19 because he developed the bed sores while medically

immobilized for an extended period of time to be placed on a ventilator as

part of his COVID-19 pneumonia treatment. Id. at *4. And in Fluhr v.

Anonymous Doctor 1, the Court of Appeals held that medical providers

were immune from liability under the Healthcare Immunity Act when

they delayed treating the patient’s stroke to conduct COVID-19 isolation

procedures. 234 N.E.3d 912, 915, 917, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

Even though the patient did not have COVID-19, the delay in treatment

arose from measures taken to limit the spread of COVID-19. Id. at 917.

Like the patients in Ashley and Fluhr, Elmer’s injuries arose from

treatment in response to COVID-19. According to the Estate’s own expert,

when Elmer developed COVID-19, he suffered from intractable

respiratory failure and needed mechanical ventilation to live. Appellant’s

App. Vol. 3, p. 109. By being immobilized for an extended period of time

as part of his COVID-19 treatment, the expert opined, Elmer developed

the bed sore. Id. Even assuming the Estate is correct that Elmer died from

a failure to treat his bed sore rather than COVID-19, he would not have

developed the bed sore in the first place had he not developed COVID-19

and needed the assistance of a ventilator. Therefore, his injuries arose

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 9 of 15

from services provided in response to the “state disaster emergency” or from

“services, treatment, or other actions performed for COVID-19,” making

the Providers immune under the Healthcare Immunity Act and Premises

Immunity Act.

Still, the Estate argues that the Healthcare Immunity Act does not apply

because the state disaster emergency expired before Elmer died. The

Governor first declared the state disaster emergency on March 6, 2020,

and Elmer began treatment at Anonymous Hospital 1 on January 27, 2022,

during the emergency. The Governor then rescinded the state disaster

emergency on March 3, 2022, and Elmer died later that month on March

29, 2022. Although Elmer died after the emergency expired, the Providers’

care still arose in response to and during the state disaster emergency. That

some of the Providers’ care extended beyond the expiration of the

emergency does not change the fact that their services still arose during the

emergency. Therefore, the civil immunity afforded by the Healthcare

Immunity Act could “appl[y] to medical services provided either before or

after the actual disaster emergency declaration from the Governor.” 2017

Ind. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 8, at 6 (Dec. 4, 2017). And even if the Healthcare

Immunity Act no longer applied, the Premises Immunity Act still applied

because it did not expire until 2024, after Elmer’s death.

Finally, the Estate argues that the Providers are not immune or that the

medical-review panel should decide immunity because the Estate alleged

that Providers were grossly negligent. Under the Healthcare Immunity

Act, a provider “is not immune from civil liability if the damages resulting

from the act or omission relating to the provision or delay of the health

care services resulted from the person’s gross negligence, willful or

wanton misconduct, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation.” I.C. § 34-30-

13.5-2. The Premises Immunity Act also does not provide immunity for

“gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.” I.C. § 34-30-32-7

(2022). “Gross negligence” is the “conscious, voluntary act or omission in

reckless disregard of … the consequences to another party.” N. Ind. Pub.

Serv. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1057 (7th ed. 1999)). For willful or wanton misconduct, the

wrongdoer must intentionally engage in misconduct or be conscious of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 10 of 15

the misconduct and the probability it will cause injury. Hershberger v.

Brooker, 421 N.E.2d 672, 678, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

The Estate alleged for the first time that Elmer’s injuries were due to

gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, fraud, or intentional

misrepresentation in its response to Providers’ motion for summary

judgment. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 22, 187, 192. But the Estate failed to

designate any evidence to support finding gross negligence. The Estate

provided a report where an expert opined that necrotizing fasciitis caused

and hastened Elmer’s death and that Elmer’s bed sore was “inadequately

treated,” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 109, but the Estate provided no

evidence that Providers consciously or intentionally mistreated Elmer, see

McGowen v. Montes, 152 N.E.3d 654, 660–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding

summary judgment proper where the designated evidence undisputably

showed that the defendant was not grossly negligent and did not commit

willful or wanton misconduct), trans. denied. Therefore, the exception to

immunity for gross negligence does not apply.

B. Providers are immune under the federal PREP Act.

Even if expiration of the state disaster emergency deprived the

Providers of immunity, and even if the Estate designated evidence of

gross negligence, the Providers are still immune from liability under the

federal PREP Act.

The PREP Act authorizes the HHS to issue a declaration in the event of

a public-health emergency. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a). Once the declaration is

issued, the PREP Act immunizes “covered person[s]” from “suit and

liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused

by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the

use by an individual of a covered countermeasure” to respond to the

emergency. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1) (emphases added). In other words,

the PREP Act preempts claims under state law, such as negligence, as it

relates to the administration of covered countermeasures. A “covered

countermeasure” includes a “qualified pandemic or epidemic product.”

42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(A). A medical device is a “qualified pandemic or

epidemic product” when it is used “to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 11 of 15

or cure a pandemic or epidemic” or “to limit the harm such pandemic or

epidemic might otherwise cause,” and is “authorized for emergency use”

by the FDA. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(B)(iii).

And a “covered person” includes those qualified to administer

countermeasures. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iv). If a patient alleges

injuries caused by the administration of covered countermeasures, the

plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is to seek compensation from the federal

“Covered Countermeasures Process Fund.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6e(a), (b)(4),

(d)(4).

Here, the HHS Secretary issued an emergency declaration on March 17,

2020, triggering the PREP Act and declaring “the spread of” COVID-19 “a

public health emergency.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 15198. The federal public-health

emergency under the Public Health Service Act ended in May 2023, with

some PREP immunity extending even longer, meaning the entirety of

Elmer’s treatment and death occurred while PREP immunity was in effect.

89 Fed. Reg. at 99876, 99882. What’s more, Elmer’s injuries were “caused

by, ar[ose] out of, relat[ed] to, or result[ed] from” the provision of a

covered countermeasure—a ventilator—in response to COVID-19. Elmer’s

ventilator was a covered countermeasure because it was used to treat

COVID-19, and ventilators were authorized by the FDA for emergency

use. See Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, FDA, to

Manufacturers and Other Stakeholders (Mar. 24, 2020),

https://www.fda.gov/media/136423/download?attachment. Next, the

Estate’s own expert opined that Elmer’s bed sore was caused by being

medically immobilized for an extended period so that he could be placed

on a ventilator. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 109. Because the Estate’s claims

arise from the Providers’ provision of a covered countermeasure during

the public-health emergency, the Providers are “covered persons” and

immune under the PREP Act from civil liability for both federal and state-

law claims. Although the Estate argues Elmer’s death arose from a bed

sore, not COVID-19, the “chain of events cannot be separated from the

administration of a covered countermeasure.” See Cowen v. Walgreen Co.,

No. 22-CV-157-TCK-JFJ, 2022 WL 17640208, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 13,

2022). Elmer would not have developed the bed sore and needed a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 12 of 15

ventilator as a treatment had he not suffered respiratory failure from

COVID-19.

Nor does the PREP Act’s exception to immunity for willful misconduct

apply here. Under the PREP Act, “the sole exception to the immunity from

suit and liability of covered persons ... shall be for an exclusive Federal cause

of action against a covered person for death or serious physical injury

proximately caused by willful misconduct.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1)

(emphases added). Willful misconduct consists of acts or omissions taken

“(i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without

legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious

risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will outweigh

the benefit.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A). A plaintiff asserting a willful-

misconduct claim must first seek compensation from the Covered

Countermeasures Process Fund. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d)(1). If the plaintiff is

eligible for compensation but chooses to instead file suit, the plaintiff must

file in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42

U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(1). Because the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction

over any willful misconduct claim, and because the Estate did not make

such a claim in federal court, the PREP Act’s exception to immunity does

not apply.

Because the Providers are immune from civil liability here, the trial

court did not err in granting summary judgment to Providers.

Conclusion

Our lawmakers chose as a matter of policy to immunize healthcare

providers working the frontlines in response to the COVID-19 emergency.

Assuming the patient here died from his bed sore rather than COVID-19,

his bed sore still arose from treatment he was receiving due to his COVID-

19. Therefore, the Providers’ services here fall within the Immunity

Statutes. We affirm.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 13 of 15

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ANONYMO US P HYSI C IANS

Arie J. Lipinski 1–3 , 5 –12, 14–17 , 19 , 21, 23–

Lipinski Law 27 , 30 , 32 , 34 , 39 , 43–4 7 , 5 0 , 5 2

Indianapolis, Indiana & 54, ANONYMOUS

PHYSICAL THERAPISTS 1–3,

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

AN D ANONYMOUS

ANONYMOUS SURGERY OCCUPAT I ONAL

CENTER 1 AND ANONYMOUS THERAPISTS 1–3

PHYSICIANS 18, 20, 22, 28, Colleen O. Davis

31, 48, & 56

Thompson Miller & Simpson, PLC

Katherine M. Haire

Louisville, Kentucky

Trenton W. Gill

Reminger Co., LPA ATTORNE YS FOR A P P EL LE ES

Indianapolis, Indiana ANONYMOUS HOS PITAL 3 ,

ANONYMOUS HOS PITAL 3 ,

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

L LC , A NONYMOUS

ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 29

OCCUPAT I ONAL

Ryan T. Wood

THERAPISTS 4 & 5 , AND

Kyle L. Childress

ANONYMOUS P HYSI CAL

Barnes Maloney, PLLC

THERAPIST 4

Louisville, Kentucky

Allyson R. Breeden

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Alyssa F. Ricker

ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 55 Stoll Keenon Ogden, PLLC

David S. Strite Evansville, Indiana

Nicholas J. Davis

O’Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC ATTORNE YS F OR A P P EL LE E

Louisville, Kentucky S ANONYMO US P HYSI C IANS

13 , 3 5 –38, 40–42

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Margaret M. Christensen

ANONYMOUS HEALTH Moncerrat Z. Alvarez

SYSTEM, INC., ANONYMOUS Dentons Bingham Greenebaum LLP

HOSPITAL 1 INC, Indianapolis, Indiana

ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN

GROUPS 1–4, ANONYMOUS

HOSPITAL 2, ANONYMOUS

HOSPITAL 2, LLC,

ANONYMOUS CLINIC, INC.,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 14 of 15

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 4 ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 51

Patrick P. Devine Mark E. Hammond

Sam S. Zabaneh Morgan N. Blind

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP O’Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC

Schererville, Indiana Louisville, Kentucky

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 53

Jon M. Pinnick

Schultz & Pogue, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CT-71 | March 4, 2026 Page 15 of 15