The opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 25-1716
____________
ROBERT BOYER, Executor of the Estate of Tamra Smith, Deceased;
ROBERT BOYER
v.
MICHAEL MULVEY,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00242)
District Judge: Honorable Karoline Mehalchick
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 6, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 4, 2026)
_______________
OPINION *
_______________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Mulvey appeals an order denying his motion
for summary judgment. Trooper Mulvey was sued by Robert Boyer, who claimed his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Mulvey searched his residence. Because
Mulvey was entitled to qualified immunity, we will reverse the judgment of the District
Court.
I
Boyer was the mayor of Wyoming Borough from January 2006 until January
2018. During that time, he also ran a catering business—Boyer Brothers Bar-B-Que and
Deli Food Truck.
In January 2018, Mayor Boyer authored a letter in support of the Wyoming
Borough Council’s application for a grant of state funds to renovate the West Wyoming
Hose Company’s firehouse. The Hose Company is a non-profit corporation providing
volunteer fire and ambulance service to West Wyoming and Wyoming boroughs.
A month later, when Boyer was no longer mayor, a local news station reported on
the proposed firehouse renovation. The firehouse had a banquet hall and it listed Boyer as
its preferred caterer for events. Boyer Brothers Bar-B-Que and Deli Food Truck listed the
firehouse as its address. The news station also reported that the grant would be used to,
among other things, upgrade the firehouse’s heating and air conditioning system and
expand the kitchen in the firehouse’s banquet hall.
After Mulvey learned of the news report, he began to investigate whether Mayor
Boyer had violated the Pennsylvania Public Official and Employee Ethics Act by
2
engaging in “conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.” 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1103(a);
The Ethics Act defines a conflict of interest as “[u]se by a public official or public
employee of the authority of his office or employment . . . for the private pecuniary
benefit of himself . . . or a business with which he . . . is associated.” 65 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 1102. But a conflict of interest “does not include an action having a de minimis
economic impact,” which the act further defines as “[a]n economic consequence which
has an insignificant effect.” Id. Nor does it cover an action “which affects to the same
degree a class consisting of the general public or a subclass consisting of an industry,
occupation or other group which includes the public official . . . or a business with which
he . . . is associated.” Id.
Mulvey confirmed that Boyer used the firehouse as the address for his catering
company in print and social media advertising services. So he spoke with Senior Deputy
Attorney General (SDAG) Bernard Anderson from the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s
Office, who advised Mulvey to further investigate what Anderson thought might be an
Ethics Act violation. The State Police sent information to Brian Jacisin, the Deputy
Executive Director for the State Ethics Commission, about Boyer’s involvement in the
grant application. Mulvey and Jacisin agreed to meet to discuss the matter.
Mulvey claimed that, ahead of his planned meeting with Jacisin, he reviewed the
grant application, the minutes of the Wyoming Borough Council discussing the grant
application, and Boyer’s letter supporting the grant. Mulvey also claimed he spoke with
Councilman Michael Baloga, who related that at executive sessions before the Council’s
vote on the grant application, Boyer and his girlfriend, Tamra Smith—who at the time
3
was the Wyoming Borough manager—“were very adamant about obtaining the grant” for
the Firehouse. App. 262.
Mulvey then met with Jacisin and Special Investigator for the State Ethics
Commission Jonathan Fry. Jacisin and Fry reviewed the grant application; after their
review, Mulvey “determined that there [were] clearly ethics violations.” App. 263.
Jacisin “indicated that it was an ethics violation to conduct personal business out of the
Hose Company banquet hall.” App. 488. Jacisin and Fry stated that the State Ethics
Commission wanted to work with the State Police on this investigation. As the
investigation continued, Mulvey saw more postings on the Bar-B-Que and Deli Food
Truck Facebook page, one of which stated: “we work out of the West Wyoming Fire
Hall.” App. 268.
In April 2018, Mulvey drafted a warrant application to search Boyer’s home for
evidence of an Ethics Act violation. Before Mulvey filed the application, he had SDAG
Anderson review and approve it. In the affidavit of probable cause, Mulvey recounted the
findings of his investigation:
• The Wyoming Borough Council had submitted a Local Share Account
grant application to renovate the West Wyoming Firehouse.
• The firehouse has a banquet hall out of which Boyer, while mayor of
Wyoming Borough, was operating his catering business.
• Boyer listed the firehouse’s address in both print and social media
advertisements as the address for his business
• The renovations to the firehouse included “an upgrade to the heating and air
conditioning systems at the facility as well as an expanded kitchen.” App.
71.
• Mayor Boyer sent a letter to the Secretary for the Department of Economic
and Community Development supporting the grant application.
4
Based on these findings, Mulvey averred that he had probable cause to believe Boyer had
“engaged in the criminal activities of at least attempted violations of the PA State Ethics
Act, specifically Section 1103(a) Conflict of Interest.” App. 74. Mulvey further averred
that the search would uncover evidence of at least Boyer’s attempted violation of
Section 1103(a), such as checks, contracts, and correspondence between Boyer’s business
and the Firehouse.
A magisterial district judge issued the warrant to search Boyer’s home. During the
search, State Police officers seized several items, including Boyer’s computer and
financial documents. Thereafter, the Hose Company stopped permitting Boyer to operate
his catering business out of the firehouse and the business ceased operating entirely.
Boyer sued Mulvey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the search of his home
lacked probable cause in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
parties moved for summary judgment, disputing whether Mulvey’s search warrant was
supported by probable cause. Mulvey also argued that he was entitled to qualified
immunity.
The District Court denied both motions. It first held that there was an issue of
material fact as to whether Mulvey had probable cause to believe evidence of an Ethics
Act violation would be found in Boyer’s home. Turning to qualified immunity, the
District Court determined that “the right to be free from unlawful searches except on
probable cause” was clearly established. Boyer v. Mulvey, 2025 WL 848455, at *7 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 18, 2025). Without pointing to any factually analogous case, the Court
concluded that if the warrant application’s description of the renovations was misleading,
5
then a reasonable juror could find that Mulvey violated clearly established Fourth
Amendment law. So the District Court denied Mulvey’s motion for summary judgment
on qualified immunity.
II 1
On appeal, Mulvey reiterates his contention that he is entitled to summary
judgment. We agree. Because Mulvey did not violate clearly established Fourth
Amendment law, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Mulvey is entitled to a presumption of qualified immunity because he consulted
with two investigators for the State Ethics Commission before filing the warrant
application, and that reliance was objectively reasonable. See Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010). This presumption serves the “salutary
purpose” of “encouraging police to seek legal advice” and rests on the common-sense
notion that officers cannot be expected “to be as conversant in the law as lawyers and
judges who have the benefit not only of formal legal training, but also the advantage of
deliberate study.” Id. at 255. Mulvey’s consultation with these ethics experts, who
reviewed the underlying grant application, led him to conclude that “there [were] clearly
ethics violations.” App. 263, 488. To overcome this presumption, Boyer had to show that
“a reasonable officer would not have relied on [their] advice.” Kelly, 622 F.3d at 256.
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
6
Boyer did not make this showing, and the District Court never addressed this
presumption despite Mulvey’s reliance on it in his briefing below.
Presumption aside, the District Court’s qualified immunity analysis also erred
because it articulated the clearly established law too abstractly. The District Court held
that it was clearly established that people have “the right to be free from unlawful
searches except on probable cause.” Boyer, 2025 WL 848455, at *7. True enough. But
for purposes of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed that
courts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
779 (2014)). Defining “extremely abstract rights,” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or using “general proposition[s] . . . is of
little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly
established,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). And as we recently
explained: “existing law must clearly establish what this officer did in these
circumstances violated the plaintiff’s rights,” and “that framing is especially important
for Fourth Amendment claims because probable cause depends heavily on each case’s
facts.” Urda v. Sokso, 146 F.4th 311, 314 (3d Cir. 2025).
The two cases the District Court relied on to formulate its broad abstraction—
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012), and Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690
(3d Cir. 2017)—also do not present analogous facts. Messerschmidt considered whether
there was probable cause to search the suspect’s home for “all guns,” even though he had
used only a sawed-off shotgun to fire at his girlfriend. 565 U.S. at 540, 548–49. And
7
Andrews involved a § 1983 suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution based on an
officer’s misrepresentations and omissions in an affidavit supporting a warrant to arrest a
man for attempting to lure a fifteen-year-old girl into his car. 853 F.3d at 694–95. 2
Neither case can “put the illegality of [Mulvey’s] conduct ‘beyond debate.’” Urda, 146
F.4th at 314–15 (citation omitted). Boyer cites a third case, Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ.,
834 F.3d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 2016). But like Andrews, Dempsey did not involve a search,
so it could not have clearly established the relevant law for this case. Id. at 463–66.
Boyer also argues that it should have been clear that any potential benefit from the
firehouse renovation would be de minimis. But under Pennsylvania law, there is no
“bright-line determination” as to what counts as de minimis, and the de minimis inquiry
is “highly fact specific and must be considered on a case by case basis.” Seropian v. State
Ethics Comm’n, 20 A.3d 534, 545 n.10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011). Boyer once again does
not point to analogous authority that would put a reasonable officer like Mulvey on notice
that his conduct was clearly unlawful.
* * *
2
“To be sure,” Andrews “seemed to analyze qualified immunity at a high level of
generality, stating that it is clearly established that people may not be arrested or
prosecuted without probable cause.” Urda, 146 F.4th at 314. But “Andrews cannot mean
that courts may define clearly established law abstractly; that reading would conflict with
a landslide of Supreme Court precedent.” Id. (citing Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595
U.S. 1, 5–6 (2021) (per curiam) and seven other Supreme Court cases).
8
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment to Boyer on Count Two, reverse its order denying summary judgment to
Mulvey on that count, and remand for judgment to be entered in Mulvey’s favor.
9