The opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
TRACEY POWELL, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DA-315H-25-0078-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: March 3, 2026
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Jason Crump , Esquire, Lanham, Maryland, for the appellant.
Debbie Clark , Esquire, Rachel Trafican , Esquire, and David P. Simmons ,
Washington, D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman
James J. Woodruff II, Member
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On
petition for review, the appellant asserts that she already completed a
probationary period in a prior appointment, she had 1 year of current continuous
service, the agency was precluded from requiring her to complete a new
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
probationary period, and she did not waive her Board appeal rights as part of her
new appointment. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Generally, we grant
petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as
expressly MODIFIED to discuss the appellant’s contention that she had 1 year of
current continuous service and she was therefore an “employee” under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), we AFFIRM the initial decision.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
To qualify as an “employee” with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75,
an individual in the competitive service must show that she either is not serving a
probationary or trial period under an initial appointment or has completed 1 year
of current continuous service under an appointment other than a temporary one
limited to 1 year or less. 2 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); Hurston
v. Department of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9 (2010). We have considered the
2
The appellant does not assert on review that she has a regulatory right to appeal her
termination during her probationary period. We affirm the administrative judge’s
finding that she did not make nonfrivolous allegations in this regard. Initial Appeal
File, Tab 6 at 8.
3
appellant’s assertions on review, but we conclude that she has not met her burden
to make nonfrivolous allegations in this regard.
For the first time on review, the appellant asserts that she nonfrivolously
alleged that she was an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii)
because she “completed [1] year of current continuous service when she was
competitively appointed from a register in her previous [F]ederal employment (as
an Office Automation Clerk with [the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)] on October 29, 2006, and later as a Work/Life Technician with the
Department of [the] Air Force).” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The Board generally will
not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a
showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available
despite the party’s due diligence. Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
245, ¶ 6 (2016). The appellant has not made such a showing.
Even if we modify the initial decision to consider this assertion, a different
outcome is not warranted. The term “current continuous service” means a period
of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a
break in Federal civilian employment of a workday. Avalos v. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 963 F.3d 1360, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
Ellefson v. Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 14 (2005); see 5 C.F.R.
§ 752.402. The appellant does not contend on review that she had any Federal
service between her September 2022 resignation from the Department of the Air
Force and her October 23, 2023 agency appointment. PFR File, Tab 1; Initial
Appeal File, Tab 4 at 19-20. Therefore, she did not have 1 year of current
continuous service, and she did not nonfrivolously allege that she was an
employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii).
The appellant also asserts on review that she made a nonfrivolous
allegation that she was an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i)
because she completed her probationary period during her earlier HHS
appointment, and she was not required to undergo a second probationary period.
4
PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. In pertinent part, she asserts that the initial decision is
inconsistent with the Board’s decision in Stoute v. Department of the Navy,
98 M.S.P.R. 409 (2005), which she contends stands for the proposition that the
only time an employee is obligated to undergo a second probationary period is if
the employee voluntarily waives her appeal rights. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
We have reviewed the Board’s decision in Stoute. Mr. Stoute was
appointed to a competitive-service position, he completed his 1-year probationary
period, he applied and was selected for a different competitive-service position at
the same agency which required completion of another 1-year probationary
period, and he was terminated during his second 1-year probationary period.
Stoute, 98 M.S.P.R. 409, ¶ 2. Mr. Stoute filed a Board appeal, and the
administrative judge reversed the action because he was an employee under
5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), he did not waive his Board appeal rights, and the
agency did not provide him with due process. Id., ¶¶ 3-4. The agency’s petition
for review followed. Id., ¶ 4.
The Board in Stoute discussed McCormick v. Department of the Air Force,
307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and determined that an individual who
may be excluded from “employee” status under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i) may
be an employee under section 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii). Stoute, 98 M.S.P.R. 409, ¶¶ 6-7.
The Board concluded that Mr. Stoute was an “employee” under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) because he was employed by the agency from July 31, 2000,
until the July 29, 2023 effective date of his termination, and thus, he completed
1 year of current continuous service prior to his termination. Stoute, 98 M.S.P.R.
409, ¶ 8. Having found that Mr. Stoute was an “employee” with Board appeal
rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), the Board also considered whether he
waived his Board appeal rights when he accepted the second position, and it
concluded that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his appeal rights. Id.,
¶¶ 11-13.
5
The facts of Stoute are easily distinguishable from this matter. Notably,
Mr. Stoute had nearly 3 years of current continuous service with the same agency
at the time of his termination and, thus, he was an employee under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) with Board appeal rights. By contrast, for the reasons
described above, the appellant did not have 1 year of current continuous service
with the agency, and she was therefore not an “employee” with Board appeal
rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii). Because she did not have chapter 75
Board appeal rights, we need not consider whether she waived any such rights. 3
The appellant offers no other persuasive authority to support her contention
that the agency was precluded from requiring her to complete a new probationary
period based on her successful completion of a probationary period in 2006 -07
with a different agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Accordingly, we affirm the
administrative judge’s conclusion that she did not nonfrivolously allege that she
was an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i).
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
3
We have considered the appellant’s reliance on Stoute for the proposition that a
competitive-service appointment from a register is not relevant to the issue of whether
an individual completed 1 year of continuous service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; Stoute,
98 M.S.P.R. 409, ¶¶ 9-10. However, because we find that the appellant did not
nonfrivolously allege that she had 1 year of current continuous service, her assertion in
this regard does not warrant a different outcome.
4
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
6
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
7
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
8
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
5
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
9
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.