Rios

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAIME RIOS, )

) Case No. 22 CV 3973

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Jeremy Daniel

vs. )

)

REYNALDO GUEVARA, MICHAEL MASON, )

ERNEST HALVORSEN, CITY OF CHICAGO, )

)

Defendants. )

DEFENDANT GUEVARA’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

NOW COMES Defendant, REYNALDO GUEVARA, by and through his attorneys,

Timothy P. Scahill and Graham P. Miller of BORKAN & SCAHILL, LTD., and pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2), moves for Judgment as a Matter of Law. In support thereof, Guevara states as

follows:

INTRODUCTION

It is clear from the conclusion of the presentation of evidence in this case that Defendant

Guevara is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on several of Plaintiff Jaime Rios’ remaining

claims. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to proffer evidence sufficient for a jury to return a verdict

for him on Counts II (Fabrication of Confidential Informants), X (Fabrication of Carrero’s

Testimony), XI (Suppressing Garcia’s Alleged Alibi), XII (Suppressing the Alleged Physical

Abuse of Garcia), and XIII (Malicious Prosecution). Moreover, Guevara is entitled to Qualified

Immunity on these claims. Accordingly, Guevara must be granted judgment as a matter of law

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) on these five claims.

STANDARD

A directed verdict should be entered when “under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51

(1986). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an

issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the

party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or

defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding

on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Regarding how judges should consider this type of motion, the

Supreme Court poignantly stated as follows:

Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a jury merely because some

evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence

be of such a character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that

party. Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support

of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority

have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to

the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a

verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (citations omitted). Finally, the question of Qualified Immunity is a

question of law for the trial court to resolve, not for the jury. Alvarado v. Picur, 859 F.2d 448, 451

(7th Cir. 1988).

ARGUMENT

I. Guevara Is Entitled to Judgment As A Matter of Law On The Remainder of Count II

Because Plaintiff Has Proffered No Evidence That The Information Provided By the

Confidential Informants Was Fabricated.

In Count II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Guevara fabricated the

existence of and information provided by the two confidential informants that told him (and Gang

Specialist Stephen Gawrys and Defendant Detective Michael Mason) that Plaintiff and Christino

“Tino” Garcia were responsible for the murder of Luis Morales. Ex. A (2nd Amend. Compl.) at Ct.

II. Plaintiff claims this alleged fabrication violated his 14th Amendment right to a fair trial. Id. After

Plaintiff’s counsel revealed for the first time during trial that he had information about the identity

of these confidential, yet failed to disclose any such information to Defendants during discovery,

this Court dismissed as a discovery sanction the part of Plaintiff’s claim in Count II that alleged

the existence of the confidential informants was fabricated, but permitted Plaintiff to proceed on

his claim that the information provided by these informants was fabricated. Dckt. # 328. However,

at trial, Plaintiff offered no competent evidence to establish that the information provided by these

informants was fabricated, that the information violated a trial right outside Guevara’s absolute

testimonial immunity, or that such evidence was material to Plaintiff’s conviction. Finally, if not

entitled to absolute immunity, Guevara is entitled to Qualified Immunity on this claim.

At the outset, Plaintiff has put on no affirmative evidence to establish the information that

Plaintiff and Tino were involved in the shooting of Morales was fabricated. Instead, on adverse

direct examination of Defendant Michael Mason, Plaintiff elicited testimony from Detective

Mason that Guevara had brought the informants to Detective Mason and that Detective Mason had

personally met and spoke with the two confidential informants on July 6, 1989 and again on July

9, 1989. Tr. at 774:20-774:23, 779:4.1 Detective Mason testified that the informants told him

directly that they were getting information that Jaime Rios and Tino were responsible for the

shooting on 1440 N. Leavitt. Tr. at 779:9-779:22. Guevara’s partner, Steven Gawrys, also testified

that he personally spoke with the confidential informants. Tr. at 1943:4-1943:10. Thus, this

evidence corroborates the existence of the confidential informants and the information they told

Guevara about Rios.

1 Reference to the trial record in this case is designated as “Tr. at X.”

At Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Guevara testified that during the investigation of the murder of

Luis Morales, he spoke with several individuals on the street, two of whom were confidential

informants he had worked with in the past, and who told him they had heard Plaintiff and Tino

were involved in the shooting of Luis Morales. Tr. 393:7-394:5, 401:13-403:9. While Plaintiff

presumably maintains that the information the confidential informants heard on the street and

communicated to Guevara was false (since he claims he was not involved in the shooting), he has

produced no evidence to suggest Guevara was not told this by the confidential informants. In fact,

a portion of Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorneys’ cross examination of Guevara pursued the

theory that these informants were part of a rival gang, that such informants often lie, and that the

informants’ information was secondhand or thirdhand, they were not on the scene at all. Tr. 401:13-

403:9. In sum, there is evidence in this trial from three separate individuals that all say they spoke

with the two confidential informants and those informants stated they had heard Plaintiff was

involved in the shooting. Plaintiff has introduced no evidence that, even if false, the confidential

informants’ information was fabricated such that a reasonable jury could find a violation by

Guevara of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Guevara is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the only evidence Guevara

supplied at trial related to the confidential informants was his testimony, for which Guevara is

subject to absolute immunity for any such acts. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332 (1983); see

also Knox v. Curtis, 771 Fed. Appx. 656, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2019); Canen v. Chapman, 847 F.3d 407,

415 (7th Cir. 2017); Maxson v. Dwyer, 2017 WL 1493712, *5 (N.D. Ill. 2017).

Guevara is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a reasonable jury could not

find that the information related to the informants was material for Brady purposes. Again,

Guevara’s testimony at Plaintiff’s criminal trial was that confidential informants without personal

knowledge supplied the police with rumors that Plaintiff was involved in the murder. Tr. 393:7-

394:5, 401:13-403:9. With respect to materiality, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant

would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its

absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”

Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 643-45 (7th Cir. 2008). “The mere possibility that an

item of … information might … affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’

in the constitutional sense.” See U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976). “In performing the

materiality analysis, courts are to consider the “cumulative effect” of the evidence at issue “as

opposed to considering each piece alone.” Lyons v. Vill. of Woodridge, 2011 WL 2292299, *8 (N.D.

Ill. 2011); Phillips v. Allen, 743 F. Supp. 2d 931, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2010); see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at

112. The issue of whether evidence is material is a question of law for the court to decide. See

Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336, 350 (7th Cir. 2019)(“Coleman contends the

materiality of this evidence is a fact question for the jury. But the Supreme Court has ruled on

Brady materiality as a matter of law, as has this court.”).

Plaintiff’s conviction was not premised in any way on third-hand hearsay but, rather, was

supported by overwhelming direct evidence including, most significantly, the testimony of an

eyewitness, Luis Huertas, who saw Plaintiff pull the trigger killing Morales. How the police landed

on Plaintiff as a suspect is entirely irrelevant to his guilt at trial. Rumor information-even if false-

would have no impact on the assessment of guilt given highly inculpatory eyewitness testimony.

Thus, this evidence could never be material for the purposes of a Due Process claim. See Hart v.

Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 593 (7th Cir. 2015)(eyewitness testimony rendered uncertainty of other

witness immaterial); U.S. v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 2011)(materiality not

established because there was other incriminating evidence that supported conviction); U.S. v.

Bland, 517 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2008)(same); U.S. v. Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir.

2007)(same); U.S. v. Baker, 453 F.3d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 2006)(same); Mola v. Warden, 2020 WL

6149803, *6 (N.D. Ind. 2020)(existence of eyewitnesses established that other evidence was not

material).

Finally, Guevara is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, as it was not clearly

established in 1989 that the fabrication of informants, who did not establish probable cause to

arrest or to prosecute, was a constitutional violation.

II. Guevara Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law On Count X Because Plaintiff

Has Not Established That Carrero’s Allegedly Coerced Testimony Was Material.

Count X alleges that Defendant Guevara fabricated evidence by coercing Benjamin Carrero

to falsely state Jaime Rios had given Carrero a gun and told Carrero he had just shot someone. Ex.

A at Ct. X. The evidence in this case is that, at Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Carrero testified that

Plaintiff had given him the gun, but had not told Carrero that he had shot anyone. Tr. at 591:7-

591:10. However, as far as Plaintiff’s fabrication claim is based on Carrero’s testimony, Plaintiff

has not met his burden to establish Carrero’s testimony was material to his conviction. If anything,

this testimony was helpful to Plaintiff. Again, “courts must consider the “cumulative effect” of the

evidence at issue “as opposed to considering each piece alone.” Lyons, 2011 WL 2292299, at *8;

Phillips, 743 F. Supp. At 948. The specific probative value of the evidence Carrero supplied

compared to the other evidence in this case establishes that the allegedly “fabricated” evidence

would have had de minimus impact upon the confidence in the criminal verdict for the purposes

of the materiality. The criminal jury heard from Carrero that Plaintiff had provided him with a .32

caliber revolver the day following the Morales murder, but specifically denied that Plaintiff had

made any statements admitting that this weapon was used in any criminal activity. Tr. at 591:7-

591:10. At trial, the State presented eyewitness evidence through witness Huertas that Plaintiff was

the shooter. The only firearm-related evidence recovered at the scene were shell casings from a .25

caliber automatic weapon. The weapon recovered from Carrero was not a .25 caliber nor a semi-

automatic or automatic weapon; it was a revolver. As has been made clear to both the jury in the

instant case and the jury in the underlying criminal matter, revolvers do not eject shell casings. In

other words, even accepting Carrero’s original statements as true, there was no evidence at the trial

that the gun recovered from Carrero was the gun used to shoot Morales. On the other hand, there

was a wealth of other evidence supporting Plaintiff’s role in the Morales murder including the

eyewitness testimony of Luis Huertas and Plaintiff’s own court-reported confession. Plaintiff has

offered no evidence that would suggest to a reasonable jury that Carrero’s testimony would have

materially changed the result of his trial in light of the strength of the other inculpatory evidence

against him. Moreover, Guevara is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was not

clearly established in 1989 that concealment of evidence of this type would constitute a

constitutional violation.

III. Guevara Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law On Count XI Because Plaintiff

Has Not Introduced Evidence That Guevara Had Any Knowledge Of Garcia’s Alibi,

Nor Was Garcia’s Alleged Alibi Exculpatory.

In Count XI, Plaintiff alleges that Guevara concealed exculpatory evidence: that Garcia

had given Guevara an alibi. Ex. A at Ct. XI. Plaintiff alleges that had he known Garcia gave an

alibi, he would have subpoenaed Garcia to testify on his behalf. There are several reasons why

Plaintiff has not met his burden on this claim.

At trial in this matter, Garcia testified expressly that he never gave this alibi to Guevara.

Tr. at 178:2-178:7. He gave the alibi to another officer, Officer O’Quinn, the officer who arrested

him. Tr. at 178:2-178:7 (Q. So is it your testimony that you -- that this alibi or whatever it is

that we are talking about, that this is information that you gave to Mr. Guevara? A. No, I

gave it to O'Quinn. Q. You gave it to O'Quinn, not Guevara, right? A. O'Quinn). Garcia then

attempted to speculate that Guevara may have overheard the alibi (Tr. at 178:8-178:14 (Q. So you

didn't even tell Mr. Guevara about this supposed alibi at all, did you? A. He heard. I think he was

in the room. I believe he was in the room. Q. So it was not just you and O'Quinn when he was

asking the questions? A. It was both of them, probably.), However, he later clarified that Guevara

was not present when Garcia gave the alibi to Officer O’Quinn. Tr. at 179:9-179:12 (Q. So Mr.

Guevara, as you remember it now, was not present when you were even having this discussion

about this alibi, right? A. If I said that, that is the way it is). Then, when Plaintiff’s counsel

attempted to rehabilitate Garcia on the issue, Garcia stated he could not recall whether anyone else

was present when he gave his alibi to Officer O’Quinn. Tr. at 210:19-210:24 (Q. Now, counsel

asked you about the alibi you gave about ordering pizza, and I want to ask you this: Do you recall

which officer you told that to? A. To O'Quinn. Q. And when you told that to O'Quinn, was anyone

else around? A. I don't recall), 211:14-211:16 (Q. Do you know where Officer Guevara was when

you were talking to O’Quinn about the alibi? A. No. I don't recall). No other evidence was elicited

by Plaintiff supporting the claim that Guevara was even aware of this alleged alibi given by Garcia,

and thus there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to proceed on a claim that Guevara held

any such information from the prosecution.

Moreover, as was made clear during Garcia’s testimony, this purported alibi was not an

alibi at all. It is undisputed that the shooting and murder of Luis Morales occurred between 11:45

p.m. and midnight on June 27, 1989. Tr. at 12:24-13:14. The “alibi” that was elicited by Plaintiff’s

counsel on direct examination of Garcia was that on June 27, 1989, Garcia was at home with his

mom and girlfriend eating pizza and rib tips for dinner. Tr. at 120:7-120:14, 142:8-142:12. But

Garcia testified that he was home with his mother and girlfriend eating pizza and rib tips around

“dinner time,” around 6:00 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. on June 27, 1989. Tr. 141:12-141:19. Garcia testified

that he was not at home eating pizza and rib tips around midnight. Tr. at 143:19-143:22. Garcia

testified that he could not recall whether he was home eating the pizza and rib tips with his mother

and girlfriend on June 27, 1989 at 5:00 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., but he was not eating dinner at midnight

that night. Tr. at 143:13-143:17. As such, this is not an alibi for the murder of Luis Morales, which

occurred between 11:45 p.m. and midnight on June 27, 1989. And, had Garcia testified to this alibi

at trial, it would not have exculpated him from the murder of Luis Morales, much less Rios. Such

evidence would not meet the materiality element of a Brady claim.

Finally, as best can be gleaned from Garcia’s testimony in this trial, Garcia stated that had

he in fact been asked to testify in Plaintiff’s criminal trial, he would have pled the Fifth, he did not

want to testify. Tr. at 131:3-131:13, 171:17-171:21 (“If I would have been asked to testify I would

have pled the Fifth”). Thus, even assuming Garcia had an actual alibi, and assuming he told the

alibi to Guevara (neither of which was established by the evidence), no reasonable jury could find

that disclosure of that “alibi” would have materially affected the result of Plaintiff’s criminal trial.

At minimum, Guevara is entitled to qualified immunity as it was not clearly established in

1989 that Guevara’s conduct under these circumstances would constitute a constitutional violation.

IV. Guevara Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law On Count XII Because The

Evidence Of Garcia’s Alleged Abuse Was Not Concealed.

Count XII alleges that Defendant Guevara concealed exculpatory evidence that he beat

Garcia, “evidence that that would have established that Guevara had a pattern and practice of using

physical and psychological coercion.” Ex. A at Ct. XII. Garcia testified at trial that Guevara put a

phone book on his head and started hitting him on the head in an attempt to get him to confess. Tr.

at 122:7-122:17. Count XII is based on the allegation that this abuse by Guevara occurred and that

Guevara failed to disclose it. Following the close of Plaintiff’s case, however, Guevara is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on this claim because the evidence established that this alleged

abuse, if true, was not concealed for purposes of a Brady claim.

Garcia testified that while this alleged abuse was occurring, the Assistant State’s Attorney

was standing just outside the interview room watching. Tr. at 123:9-124:20 (“Officer O’Quinn was

standing on the outside of the door watching. And the lady that said she was a State Attorney, she

was sitting there too and didn’t say nothing.” “Q. And so Officer O’Quinn is outside, the lady

State’s Attorney is sitting there saying nothing, and is it Officer Guevara who is hitting you? A.

Yes, Officer Guevara is the one.”). Once prosecutors are aware of alleged Brady material, a police

officer is no longer responsible for providing any such information to a criminal defendant. Mims

v. City of Chicago, 155 F. 4th 970, 975 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Put another way, a criminal defendant

generally cannot establish a Brady violation by pointing to a police failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence if the prosecutor was aware of that evidence or obtained it from another source”). Under

Brady, a police officer is obligated to turn over exculpatory or impeaching evidence to the

prosecutor, who then has a duty to disclose that evidence to the defense. Id.; Carvajal v.

Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008). The police can only be liable for a Brady violation

if they conceal exculpatory evidence from the prosecution, thereby depriving the prosecution of

the ability to disclose it. Id. In other words, once a prosecutor is aware of information that may be

considered Brady material, it remains the responsibility of the prosecutor to provide this evidence

to the defense not the police. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015); Whitlock

v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 583 (7th Cir. 2012). Information known by one prosecutor “must

be attributed” to other attorneys in the prosecutor’s office (see Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154

(1972)), and “a prosecutor’s office cannot get around Brady by keeping itself in ignorance, or

compartmentalizing information about different aspects of a case” (Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d

875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984)). Further, “once the prosecution has the evidence, it is the prosecution’s—

not the officer’s—duty to disclose it to the defense.” Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th 483, 493 (7th

Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the fact that the ASA was present for the alleged beating of Garcia by

Guevara is fatal to Plaintiff’s Brady claim based on such allegedly concealed evidence.

Moreover, Plaintiff can point to no clearly established law in 1989 holding that officers had

Brady obligations to affirmatively disclose the matters at issue, particularly when such information

is already known to the prosecution. Specifically, it was not clearly established then, and still not

now, that a police officer can be liable under the Due Process Clause to a criminal defendant for

the alleged physical coercion of a witness. Petty v. City of Chi., 754 F.3d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 2014)

(“Although Petty may have used terms and phrases such as ‘manufactured false evidence’ and

‘false identification,’ when one closely examines the evidence, it is clear that his case is a coercion

case. There is not one shred of evidence to suggest that CPD officers fabricated evidence, which

would have been a due process violation. ‘Manufactured false evidence’ and ‘false identification’

are not magic talismans that will transform a coercion case into an evidence fabrication case and

give rise to a cognizable claim where one does not exist.”).

V. Guevara Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law On Plaintiff’s Malicious

Prosecution Claim Because There Was An Independent Basis For Probable Cause

And Because Guevara Did Not “Commence Or Continue” The Prosecution.

Defendant Guevara is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s state law

malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Guevara. To establish a malicious prosecution

claim under Illinois law, the plaintiff must prove “the absence of probable cause…” Beaman v.

Freesmeyer, 2021 IL 125617, ¶ 74; Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017).

Probable cause is “an absolute bar to an action for malicious prosecution.” Burrell v. Sauk Village,

2017 IL App (1st) 163392, ¶ 16 (quoting Turner v. City of Chicago, 91 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934-35

(1980)). Moreover, a defendant “commences or continues” a prosecution for purposes of a

malicious prosecution claim only when the defendant was actively instrumental in causing the

prosecution. JI 32. Plaintiff has failed to establish both of these elements at trial.

At trial, the criminal trial testimony of eye witness Luis Huertas was read into the record

by Plaintiff as substantive evidence. Tr. at 460:14-502:4. The evidence revealed that, on July 7,

1989, Huertas identified Plaintiff as the shooter of Luis Morales in a lineup. Tr. at 482:6-484:16.

Plaintiff also read in Huertas’ deposition testimony from September 18, 2023. Tr. at 502:19-547:4.

That testimony established, inter alia, that: (1) even today Huertas stands by his identification of

Plaintiff as the shooter of Luis Morales (Tr. at 528:5-528:17, 531:15-531:25); (2) Heurtas never

saw a photo of Rios prior to the lineup (or at any time) (Tr. at 536:18-536:21, 537:1-537:3); (3)

Guevara never showed Huertas any photos of anyone (Tr. at 535:1-535:4); and (4) Guevara nor

any other police officer ever told Huertas who to pick out of the lineup (Tr. at 528:25-529:2, 534:6-

534:7, 541:15-541:22). While Huertas’ May 2020 affidavit, written by Plaintiff’s investigator and

disavowed by Huertas, was referenced in that testimony, the only permissible purpose for the

affidavit would be impeachment; it was not admitted into evidence. See Tr. at 530:9-538:3,

1848:22-1848:23. Thus, the only evidence in this case is that Luis Huertas identified Plaintiff as

the shooter of Luis Morales on July 7, 1989 without any improper suggestion or coercion by

Guevara or anyone else.

An eyewitness identification, even if questionable, is sufficient to create probable cause.

See, e.g., Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th 483, 499–500 (7th Cir. 2022); Coleman v. City of

Peorioa, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 835 (7th

Cir. 2016) (eyewitness identification provided probable cause to arrest, despite witness’ hesitancy

and inconsistencies with earlier descriptions); Blackmon v. City of Chicago,700 F. Supp. 3d at 632

(“The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that eyewitness identification creates probable cause,

even if the identification is questionable or the officers subjectively doubt its accuracy.” (collecting

cases)), rev’d on other grounds by Blackmon v. City of Chicago, 132 F.4th 522 (7th Cir. 2025);

Holt v. City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 220400, ¶69 (reports from purported victims or

witnesses of crimes sufficient to establish probable cause); People v. Maxey, 2011 IL App (1st)

100011, ¶¶ 54-55; (information from victim or eyewitness to crime entitled to great weight in

evaluating reliability for probable cause for arrest). Here, Plaintiff has introduced no evidence to

impugn Huertas’ identification of Plaintiff, and Huertas’ identification is independently sufficient

to establish probable cause, thereby defeating Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim as a matter

of law.

Moreover, there was no evidence elicited at trial that Guevara “commenced or continued”

the prosecution of Plaintiff. Again, to satisfy this element of a malicious prosecution claim,

Plaintiff must prove that Guevara was actively instrumental in causing Plaintiff’s prosecution. JI

32. There is a presumption of prosecutorial independence, that is, that a prosecutor exercises

independent judgment when deciding to charge someone with a crime and when deciding to

continue prosecuting that charge, which is only overcome where a defendant improperly exerted

pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor, concealed

exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad-faith conduct instrumental in the

initiation of the prosecution. Id. The trial prosecutor for Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Anthony Carballo,

testified that Guevara never attempted to lean on, pressure, or influence him regarding the decision

to go forward with Plaintiff’s prosecution.2 He testified multiple times that the decision to charge

and prosecute Plaintiff was that of the State’s Attorneys Office alone. He further testified that the

2 As of the writing of this Motion, Defendants do not have a copy of the transcript of Carballo’s testimony on

February 17, 2026.

confidential informants’ information played no role in the decision to prosecute. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not introduced evidence in this case sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that

Guevara “commenced” or “continued” Plaintiff’s prosecution, and Guevara is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution claim.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Guevara prays this Honorable Court grant him Judgment as a

Matter of Law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) on Counts II, X, XI, XII, and XIII, and for

whatever additional relief this Court deems just.

Respectfully submitted,

BORKAN & SCAHILL, LTD.

By: /s/ Graham P. Miller

Special Assistant Corporation Counsel

Steven B. Borkan

Timothy P. Scahill

Graham P. Miller

Special Assistants Corporation Counsel

Borkan & Scahill, Ltd.

20 South Clark Street

Suite 1700

Chicago, IL 60603

(312)580-1030

Attorneys for Reynaldo Guevara