P.s.c., Inc., V. Purdys Public House, Llc

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

March 3, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

P.S.C., INC., a Washington Corporation, No. 60806-5-II

Respondent,

v.

TERESA J. REED,

Defendant below,

PURDYS PUBLIC HOUSE, LLC, PUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

LEE, P.J. — Purdys Public House, LLC (Purdys) appeals the superior court’s denial of a

motion to reduce judgment of a writ of garnishment pursuant to RCW 6.27.200 based on Purdys’

purported untimeliness in filing the motion. Purdys argues that its motion was timely filed based

on the language “within seven days following service on, or mailing to,” found in RCW 6.27.200

because Purdys filed the motion to reduce judgment within seven days after it received the writ of

garnishment that P.S.C., Inc. (PSC) mailed to them.

Because the purpose of Washington’s garnishment statute is to protect the garnishee’s

interest and because the statutory provisions must be interpreted in relation to one another, we

construe “mailing to” in RCW 6.27.200 to mean the garnishee’s receipt through the mail, such that

a garnishee has seven days from the date of receipt to file a motion to reduce judgment.

No. 60806-5-II

Accordingly, Purdys’ motion was timely filed. We reverse and remand to the superior court for

consideration of Purdys’ motion to reduce judgment.

FACTS

In April 2015, PSC obtained a default judgment against Reed. On January 18, 2024, PSC

filed an application for writ of garnishment for a continuing lien on Reed’s earnings with the

superior court. The application identified Purdys, Reed’s employer, as the garnishee defendant.

On January 19, the superior court issued a writ of garnishment. On January 22, PSC mailed

copies of the garnishment documents, including the application for the writ of garnishment and

the writ of garnishment, to Purdys via certified mail. On January 25, Purdys received the certified

mailing.

Over the next several months, PSC attempted to contact Purdys via telephone calls and

leaving voicemails. Purdys neither returned PSC’s calls nor answered the garnishment documents.

Then, on June 13, PSC filed a notice of default against Purdys as the garnishee in superior court.

The notice of default stated: “Please take notice that the undersigned intends to present a default

judgment . . . against garnishee in . . . ten (10) or more days after mailing this Notice.” Clerk’s

Papers (CP) at 80. PSC mailed a copy of the notice of default, along with a proposed “Judgment

Against Garnishee Defendant for Failure to Answer” to Purdys. CP at 57.

Purdys again failed to respond. On July 3, PSC filed a motion for default judgment against

Purdys as the garnishee for failure to answer. The superior court entered a default judgment against

Purdys. On July 19, PSC mailed a copy of the default judgment to Purdys, along with a cover

letter. The cover letter stated: “[PSC] will be in a position to commence Judgment enforcement

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proceedings in order to collect the amount of the Judgment. You may expect that action will be

taken against you . . . to collect this Judgment if payment in full is not received.” CP at 91.

For the next several weeks, PSC attempted to contact Purdys. Purdys did not respond.

Then, on September 12, PSC received a handwritten letter from Bryan Purdy, the owner of Purdys,

which stated: “[Reed] is [n]o longer employed at Purdys Public House as of July 5th[,] 2024.” CP

at 96. That same day, PSC attempted to call Purdys twice; both calls went unanswered. On

September 13, PSC called Purdys again, but the phone rang for an extended period of time before

the line disconnected. Between September and November 2024, PSC called Purdys several times

but to no avail.

On January 22, 2025, PSC filed an application for bank garnishment of Purdys’ bank

account in superior court. On January 27, the superior court issued a bank writ of garnishment to

Purdys’ bank. PSC “served via certified mail” the bank garnishment documents on Purdys,

mailing the documents on February 4. CP at 60. Also on February 4, PSC personally served

Purdys’ bank.

Purdys received the bank garnishment documents on February 6. On February 7, Bryan

Purdy called PSC, upset that his bank account had been garnished. On February 12, PSC received

a call from an attorney that Bryan Purdy had retained for the garnishment matter. Purdys’ attorney

also filed a notice of appearance.

On February 13, Purdys filed a motion to reduce the default judgment pursuant to RCW

6.27.200. RCW 6.27.200 allows a garnishee to move for the reduction of a judgment “to the

amount of any nonexempt funds or property which was actually in the possession of the garnishee

at the time the writ was served,” so long as the motion is made within seven days “following

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service on, or mailing to, the garnishee of a copy of the first writ of execution or writ of

garnishment under such judgment.” In an attached declaration in support of the motion to reduce

judgment, Bryan Purdy stated that Reed had been employed by Purdys from January to June of

2024. Bryan Purdy also stated that February 6, 2025 was the first time he became aware that any

judgment existed.

In response, PSC argued that its February 4 mailing date of the bank garnishment

documents triggered the seven-day period within which Purdys needed to file its motion to reduce

judgment. Accordingly, PSC asserted that Purdys’ motion to reduce judgment filed on February

13 was untimely.

The superior court considered Purdys’ motion to reduce judgment on February 28 and

denied the motion. The superior court’s order denying the motion stated:

THIS MATTER having come on regularly this day for hearing on [Purdys’]

Motion to Reduce Garnishee Defendant’s Default Judgment Pursuant to RCW

6.27.200; and the court having considered the evidence and having reviewed the

records; now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Purdys’] Motion to

Reduce is hereby

[X] DENIED with no reduction in the amount owed to [PSC] plus a

monetary award to [PSC] for reasonable attorney’s fees . . . given proof in [PSC’s]

Exhibit K of Declaration filed 2/21/25 showing mailing of said documents on

2/4/25 via USPS to [Purdys’] registered agent address.

CP at 124.

On March 14, the superior court entered a judgment and order to pay against Purdys and

its bank.

Purdys appeals.

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ANALYSIS

On appeal, Purdys assigns error to the superior court’s denial of its motion to reduce the

default judgment amount based on the motion’s purported untimely filing. Specifically, Purdys

argues that the seven-day window described in RCW 6.27.200 as “mailing to” starts from the date

of receipt of the applicable documents sent through the mail, not the date the documents are placed

in the mail. We agree.

A. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Statutory interpretation is an issue of law courts review de novo. Branson v. Wash. Fine

Wine & Spirits, LLC, 5 Wn.3d 289, 293, 574 P.3d 1031 (2025). “Our ‘fundamental objective is to

ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face,

then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’” Id.

293-94 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4

(2002)).

When reviewing the plain language of a statute to determine legislative intent, courts

consider “the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is

found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.”

Lenander v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 186 Wn.2d 393, 403, 377 P.3d 199 (2016). “If the plain language

of the statute is clear and subject to only one reasonable interpretation, then we look no further.”

Branson, 5 Wn.3d at 294. A statute is not ambiguous merely because multiple interpretations are

conceivable. Id. “Furthermore, courts construe statutes to avoid absurd results.” Wash. Tr. Bank

v. Kozak, 27 Wn. App. 2d 542, 549, 533 P.3d 152, review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1009 (2023).

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B. GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER CHAPTER 6.27 RCW

1. Legal Principles

Chapter 6.27 RCW governs garnishments in Washington, outlining “specific procedures

for issuance and enforcement of a writ of garnishment.” Watkins v. Peterson Enters., 137 Wn.2d

632, 638, 973 P.2d 1037 (1999); see generally RCW 6.27 et seq. A writ of garnishment “serves

as the mechanism initiating an action against a garnishee, directing the garnishee to answer

whether it holds funds or property owing to the debtor.” Id. (citing RCW 6.27.100). The writ

serves as notice to both the garnishee and the debtor and gives the parties an opportunity to defend.

Id.

The purpose of the garnishment statute is to enforce the obligations of debtors. Id.

However, the legislature also recognizes that garnishee defendants have “no responsibility for the

situation leading to the garnishment of a debtor’s wages, funds, or other property” and instructs

the state to “take whatever measures that are reasonably necessary to reduce or offset the

administrative burden on the garnishee consistent with the goal of effectively enforcing the

debtor’s unpaid obligations.” RCW 6.27.005; see also Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 638.

“Garnishment is a statutory remedy that requires strict adherence to the procedures

expressly authorized by statute.” Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 640; accord Boundary Dam Constructors

v. Lawco Contractors, Inc., 9 Wn. App. 21, 25, 510 P.2d 1176 (1973) (“Garnishment being

statutory, compliance with the applicable statutes is essential to the validity and preservation of

the writ.”). Because the issuance and enforcement of a writ are central to the garnishment

process—“constituting notice, ordering the entry of pleadings, and providing an opportunity for a

hearing”—provisions in the garnishment statute are interpreted “in relation to each other and

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No. 60806-5-II

consistent with the legislative intent to protect a garnishee’s interest.” Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 639-

40.

RCW 6.27.200, the statute at issue here, provides:

If the garnishee fails to answer the writ within the time prescribed in the writ, after

the time to answer the writ has expired and after required returns or affidavits have

been filed, showing service on the garnishee and service on or mailing to the

defendant, it shall be lawful for the court to render judgment by default against such

garnishee, after providing a notice to the garnishee by personal service or first-class

mail deposited in the mail at least ten calendar days prior to entry of the judgment,

for the full amount claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant, or in case the

plaintiff has a judgment against the defendant, for the full amount of the plaintiff’s

unpaid judgment against the defendant with all accruing interest and costs as

prescribed in RCW 6.27.090: PROVIDED, That upon motion by the garnishee at

any time within seven days following service on, or mailing to, the garnishee of a

copy of the first writ of execution or writ of garnishment under such judgment, the

judgment against the garnishee shall be reduced to the amount of any nonexempt

funds or property which was actually in the possession of the garnishee at the time

the writ was served, plus the cumulative amount of the nonexempt earnings subject

to the lien provided for in RCW 6.27.350, or the sum of one hundred dollars,

whichever is more, but in no event to exceed the full amount claimed by the plaintiff

or the amount of the unpaid judgment against the principal defendant with all

accruing interest and costs and attorney’s fees as prescribed in RCW 6.27.090, plus

the accruing interest and costs and attorneys’ fees as prescribed in RCW 6.27.090

for any garnishment on the judgment against the garnishee, and in addition the

plaintiff shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee for the plaintiff's response

to the garnishee’s motion to reduce said judgment against the garnishee under this

proviso and the court may allow additional attorney’s fees for other actions taken

because of the garnishee’s failure to answer.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, under RCW 6.27.200, “[s]hould the garnishee timely respond to a writ

of execution or writ of garnishment issued under the default judgment, the garnishee may move to

reduce the amount to any nonexempt funds or property which was actually in the possession of the

garnishee at the time the writ was served.” Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 649-50.

RCW 6.27.110 provides for service of writs generally:

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(1) Service of the writ of garnishment, including a writ for continuing lien on

earnings, on the garnishee is invalid unless the writ is served together with: (a) An

answer form as prescribed in RCW 6.27.190; and (b) a check or money order made

payable to the garnishee in the amount of twenty dollars for the answer fee if the

writ of garnishment is not a writ for a continuing lien on earnings.

(2) Except as provided in RCW 6.27.080 for service on a bank, savings and

loan association, or credit union, the writ of garnishment shall be mailed to the

garnishee by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed in the same manner

as a summons in a civil action, and will be binding upon the garnishee on the day

set forth on the return receipt. In the alternative, the writ shall be served by the

sheriff of the county in which the garnishee lives or has its place of business or by

any person qualified to serve process in the same manner as a summons in a civil

action is served.

(3) If a writ of garnishment is served by a sheriff, the sheriff shall file with

the clerk of the court that issued the writ a signed return showing the time, place,

and manner of service and that the writ was accompanied by an answer form, and

check or money order if required by this section, and noting thereon fees for making

the service. If service is made by any person other than a sheriff, such person shall

file an affidavit including the same information and showing qualifications to make

such service. If a writ of garnishment is served by mail, the person making the

mailing shall file an affidavit showing the time, place, and manner of mailing and

that the writ was accompanied by an answer form, and check or money order if

required by this section, and shall attach the return receipt or electronic return

receipt delivery confirmation to the affidavit.

(Emphasis added.)

RCW 6.27.130 elaborates on mailings to a judgment debtor:

(1) When a writ is issued under a judgment, on or before the date of service of the

writ on the garnishee, the judgment creditor shall mail or cause to be mailed to the

judgment debtor, by certified mail, addressed to the last known post office address

of the judgment debtor, (a) a copy of the writ and a copy of the judgment creditor’s

affidavit submitted in application for the writ, and (b) if the judgment debtor is an

individual, the notice and claim form prescribed in RCW 6.27.140. In the

alternative, on or before the day of the service of the writ on the garnishee or within

two days thereafter, the stated documents shall be served on the judgment debtor

in the same manner as is required for personal service of summons upon a party to

an action.

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(2) The requirements of this section shall not be jurisdictional, but (a) no

disbursement order or judgment against the garnishee defendant shall be entered

unless there is on file the return or affidavit of service or mailing required by

subsection (3) of this section, and (b) if the copies of the writ and judgment or

affidavit, and the notice and claim form if the defendant is an individual, are not

mailed or served as herein provided, or if any irregularity appears with respect to

the mailing or service, the court, in its discretion, on motion of the judgment debtor

promptly made and supported by affidavit showing that the judgment debtor has

suffered substantial injury from the plaintiff’s failure to mail or otherwise to serve

such copies, may set aside the garnishment and award to the judgment debtor an

amount equal to the damages suffered because of such failure.

(3) If the service on the judgment debtor is made by a sheriff, the sheriff

shall file with the clerk of the court that issued the writ a signed return showing the

time, place, and manner of service and that the copy of the writ was accompanied

by a copy of a judgment or affidavit, and by a notice and claim form if required by

this section, and shall note thereon fees for making such service. If service is made

by any person other than a sheriff, such person shall file an affidavit including the

same information and showing qualifications to make such service. If service on

the judgment debtor is made by mail, the person making the mailing shall file an

affidavit including the same information as required for return on service and, in

addition, showing the address of the mailing and attaching the return receipt or the

mailing should it be returned to the sender as undeliverable.

(Emphasis added.)

2. “Mailing to” Means the Garnishee’s Receipt of Mailed Documents

The parties dispute the meaning of “within seven days following service on, or mailing to,”

found in RCW 6.27.200. Specifically, Purdys argues that “[b]asic due process requires that the

seven-day window to file a motion to reduce commence upon service [of], (actual notice to), the

writ [to the garnishee].” Br. of Appellant at 10. PSC conversely argues that RCW 6.27.200

“unambiguously” “draws a clear distinction between the definitions of ‘service’ and ‘mailing’”

and that “‘mailing to’” means “the date the mail is sent.” Br. of Resp’t at 7, 8, 11.

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In cases of statutory interpretation, the primary objective is to carry out the legislature’s

intent. Branson, 5 Wn.3d at 293-94. Courts first look at the plain language of the statute and

consider the text of the provision. Lenander, 186 Wn.2d at 403.

Here, RCW 6.27.200 provides in relevant part:

If the garnishee fails to answer the writ within the time prescribed in the writ, after

the time to answer the writ has expired and after required returns or affidavits have

been filed, showing service on the garnishee and service on or mailing to the

defendant, it shall be lawful for the court to render judgment by default against such

garnishee, . . . PROVIDED, That upon motion by the garnishee at any time within

seven days following service on, or mailing to, the garnishee of a copy of the first

writ of execution or writ of garnishment under such judgment, the judgment against

the garnishee shall be reduced to the amount of any nonexempt funds or property

which was actually in the possession of the garnishee at the time the writ was

served.

(Emphasis added.)1 RCW 6.27.200 does not define “service on” or “mailing to.” Thus, the parties

argue that the terms are ambiguous.

To the extent the terms “service on” and “mailing to” are ambiguous, we consider the

context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme

as a whole. Lenander, 186 Wn.2d at 403.

As to the context, as discussed above, the statute is found in chapter 6.27 RCW, which

governs garnishments in Washington. The garnishment statutes provide creditors with a statutory

remedy to enforce the obligations of debtors and “requires strict adherence to the procedures

expressly authorized by statute.” Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 638, 640.

1

The parties do not dispute that all other statutory requirements found in RCW 6.27.200 have

been met.

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Looking to the other garnishment provisions and the garnishment statutes as a whole,

“service on” and “mailing to” refer to the two statutory means which the legislature has set forth

to effectuate service on a garnishee and “mailing to” means the date the garnishee actually receives

the writ of garnishment sent through the mail.

RCW 6.27.110 states, in relevant part:

(2) Except as provided in RCW 6.27.080 for service on a bank, savings and

loan association, or credit union, the writ of garnishment shall be mailed to the

garnishee by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed in the same manner

as a summons in a civil action, and will be binding upon the garnishee on the day

set forth on the return receipt. In the alternative, the writ shall be served by the

sheriff of the county in which the garnishee lives or has its place of business or by

any person qualified to serve process in the same manner as a summons in a civil

action is served.

(3) . . . If a writ of garnishment is served by mail, the person making the

mailing shall file an affidavit showing the time, place, and manner of mailing and

that the writ was accompanied by an answer form, and check or money order if

required by this section, and shall attach the return receipt or electronic return

receipt delivery confirmation to the affidavit.

(Emphasis added.)

RCW 6.27.110 provides (1) the required documents to be served for a writ to be valid, (2)

how the writ may be served (either through personal service on the garnishee or by certified mail

with return receipt requested), and (3) what must be filed with the superior court to demonstrate

that service was effective. Thus, service on a garnishee under RCW 6.27.110 is effectuated either

through personal service on the garnishee or by mailing the required documents to the garnishee

in the manner required by the statute. Of note, RCW 6.27.110(2) clearly states that when a

judgment creditor serves the garnishee a writ by mail, it “shall be mailed to the garnishee by

certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed in the same manner as a summons in a civil

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action, and will be binding upon the garnishee on the day set forth on the return receipt.”

(Emphasis added.) Thus, service of a writ sent via mail is effective “on the day set forth on the

return receipt,” meaning when the garnishee actually received the writ sent through the mail.

This concept of service being effectuated under the garnishment statutes either through

personal service on the garnishee or by mailing to the garnishee in the manner required by the

statute comports with other provisions in the overall statutory scheme. For instance, under RCW

6.27.130, addressing service on the judgment debtor, states in relevant part:

(2) The requirements of this section shall not be jurisdictional, but (a) no

disbursement order or judgment against the garnishee defendant shall be entered

unless there is on file the return or affidavit of service or mailing required by

subsection (3) of this section, and (b) if the copies of the writ and judgment or

affidavit, and the notice and claim form if the defendant is an individual, are not

mailed . . . as herein provided, or if any irregularity appears with respect to the

mailing . . . .

(3) . . . If service on the judgment debtor is made by mail, the person making

the mailing shall file an affidavit including the same information as required for

return on service and, in addition, showing the address of the mailing and attaching

the return receipt or the mailing should it be returned to the sender as undeliverable.

(Emphasis added.)

Similar to RCW 6.27.110, RCW 6.27.130 provides for (1) the accepted methods of service

to the debtor, (2) how to confirm service was effectuated, and again, (3) what must be filed with

the superior court. Indeed, RCW 6.27.130(3) requires, in the case of service by mail, confirmation

of receipt or lack thereof. See generally CR 4(d)(4), (g)(4); CR 5(b)(2).

Turning back to RCW 6.27.200, when looking at the context of the statute in which the

provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole, it follows that the

phrase “service on or mailing to” refers to the two methods to effectuate service of documents in

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the garnishment context—personal service or mailing via certified mail with return receipt

requested. Thus, in light of the definition of service by mail found in RCW 6.27.110, and the

discussion of service by mail in RCW 6.27.130, we conclude that the language stating “any time

within seven days following service on, or mailing to” the garnishee means the seven days

following actual receipt of notice to the garnishee by personal service or through the mail.

PSC makes much of Purdys’ failure to respond to PSC’s repeated attempts at contact,

PSC’s compliance with garnishment procedures, and Purdys’ disregard for its obligations. The

record is clear, and there is no dispute, that PSC strictly complied with the garnishment procedure

set forth in the garnishment statutes and that Purdys was delinquent in responding. However,

Purdys’ failure to respond is addressed directly by the procedure outlined in RCW 6.27.200, which

PSC followed, and is the basis for this appeal. PSC was under no obligation to attempt to contact

Purdys as much as it did, and whether Purdys responded to PSC following the initial issuance of

the writ, or had notice of it, has no bearing on the time Purdys is statutorily allowed to file a motion

to reduce judgment under RCW 6.27.200.2

Further, Washington’s garnishment statute provides a clear articulation of legislative

intent, instructing the State to “take whatever measures that are reasonably necessary to reduce or

offset the administrative burden on the garnishee” while enforcing a debtor’s obligations. RCW

6.27.005. Indeed, the strict procedures outlined in the garnishment statute are interpreted “in

relation to each other and consistent with the legislative intent to protect a garnishee’s interest.”

2

That PSC is frustrated is understandable, particularly when the record shows PSC put forth great

effort to notify Purdys of the circumstances. However, we must still interpret the statute based on

established legal principles and not on sympathy.

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Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 639-40 (emphasis added). “‘Where two interpretations of statutory

language are equally reasonable, our canons of construction direct us to adopt the interpretation

which better advances the overall legislative purpose.’” SYNNEX Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 34

Wn. App. 2d 857, 865, 572 P.3d 1214 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright

v. Lyft, Inc., 189 Wn.2d 718, 729, 406 P.3d 1149 (2017)). The creation of two timelines in RCW

6.27.200 does not protect a garnishee’s interest for an original obligation that the garnishee shares

no fault in: one timeline based on personal service that affords a garnishee seven days to file its

motion for reduction and another timeline based on service by mail, which potentially eliminates

the garnishee’s opportunity for a reduction if the garnishee does not receive the garnishment

documents within seven days after mailing.

Accordingly, we construe “mailing to” in RCW 6.27.200 to mean the garnishee’s receipt

of garnishment documents sent through the mail; thus, the garnishee has seven days from the

receipt of the “copy of the first writ of execution or writ of garnishment under such judgment” to

move for a reduction in judgment. Therefore, we reverse the superior court’s order denying

Purdys’ motion to reduce judgment based on the superior court’s determination that the motion

was untimely and remand for the superior court to consider Purdys’ motion to reduce judgment.

3. CR 5(b)(2)

In the alternative, Purdys argues that “CR 5 governs the calculation of the date of service

of the writ on Purdys.” Br. of Appellant at 15. Specifically, Purdys identifies CR 5(b)(2)(A),

which provides in part:

If service is made by mail, the papers shall be deposited in the post office addressed

to the person on whom they are being served, with the postage prepaid. The service

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shall be deemed complete upon the third day following the day upon which they

are placed in the mail.

Purdys asserts that CR 5’s clause, “[t]he service shall be deemed complete upon the third

day following the day upon which they are placed in the mail,” allows for essentially the same

outcome that Purdys advocates within the language of RCW 6.27.200 itself—that the seven-day

window in RCW 6.27.200 does not begin until three days after the mailing of the garnishment

judgment documents.

PSC conversely argues that CR 5 does not apply. PSC points to CR 81(a), which states:

“Except where inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings, these rules

shall govern all civil proceedings. Where statutes relating to special proceedings provide for

procedure under former statutes applicable generally to civil actions, the procedure shall be

governed by these rules.” PSC asserts that garnishment proceedings are “special proceedings” and

the garnishment statutory scheme is inconsistent with the civil rules; therefore, the civil rules are

inapplicable. Br. of Resp’t at 19.

PSC is correct that Washington courts have identified garnishment proceedings as special

proceedings. Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., P.S., 166 Wn.2d 974, 981, 216 P.3d 374

(2009); Zesbaugh, Inc. v. Gen. Steel Fabricating, Inc., 95 Wn.2d 600, 603, 627 P.2d 1321 (1981);

Snyder v. Cox, 1 Wn. App. 457, 459, 462 P.2d 573 (1969), review denied, 77 Wn.2d 962 (1970).

Thus, where the civil rules are inconsistent with any of the statutory provisions under the

garnishment statute, “the civil rule must give way to the express provision in the statute.”

Zesbaugh, Inc., 95 Wn.2d at 603; CR 81(a).

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PSC contends that the CR 5 is “explicitly inconsistent with the statutory garnishment

scheme.” Br. of Resp’t at 20. PSC first points to RCW 6.27.110(2), which provides that service

by mail is binding upon a garnishee “‘on the day set forth on the return receipt.’” Br. of Resp’t at

20 (quoting RCW 6.27.110(2)). This is different than CR 5’s perfection of mail service, which is

deemed complete “upon the third day following the day upon which they are placed in the mail.”

CR 5(b)(2)(A). We agree with PSC. RCW 6.27.110(2) provides a specific definition of when

service has been perfected; thus, RCW 6.27.110 is inconsistent with CR 5, and RCW 6.27.110

prevails. Zesbaugh, Inc., 95 Wn.2d at 603. CR 5 is inapplicable.

CONCLUSION

We construe “mailing to” in RCW 6.27.200 to mean the garnishee’s receipt of garnishment

documents sent through the mail; therefore, a garnishee has seven days from the date of receipt to

file a motion to reduce judgment. And CR 5 is inapplicable. Thus, Purdys’ motion was timely

filed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the superior court for consideration of Purdys’

motion to reduce judgment.

Lee, P.J.

We concur:

Glasgow, J.

Che, J.

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