Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CENTRAL BOAT RENTALS, INC. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-2861

HARBOR DREDGING, INC., ET AL. SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are three unopposed motions by Third-Party Defendant and

Counter-Claimant Stolt Tankers USA, Inc. (“Stolt”): (1) motion1 for summary

judgment dismissing all claims asserted by Third-Party Plaintiff, Harbor Dredging,

Inc. (“Harbor Dredging”) against Stolt; (2) motion2 for entry of judgment under Rule

58(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking entry of a judgment in favor of

Third-Party Defendant Stolt and against Third-Party Plaintiff Harbor Dredging,

dismissing with prejudice Harbor Dredging’s third-party claims against Stolt; and (3)

motion3 for default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2) in favor of Counter-Claimant Stolt

and against Counter-Defendant Harbor Dredging as to Stolt’s counterclaim.

In its motion for summary judgment and motion for entry of judgment, Stolt

seeks a judgment dismissing all claims asserted by Harbor Dredging against it. In its

motion for default judgment, Stolt moves for relief concerning its counterclaims for

affirmative relief, requesting that the Court enter judgment in its favor in the amount

of $407,863.49 plus $40,235.24 in prejudgment interest. For the following reasons,

1 ECF No. 80.

2 ECF No. 128.

3 ECF No. 138.

the Court will GRANT the motion seeking entry of a separate judgment dismissing,

or memorializing dismissal, with prejudice of Harbor Dredging third-party claims

against Stolt. The Court will DENY AS MOOT Stolt’s motion for summary judgment

seeking the same relief (dismissing with prejudice Harbor Dredging’s claims against

Stolt). Finally, the Court will GRANT Stolt’s motion for default judgment in its favor

as to its affirmative counterclaim against Harbor Dredging with a proviso respecting

the quantum of prejudgment interest. Stolt’s motion for default judgment will be

granted insofar as Stolt has demonstrated entitlement to $407,863.49 in

compensatory damages as well as entitlement to prejudgment interest. As set forth

below, Stolt is ordered to file a proposed default judgment and, in its motion for leave

to file the same, Stolt shall brief whether Texas’s rate or the federal rate should apply

along with the quantum warranted by applicable law. The Court will withhold entry

of the default judgment on damages and prejudgment interest until the briefing and

proposed judgment is filed. Finally, disposition of these motions resolves all pending

claims and, accordingly, the pretrial conference and trial dates shall be cancelled.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit is the fallout from a failed dredging project. What is left4 focuses

on claims among Harbor Dredging and Stolt, so those pertinent facts and procedural

history are recounted.

4 Recently, Central Boat and Stolt indicated that they settled their claims and the Court

dismissed those claims without prejudice pending consummation of the settlement. ECF Nos. 235, 236.

Central Boat has pursued post-judgment remedies pertaining to its claims resolved among other

parties, such as Port Bolivar Marine Services, Inc. (“Port Bolivar”).

Dredging Project

Stolt contracted with Harbor Dredging to perform dredging work at Stolt’s site

in Harris County, Texas (the “Project”).5 Harbor Dredging in turn contracted with

Central Boat Rentals, Inc. (“Central Boat”) to charter barges to perform the work.6

Though the dredging began in 2023, work ceased after Central Boat’s invoices for its

charters went unpaid.7

And thus the remaining claims which are subject to the instant lawsuit stem

from Harbor Dredging and Stolt’s Master Service Agreement (“MSA”), which was

executed in February 2020.8 The MSA governed the dredging services Harbor

Dredging agreed to provide to Stolt.9 The MSA requires that all work requests be

memorialized in a Work Order.10 The MSA provides that its terms prevail over any

conflicting terms contained in another document and it further contains a merger

clause, which prohibits oral modifications.11

A couple of years after the MSA’s execution, Stolt contacted Harbor Dredging

for a quote to dredge Stolt’s docks to a depth of 10 feet.12 Harbor Dredging provided

Stolt with the requested quote for the project, as well as updated quotes at Stolt’s

request.13 Soon after, Stolt accepted Harbor Dredging’s offer and issued Purchase

5 ECF No. 41 (Stolt’s Counterclaim).

6 Harbor Dredging, Central Boat Rentals, Inc., and Port Bolivar had executed a Barge

Bareboat Charter Agreement and Master Towage Agreement for towage services to be provided by

Central Boat as part of a dredging project performed for Stolt’s benefit. ECF No. 1.

7 ECF No. 1; ECF No. 41.

8 ECF No. 138-1 (citing ECF Nos. 41 and 41-1); ECF No. 41-1.

9 Id. at 1.

10 ECF No. 41-1.

11 Id.

12 ECF No. 41-2 at 2.

13 ECF No. 23-1; ECF No. 138-1.

Orders to Harbor Dredging.14 Harbor Dredging commenced dredging on February 20,

2023, over a month later than it said it would do so.15

Even while the dredging work was being performed, Stolt submits that the

work was performed in a poor workmanlike manner, replete with delays, inefficient

use of resources, cost overruns, and fill-in of previously dredged areas.16 Just a few

months later in June 2023, several of Harbor Dredging’s subcontractors stopped work

due to Harbor Dredging’s failure to pay for their work.17 Harbor Dredging failed to

resolve these payment disputes and failed to arrange for replacement

subcontractors.18 Work ceased after just a few months when Central Boat’s invoices

for its charters went unpaid.19 Harbor Dredging failed to complete the work.20

Procedural History

After its invoices under the charter agreement went unpaid, in late July 2023,

Central Boat sued Harbor Dredging and Port Bolivar Marine Services, Inc. (“Port

Bolivar”) alleging claims for breach of contract and claims under Louisiana’s Open

Account Statute.21 Central Boat brought its suit under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 9(h) and invoked the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1333.22 Harbor Dredging and Port Bolivar promptly answered.23 The case was

14 ECF No. 41-4.

15 ECF No. 138-1.

16 ECF No. 138-1; ECF No. 41.

17 Id. (citations omitted).

18 ECF No. 41.

19 ECF No. 1; ECF No. 41.

20 ECF No. 1; ECF No. 41; ECF No. 138-1.

21 ECF No. 1.

22 Id.

23 ECF Nos. 8, 9.

initially assigned to another section of this Court, which issued a scheduling order in

October 2023.24 Central Boat moved25 for summary judgment on its claims against

Harbor Dredging.

Port Bolivar filed a crossclaim26 against Harbor Dredging for breach of

contract. Harbor Dredging amended its answer to Central Boat’s lawsuit and filed a

third-party complaint against Stolt via Rule 14(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.27 In its third-party complaint, Harbor Dredging alleged claims against

Stolt: breach of an oral agreement (i.e., alleging that Stolt orally agreed to pay for

additional dredging yardage not contemplated in the original work order) and unjust

enrichment. Under Rule 14(c), Harbor Dredging tendered Stolt as a defendant to

Central Boat on Central Boat’s claims.

Stolt answered Harbor Dredging’s Third-Party Demand and asserted

counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of warranty against Harbor

Dredging.28 Stolt’s counterclaims arise from the MSA.29

Shortly after Central Boat’s motion for summary judgment was briefed and

submitted before another section of this Court, the case was transferred to this

section in late December 2023.30

24 ECF No. 19.

25 ECF No. 29.

26 ECF No. 25.

27 ECF No. 23.

28 Id.; ECF No. 41. Harbor Dredging answered Stolt’s counterclaim.

29 ECF Nos. 41, 41-1.

30 ECF No. 40.

Less than one year after the case was filed—on April 16, 2024—Harbor

Dredging’s counsel withdrew without substituted counsel.31 Given that a corporation

may not appear in federal court without counsel, Stolt promptly filed a motion32

requesting that the Court set a deadline for Harbor Dredging to retain counsel; warn

Harbor Dredging that its failure to comply with that deadline would result in the

dismissal of Harbor Dredging’s claims and the entry of default judgment against

Harbor Dredging; and reset remaining Scheduling Order deadlines.33 After a status

conference with the parties, the Court granted Stolt’s motion34 and ordered Harbor

Dredging to enroll counsel by June 26, 2024.35 The Court also warned Harbor

Dredging that its failure to comply with that deadline could result in a default

judgment against it.36 Despite these warnings, Harbor Dredging failed to enroll new

counsel by the Court’s deadline—or ever.37

Motion practice continued. But only Central Boat and Stolt meaningfully

participated and complied with scheduling order deadlines.

Stolt filed a second motion38 directed to addressing Harbor Dredging’s lack of

representation, this one seeking to enforce the Court’s order39 that Harbor Dredging

31 ECF No. 48.

32 ECF No. 52.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 ECF No. 100. Harbor Dredging did not participate in the June 10, 2024 status conference.

The Court specified that the discovery deadline would be extended for the limited purpose of allowing

the parties to conduct depositions of Harbor Dredging’s corporate representative, Roland Maturin, and

for Harbor Dredging to produce discovery. Roland Maturin has since passed away. ECF No. 207.

36 ECF No. 100.

37 Id.

38 ECF No. 105.

39 ECF No. 100.

enroll counsel or face litigation consequences if it failed to enroll counsel to appear on

its behalf. Specifically, Stolt requested that the Court enforce its June Order and

direct the Clerk to enter a preliminary default as to Stolt’s counterclaim against

Harbor Dredging and to dismiss Harbor Dredging’s third-party claims against Stolt

with prejudice.40 Again, this time in August 2024, the Court granted the motion and

ordered the parties to file their respective motions seeking default judgment against

Harbor Dredging under Rule 55(b)(2).41 Stolt first moved for preliminary default

under Rule 55(a) as to Stolt’s counterclaims against Harbor Dredging.42 Shortly

thereafter the Clerk of Court entered preliminary default against Harbor Dredging.43

Meanwhile, Central Boat and Port Bolivar executed a consent judgment44 and

Central Boat obtained a default judgment45 against Harbor Dredging. Thereafter,

Central Boat pursued post-judgment relief against Harbor Dredging and Port Bolivar

as it continued to pursue its claims (tendered by Harbor Dredging) against Stolt.

Recently, however, Central Boat and Stolt settled in principle their claims, which

have been dismissed without prejudice.46

40 ECF No. 105-1.

41 ECF No. 120. The Court wishes to clarify that its August 16, 2024 order granted Stolt’s

motion, but did not directly address Stolt’s request for the dismissal of Harbor Dredging’s third-party

claims with prejudice in its order. The Court did not intend to dismiss Harbor Dredging’s claims

against Stolt at that time.

42 ECF No. 122. Central Boat also moved for entry of preliminary default. ECF No. 123. After

amending its motion for default judgment against Harbor Dredging, ECF Nos. 167 and 170, on March

28, 2025, the Court granted Central Boat’s motion for default judgment and entered a default

judgment in favor of Central Boat and against Harbor Dredging. ECF No. 172. Central Boat’s motion

for summary judgment as to its claims against Harbor Dredging was denied as moot. ECF No. 173.

43 ECF Nos. 133, 135.

44 ECF Nos. 117, 151.

45 ECF No. 172.

46 ECF Nos. 235, 236.

What’s left in this litigation are claims among Stolt and Harbor Dredging.

Notably, since its counsel withdrew, Harbor Dredging has failed to comply with this

Court’s orders, including the Court’s orders that it enroll counsel or face litigation

sanctions. Thus, Harbor Dredging has been ineligible to and/or failed to participate

in this litigation for some time. By three motions, Stolt seeks to dispose of all

remaining claims:

First, Stolt requests that the Court grant its motion47 for summary judgment

dismissing with prejudice all claims asserted by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff

Harbor Dredging against Stolt as Third-Party Defendant.

Second, Stolt requests48 entry of a judgment in its favor dismissing with

prejudice Harbor Dredging’s third-party claims against it based on the Court’s orders

granting Stolt’s motions for miscellaneous relief, which in part had requested

dismissal of Harbor Dredging’s third-party claims against Stolt related to Harbor

Dredging’s failure to enroll counsel in this litigation since its counsel withdrew nearly

two years ago.

Third, pursuant to the Court’s August 16 Order and Rule 55(b)(2), Stolt now

moves49 for default judgment in its favor on its counterclaims (arising from Harbor

Dredging’s obligations under the MSA and Work Order) against Harbor Dredging as

counter-defendant; Stolt seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $407,863.49

47 ECF No. 80.

48 ECF No. 128.

49 ECF No. 138.

and prejudgment interest in the amount of $40,235.24.50 The Court takes up these

unopposed51 motions now.

II. LAW AND APPLICATION

Stolt’s first and second motions each requests that the Court dismiss with

prejudice Third-Party Plaintiff Harbor Dredging’s affirmative breach of oral contract

and unjust enrichment claims against Stolt; only the proffered basis for dismissal is

different. The third seeks a default judgment in Stolt’s favor and against Harbor

Dredging respecting Stolt’s affirmative counterclaims for breach of contract and

breach of warranty against Harbor Dredging.

For the following reasons, Stolt has previously and here again demonstrates

entitlement to a judgment dismissing with prejudice Harbor Dredging’s claims

against it; a separate judgment will follow. The Court need not reach Stolt’s motion

for summary judgment, which seeks the same relief—dismissal with prejudice of

those same claims by Harbor Dredging—and accordingly that motion will be denied

as moot. Finally, Stolt has demonstrated entitlement to a default judgment in its

favor on compensatory damages as well as prejudgment interest with the proviso that

the quantum of prejudgment interest needs to be calculated under either Texas’s, or

the federal, rate. The Court thus orders Stolt to file a motion seeking leave to file its

proposed default judgment with the accompanying briefing supporting the

prejudgment interest quantum to be included in the proposed judgment.

50 ECF No. 138.

51 Though Central Boat initially opposed Stolt’s motions, it withdrew its opposition after

Central Boat and Stolt reached a settlement. Harbor Dredging, which never complied with the orders

that it enroll counsel, has not filed an opposition.

A. Under Rule 41(b), Stolt Is Entitled to Judgment Dismissing with

Prejudice Harbor Dredging’s Claims Against It.

When a plaintiff fails to comply with the Court’s orders and abandons its

claims, dismissing with prejudice may be appropriate. Rule 41(b) provides:

Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to

comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to

dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order

states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any

dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction,

improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an

adjudication on the merits.

This rule applies equally to dismissal of third-party claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(c).

Though subsection (b) of Rule 41 references a defendant’s motion, the Court

may exercise its discretion sua sponte to dismiss claims under this rule and,

additionally, the Court has inherent authority to dismiss a lawsuit or claims for these

same reasons, including for failure to comply with Court orders or for failure to

prosecute. See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 826 (1996) (“A federal court

has at its disposal an array of means to enforce its orders, including dismissal in an

appropriate case.”); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962) (rejecting

petitioner’s argument that Rule 41(b) prohibits involuntary dismissals for failure of

the plaintiff to prosecute absent motion by defendant, observing that “[t]he authority

of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice because of his

failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted”); see also 9 Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 2372 (4th ed. 2025) (“Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b) speaks of dismissal on the defendant's motion, but . . . the district

court may dismiss on its own motion for want of prosecution or for failure to comply

with a court order.”).

One scenario where Rule 41(b) may be implicated is where a corporation has

no licensed attorney representing it in a case brought in federal court. Although

individuals may proceed pro se in federal court, corporations like Harbor Dredging

may not; rather, such artificial entities must be represented by a licensed attorney to

appear in federal court. See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s

Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (observing that courts have interpreted

28 U.S.C. § 1654 as precluding corporations, partnerships, or associations from

appearing in federal court absent representation by licensed counsel); see also Memon

v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing as “well-settled”

the rule that a corporation or business association “cannot appear in federal court

unless represented by a licensed attorney”).

“[W]hen confronted with an unrepresented corporation” or business entity, the

Court has discretion to determine the appropriate course of action. Memon, 385 F.3d

at 873. Where the unrepresented corporation is the defendant, courts generally

admonish the corporation that it cannot proceed without licensed counsel, formally

order it to retain counsel, strike its defenses, and/or ultimately consider whether

dismissal or a default judgment is warranted. See id.; see also Donovan v. Road

Rangers Country Junction, Inc., 736 F.2d 1004, 1005 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

Where the unrepresented corporation is the plaintiff, the Court typically “warn[s] the

corporation that it must retain counsel or formally order[s] it to do so before

dismissing the case.” See Memon, 385 F.3d at 873; see also Am. Safety LLC v. Alger,

No. 20-3451, 2021 WL 1753808, at *2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2021) (Brown, J.) (denying

motion to vacate entry of default as to LLC but granting request for additional time

to obtain counsel and file an answer); see also Transco Syndicate #1, Ltd. V. Rose

Towing Serv., Inc., No. 96-2581, 1997 WL 35219, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 1997)

(Fallon, J.) (ordering corporation to enroll licensed counsel or show cause why its

answers should not be stricken).

Memon is instructive. There, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's

dismissal for lack of attorney representation where a corporation appeared in court

and pursued claims through a non-attorney corporate officer. 385 F.3d at 874–75.

Critically, the district court never ordered the corporation to retain an attorney, nor

had the district court admonished the corporation that it could not proceed without

an attorney. Id. at 872-73.52 Unlike the district court in Memon, the Fifth Circuit

observed that “[i]n virtually every case in which a district court dismissed the claims

(or struck the pleadings) of a corporation that appeared without counsel, the court

expressly warned the corporation that it must retain counsel or formally ordered it to

do so before dismissing the case,” or dismissed the case without prejudice in order to

“allow[] the corporation to re-file after acquiring a lawyer.” Id. at 874 (collecting

cases). Dismissing with prejudice the entity’s case without ordering it to obtain

counsel or otherwise providing a warning was error. So the Fifth Circuit reversed,

holding that it was error for the district court to have dismissed with prejudice the

52 Notably, the corporate officer acting on its behalf moved the court to dismiss the case without

prejudice because he wished to hire an attorney but could not afford one. Id. at 872.

corporation’s case where it “never admonished” the corporation that it needed to

retain counsel before dismissal. Id. at 874–75.

Stolt has twice invoked Rule 41(b) in support of its request that Harbor

Dredging’s affirmative third-party claims against Stolt be dismissed with prejudice if

Harbor Dredging fails to comply with court orders that it enroll counsel.53 The Court

agreed that such an approach was warranted.54 Indeed, the Court granted Stolt’s

motion in which Stolt expressly requested dismissal with prejudice of Harbor

Dredging’s claims.55 Though the Court’s prior order explicitly focused on default

(which concerned Stolt’s counterclaims against Harbor Dredging), Stolt was (and is)

likewise entitled to dismissal of Harbor Dredging’s third-party claims against Stolt.

Insofar as Stolt now applies for a separate judgment setting forth the same, its

request is hereby granted.

Applying Rule 41(b), the Court (again) agrees that dismissal with prejudice is

warranted and accordingly Stolt is entitled to judgment in its favor dismissing with

prejudice Harbor Dredging’s Third-Party Complaint against, and Rule 14(c) tender

of, Stolt. To be sure, the Court has twice granted motions by Stolt in which Stolt

requested that the Court order Harbor Dredging to retain counsel and warn Harbor

Dredging that failure to do so will result in dismissal of Harbor Dredging’s claims and

entry of default as to those claims advanced against Harbor Dredging.56 In granting

Stolt’s motions, the Court expressly ordered Harbor Dredging to enroll counsel or face

53 ECF Nos. 52-1, 105-1.

54 ECF Nos. 105, 120.

55 ECF No. 120 (granting ECF No. 105).

56 ECF Nos. 100 (granting ECF No. 52) and 120 (granting ECF No. 105).

the consequences, citing the applicable case law authorizing dismissal and/or default.

Having applied Memon’s warn or instruct-before-dismissal approach, the Court

granted Stolt’s motion requesting dismissal with prejudice of Harbor Dredging’s

third-party claims against Stolt. Dismissal with prejudice was and is warranted

where, as here, Harbor Dredging has failed to enroll counsel in nearly two years, in

clear defiance of this Court’s orders.57

Not only has Harbor Dredging failed to enroll counsel, it has violated the

Court’s orders mandating that it do so and it has failed to prosecute its claims or

defend against those claims asserted against it. Though Rule 41(b) was inapplicable

in Memon because the district court had never ordered the corporation to enroll

counsel, see id. at 873 n.4, here, the Court has twice ordered Harbor Dredging to

obtain counsel. And, Harbor Dredging has failed to comply with these orders.58

Harbor Dredging has ceased participation in this litigation and effectively abandoned

its third-party claims against Stolt. Accordingly, the Court finds that Rule 41(b)

authorizes dismissal of Harbor Dredging’s claims against Stolt for failure to comply

with this Court’s orders and for its failure to prosecute for nearly two years, entitling

Stolt to a separate judgment setting forth the same.

57 In a sworn declaration, Stolt’s attorney asserts, among other things, that Ronald Maturin,

Harbor Dredging’s corporate representative, “has not contacted me or my colleagues since the [Court’s]

June 12[, 2024] Order was entered or represented in any way that he intends to comply with the June

12 Order.” ECF No. 138-4 (Exhibit C to Stolt’s motion for default judgment). Apparently, Mr. Maturin

died in September 2025. ECF No. 207.

58 Considering the notice and warnings contained in Stolt’s motions (as well as motions by

other parties in the case) and this Court’s orders, there can be no doubt that Harbor Dredging then

knew that it needed to enroll counsel or face dismissal with prejudice of its claims, see Memon, 385

F.3d at 875, as well as face default judgment against it due to its failure to enroll counsel of record to

participate in these proceedings.

Because the Court finds that Stolt is entitled to a judgment in its favor

dismissing Harbor Dredging’s claims against it, the Court need not reach Stolt’s

motion for summary judgment. Thus, Stolt’s motion for summary judgment seeking

the same relief—dismissal with prejudice of Harbor Dredging’s third-party complaint

and Rule 14(c) tender of Stolt—will be dismissed as moot.

The Court turns to consider Stolt’s motion for default judgment as to its

counterclaims against Harbor Dredging.

B. Under Rule 55(b), Stolt Is Entitled to a Default Judgment in Its

Favor on Its Counter-Claims Against Harbor Dredging.

1. Rule 55(b) Standard

Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. First, the movant must

petition the clerk for an entry of default. “When a party against whom judgment for

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is

shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 55(a). Once the clerk enters this technical or preliminary default, then, the second

step is implicated: the movant may move for a default judgment under Rule 55(b). If

the plaintiff’s claim is not for a sum that can be made certain by computation, then

the party against whom the judgment for affirmative relief is sought must apply to

the court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Timely written notice of the

application for default judgment “must be served” on any “party against whom a

default judgment is sought [if that party] has appeared personally or by a

representative.” Id.

“Default judgments are available only when the adversary process has been

halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” EW Polymer Group, LLC v. GSX

Int'l Group, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 3d 232, 237 (M.D. La. Aug. 17, 2022) (citing Sun Bank

of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)). The

district court’s “role . . . in adjudicating a motion for default judgment is limited.”

Escalante v. Lidge, 34 F.4th 486, 492 (5th Cir. 2022). A default judgment “must be

‘supported by well-pleaded allegations’ and must have ‘a sufficient basis in the

pleadings.’” Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir.

2015) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hou. Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th

Cir. 1975)). The well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true,

except regarding damages. Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206; see also United States v.

Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). Indeed, “[t]he defendant, by

his default, admits the plaintiff’s well pleaded allegations of fact[.]” Escalante, 34

F.4th at 492-93 (citation omitted). However, “[t]he defendant is not held to admit facts

that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at

1206. Accordingly, “even if a defendant defaults, a court may still deny default

judgment if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”

Escalante, 34 F.4 at 493.

Courts consider several factors when determining whether to enter a default

judgment, including “whether material issues of fact are at issue, whether there has

been substantial prejudice, whether the grounds for default are clearly established,

whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect, the

harshness of a default judgment, and whether the court would think itself obliged to

set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886,

893 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Absent any request to set aside a default or a

suggestion by a defendant that it has a meritorious defense, the standard for a default

judgment has been satisfied. United States v. Bentley, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D. D.C.

2010) (citation omitted).

Whether to conduct a hearing on an application for default judgment is within

the Court’s discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(A)-(D); see also Wooten, 788 F.3d at

496 (citations omitted). Rule 55 allows plaintiffs to submit evidence in order to

“establish the truth of any allegations [in their complaint] [and] flesh[ ] out [their]

claim” as well as to determine the amount of damages. See Wooten, 788 F.3d at 497-

500 (cleaned up); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B), (C).

If the Court determines that a default judgment is warranted, it must then “fix

the amount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover and give judgment

accordingly.” M C Bank & Trust Co. v. Suard Barge Serv., Inc., No. 16-14311, 2017

WL 3991076, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2017) (Vance, J.) (quoting Pope v. United States,

323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). “A court’s award of damages in a default judgment must be

determined after a hearing, unless the amount claimed can be demonstrated ‘by

detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.’” EW Polymer Group, LLC v. GSX

Int’l Group, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 3d 232, 239 (M.D. La. 2022) (quoting United Artists

Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)). If the declaratory judgment

movant seeks a liquidated sum “or one capable of mathematical calculation [i.e., one

that can be computed with certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting

documents alone]” then the Court acts within its ample discretion to forego a hearing,

which is vested to the Court’s discretion under Rule 55(b). See James v. Frame, 6 F.3d

307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993) (district court has “wide latitude” in determining the amount

of damages to award upon default judgment).

For example, another section of this Court determined that a declaration and

various invoices submitted by the lessor of remotely-operated vehicles and related

equipment attesting to the amount owed by the lessee provided sufficient evidence of

the entry of a default judgment on the lessor’s breach-of-contract and conversion

claims in the amount of $863,950, without the need for an evidentiary hearing. Mid-

Gulf Shipping Company Inc. v. Energy Subsea LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 318 (E.D. La.

2020); accord Cutcliff v. Reuter, 791 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that an

evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to determine the amount of damages awarded

to plaintiffs against a limited liability company and a bankruptcy debtor, given that

the plaintiffs submitted affidavits and documentary proof showing how much they

invested in the company member’s misappropriation scheme, and the defendants did

not challenge the accuracy of the evidence).

So too here. The Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary where Stolt has

provided ample basis in the record—including declarations and documentary

evidence—supporting entitlement to a default judgment and the damages requested.

2. Stolt’s Motion for Default Judgment Has a Sufficient Basis in the

Pleadings and Record.

In abandoning this litigation, not only has Harbor Dredging failed to prosecute

its third-party claims against Stolt, but Harbor Dredging likewise has failed to

appear and advance its asserted defenses against Stolt’s affirmative counterclaim.59

Stolt seeks default judgment on its breach of contract and breach of warranty

counterclaim against Harbor Dredging.60 Stolt’s counterclaim stems from Stolt and

Harbor Dredging’s MSA and Work Orders pertaining to the specific dredging

project—ultimately abandoned by Harbor Dredging—at issue in this case.

First, pursuant to Rule 55(a), Stolt obtained an entry of preliminary default.61

Second, in its default judgment application, Stolt submits that its counterclaim

against Harbor Dredging can be determined based on its allegations in support of its

counterclaim, the plain language of the MSA and Work Orders, and the unopposed

opinions of Stolt’s experts. Stolt contends that no hearing is needed given its

allegations; the MSA’s terms requiring Harbor Dredging to complete the work in a

safe and workmanlike manner and to correct any defects or pay Stolt to obtain

another contractor to re-perform defective work; the undisputed fact that Harbor

Dredging’s poor performance resulted in its failure to complete the work (dredging

Stolt’s docks to the agreed upon 10-foot draft at low tide); and thus Harbor Dredging

is liable to Stolt for resulting damages under the MSA.

The Court agrees. Stolt’s application for default judgment is “‘supported by

well-pleaded allegations’ and . . . ha[s] ‘a sufficient basis in the pleadings.’” Wooten,

59 Since filing its answer on January 29, 2024 (ECF No. 43), Harbor Dredging has filed nothing

directed towards defending against Stolt’s counterclaims.

60 ECF No. 41 at 15–19; ECF No. 138.

61 ECF No. 135.

788 F.3d at 498 (citation omitted). Harbor Dredging has neither moved to set aside

the entry of preliminary default, nor advanced any argument in support of any

defenses to Stolt’s counterclaim. Furthermore, no material issues of fact are at issue,

the grounds for default are clearly established, the default was not caused by a good

faith mistake or excusable neglect, there has been no submission concerning the

harshness of a default judgment, and the Court does not find that it would be obliged

to set the default aside on any motion requesting the same.

Foremost, Stolt has demonstrated that the grounds for default are clearly

established. In its counterclaim against Harbor Dredging, Stolt seeks compensatory

damages for breach of the MSA, which it contends is a maritime contract governed

by maritime law. The Court agrees. See Barrios v. Centaur, L.L.C., 942 F.3d 670, 680

(5th Cir. 2019) (setting forth the elements for determining whether a contract is a

maritime contract and finding that a barge played a critically important role in a dock

construction project such that the dock contract was a maritime contract); cf.

Diamond Servs. Corp. v. RLB Contracting, Inc., 113 F.4th 430, 440 (5th Cir. 2024)

(observing that the primary objective of the relevant contract, which “was dredging a

navigable waterway in a port that services international and national commerce,”

centered on maritime commerce); see also J-Way S., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 34 F.4th 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2022) (dredging contract was maritime contract

given that objective—dredging a navigable waterway—had a direct effect on

maritime commerce); see also Misener Marine Const., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co.,

594 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2010) (same).

Like in an ordinary contract dispute, a plaintiff or counterclaimant asserting

breach of contract under federal maritime law must demonstrate the following

elements: “(1) contract; (2) breach of that contract; and (3) damages.” Mid-Gulf

Shipping Co. Inc. v. Energy Subsea LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 318, 324 (E.D. La. 2020)

(Africk, J.) (quoting FEC Heliports, LLC v. Hornbeck Offshore Operators, LLC, No.

15-4827, 2016 WL 5678557, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2016) (Feldman, J.)); accord

Central Boat Rentals, Inc. v. Pontchartrain Partners, LLC, 744 F. Supp. 3d 635, 639-

40 (E.D. La. 2024) (Ashe, J.)

Taking as true Stolt’s well-pled allegations in its counterclaim, which includes

the governing MSA, Stolt has demonstrated entitlement to a default judgment. The

MSA provides that the dredging services should be memorialized in written “Work

Orders.”62 About two years after the MSA was executed, Stolt contacted Harbor

Dredging for a quote to dredge Stolt’s docks to a depth of 10 feet.63 Harbor Dredging

sent Stolt the requested quote.64 Stolt and Harbor Dredging agreed on a price of

$559,070, including a $125,000 mobilization/demobilization fee, to dredge Stolt’s

docks F through K over 39 days, and $236,490 to dredge Stolt docks L through Q over

19 days (the “Work”).65 Stolt accepted Harbor Dredging’s offer for the Work and

62 ECF No. 41-1 at 1.

63 ECF No. 41-2 at 2.

64 ECF No. 23-1.

65 ECF No. 41-3.

issued Purchase Orders to Harbor Dredging.66 Work on the dredging project began in

2023, but ceased shortly thereafter.67

Harbor Dredging was solely responsible for paying its subcontractors and for

its subcontractors’ performance under the MSA.68 Harbor Dredging failed to perform

the Work within the fixed time and cost specified; these twin failures constituted a

breach of the parties’ contract, including the MSA’s terms and conditions and

standard of performance provision.69 That Harbor Dredging performed the Work in a

poor, unworkmanlike manner and failed to complete it likewise breached the terms

and conditions in the MSA’s warranty.70 Under the MSA, Harbor Dredging is obliged

to correct the defects or pay Stolt for costs and expenses necessary in hiring another

contractor to re-perform the defective work.71

As a result of Harbor Dredging’s poor performance and failure to complete the

Work, Stolt submits a sworn declaration by a professional engineer and certified

hydrographer, who opines that additional dredging of 10,069.9 cubic yards is

required.72 This additional dredging is required due to Harbor Dredging’s failure to

follow proper and customary dredging methods and its failure to pay its

subcontractors, which resulted in its failure to perform the Work on areas it had not

66 ECF No. 41-4. The Purchase Order for docks L through Q (ECF No. 41-4) contained an

updated price of $237,300. Stolt submits this is the amount it actually paid for docks L-Q. ECF No.

138-1 at 4.

67 ECF No. 1; ECF No. 41.

68 ECF Nos. 41 at ¶35; 41-1 at Article 14.1.

69 ECF Nos. 41 at ¶¶ 24, 29-30; 41-1 at Article 8.1.

70 ECF Nos. 41 at ¶ 33; 41-1 at Article 8.5 (“Contractor hereby guarantees that the Work shall

be performed in a safe and workmanlike manner and that the Work shall be free from any and all

defects from final acceptance of the Work by the Company.”).

71 ECF Nos. 41 at ¶ 37; 41-1 at Article 8.5.

72 ECF No. 138-3 (Declaration of Roy Okurowski at ¶ 17).

yet completed.73 In other words, Stolt submits that Harbor Dredging breached the

primary object of the contract—dredging the berths to a depth of 10 feet—and it

breached the warranty providing that its work would be performed in a workmanlike

manner and free of defects.

Stolt’s well-pleaded factual allegations—taken as true—establish each

element of its counterclaim. First, there was a contract between Stolt and Harbor

Dredging.74 Second, Harbor Dredging breached the parties’ agreement by failing to

complete the Work within the fixed time and specified cost. Harbor Dredging’s quote

states that it would complete each dock within a specified period of time at a fixed

cost.75 And Harbor Dredging did not complete the project: the project began in 2023,

but work stopped after Harbor Dredging failed to pay the invoices for subcontractors,

including Central Boat.76 Harbor Dredging did not resolve these payment disputes

and failed to arrange replacement subcontractors to complete the work. Further, the

MSA’s “Standard of Performance” provision states that the “Contractor [Harbor

Dredging] shall execute the Work in a good and workmanlike manner, continuously

and diligently in accordance with generally accepted Industry standards, using

qualified, careful and efficient workers and in strict conformity with provisions of this

Contract.”77 But Harbor Dredging fell below this standard. And under the MSA,

Harbor Dredging was responsible for its subcontractors’ performance and payment.78

73 Id. ¶¶10, 14; ECF No. 138-2 (Declaration of Thomas H. Johnsrud) ¶¶ 16-19.

74 ECF No. 41-1; ECF No. 41-3.

75 ECF No. 23-1.

76 ECF No. 1; ECF No. 41.

77 ECF No. 41-1 at 3.

78 Id. at 5. Article 14.1 of the MSA reads: “Contractor [Harbor Dredging] shall be fully

responsible to Company [Stolt] for any Work of its subcontractors.”

Stolt has thus demonstrated entitlement to damages for Harbor Dredging’s

breach of contract and warranty.

3. Amount of Recovery

a) Compensatory Damages

Next, the Court must “fix the amount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to

recover and give judgment accordingly.” Mid-Gulf Shipping Co. Inc. v. Energy Subsea

LLC, 474 F. Supp. 3d 318, 325 (E.D. La. 2020) (citations omitted). Stolt provides

detailed declarations in support of its motion. Because the amount Stolt sustained in

damages is capable of mathematical calculation based on record evidence, no hearing

is needed. See id. (citations omitted).

Here, Stolt provides support for recovery of $407,863.49 in damages. Stolt

agreed to pay Harbor Dredging a fixed price in return for dredging the docks to the

agreed upon 10-foot draft. To assess Stolt’s damages, the average rate of $28.09 per

cubic yard was calculated based on the yardage that Harbor Dredging estimated

would be needed to dredge the L through Q berth areas to the agreed upon 10-foot

depth. Based on this rate, Stolt submits that the additional dredging will cost

$282,863.49 to complete. As it paid to Harbor Dredging, Stolt must pay a

de/mobilization fee—$125,000—to complete the Work.79 Using Harbor Dredging’s

rates and charges, Stolt submits that it is entitled to recover a total of $407,863.49 in

damages from Harbor Dredging for its breach of the parties’ agreements.80

79 Exhibit A at 23. Harbor Dredging charged (and Stolt paid) this fee in the amount of $125,000.

80 Stolt withdraws the portion of its counterclaim in which it purported to seek damages for

internal costs and lost revenue in light of the MSA’s consequential damages waiver. ECF No. 138-1 at

11 n.59.

In sum, in support of its request for compensatory damages, Stolt submitted

Harbor Dredging’s quotes for docks F through K and L through Q, along with the

costs, yardage, and number of days to dredge each dock, and a sworn declaration,

which establishes the remaining yardage needed to complete the dredging project,

10,069.9, at a rate $28.09/cubic yard.81 And based on this rate, the additional

dredging will cost Stolt $282,863.49 to complete.82 Stolt’s damages assessment

additionally includes the $125,000 mobilization/demobilization fee, which Stolt paid

to Harbor Dredging. 83 Thus, Stolt has demonstrated that it is entitled to a

compensatory damages judgment in its favor in the amount of $407,863.49.

b) Prejudgment Interest

Stolt additionally seeks to recover a minimum of $40,235.24 in prejudgment

interest.84 Because a prejudgment interest award “is the rule rather than the

exception, and, in practice, is well-nigh automatic” in cases under maritime law, the

Court agrees that Stolt is entitled to recover prejudgment interest. See Offshore

Marine Contractors v. Palm Energy Offshore, L.L.C., 779 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotations omitted). Because admiralty law does not fix a particular rate,

the Court in its broad discretion must apply the interest rate prescribed by state or

other federal law. See id. (courts “may look to the judgment creditor’s actual cost of

81 The rate of $28.09 per cubic yard is the average rate per cubic yard that Harbor Dredging

estimated would be needed to dredge the L through Q berth areas to the agreed upon 10-foot depth.

ECF No. 138-2 at 4–5 ¶ 21.

82 Id.

83 Id. at 5 ¶ 23.

84 ECF No. 138-1 at 11–12. Stolt submits that this amount will increase in an amount

dependent on the date the default judgment is entered.

borrowing money, to state law, or to other reasonable guideposts indicating a fair

level of compensation”).

Courts award prejudgment interest “to compensate for the use of funds to

which the plaintiff was entitled, but which the defendant had use of prior to

judgment.” Id. As another section of Court summarized the law on prejudgment

interest in admiralty cases:

“‘As a general rule, prejudgment interest should be awarded in

admiralty cases – not as a penalty, but as compensation for the use of

funds to which the claimant was rightfully entitled.’” Ziegler v.

Subalipack (M) SDN BHD, 2018 WL 2933349, at *10 (S.D. Tex. June 12,

2018) (quoting Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724,

728 (5th Cir. 1980)). The Fifth Circuit recognizes “the bedrock premise

that an award for prejudgment interest in actions under the general

maritime law is the rule rather than the exception,” and that

“prejudgment interest must be awarded unless unusual circumstances

make an award inequitable.” Ryan Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. James

Marine Servs., Inc., 792 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1986). “Prejudgment

interest in an action for breach of contract is allowable from the date the

debt is due.” Am. Marine Tech, Inc. v. M/Y Alchemist, 2022 WL 4345297,

at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2022) (citing Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v.

Fortune Constr. Co., 320 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003)), adopted,

2022 WL 4310894 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2022). Admiralty courts have

broad discretion in setting the prejudgment interest rate and may look

to state law for a fair level of compensation. Todd Shipyards Corp. v.

Auto Transp., S.A., 763 F.2d 745, 753 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming use of

state interest rate compounded daily to account for uncommonly high

prime rates during the applicable period); Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified

Remains of Vessel, 695 F.2d 893, 907 (5th Cir. 1983) (observing that the

particular interest rate lies within the district court’s discretion after it

evaluates the circumstances of the case).

Central Boat Rentals, Inc. v. Pontchartrain Partners, LLC, 744 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640-

41 (E.D. La. 2024) (Ashe, J.). There, the Court “[saw] no reason not to award

prejudgment interest at the Louisiana judicial interest rate as requested by” Plaintiff.

Id. at 641. On another occasion the same section of this Court applied a federal, post-

judgment rate to a prejudgment interest award in the absence of a governing law

provision:

After considering the circumstances of this case, including the absence

from the charter agreement of any provision regarding interest or choice

of law, and the crux of the dispute as concerning a maritime contract,

this Court will assess prejudgment interest at the legal rate established

under 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

Drinnon Marine, LLC v. Four Rivers Towing of Alabama, LLC, 549 F. Supp. 3d 505,

518 (E.D. La. 2021) (Ashe, J.).

Here, Stolt has demonstrated that it is entitled to prejudgment interest, award

of which in maritime context is the rule rather than the exception, absent peculiar or

unusual circumstances making such an award inequitable. No peculiar

circumstances are present here. See Trigleth v. Ocean Belt Maritime, Inc., 798 F.

Supp. 3d 618 (E.D. La. 2025) (Ashe, J.); Matter of Lasala, 644 F. Supp. 3d 245, 278

(E.D. La. 2022) (Vitter, J.) (citation omitted). Stolt is thus entitled to reasonable

prejudgment interest.

In setting the prejudgment interest rate, the Court may look to either state

law—Texas or Louisiana—or to the legal rate established for post-judgment interest

under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. A court might select “the lower federal interest rate” if it

considers that the movant suffered no hardship without the interest monies. See In

re M/V Nicole Trahan, 10 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that an

award of prejudgment interest at a lower rate than requested may be upheld when

no inequity has been shown). Regardless, selecting the appropriate interest rate is

within the Court’s “broad discretion.” Pollsbury Co. v. Midland Enterprises, Inc., 715

F. Supp. 738, 769-70 (E.D.La.1989) (noting narrowly prescribed circumstances that

may justify denying or limiting prejudgment interest and observing that “[d]eferal of

repairs [ ] does not constitute such a circumstance”), aff'd, 904 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990).

Here, Stolt is entitled to prejudgment interest on an award on its breach of

maritime contract counterclaim. The only question is quantum, which depends on

which interest rate applies. Maritime law does not provide a particular prejudgment

interest rate, so Stolt proposes that this Court apply the interest rate prescribed by

the state of Louisiana under La.R.S. 9:3500 and has applied daily, monthly, or

annually compounded interest. Stolt contends that it has calculated the prejudgment

interest on a monthly compounded basis at the Louisiana judicial interest rate

applicable to each year. Doing so, Stolt suggests that Harbor Dredging owes Stolt at

least $40,235.24 in prejudgment interest, “which will increase in an amount

dependent on the date that default judgment is entered.”85

To be sure, as Stolt points out, this Court often applies the Louisiana rate in

calculating prejudgment interest. However, for those cases in which this Court has

applied Louisiana’s interest rate, there was some nexus to Louisiana beyond the

location of the lawsuit. See, e.g., Bommarito v. Belle Chasse Marine Transp., 606 F.

Supp. 3d 304, 319 (E.D. La. 2022) (marine personal injury occurred in Louisiana),

reversing award of damages for wrongful death, 159 F.4 297, 306-08 (5th Cir. 2025);

Shallow Water Equip. L.L.C. v. Pontchartrain Partners, L.L.C., No. 21-949, 2022 WL

85 ECF No. 138-1.

3755041, at * 13 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 2022) (applying the Louisiana prejudgment

interest rate “[g]iven that this Court sits in Louisiana, the parties sustaining (and

causing) damage are domiciled in Louisiana, and the incident giving rise to this action

occurred in Louisiana”).

Unlike the section of Court in a different case which saw “no reason not to

award prejudgment interest at the Louisiana . . . rate[,]” Central Boat, 744 F. Supp.

3d at 640-41, this Court sees reasons not to apply Louisiana’s rate. Stolt’s proposal

that the Court apply Louisiana’s prejudgment interest rate appears to be anchored

only to this Court’s location. Though it may not be unreasonable in the abstract for a

district court in Louisiana to apply Louisiana’s rate, doing so borders on arbitrary

under the circumstances here, where Stolt and Harbor Dredging—both non-

Louisiana entities—selected maritime law or Texas law to govern their relationship

and contract for dredging occurring in Texas.86 Accordingly, in its broad discretion in

selecting the particular interest rate, the Court finds that either the federal statutory

post-judgment interest rate, see 28 U.S.C. § 1961, or Texas’s rate should apply here

to these non-Louisiana entities where the crux of the parties’ dispute relates to a

maritime contract which itself selects maritime or Texas law to govern. See generally

Drinnon Marine, LLC v. Four Rivers Towing of Alabama, LLC, 549 F. Supp. 3d 505,

518-19 (E.D. La. 2021) (Ashe, J.) (collecting cases informing district court discretion

86 Article 20.1 of the MSA provides that “the legal relationship” between Stolt and Harbor

Dredging “shall be construed in accordance with the United States general maritime law to the full

extent possible, and solely to the extent that maritime law cannot be made applicable[,] the Parties

intend and agree that the laws of the State of Texas shall govern without regard to conflicts-of-law

principles that would require the application of any other law.” ECF No. 41-1.

in selecting interest rate); see also In re M/V Nicole Trahan, 10 F.3d 1190, 1196-97

(5th Cir. 1994). Stolt shall have an opportunity to brief whether Texas or the federal

post-judgment rate should apply and to provide a proposed default judgment

proposing quantum based on the applicable rate assuming entry of default judgment

within 10 days of submission.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Stolt’s motion87 for entry of judgment in its favor

dismissing Harbor Dredging’s claims with prejudice is GRANTED. A separate

judgment shall follow entry of this Order and Reasons.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Stolt’s motion88 for summary judgment

is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Stolt’s motion89 for entry of default

judgment against Harbor Dredging is GRANTED. Stolt is entitled to a default

judgment in its favor and against Harbor Dredging in the amount of $407,863.49 in

compensatory damages. Additionally, Stolt is entitled to an award of prejudgment

interest with the proviso that the quantum of prejudgment interest first shall be

briefed by Stolt as follows.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, not later than March 11, 2026, Stolt shall

file its motion requesting leave to submit a proposed default judgment, along with a

87 ECF No. 128.

88 ECF No. 80.

89 ECF No. 138.

memorandum briefing whether Texas or the federal rate should apply and the

quantum of prejudgment interest to which Stolt is entitled under this governing rate,

as well as its proposed default judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the March 3, 2026 pretrial conference and

March 23, 2026 trial date and all related deadlines are CANCELLED and the

pending motion” in limine is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of February, 2026.

Hs SK

BRANDON 8. LONG “PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

90 ECF No. 233.

31