KINDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SUSAN KINDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-00856-TWP-MJD

)

MARION COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, )

CELITA SCOTT, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants'

Marion County Prosecutor's Office ("MCPO") and Celita Scott ("Scott") (collectively,

"Defendants") (Filing No. 56), and a Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence, which is

imbedded within Plaintiff Susan Kinder's ("Kinder") Response brief (Filing No. 72 at 15). Kinder

initiated this action on May 22, 2024 and filed an Amended Complaint on September 5, 2024,

alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Filing No. 24). On June 2, 2025 the Court granted Defendants' unopposed Partial Motion

to Dismiss.1 (Filing No. 58). Defendants now seek judgment as a matter of law on the remaining

Title VII claims of retaliation against the MCPO based on the denial of the major felony secretary

position and the issuance of a verbal warning with a threat of a formal written warning. For the

reasons discussed in this Order, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and

Kinder's Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence is denied.

1 The Court dismissed Kinder's Section 1981 claims against the MCPO and Scott, Title VII claims against Scott and

Title VII claim against MCPO concerning the diminishment of her job duties and failure to be assigned victim

advocacy work. (Filing No. 58 at 11).

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to Kinder as the non-moving

party. See Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). This background section is not inclusive of all facts alleged, rather it

references only those facts relevant to the remaining claims.

Kinder, a white female, joined the MCPO in 2014. In October 2021, Kinder, filed an EEOC

Charge against the MCPO alleging discrimination based on her race in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. A year later, in October 2022, Kinder filed a lawsuit alleging that MCPO

discriminated against her due to her race by refusing to allow her to perform victim advocacy work

in violation of Title VII and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Filing No.

24 at 4). Another judge in this district granted MCPO's motion for summary judgment and entered

final judgment against Kinder. See Kinder v. Marion County Prosecutor's Office, 1:22-cv-01952-

MPB-MJD. 2024 WL 2836481, at *7 (S.D. Ind. April 2, 2024) ("Kinder I").2 During Kinder I,

Kinder remained employed at MCPO at its downtown office as a receptionist and victims'

advocate.

Scott is a deputy prosecutor at MCPO and she serves as the office's chief counsel. At all

times relevant to this action, Kinder's advocacy duties were supervised by advocacy administrator

Linda Cochran ("Cochran") (Filing No. 56-1 at 2). Concerning her receptionist duties, Kinder

reported to Venita Farrow ("Farrow"), and Farrow reports to Domini Eldridge ("Eldridge"), who

reports to Scott. Id. William Timothy Kelsey ("Kelsey") is the human resources manager at MCPO

(Filing No. 56-7).

2 Summary Judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Kinder v. Marion

County Prosecutor's Office, No. 24-1952, 2025 WL 914342, at *6 (7th Cir. 2025).

As a receptionist, Kinder answers telephones, greets people arriving for appointments,

depositions, and meetings, and opens court mail, crime labs, and EFS court mail. Kinder was

required to find someone to cover the reception desk when she needed to leave the desk to go to

the bathroom or any other time she needed to be away from the desk. (Filing No. 72-19). She was

required to find coverage if she called out sick or took a vacation. Id. If Kinder called off sick for

a day, she was required to notify the secretaries via email and ask for someone to cover for her. Id.

at 20. If Kinder was going to be off work for three days or more, her supervisor was responsible

for finding coverage. Id. at 15.

On March 30, 2023, Scott sent an email to office staff informing them that a major felony

secretary position was open (Filing No. 56-19 at 1), and anyone interested could send their resumes

to Eldridge, Farrow, and Kelsey. Ultimately, there were two openings for the major felony special

victim's unit secretary position. (Filing No. 56-7 at 1 ¶3). A hiring committee of Max Pena Pardo

("Pena Pardo"), Farrow, Eldridge, and Kelsey (collectively, the "Panel") conducted interviews for

the two available positions for which Kinder applied. Id. The positions Kinder applied for were

considered lateral transfers and would not have resulted in any pay increase had she gotten either

job (Filing No. 56-1 at 3 ¶11). Upon conclusion of the interviews the Panel chose two candidates

to fill the positions and unanimously agreed that both interviewed better and were a better fit than

Kinder. Id. at 2 ¶5.

Each of the interviewers had significant concerns about Kinder's interview. Kelsey noted

that Kinder seemed to stumble through the questions and that there were better candidates for the

position (Filing No. 56-8 at 8). Farrow noted that Kinder was closed off, did not seem happy to be

interviewing, answered all the questions with "yes" or "no", and did not offer any insight on why

she was interested in the secretary position (Filing No. 56-10 at 1). Eldridge noted that when asked,

"how do you [] stay organized at work[?]", Kinder replied "I'm not doing the job so, I don't know

how to answer that." (Filing No. 56-6 at 1). Pena Pardo noted that Kinder "did not interview very

well and did not seem prepared." (Filing No. 56-4 at 1). Kelsey also noted that Kinder did not ask

any questions of the Panel after the interview (Filing No. 56-8 at 8).

In May and June 2023, a series of incidents led to Kelsey issuing Kinder a verbal warning

(Filing No. 56-7 at 2 ¶ 6). First, on May 2, 2023, an employee reported that they witnessed Kinder

being rude to a food service employee. Id. at ¶7. Specifically, the employee alleged that this

occurred as Kinder was leaving to go to lunch, and the food service person was asking for a name

Kinder said she did not know (Filing No. 72-9 at 9:10–10:11). Kinder did not recall this encounter,

and denies that she turned away a food delivery person because she did not know a name that was

on the order. Id.; (Filing No. 72-20 at 88:15–19).

Second, on May 31, 2023, an intern reportedly forgot their keys to access their work area

on the third floor, which was the same floor where Kinder worked. When the intern asked Kinder

if she could let her in, Kinder refused and told the intern to go to the sixth floor. Operations

Manager Alexis Clesi ("Clesi") found the intern in the sixth-floor lobby crying and escorted the

intern back to the third floor to let her in. Clesi reported that she verified for Kinder who the intern

was and asked Kinder to let the intern into the third floor for the rest of the day, but Kinder refused

to do so. Id. at ¶8. Kinder did not grant the intern access because Eldridge had communicated to

Kinder that she received a phone call from Scott telling her not to let anyone in without their key

or fob. (Filing No. 72-9 at 2).

Third, on June 2, 2023, Kinder sent an email to her supervisor stating that she would not

be at work that day and letting her know who would cover the front desk. Kinder failed to provide

any explanation for the absence which violated the office's attendance policy as outlined in the

employee policies and procedures manual. Id. at 2–3 ¶9. Fourth, on June 12, 2023, Kinder sent an

email indicating that she would not be at work, but this time she failed to obtain coverage, which

also violated the office's attendance policy. Id at 3 ¶11.

On June 9, 2023, Eldridge and Kelsey met with Kinder regarding the complaints involving

the intern and food worker. During this meeting, Kinder explained that she believed she was

following Eldridge's orders by not letting someone in who did not have a key or badge. They

informed Kinder that she would be given a procedure to follow in the future to verify an employee's

identity. Kinder also denied being rude to the food service employee. Id. at 3 ¶10.

On June 15, 2023, Kelsey and Eldridge met with Kinder to discuss the complaints and her

issues with attendance and coverage policies. Id. at 3 ¶12. Kinder provided an explanation

concerning each incident. Kelsey made the decision to provide Kinder with a verbal warning to

ensure that Kinder was aware of the office's expectations moving forward. Id. at 4 ¶14. He

communicated to Kinder that a record of the verbal would be neither placed in Kinder's personnel

file nor in her permanent record (Filing No. 72-13 at 2). However, the verbal warning included

that any further violations of the MCPO policies and procedures may result in further corrective

action, up to and including termination of employment. Id.

On July 19, 2023, Kinder filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging retaliation with the

EEOC Indianapolis District Office (Filing No. 72-5). On August 8, 2023, Kelsey—aware of the

pending EEOC Charge—sent an email to Eldridge, Farrow, and Pena Pardo requesting all the notes

they had on the interviews for the Major Felony Sex Crimes Secretary position (Filing No. 72-6).

Pena Pardo, Eldridge and Farrow provided an email summary of their notes to Kelsey but did not

provide their actual notes. (Filing No. 56-21 at 79; Filing No. 56-3 at 1; Filing No. 56-23 at 58).

Kinder filed her Complaint in this action on May 22, 2024.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary

judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v.

Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).

"However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a

summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular

issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual

allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth, 476 F.3d

at 490 (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements

or speculation but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox

County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).

"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence

to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits

of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). "[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties

nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Kinder asserts that the MCPO and Scott denied her a major felony secretary position, and

issued a verbal warning against her in retaliation for engaging in protected activity of filing the

lawsuit in Kinder I. The Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on May 27, 2025

asserting that Kinder's retaliation claims fail on the merits as she cannot show that she suffered an

adverse action or that there was a causal connection between any alleged adverse action and any

protected activity. Kinder filed her response on August 22, 2025, in which she imbedded a Motion

for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence. The Court will first address the merits of the summary

judgment motion then turn to the request for sanctions.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Kinder engaged in statutorily protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge of

discrimination in October 2021 and her complaint in federal court in October 2022. She alleges

the Defendants retaliated against her for engaging in this protected activity by (1) not hiring her

for a major felony secretary position and (2) issuing her a verbal warning with the threat of further

action (Filing No. 24). To survive summary judgment on her retaliation claims, Kinder must offer

evidence of "(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the

employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two." Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656,

661 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403–04 (7th Cir.

2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)). The Defendants do not dispute that Kinder engaged in protected

activities, but argue that her claims nonetheless fail on the second and third elements. (Filing No.

57 at 16). The Court will address each element in turn.

1. Materially Adverse Action

"[M]aterially adverse actions may include 'termination of employment, a demotion

evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,

significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a

particular situation." Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 1999)). The denial of a transfer with

"parallel pay, benefits, and responsibilities" does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Saggu v. Dejoy, No. 19 C 2303, 2021 WL 1165106, at *12 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 2021) (quoting

Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 275 (7th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, if a plaintiff fails

to prove they were qualified for a promotion, their subsequent denial of that promotion does not

constitute an adverse employment action. Dandy, 388 F.3d at 275 (citing Patt v. Family Health

Systems, Inc., 280 F.3d 749, 745–55 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Defendants argue that Kinder did not suffer a materially adverse employment action

because the major felony secretary position was not a promotion, rather, it was a lateral transfer in

which she would not have received any additional pay. (Filing No. 57 at 16). Defendants argue

that Kinder's preference to perform secretary duties instead of receptionist duties is insufficient to

establish that the denial of the position constituted a materially adverse action. Id. at 17. The

Defendants further argue that the verbal warning was not a materially adverse action because the

warning neither went into Kinder's personnel file nor her permanent record.

Kinder argues that "[u]nder the hierarchy of MCPO, there are paralegals, then secretaries,

then receptionists. The receptionist position is considered to be a level below a secretary. By

denying Kinder the position, she contends she was denied the opportunity to move into a higher-

level position within MCPO." (Filing No. 72 at 6). Kinder does not proffer any argument as to why

the verbal warning was a materially adverse action beyond stating that "MCPO's verbal warning

to Kinder was based on unsubstantiated, inaccurate information and events that did not occur." Id.

at 15.

Kinder is correct that within the MCPO hierarchy, a secretary position is technically a

higher-level position than a receptionist, however, as Defendants point out, she was not simply

employed as a receptionist but had a hybrid receptionist and backup advocate role. (Filing No. 56-

1 ¶ 6.) Defendants argue persuasively that for Kinder, the new position would have been lateral,

because Kinder would not have received any additional pay if she had been selected for either of

the major felony secretary positions (Filing No. 56-1 at 3 ¶11). A lateral change in employment

alone is not material. For an adverse employment action to be material, the change in terms and

conditions of employment "must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of

job responsibilities." Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

For example, a “materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a

demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of

benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique

to a particular situation.” Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th

Cir.1993). None of these circumstances apply here. Denial of a purely lateral transfer is not an

adverse employment action under Title VII. See Saggu v. Dejoy, 2021 WL 1165106, at *12 (N.D.

Ill. Mar. 26, 2021). Accordingly, Kinder has not shown that she suffered a materially adverse action

when she was denied the major felony secretary position, and she has failed to put forth sufficient

evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to the adverse employment action element.

Kinder argues that MCPO’s verbal warning was based on unsubstantiated, inaccurate

information and events that did not occur. She contends that she followed the directive Scott gave

to Eldridge that Eldridge in turn gave to Kinder concerning the intern, and the alleged incident

with the food delivery person occurred while the office was closed and Kinder wasn’t even present.

(Filing No. 72 at 15). But Kinder did not suffer an adverse employment action when given the

verbal warning with the threat of future disciplinary action. The verbal warning neither went into

her personnel file nor went on her permanent record. Indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence

that the verbal warning resulted in any adverse action let alone a material one.

And even if, as Kinder claims, the verbal warning was "based on unsubstantiated,

inaccurate information and events that did not occur," "[u]nfair reprimands or negative

performance evaluations, unaccompanied by some tangible job consequence, do not constitute

adverse employment actions." Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001); see

also Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that verbal

warnings without being accompanied by any tangible job consequence do not amount to adverse

employment actions); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir. 2011) ("No reasonable

jury could find that the delivery of a verbal warning, based on a complaint from a coworker,

constitutes an adverse employment action[.]").

In addition, the threat of future action does not amount to a materially adverse employment

action. See Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that an

employer's unfulfilled threats of unspecified disciplinary action did not constitute adverse actions);

see also Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 870 (7th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). Accordingly, because

Kinder did not suffer a materially adverse employment action, from either the denial of the

secretary role or the issuance of a verbal warning with the threat of further action, her claims fail

on the second element of her retaliation claim.

2. Causal Connection

Even if Kinder could establish a materially adverse action, there is clearly no causal link

between her filing of the EEOC charge and lawsuit and the denial of the major felony secretary

position or the verbal warning she received.

"Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for

causation . . . . This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the

absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer." Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. V.

Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). A plaintiff can survive summary judgment by pointing to either

direct or circumstantial evidence to demonstrate causation. Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1015

(7th Cir. 2018). Circumstantial evidence can include, for example, "suspicious timing, a pretextual

explanation for the termination, and evidence that similarly situated employees were treated

differently." Id. (quoting Gracia v. SigmaTron Int'l, Inc., 842 F.3d 1010, 1021 (7th Cir. 2016). "This

list is not exclusive; the plaintiff can point to any 'other evidence from which an inference of

discriminatory intent might be drawn.'" Id. (quoting Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1019).

In her response brief, Kinder acknowledges that to show causation, she must point to

circumstantial evidence, such as "suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence

other employees were treated differently, or evidence the employer's proffered reason." (Filing No.

72 at 6). However, she fails to point to any such evidence to show causal connection between her

filing of the EEOC charge and lawsuit and her denial of the major felony secretary position or the

verbal warning. She simply concludes, without support, that both occurrences were the result of

her filing an EEOC charge and lawsuit. This is unsurprising as the record is entirely devoid of any

evidence—circumstantial or direct—that would lead to the conclusion that either occurrence was

the result of Kinder's EEOC charge or prior lawsuit.

Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that Kinder was denied the major felony

secretary position because she interviewed poorly. Kinder admits that she was late for the interview

due to an issue logging into Webex and she had to seek assistance from IT. (Filing No. 72-23 at

24–25). Thereafter, all four members of the Panel expressed significant concerns about Kinder's

ability to succeed in the secretary role. Kelsey noted that Kinder seemed to stumble through the

questions and that there were better candidates for the position (Filing No. 56-8 at 8). Farrow noted

that Kinder was closed off, answered all the questions with "yes" or "no", and did not offer any

insight on why she was interested in the secretary position (Filing No. 56-10 at 1). Eldridge noted

that when asked, "how do you [] stay organized at work[?]", Kinder replied "I'm not doing the job

so, I don't know how to answer that." (Filing No. 56-6 at 1). In his notes, Eldridge wrote that

Farrow did not believe Kinder was going to be a good fit (Filing No. 72-22 at 20). Pena Pardo

noted that Kinder "did not interview very well and did not seem prepared." (Filing No. 56-4 at 1).

And even if the Panel did not express such concerns, federal courts "do not sit as a kind of 'super-

personnel department' weighing the prudence of employment decisions made by firms charged

with employment discrimination." Giannapoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d

406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997).

Likewise, Kinder fails to show causation concerning the verbal warnings. She argues that

MCPO’s verbal warnings were based on unsubstantiated, inaccurate information and events that

did not occur. Even though she denies any wrongdoing, the designated evidence shows that Kinder

received the verbal warning based on issues reported by other employees, failing to explain why

she called off work on multiple occasions in violation of MCPO policies, and failing to find

coverage on one of the days she called off in violation MCPO policies. These are legitimate issues

which an employer may bring to an employee's attention.

Kinder's retaliation claims fail on both the second and third elements. She has not shown a

causal connection between her filing of the EEOC charge and lawsuit and her denial of the major

felony secretary position or the verbal warning. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted.

B. Motion for Sanctions

Embedded in the conclusion section of Kinder's response brief is a Motion for Sanctions

for Spoliation of Evidence (Filing No. 72 at 15). As an initial matter, Plaintiff's counsel is

reminded of their obligation to comply with the Court's Local Rules. Local Rule 7-1(a) states that

"[a] motion must not be contained within a brief, response, or reply to a previously filed motion,

unless ordered by the court." S.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(a). Further, Local Rule 37-1(b) states that "[a]ny

motion raising a discovery dispute must contain a statement setting forth the efforts taken to

resolve the dispute[.]" S.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(b). The request for sanctions fails on both accounts.3

Nonetheless, the Court will rule on the merits of the Motion as if it were properly filed.

"To obtain an adverse inference related to spoliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a

defendant intentionally destroyed documents in bad faith." Downing v. Abbott Lab'ys, 48 F.4th

793, 812 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing cases). "The crucial element in a spoliation claim is not the fact

that the documents were destroyed but that they were destroyed for the purpose of hiding adverse

information." Id. (quoting Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 428 (7th

Cir. 2010)).

Kinder points out that Eldridge’s interview notes were not produced in discovery and were

destroyed in December 2024 when she left MCPO, and Farrow’s is uncertain as to when her actual

notes were destroyed. Kinder argues that the destruction of these panel members interview notes

3 Kinder's Motion may also be untimely as she learned of the alleged spoliation at least four months before raising

the issue. However, the Court need not rest its decision on procedural failures.

after her EEOC charge and litigation had been filed, was done in bad faith and has prejudiced her

(Filing No. 72 at 9). The Court is not persuaded.

Kinder has designated no evidence to show bad faith or prejudice. On August 8, 2023

Kelsey reached out to the other members of the Panel after Kinder's interview and requested they

send him their interview notes (Filing No. 56-4 at 2). Each of the other three Panel members' notes

were sent to Kelsey via email and preserved for this litigation (see Filing No. 56-4, Filing No. 56-

6, Filing No. 56-10). Eldridge testified that she recopied whatever she wrote in her notes, and

emailed an exact copy of her interview notes without any changes (Filing No. 56-21 at 79:18–

80:9). Pena Pardo testified that he sent an accurate account of his notes (Filing No. 56-3 at 1 ¶4).

Farrow also confirmed the validity of the interview notes she sent (Filing No. 56-23 at 58:4–61:8,

Filing No. 56-5 at 2 ¶6).

Kinder has not shown that any notes were destroyed in bad faith or that she has suffered

any prejudice. Her contention that the notes in the emails may have been modified is mere

speculation, unsupported by the record, which is not enough to warrant sanctions. See In Re Text

Messaging Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 788, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (denying spoliation sanctions

where spoliation claim was based on speculation); see also Stoller v. CMH Mfg. West Inc., No. 18

C 0047, 2020 WL 616464, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2020) (citing Rummery v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,

250 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2001) ("In other words, because [plaintiff] has provided only

speculation that [defendants] intentionally destroyed the [evidence], the Court denies his motion

for sanctions and default."). Accordingly, Kinder's Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of evidence

is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 56)

is GRANTED, and Kinder's Title VII retaliation claims for the denial of the major felony secretary

position and the verbal warning with threat of further action are dismissed with prejudice.

Kinder's Motion for Sanctions (Filing No. 72) is DENIED.

Final judgment shall issue separately.

SO ORDERED.

Date: _ 3/2/2026 O athon Urcath

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

Gustavo Angel Jimenez

INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

gustavo.jimenez@atg.in.gov

Thomas B. Roberts

Roberts Law

thomas@trobertslaw.com

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