Sylvas

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

DONALD SYLVAS #106762, CIVIL DOCKET NO. 1:25-CV-00594

Plaintiff SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

JEREMY WILEY ET AL, MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

Defendants

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is a civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by pro

se Plaintiff Donald Sylvas (“Sylvas”). ECF No. 1. Sylvas is incarcerated at the River

Bend Detention Center in Lake Providence, Louisiana. He alleges the violation of his

constitutional rights while incarcerated at Catahoula Correctional Center (“CCC”) in

Harrisonburg, Louisiana.

Because Sylvas fails to state a viable claim, his Complaint (ECF No. 1) should

be DENIED.

I. Background

Sylvas alleges that his life was “put at risk” by forcing him to live with second-

hand smoke for 13 months at Catahoula Correctional Center. ECF No. 1 at 3. Sylvas

asserts that he was transferred to Tensas Parish Detention Center in retaliation for

complaining about the smoke. He also alleges that he gets “no access to the courts

or law library.”

Sylvas asserts that state officials “refuse to honor” the judge’s sentence to

provide him with programming options to earn sentencing credits under Act 280.

at 4.

Finally, Sylvas alleges that he has received inadequate dental care for dental

abscesses in March 2024 and October 2024. at 5.

Sylvas requests that he be given one year of credit toward his sentence as well

as $50,000 for mental anguish. at 6.

II. Law and Analysis

A. The Complaint is subject to preliminary screening.

Sylvas is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed . ECF

No. 4. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental

entity, the Complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. t, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

Because Sylvas is proceeding , the Complaint is also subject to

screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for

dismissal of a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1

1 A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” . at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.

B. Sylvas is not entitled to programming, and his request for release cannot

be pursued in a civil rights action.

Sylvas requests sentencing credit, which would make him eligible for parole.

To the extent Sylvas asserts that he is entitled to release prior to the expiration of his

sentence, his claim is not viable under § 1983. , 411 U.S.

475, 500 (1973) (a prisoner seeking “a determination that he is entitled to immediate

release or a speedier release” from custody must pursue relief through a petition for

writ of habeas corpus, not through § 1983).

If Sylas merely seeks credits that would make him eligible for parole

consideration, his claim still fails. “Louisiana parole statutes do not create an

expectancy of release or [a] liberty interest in general.” , 20-30430,

2022 WL 2072861, at *4 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing , 627 So. 2d 629,

633 (La. 1993)); , 205 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1999) (no

constitutionally protected liberty interest “under the Louisiana parole statutes or

other state statutes encouraging the rehabilitation of inmates”). There is no liberty

interest in the right to earn good-time credits through participating in programs that

will increase parole eligibility. , 264 F.3d 1140 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A

claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” , 556

U.S. at 678 (citing , 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or

probability; it lies somewhere in between. . Plausibility simply calls for enough factual

allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support

the elements of the claim. , 550 U.S. at 556.

211 F.3d 953, 957-59 (5th Cir. 2000)). Nor is there a liberty interest

in the programs themselves. , 779 F.3d 330, 342 (5th Cir. 2015)

(no liberty interest in substance abuse treatment or educational/vocational

programs).2

C. Sylvas fails to allege a viable claim regarding delayed medical care.

“Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs constitutes an

Eighth Amendment violation and states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

, 864 F.2d 1235, 1244 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing , 429

U.S. 97, 105–07 (1976)). Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to

meet. , 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). The “official conduct must be ‘wanton,’ which is defined to

mean ‘reckless.’ ” , 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th

Cir. 2017). “Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical

malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does an inmate's

disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.”

Additionally, an incorrect diagnosis by medical personnel or the “failure to alleviate

a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not” are both

insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. , 759 F.2d

1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); , 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).

2 As the Warden informed Sylvas in responding to his grievance, CCC offers programing and

classes that are approved by the Louisiana Department of Corrections. “However, CCC does

not determine who is selected to participate in these programs; that decision is made by

DOC.” ECF No. 1-2 at 6.

“[A]n inmate who has been examined by medical personnel fails to set forth a

valid showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” ,

2008 WL 544240, at *2 (W.D. La. 2008) (citing , 122 F.2d 286,

292 (5th Cir. 1997)). And a plaintiff alleging a delay in medical care must show that

the delay was caused by deliberate indifference and resulted in substantial harm.

, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006); 989

F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir.1993).

Sylvas alleges that treatment for his first abscess was successful, but he

developed another abscess seven months later. ECF No. 1 at 5. He asserts that

medication was prescribed, but not administered consistently, resulting in a three-

month delay in having his tooth extracted. Sylvas does not allege that the delay

was caused by a refusal to treat him, intentional acts, or wanton disregard, as

opposed to staff negligence.

The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted: “The treatment

may not have been the best that money could buy, and occasionally, a dose of

medication may have been forgotten, but these deficiencies were minimal, they do not

show an unreasonable standard of care, and they fall short of establishing deliberate

indifference by the prison authorities.” , 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir.

1992). The Fifth Circuit also rejected a deliberate indifference claim where an inmate

alleged that medical staff failed to administer 180 doses of his medication over a one

year period. , 190 F.3d 693,697 (5th Cir. 1999). It also found that

the “‘occasional expiration of prescriptions . . . was constitutionally insignificant.’”

, 6:17-cv-649, 2018 WL 11462741, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2018), , 772 F.

App’x 92 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting , 442 F. App’x 911, 914 (5th Cir.

2011). Accordingly, Sylvas has not alleged deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs sufficient to state a viable claim.

D. Sylvas fails to state a viable claim regarding the conditions of his

confinement, access to courts, or retaliation.

Sylvas alleges that Defendant forced him to endure second-hand smoke for 13

months at Catahoula Correctional Center. ECF No. 1 at 3. In ,

509 U.S. 25, 35–36 (1993), the United States Supreme Court established a two-part

test to state a viable claim regarding environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”). A

prisoner must allege that: (1) he was exposed to unreasonably high levels of

secondhand smoke; and (2) prison authorities were subjectively deliberately

indifferent to his plight. .

Sylvas does not allege that he was exposed to “unreasonably high” levels of

ETS. According to an attachment to the Complaint, CCC allows tobacco use only in

designated areas. No smoking signage is posted in all dorms, and non-smoking

policies are strictly enforced. ECF No. 1-2 at 6. Sylvas does not allege that

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his plight.

Sylvas asserts that he was transferred to Tensas Parish Detention Center in

retaliation for complaining about ETS. But this is a conclusory allegation. Sylvas

provides not facts to support a theory that the motivation behind the transfer was

retaliatory. , 44 F.3d 1004 (5th Cir. 1994);

, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must allege “causation, ,

‘but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident . . . would not have

occurred.’” (quoting , 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Finally, Sylvas alleges a denial of access to the courts due to lost paperwork

and lack of access to a law library. ECF No. 1 at 3. The right of access to the courts

is not unlimited and includes only a reasonable opportunity to file non-frivolous legal

claims challenging convictions or conditions of confinement. , 518

U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Thus, to state a viable claim, a plaintiff must allege that his

position as a litigant was actually prejudiced. , 73 F.3d 1322,

1328 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing , 4 F.3d 410,

413 (5th Cir. 1993)). Sylvas does not allege that he was prevented from bringing any

non-frivolous legal claims.

E. Sylvas is not entitled to compensatory damages.

Sylvas’s request to be compensated for mental anguish also fails. “No federal

civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined to a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without

a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); , 404 F.3d

371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that § 1997e(e) bars compensatory damages for

allegations of “mental anguish, emotional distress, psychological harm,” and the like).

Sylvas does not allege that he suffered a physical injury that is more than .

112 F.3d 191, 193–94 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of

claim seeking damages for a injury as frivolous)).

Ill. Conclusion

Because Sylvas fails to state a viable constitutional claim, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A, but without prejudice to filing

a habeas petition regarding the length of his sentence.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), a party may file

written objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days of service,

unless the Court grants an extension of time to file objections under Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(b). A party may also respond to another party’s objections to this Report and

Recommendation within 14 days of service of those objections, again unless the Court

grants an extension of time to file a response to objections.

No other briefs may be filed without leave of court, which will only be granted

for good cause. A party’s failure to timely file written objections to this Report and

Recommendation will bar a party from later challenging factual or legal conclusions

adopted by the District Judge, except if the challenge asserts “plain error.”

SIGNED on Wednesday, January 21, 2026

Hite.

JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE