McIntosh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

WILLIAM MCINTOSH, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-2092

)

FELICIA ADKINS et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983

by Plaintiff William McIntosh, an inmate at Dixon Correctional Center. Plaintiff also filed

a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In

reviewing the Complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff’s pleading alleges constitutional violations at Danville Correctional

Center against former Warden Felicia Adkins and Dr. Nitin Thapar.

On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff went on crisis watch. Plaintiff alleges that the

corrections officer in charge of inventorying his individual property did not provide an

itemized inventory listing and that another corrections officer allowed an inmate to steal

his property, which included clothing, commissary items, and prescription tinted

eyeglasses. Plaintiff asserts the inmate later sold his property. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 5.)

Plaintiff suffers from scleritis, which causes light sensitivity. Plaintiff asserts that

he cannot see without his glasses, which provide the protection he requires due to his

medical condition, especially when outdoors. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff claims

that Defendant Adkins denied the many grievances he submitted regarding the

acquisition of another pair of prescription-tinted glasses, the absence of which causes

Plaintiff excruciating migraines. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Thapar has forced the involuntary administration

of psychotropic drugs because of a “feud” between Plaintiff and Defendant Adkins. (Id.)

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s assertion that a corrections officer allowed the misappropriation of

Plaintiff’s individual property does not state a § 1983 claim. See Lucien v. Johnson, 61 F.3d

573, 576 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that if an inmate’s “property was merely lost, or was

stolen not by prison guards but by other inmates, then [the plaintiff] has no federal

constitutional claim even if the loss or theft would not have occurred but for the

negligence or even the gross negligence of the prison’s employees”).

Additionally, under the Supreme Court decisions, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

(1981), and Hudson, “persons who complain about the unauthorized loss or destruction

of their property must seek compensation in state court rather than under §1983. Hudson,

468 U.S. at 533 (holding the intentional, unauthorized deprivation of property does not

violate the Constitution, provided that adequate remedies are available under state law);

see also Lyons v. Dart, 901 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2018); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330

(1986) (“mere negligence could not ‘wor[k] a deprivation in the constitutional sense.’”

(quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548.) (emphasis in original).

In Illinois, an inmate has an adequate remedy in the Illinois Court of Claims. See

Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing 705 ILCS 505/8); see also

Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The Illinois Court of Claims has

exclusive jurisdiction over suits asserting damages to property.”).

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an

objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under

the objective element, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical condition is

sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective

component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that a

defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Adkins was made aware that his lack of tinted

prescription glasses was causing his migraines through the grievance process, which is

sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Adkins at

the screening stage. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that to

establish adequate notice to the prison official of a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff “has the burden of demonstrating that the communication, in its content and

manner of transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994)).

The Supreme Court recognizes that inmates have “a ‘significant liberty interest,’

created by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in ‘avoiding the

unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs’—drugs used to treat mental disorders

by ‘alter[ing] the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes, intended to be

beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes.’” Johnson v. Tinwalla, 855 F.3d 747, 748 (7th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221, 229 (1990)); see also Washington,

494 U.S. at 221-22 (“[An inmate] possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the

unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.”). However, “a prisoner’s interest in liberty gives way if the

state establishes, by a medical finding, that the prisoner has a mental disorder likely to

cause harm to himself or others unless he is treated with an antipsychotic drug.” Johnson,

855 F.3d at 749; see also Washington, 494 U.S. at 227 (“[G]iven the requirements of the

prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate

who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate

is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”).

Plaintiff claims Defendant Thapar has forced the involuntary administration of

psychotropic drugs, which is sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim against Thapar.

II. Counsel and Status

Plaintiff moves for the recruitment of counsel. Plaintiff has no constitutional right

to counsel, and the Court cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in

civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County

of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that although indigent civil litigants

have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request

counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances). In considering

Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent

plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from

doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent

to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is denied because he has not satisfied his

threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically

requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is DENIED.

2) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

against Defendant Adkins and a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Defendant Thapar. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants proceeds in their

individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the case,

except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court recommends that Plaintiff

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise

directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.

Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not

filed their respective Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service.

After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

5) If a defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for

whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be kept only by the Clerk and shall

not be kept in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all

defenses proper under the Federal Rules. The Answer and later pleadings shall

be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions

unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no response to the Answer

is necessary or will be considered.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents

that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does

not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses

are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests

and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the

subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a scheduling order, which will

explain the discovery process in more detail.

8) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of

a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

10) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will

require Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED March 2, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE