Sims

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RAMONA SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-CV-2507-NJR

CLAYTON HOMES and VANDERBILT

MORTGAGE & FINANCE, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Ramona Sims’s Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11) and Amended

Complaint (Doc. 9). The Court granted Sims’s Application to Proceed in District Court

without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 4) but determined her initial Complaint (Doc. 3)

was deficient under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; consequently, Sims

was ordered to file an amended complaint (Doc. 8). In her amended complaint, Sims

alleges that Clayton Homes and Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. (collectively

“Defendants”) violated various federal and state consumer financial protection laws

when they entered into an installment loan contract with her. (Doc. 9). She seeks

compensatory, punitive, and injunctive relief. Id.

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Sims asks this Court to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary

injunction against Defendants to “enjoin[] them from enforcing the illegal orders entered

against her . . . by St. Clair County Circuit Court.” (Doc. 11, at 1). Specifically, Defendant

Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. (VMF) secured a judgment awarding it possession

of Sims’s property in state court in 2024. (Doc. 11-1, at 10–11, 13, 15). VMF seeks to enforce

that judgment through a supplemental order of the state court, for which there is a

hearing scheduled on March 20, 2026. Id. at 8–11. Sims asks this Court to prevent VMF

from doing so.

The Court cannot grant Sims’s request for a TRO or other preliminary injunctive

relief because the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits federal courts from

enjoining state court proceedings.1 Sims’s motion expressly seeks an injunction to

prevent the enforcement of a state court judgment and is therefore barred by the Act,

even though the injunction would run against private parties rather than the state court

itself. E.g., Millonzi v. Bank of Hillside, 605 F. Supp. 140, 143–44 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (barring

preliminary injunction against lender seeking to enforce state foreclosure judgment

because “the mandate of the Anti-Injunction Act ‘cannot be evaded by addressing the

order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state

proceeding’” (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287

(1976))); Merritt-Wilson v. New American Funding, LLC, No. 25-cv-02177, 2025 WL 3640236,

at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2025) (applying the Anti-Injunction Act to a TRO request to enjoin

1 There are three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act: such injunctions are permissible (1) as expressly

authorized by Congress, (2) where necessary in aid of the court’s jurisdiction, or (3) to protect or effectuate

its judgments—is applicable here. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. None are applicable here. See Millonzi v. Bank of Hillside,

605 F. Supp. 140, 143–44 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (barring preliminary injunction against lender seeking to enforce

state foreclosure judgment on similar facts); see also 19 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 47:128, Westlaw (2026) (listing

acts that have been held to expressly authorize the stay of state court proceedings, none of which are

plausibly invoked by Sims).

state foreclosure proceedings even where defendants were private parties). Accordingly,

Sims’s motion is denied.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Because Sims is proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee, the Court must

screen the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismiss it if it is

clearly frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or is

a claim for money damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample

authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus

save everyone time and legal expense.”).

Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The Court accepts the plaintiff’s

factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels, however, are not

enough. The complaint must allege enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2013).

In reviewing the amended complaint, Count III immediately appears to fail to

state a claim. There, Sims claims that Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance (VMF) violated

26 U.S.C. § 6050H. (Doc. 9, ¶ 45). Section 6050H sets information reporting requirements

to assist the Internal Revenue Service in verifying the accuracy of claimed mortgage

interest deductions. E.g., Pemberton v. Nationstar Mortg., 331 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1031–32

(S.D. Cal. 2018). Essentially, Section 6050H and its implementing regulations require

individuals who receive more than $600 in mortgage interest payments to submit a

Form 1098 to both the persons paying the mortgage interest and the Internal Revenue

Service. See id.

It is highly unlikely that a private party can bring a claim under Section 6050H, as

the statute does not appear to create a private right of action. See, e.g., Pemberton v.

Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 14-cv-1024, 2015 WL 13828420, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015)

(finding no private right of action in Section 6050H); Peaslee v. Brown, No. 24-cv-00011,

2024 WL 1715091, at *2 (D. Maine Apr. 22, 2024) (same); Rovai v. Select Portfolio Servicing,

Inc., No. 14-cv-1738, 2015 WL 3613748, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2015) (same). However,

even if Section 6050H does create a private right of action, Sims fails to allege any facts

establishing a violation of that statute. Accordingly, Count III of her amended complaint

fails to state a claim on which relief could be granted and must be dismissed under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Aside from Count III, however, it is not immediately apparent to the Court that

the amended complaint fails to state a claim. Further, it does not appear to be frivolous

or malicious. Because the Court has already determined that Sims is unable to pay the

filing fee (Doc. 8), she may proceed on her amended complaint with the exception of

Count III.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Ramona Sims’s Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11) and DISMISSES

Count III of her Amended Complaint (Doc. 9). The Court further DIRECTS the Clerk of

Court to provide Sims with a USM-285 form. Sims is ORDERED to return the completed

form to the Clerk of Court. Upon receipt of the completed USM-285 form, the Clerk is

DIRECTED to prepare and issue a summons for Defendants Clayton Homes and

Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc., and to deliver a service packet consisting of the

summons, USM-285 form, and a copy of the Amended Complaint to the United States

Marshals Service. The Court DIRECTS the United States Marshal, upon receipt of these

documents, to serve a copy of the summons and the Amended Complaint upon

Defendants in any manner consistent with Rule 4, as directed by Plaintiff Ramona Sims.

Costs of service shall be borne by the United States.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 24, 2026 71

neff onsen

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

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