Burrows

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ALBERT BURROWS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-11-JES-NPM

BILL PRUMMELL, as the duly

elected Sheriff of Charlotte

County, Florida,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a Dispositive Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. #20) filed by Defendant Bill Prummell

on November 7, 2025. Plaintiff Albert Burrows filed a Response

(Doc. #27) on November 28, 2025, and defendant filed a Reply to

Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. #30) on December 17, 2025. For the

reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when a movant shows that

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence

is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322,

1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A

court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”

Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court views all

evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Tana v.

Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010). Even if facts are

undisputed, a court should deny summary judgment if reasonable

minds might differ on inferences arising from those facts. St.

Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d

815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999). “If a reasonable fact finder evaluating

the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts,

and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact,

then the court should not grant summary judgment.” Allen v. Bd.

of Pub. Educ. Of Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).

Sheriff Prummell argues that “inadmissible hearsay may not be

considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment and cannot

serve as a basis to create a genuine issue of material fact.”

(Doc. #20, p. 10.) This is not the complete rule. In considering

a motion for summary judgment, a district court generally cannot

consider inadmissible hearsay. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683

F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012). But a district court may consider

a hearsay statement at the summary judgment stage “if the statement

could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to

admissible form.” Id. at 1293–94 (quotation marks omitted). A

typical method for having hearsay testimony reduced to admissible

form is to have the declarant of the statement testify to the

matter at trial. Id. at 1294. In any event, the Sheriff does not

identify any evidence relied upon by plaintiff to which he objects

as being inadmissible hearsay.

II.

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from

the Sheriff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. #20, pp. 2-10)

and plaintiff’s responses (Doc. #27, pp. 2-7.)

Defendant Bill Prummell (defendant or the Sheriff) has been

the Sheriff and chief law enforcement officer of Charlotte County,

Florida since January 2013. As such he is in charge of the

Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO).

Plaintiff Albert Burrows (plaintiff or Burrows) is a former

employee of the CCSO who was initially hired in January 2011 as a

correctional officer. In September 2019, Burrows applied for and

was hired in a civilian position as Support Services Assistant

Supervisor for the CCSO. Support Services involves the

“coordination, planning and supervision of the facility lawn

maintenance program and provides regular preventative maintenance

to systems and the physical structure of the Facility.” (Doc.

#21-1, Ex. 5.) Burrows later became the Support Services

Supervisor, whose job is to “facilitate the flow of the programs

department, including the Hydroponics Program, Fish Program, a

variety of inmate Programs and [to] oversee the Mail Department,

Laundry, and Hurricane Supply Room.” (Doc. #21-2, Ex. 7.) In

both of these civilian positions Burrows was considered an

“essential” employee under the CCSO’s emergency response plan. As

an essential employee, Burrows was expected to remain on shift

during emergency events such as hurricanes.

CCSO employees were expected to notify Risk Management when

the need for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave arises. The

CCSO maintains an “FMLA Guideline and Procedures” document and a

Department of Labor’s Employee Rights and Responsibilities notice

to advise employees about their rights when requesting FMLA leave.

(Doc. #21-3.) The CCSO provides employees with a template FMLA

Employee Leave Request Form and a Certification of Healthcare

Provider form (Doc. #21-3) when the employee notifies Risk

Management of the need for FMLA leave. Burrows was familiar with

the Guidelines and process, and understood they applied to him.

Prior to Hurricane Irma in September 2017, Burrows forwarded

an Inter-Office Memorandum through the CCSO chain of command

requesting that as a “special consideration” he be granted leave

to stay home with his wife during the hurricane. (Doc. #21-19.)

Burrows described his wife as “basically disabled and I am the

sole caregiver.” (Id.) Burrows also described several of his

wife’s limitations and several of her chronic medical issues.

(Id.) This request for special consideration made no reference to

the FLMA and was approved by a CCSO Major with Burrows being

advised he was “non-essential.” (Id.) Burrows did not seek FMLA

leave associated with the request for special consideration. (Doc.

#21, p. 81.)

Thereafter, Burrows developed a significant history of

requesting, and being approved for, FMLA leave from the CCSO to

aid his wife. Beginning on June 22, 2018, Burrows requested

intermittent FMLA leave based on the serious health conditions of

his wife. (Doc. #21-4.) Burrows completed the CCSO FMLA Employee

Leave Request Form, stating that the care he would provide his

wife included daily assistance getting up and down, help in and

out of his truck, transportation to and from doctors and stores,

and providing help when her muscles were cramping. (Id. at 3.) A

physician completed the medical portion of the form, including a

statement that Burrows’ wife suffered with significant disabling

chronic back and joint pain, and needed assistance from her husband

on a daily basis with activities of daily living and doctor visits.

(Id. at 4-5.) The physician also estimated intermittent patient

care would be needed for the next year. (Id. at 5.) The Risk

Management Specialist acknowledged receiving information on July

13, 2018, and approved FMLA leave. (Id. at 7.) On January 11,

2019, the CCSO sent Burrows a letter noting that he was currently

on Intermittent Family Medical Leave, stating that recertification

was required, and providing a form to be completed by a health

care provider. (Doc. #21-5.)

On January 17, 2019, Burrows completed the CCSO FMLA Employee

Leave Request Form, and signed the Certification of health Care

Provider on January 24, 2019, stating that the care he would

provide his wife included daily assistance standing and walking as

needed; that she would soon have surgery on her shoulder; that she

was receiving neck injunctions; that she needed transportation to

and from doctor’s appointments. (Doc. #21-6 at 1, 3.) The same

physician completed the medical portion of the form, including a

statement that Burrows’ wife needed frequent doctor visits and

help with daily activities. (Id. at 4.) The physician also

estimated intermittent patient care would be needed for the next

year since the issues were chronic. (Id. at 5.) The intermittent

FMLA leave was again approved by the CCSO. (Id. at 7.)

This pattern repeated itself approximately every 6 months

thereafter through 2021. The CCSO requested Burrows to update

medical documentation in order to recertify his continued need for

intermittent FMLA leave. Burrows recertified his need for

intermittent FMLA leave in January 2019, August 2019, February

2020, July 2020, February 2021, August 2021, and November 2021.

(Docs. ## 21-7 to 21-14.)

By February 2022, Burrows no longer needed intermittent FMLA

leave because he had more flexibility at work as the Supervisor

and was able to schedule his wife’s doctor’s appointments around

his work schedule. Burrows failed to provide the recertification

requested by the CCSO and was taken out of Intermittent FMLA. In

doing so, the CCSO advised Burrows he could apply again with the

proper paperwork. (Docs. #21-15, #21-16, #21-17.) Burrows did

not seek recertification of intermittent FMLA leave in 2022.

In all, Burrows requested FMLA leave on at least ten

occasions1 while employed by the CCSO under Sheriff Prummell. On

each occasion FMLA leave was approved and Burrows was reinstated

to his position without incident.

Prior to Hurricane Ian in September 2022, Burrows wrote an

Inter-Office Memorandum (Doc. #21-20) to a CCSO Corrections

Captain asking “for consideration to be exempt from having to stay

at the CCSO jail facility during this hurricane.” (Id.; Doc. #21,

p. 82.) The request for leave was approved, but Burrows was

informed that “if he was unable to be in attendance for another

incident that would require him to be stationed at the jail for

any length of time, [CCSO] would need to consider making some

1 Two of the FMLA leave requests were because of Burrows’ own

personal medical conditions at the time.

changes with his job classification.” (Doc. #21-21.) Burrows

responded that he would need to speak with his wife, and he was

advised to do so and to complete a memo with his decision. (Id.)

After conferring with his wife, Burrows wrote a memorandum to

Captain Carter stating: “This memo is to inform all of my intention

to continue my current position as an Essential employee as a

Support Services Supervisor.” (Doc. #21-20.) In a revised version

of the Memo, Burrows added the following line of text: “In the

event of a hurricane, I will be able and available to stay in the

jail facility. Fully conducting my duties as a CCSO supervisor.”

(Doc. #21-22.) Burrows asserts that he added the sentence to the

revised memo under duress and was told by CCSO personnel what to

add to the original Memo.

The next two hurricanes to impact the area were Hurricane

Helene and Hurricane Milton in 2024. Burrows was on preapproved

vacation leave during Hurricane Helene.

Before Hurricane Milton impacted the area, Burrows again

requested special consideration to remain home with his wife until

the storm passed the area. On October 6, 2024, Burrows sent an

email to CCSO personnel with the subject line of “Problem with the

storm”:

My wife is already crying on the phone when I told

her I will have to stay. She has high anxiety, fighting

depression and has chronic pain. We also have a cat that

is considered her companion pet for her depression and

anxiety, and she will not leave her. She has also had

past neck, back and knee surgeries. I will come in Monday

and Tuesday but will need to leave Tues. after work. I

understand that I am considered essential and am

supposed to stay. Capt. Barber and Capt. Carter had said

in the past that I could be forced to take a different

position. If that is the case, then that is what I will

have to do. My wife is the most important person in my

life.

(Doc. #21-23.) The next morning Burrows followed up with another

email:

First off, this morning, I would like to apologize

for my email yesterday. I realize that it came across

and sounded demanding. That is not my intention. I am

genuinely concerned for my wife's safety. And I am

stressing and scared that I could lose my position

because of what I am asking. I am asking for special

provisions to be able to be with her on Wednesday/during

the storm. I am doing everything possible to protect the

hydroponic system. I am asking to be able to leave on

Tuesday after shift and return Thursday morning.

(Doc. #21-24.) On October 8, 2024, Burrows sent an email directly

to Sheriff Prummell regarding a “serious issue”:

Good Morning and sorry to bother you.

I have been an employee since Jan. of 2011. Started

as a Housing Deputy then as Intake Deputy and now as

Support Services Supervisor.

I have what I believe is a serious issue. I am the

Support Services Supervisor (Civilian and considered

essential). But I have a problem: my wife is on the verge

of disablement.

A little about her: She has depression, anxiety,

chronic pain, she has had neck surgery, back surgery

with multiple occasions of back injections and knee

surgery with the same injections. We do not have any

family in Florida. Reasons she will not leave the house:

she has a companion cat that she must keep with her for

a calming effect, she does not drive and does not have

a driver's license, she can't go to a shelter with her

cat, she would not be able to get down and up off the

floor. No family to go to. And I am not available. She

is on chronic medication for the past 8 years. Difficulty

in lifting and filling the generator as a five-gallon

gas can is 40 lbs. and hoping that she remembers to shut

it off and cool down before refilling.

In the past: during hurricane Irma I was a housing

officer. I wrote a memo requesting the storm off (due to

my wife's issues) to Capt. Wilson and it was approved.

During hurricane Ian, I assumed I would have to do

the same. I wrote a memo to our current Capt. Carter and

Capt. Barber (Wilson had moved on) requesting only the

storm time off. With some apprehension from them it was

approved.

During Helene I was on Vacation anyway.

Now for Milton I had requested the time off again

and was denied and had to report as essential. I was

told to report, or the case would be taken to HR and

probably would not have a job any longer. I had requested

to be able to leave work on Tues. at end of shift, now

maybe Wednesday at end of shift (hurricane now slated to

make land fall Thursday morning 2am) and return as soon

as the storm has passed, even in higher wind and rain.

Long enough to make sure that my wife is safe.

I am here now because my wife insisted that I go to

work.

As Support Services Supervisor all programs'

employees are not here, classes are cancelled until at

least Friday.

My hydro and fish area are shut down and the

facility outside area has been secured.

I am asking if you could consider interceding on my

behalf and allow me to be home with my wife, only until

the storm passes our area.

If you read this, I apologize for taking any time

you need from the current weather situation.

If you cannot consider this, then please completely

disregard this email. I don't want to bring any undue

repercussions on myself.

(Doc. #21-25 at 2.)

Sheriff Prummell responded within a few hours:

I am sorry for your situation. There are pet

friendly shelters she can go to. Unfortunately, it is in

your job description that you are essential, and you

knew this going into it. If you are unable to meet all

the requirements for the job, you might want to see what

positions we have open that are not considered

essential. I am sorry to sound harsh, but this is what

we signed up for. If I make acceptations for you, I must

do it for everyone who claims a hardship. This is why we

give notice, so everyone has time to prepare.

(Id. at 1.) Burrows thanked the Sheriff for taking the time to

look at the email. (Id.)

On October 9, 2024, Burrows reported for duty at the CCSO

prepared to work his full shift. During his shift, Burrows’ wife

called about the threat of a tornado and thought she was having a

heart attack. (Doc. #21, p. 94.) The parties dispute the tone and

contents of Mrs. Burrows telephone conversation with her husband.

In any event, Burrows decided to leave work to go home to his wife,

so he went to talk to his manager but spoke to Director Rodgers

and informed his manager he was leaving. (Id. at 95-98.) Burrows

never contacted Risk Management regarding his need to leave. (Doc.

#26 at ¶ 12.)

On October 11, 2024, Burrows was notified of the Sheriff’s

intent to withdraw his appointment for abandoning his job during

an emergency event. Burrows refused to sign the letter. (Doc.

#21-26.)

On October 15, 2024, Burrows participated in a pre-

disciplinary hearing at the CCSO and was afforded an opportunity

to provide mitigating circumstances or facts prior to imposition

of discipline. Burrows made a statement and took responsibility

for his actions. (Doc. #27-8.)

Okay. So I am sitting here because of my actions on

Wednesday the 9th, and I take full responsibility for my

choices. I know Hurricane Milton was announced to make

landfall near Venice, essential employees were activated

and were to stay until the storm passed and released by

admin -- administration. I had all intentions of

staying. I had all my necessities prepared, and they

were already at the jail. I was at the jail working when

Milton was set to make landfall around 8 p.m. -- around

8 p.m.· Everything was going okay….

(Id. at 3.) Director Rogers told him not to leave the CCSO because

it was too dangerous due to weather bands, but Burrows made the

decision to go. (Id. at 4.) Before leaving, Burrows asked his

manager to come out. Burrows was stressed and emotional and said

he needed to leave. He returned his keys in the key box and left

the CCSO. Burrows stated:

I take full responsibility for my actions. I made this

choice. [Mrs. Burrows] originally did have plans to stay

with the neighbor, but the tornado was arriving eight

hours before Milton was to make landfall. I had every

intention of staying at the jail. All my clothes,

sleeping gear, and food was there. ·I don't feel like I

abandoned my post. I had workers ready to go back to

housing.

(Id. at 5.)

Burrows admitted he knew there would be consequences for his

actions, but he hoped that it did not equate to termination. (Id.

at 5-6.) Burrows acknowledged that “essential” was not going to

work for him. (Id. at 8.) Burrows never referenced the FMLA during

the hearing.

Sheriff Prummell stated that he took no issue with Burrows’

work product and that he had done a good job, “but when the

community needs [Burrows] the most, [he] leaves.” (Id. at 9.)

On October 16, 2024, Burrows received the letter officially

withdrawing his employment. Burrows signed the letter. (Doc.

#21-27.)

III.

On January 5, 2025, Burrows filed a two-count Complaint (Doc.

#1) asserting violations of the FMLA by Sheriff Prummell “as the

duly elected Sheriff of Charlotte County, Florida.” (Doc. #1,

Caption.)2 Count I alleges a claim for interference with Burrows’

FLMA rights by failing to provide certain required notices, denying

FMLA leave when such leave was required to be given, and not

restoring him to his employment position. Count II alleges a claim

of retaliation for terminating Burrows’ employment because he

requested FMLA leave. The Sheriff now seeks summary judgment on

both counts.

A. FMLA Overview

The FMLA entitles “eligible employees” to take up to 12 weeks

of unpaid leave “for any of several reasons.” Nevada Dep’t of Hum.

Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003). As relevant to this case,

“an eligible employee may take 12 weeks of so-called ‘family-care’

2 The Court reads this as being an official capacity suit against

the Sheriff, since there is no FLMA claim against an employer in

his individual capacity. Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687

(11th Cir. 1999).

leave ‘in order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or

parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent

has a serious health condition.’” Williams v. Bd. of Trustees of

Univ. of Alabama, 128 F.4th 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)). An “eligible employee” who takes leave

“for the intended purpose of the leave” is entitled upon “return

from such leave--(A) to be restored by the employer to the position

of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or

(B) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent

employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of

employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). “In order to receive FMLA

protections, one must be both eligible, meaning having worked the

requisite hours, and entitled to leave, meaning an employee has

experienced a triggering event.” Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living

Communities, Inc., 666 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 29

U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1))).

“The FMLA prohibits employers from interfering with,

restraining, retaliating against, or denying ‘the exercise of or

the attempt to exercise’ any rights guaranteed under the Act.”

Matamoros v. Broward Sheriff's Off., 2 F.4th 1329, 1337 (11th Cir.

2021) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)). The FMLA thus creates two

types of claims — interference claims and retaliation claims. 29

U.S.C. § 2615. In an interference claim, an employee asserts that

the employer denied or otherwise interfered with substantive

rights under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). An employee

claiming interference must demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the employee was eligible for the FMLA benefits and

that the employee was qualified for FMLA leave. Hurley v. Kent of

Naples, Inc., 746 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2014). In a

retaliation claim, an employee asserts that the employer

discriminated against the employee because the employee engaged in

activity protected by the FLMA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Pereda,

666 F.3d at 1272 (citing Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of

City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001)).

B. Sheriff’s Grounds for Summary Judgment

The Sheriff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on

the FMLA claims because: (1) Burrows did not qualify for, i.e.,

was not entitled to FMLA benefits; (2) Burrows did not provide

adequate notice to the CCSO; and (3) Burrows was terminated from

employment for a legitimate reason unrelated to his request for

FMLA leave. (Doc. #20, pp. 11-18.) The Court discusses each in

turn.

(1) Whether Burrows Was Entitled to FMLA Leave

The FMLA authorizes leave “[i]n order to care for the spouse,

or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse,

son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 2612(a)(1)(C). It is undisputed that Burrows is eligible in terms

of having worked the requisite hours, but the Sheriff argues he is

not entitled to FMLA leave because he did not experience a

triggering event. Both types of FMLA claims require the employee

to be entitled to the benefit denied. Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1272;

Hurley v. Kent of Naples, Inc., 746 F.3d at 1166–67; White v.

Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir.

2015). To be entitled to an FMLA benefit, an eligible employee

“must demonstrate that []he sought leave for a qualifying reason

and that []he provided notice meeting certain criteria.” Ramji v.

Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2021)

(citing White, 789 F.3d at 1194-96).

The Sheriff argues that to show entitlement Burrows must

demonstrate that his decision to leave the CCSO and go home to his

wife was for a FMLA-qualifying reason. (Doc. #20, pp. 10-13.)

More specifically, the Sheriff argues that “Burrows must

demonstrate that his wife was suffering from a serious health

condition on October 9, 2024, and that he needed to leave work to

care for her.” (Id. at 11.) The Sheriff does not dispute that

Burrows’ wife “suffers from various health conditions,” (id.) but

argues these conditions were not material to the events of October

9, 2024 (id. at 11-12). More specifically, the Sheriff argues

that Mrs. Burrows’ nervousness and feeling like she was going to

have a heart attack do not qualify as a serious health condition

(id.), and Burrows never notified the CCSO that his wife suffered

from heart-related conditions or incapacitating chest pains/panic

attacks (id. at 15). Therefore, the Sheriff argues, Burrows was

not entitled to FMLA leave.

In this case, to be eligible for FMLA leave means showing

that Burrows’ wife suffered from a ‘serious health condition.’

Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1052 (11th

Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). A “serious health condition”

“means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental

condition that involves--(A) inpatient care in a hospital,

hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing

treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11).

Additionally, continuing treatment for a chronic condition is

considered a serious health condition if it requires periodic

visits at least twice a year, continuing over an extended period

of time, and may “cause episodic rather than a continuing period

of incapacity.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(c).

The Sheriff’s view of the evidence is much too myopic. When

viewed in the light most favorable to Burrows, as the Court is

required to do, the evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to find

that Mrs. Burrows suffered from a serious health condition without

actually having a heart attack. Mrs. Burrows’s health conditions

had not substantially changed for years, and the CCSO continually

found them to constitute a serious health condition by repeatedly

approving intermittent FMLA leave. Mrs. Burrows was routinely

seen by a physician and clearly had chronic conditions which were

subject to flare-ups. While a jury may accept the Sheriff’s view

of the evidence, it could also accept plaintiff’s evidence that

this did indeed constitute a serious health condition.

(2) Whether Burrows Provided Sufficient Notice

The Sheriff next argues that even if Burrows was entitled to

benefits under the FMLA, he failed to provide sufficient notice to

the Sheriff’s Office. The Sheriff argues that while the notice

requirements differ depending on whether the need for leave was

foreseeable or unforeseeable, Burrows never requested FMLA leave

on October 9, 2024, at all. (Doc. #20, pp. 13-16.) The Sheriff

asserts that the CCSO protocols required Burrows to provide verbal

or written notice to Risk Management, and it is undisputed that

Burrows did not do so despite having done so on multiple occasions

in the past. The Sheriff argues that while Burrows notified two

supervisors he was leaving, this was not a request for leave but

a unilateral decision. According to the Sheriff, this failure to

comply with the CCSO notice requirements warrants denial of the

FMLA claims. (Id.)

The FMLA requires that the employee “actually seek leave–of

some sort–to trigger an employer’s obligation[s]” to give notice.

Graves v. Brandstar, Inc., 67 F.4th 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2023).

While an employee who needs FMLA leave must give the employer

adequate notice of the need, FMLA's notice requirements depend on

whether an employee's need for leave is foreseeable or

unforeseeable. White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d

at 1195. If an employee's need for FMLA leave is foreseeable, the

employee must give the employer at least 30 days’ advance notice,

or “such notice as is practicable.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §

2612(e)(2)). But if an employee's need for leave is not

foreseeable, the employee simply needs to “provide sufficient

information for [his] employer to reasonably determine whether the

FMLA may apply to the leave request.” Id. at 1196 (quoting 29

C.F.R. § 825.303(b)). See also Munoz v. Selig Enterprises, Inc.,

981 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2020).

The content of the request for leave is also flexible. The

employee’s request for leave may, but need not, expressly refer to

the FMLA. An employer’s FMLA obligations are triggered “[w]hen an

employee requests FMLA leave, or when the employer acquires

knowledge that an employee's leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying

reason….” 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1). “Once an employee gives

sufficient notice to her employer that potentially FMLA-qualifying

leave is needed, the employer must then ascertain whether the

employee’s absence actually qualifies for FMLA protection.” Cruz

v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). See also Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys.,

LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[N]otice must simply

allow the employer to understand that the employee potentially

qualifies for FMLA rights.”).

Whether the need for leave is foreseeable or unforeseeable,

“[w]hen an employee seeks leave due to a qualifying reason, for

which the employer has previously provided the employee FMLA–

protected leave, the employee must specifically reference either

the qualifying reason for leave or the need for FMLA leave. 29

C.F.R. § 825.302(c), § 825.303(b). When unforeseeable, “[c]alling

in ‘sick’ without providing more information will not be considered

sufficient notice to trigger an employer's obligations under the

Act. The employer will be expected to obtain any additional

required information through informal means.” 29 C.F.R. §

825.303(b).

The critical question a Court asks is whether the “employee

adequately conveyed to the employer sufficient information to put

the employer on notice that her absence was potentially FMLA-

qualifying.” Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432, 1436 (11th

Cir. 1997). An employee must provide proper notice to make out an

FMLA interference claim. White, 789 F.3d at 1195 (citing Hurley,

746 F.3d at 1167).

Mrs. Burrows had an established record of ongoing serious

medical conditions for anxiety, blood pressure, and chronic pain.

(Doc. #22, pp. 26-36.) Burrows sent correspondence in advance of

the storm requesting consideration in light of his wife’s anxiety

and other medical history. Burrows specifically referenced past

allowances that were made and FMLA leave that was approved.

Burrows points to the following chronology:

October 6: Burrows emails requesting special

consideration during Milton, explaining Lori's

conditions. (Ex. 12 - Email Correspondence re

Hurricane Milton).

October 8: Burrows emails Sheriff Prummell

detailing Lori's conditions (depression, anxiety,

chronic pain, surgeries, needs hip replacement, no

family in Florida, can't go to shelter). (Ex. 12

- Email Correspondence re Hurricane Milton).

Sheriff responds: essential status means you must

work, look for other positions if you can't meet

requirements. (Ex. 12 - Email Correspondence re

Hurricane Milton).

October 9: Lori experiences severe chest

pains/panic attack. Burrows informs Rodgers and

Ramirez of emergency and leaves. (Ex. 4 - Burrows

Deposition, 94:24-96:24).

October 11: Notice of Intent to Withdraw

Appointment issued. (Ex. 11 - Notice of Intent to

Withdraw Appointment).

October 15: Pre-disciplinary hearing. (Ex. 8 -

Pre-Disciplinary Hearing).

October 16: Termination effective. (Ex. 10 -

Withdrawal of Appointment).

(Doc. #27, p. 18.) There are sufficient facts to go to a jury as

to whether Burrows qualified for FMLA leave, and whether Burrows

provided adequate notice that it was for a qualifying serious

medical condition.

(3) Whether Burrows’ Employment Terminated for Other

Legitimate Reasons

The Sheriff is entitled to raise his alleged lawful reasons

for termination as an affirmative defense to FMLA liability. If an

employer demonstrates that it would have discharged an employee

“‘for a reason wholly unrelated to the FMLA leave, the employer is

not liable’ under the FMLA for damages for failure to reinstate.”

Spakes v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 631 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th

Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). In other words, the employer can

show he would have terminated the employee anyway. Lapham v.

Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 896 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation

omitted).

The Sheriff argues that even if Burrows qualified for FMLA

leave and provided proper notice, he would still have been fired

instead of being reinstated to his previous position because he

abandoned his job and was unable to meet the expectations of an

essential employee. The Sheriff further argues that Burrows

abandoned his job as an essential worker without authorization and

did not immediately return after confirming that his wife was not

having a cardiac episode. (Doc. #20, pp. 16-18.) Defendant argue,

even if Burrows abandoned his job for a qualifying reason, it had

no obligation to reinstated Burrows because of his admitted

inability to remain an essential employee and the unavailability

of another position.

Burrows responds that the Sheriff’s burden cannot be met

because: (1) CCSO gave prior approvals for absences during

hurricanes, contradicting the claim of abandonment; (2) multiple

contracted individuals who failed to report during Hurricane

Milton had their badges revoked, but Burrow was terminated; and

(3) a temporal proximity between the leave request and the

termination demonstrate causation. (Doc. 27, pp. 12-14.) Having

determined that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

the interference and retaliation claims, the Court finds there are

also material factual disputes as to whether Burrows would have

been terminated anyway. For example, while the Sheriff argues

Burrows did not notify Risk Management before leaving, he does not

identify any part of the summary judgment record establishing that

Risk Management was present at the CCSO during the hurricane and

therefore available to be notified.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED :

Defendant’s Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

#20) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 26th day of

January 2026.

JGHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Parties of record

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