People v. Coleman

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 2026 IL App (4th) 241515-U FILED

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 2, 2026

not precedent except in the NO. 4-24-1515 Carla Bender

limited circumstances allowed

4th District Appellate

under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of

v. ) Whiteside County

STEVEN W. COLEMAN, ) No. 20CF144

Defendant-Appellant. )

) Honorable

) Patricia A. Senneff,

) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lannerd and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict; (2) defendant

failed to establish counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of

expert testimony, cell phone records, and victim impact statements; and

(3) defendant failed to establish that counsel was ineffective or that plain error

applied for failing to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences.

¶2 Defendant Steven W. Coleman appeals his conviction on three counts of first

degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020)), three counts of aggravated arson (id. § 20-

1.1(a)(1)), and one count of residential arson (id. § 20-1(b)). Defendant was sentenced to three

consecutive life sentences for the murders and terms of various years’ imprisonment on the other

charges, all to be served consecutively. Defendant argues his counsel provided ineffective

assistance in the admission of certain evidence, the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain errors in his

sentencing, including imposing an aggregate sentence in violation of the statutory maximum

sentence in section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West

2024)).

¶3 We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 A fire occurred at the Western Apartments at 908 West 3rd Street in Sterling,

Illinois, in the early morning hours of June 1, 2020, resulting in the deaths of three apartment

complex residents, Carrie A. Hose and two minors, C.R.S. and S.R.W. Another apartment resident

was injured in the fire, and a fireman was injured while fighting the blaze.

¶6 A. Charges

¶7 Defendant was arrested and charged by information, and later by amended

information with three counts of aggravated arson (720 ILCS 5/20-1.1(a)(1) (West 2020)) (counts

I-III) (all Class X felonies), one count of residential arson (id. § 20-1(b)) (count IV), and six counts

of first degree murder (id. § 9-1(a)(2)) (counts V-X) (all Class M felonies). According to the State,

defendant deliberately set the fire in retaliation for a fraudulent drug sale.

¶8 B. Trial

¶9 The case proceeded to trial in July 2024 over the course of several days. The

relevant testimony is summarized below.

¶ 10 1. The Fire

¶ 11 Alma Walker and her husband, residents of Apartment 4 on the upper level of the

Western Apartments in Sterling, Illinois, awoke at approximately 12:30 a.m. on June 1, 2020;

Alma detected extreme heat on the upper half of her body. Within a few minutes, she smelled what

she described as the scent of burning shingles. The room was dark, but she quickly realized the

apartment was on fire. Her husband called 911 and left through the window, and she went to look

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for her children and niece in the neighboring rooms. She testified, “I was yelling for the kids.

Telling them if you can hear me cover up with a blanket and try to come to the nearest window. I

was like, I can’t see nothing. I can’t see you.” According to Walker, “It just kept getting more and

more dense until it was like blacker and blacker” and “it kept getting hotter.” Walker said she was

unable to locate the girls through the darkness and smoke and later jumped out of the window. She

suffered significant injuries from the fire.

¶ 12 Fire department personnel were dispatched to the fire at approximately 12:30 a.m.

and arrived roughly 15 minutes later. The parties stipulated that the autopsy report indicated the

cause of death of the three fatalities was carbon monoxide intoxication due to an apartment fire.

Firefighter George Markel was injured fighting the fire and a resident, Walker, suffered severe

burns. The fire was extinguished around 4:30 a.m.

¶ 13 The Western Apartments complex had two buildings, one at 907 West 3rd Steet

(north) and one at 908 West 3rd Street (south). Each building had a common entrance, which was

the only entrance to the buildings. Most of the fire damage occurred to the lower level, although

the second level sustained heavy damage. The foyer contained two stairways, one going up and

one going down.

¶ 14 2. Defendant’s Activities Before and After the Fire

¶ 15 a. Carly Fishbach

¶ 16 Defendant’s girlfriend at the time, Carly Fishbach, testified that she had gone to the

Western Apartments building on the afternoon of May 31, 2020, specifically, the south building,

to buy cocaine from a friend. She said she and defendant “used it” and later in the day wanted

more. Fishbach said she made a call and purchased additional cocaine from another friend (the

original dealer’s girlfriend) using $150 that defendant had given her. The transaction occurred at

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Fishbach’s home. According to Fishbach, it turned out that what she purchased was not actually

cocaine, which upset her and defendant. Fishbach said defendant was yelling and that he “wanted

to go to the Westerns” to “light it up.”

¶ 17 Fishbach testified that defendant contacted his mother and his brother Jesse

Coleman, seeking a ride. According to Fishbach, defendant told Jesse that he needed a ride to the

Western Apartments. Fishbach said a car arrived at her house and defendant departed in it. When

he returned, defendant did not say where he had gone. He did, however, tell Fishbach that if anyone

asked where he had been, she should say that “we were together.”

¶ 18 According to Fishbach, defendant did not go to work the next day, though he did

not appear sick. Fishbach said that she went to see the Sterling police after she discovered a red

gas can was missing from her garage. She said defendant had a black and yellow iPhone and that

she knew the passcode and gave it to the police.

¶ 19 On cross-examination, Fishbach acknowledged that she had been using cocaine off

and on for a couple of years before the day in question. She also acknowledged that she drank “[a]

lot” and that she had been drinking on that day. She said she was “really drunk.” Fishbach admitted

that she had sent a threatening text about the fake drugs to the person from whom she purchased

them. She also said that she did not “dump” defendant’s phone at the Western Apartments and did

not set the fire.

¶ 20 b. Jesse Coleman

¶ 21 Defendant’s brother Jesse confirmed that he received a phone call from his brother

late on May 31 asking for a ride. He testified that he picked defendant up at Fishbach’s house and

defendant had a red gasoline can with him when he entered the car. Coleman said defendant wanted

to go to the Western Apartments. Jesse stated, “I drove him to Avenue I right directly behind the

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Western Apartments.” According to Jesse, defendant said “he needed a ride to burn the mother

f*** down and he wanted to go to the Western Apartments.” Defendant exited the car with “the

same gasoline can that he had gotten in the car with.” Jesse did not notice any smell of gas. After

dropping defendant off, Jesse “pulled around the block and continued to drive home to [his]

house.”

¶ 22 Jesse spoke to his brother by phone the next day, and defendant “was asking if I

had seen his cell phone inside of my car.” Coleman checked his car and “didn’t see it.” He saw

defendant one other time at their mother’s house and noticed that defendant was “pacing back and

forth outside her front door” and “looked like he was very worried.” Jesse said that defendant told

him “he was smoked.”

¶ 23 Coleman acknowledged that he spoke with the police three times but that he did

not tell them about the gas can until the third interview. He claimed he was still afraid of his

brother.

¶ 24 3. Fire Investigation

¶ 25 a. Michael Dettman

¶ 26 Sterling Fire Department Deputy Chief Michael Dettman testified that he was the

incident commander at the scene and that there were approximately 25 to 30 firefighters present.

Dettman testified that he was certified as a state fire marshal and that he had undergone over 120

hours of training, and was required to take ongoing education and recertification. No objection

was made to his credentials.

¶ 27 After the fire was extinguished, Dettman inspected the building and noticed an

amount of damage in the common hallways between the apartments. Based on his prior

experiences in being inside the building, he said he knew “the amount of fuel load inside the

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apartment and it lacks a significant fuel load for the amount of fire that we had within that

apartment.” Dettman said a “fuel load is anything that is combustible that can propagate fire and

make it grow and take off.” He testified that the most damage was on the lower level, but “the

floor on the second level sustained heavy, significant damage. And the only thing really there was

carpeting which doesn’t have the heat release rate needed for the type of fire that we had.”

¶ 28 Dettman said he had “some training on electrical outlets” as far as being the location

of the fire’s origin. The following exchange then occurred:

“Q. And what do you typically see when electrical outlet is the source of a

fire?

A. If you have an outlet in the wall and it starts within that outlet, it is going

to transfer vertically in the stud space, between the studs where the outlet is

mounted.

In this case we didn’t see anything like that or I didn’t see anything or

observe anything like that. So I did not suspect the outlet as being involved in the

ignition.”

¶ 29 He also testified that he had been trained to look for pour patterns. According to

Dettman,

“Pour patterns are when an ignitable liquid is spilled, dumped, poured on a

level flat surface. It will leave like an indentation once it is ignited because the

amount of fluid or, or liquid in that area will settle to the lowest spot.

That lowest spot will have an overall heavier char to it than the rest of the

area that doesn’t have a flammable liquid on it.”

¶ 30 Dettman was then asked whether he found any holes in the floor structure:

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“Q. Do you recall if there were any holes anywhere within the flooring of

this complex?

A. Yes, there was several holes.

Q. And what does that mean to you when you observe holes in the flooring?

A. Uhm, it has been weakened. And typically you find that from a fire

underneath and not from a fire on top.

Uhm, in this case it was the fire on top that caused the weakened flooring.

I observed no damage or minor damage underneath so it was obvious and

apparent that the fire had originated in that space.”

¶ 31 He further examined the breaker box, which was located in the lower level directly

under the stairs going up to the upper level. He said, “I noticed a large amount of water in the area

but no significant fire damage to the box itself.” He attributed this water to “[f]ire suppression

activities from the firefighters.” He did not notice any heavy damage to the breaker box but did

not recall if any of the breakers were tripped.

¶ 32 On cross-examination, Dettman was asked about his qualifications and his

familiarity with section 1033 of the National Fire Protection Association Code, which outlines the

minimum qualifications for a fire investigator. Dettman said he could not remember the

qualification requirements off the top of his head, but he said he had undergone the training and

had the certificates. Dettman admitted that he did not author a report about his observations as

commander on the scene.

¶ 33 b. Cell Phone Recovered at Scene

¶ 34 Dettman said he found a silver Apple iPhone in a black and yellow OtterBox case

in the south yard of the apartment buildings, about 20 feet from the front door. He gave the cell

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phone to Sterling Police Department Chief of Police Edward Bartel. Bartel said the phone was

password protected, but he was able to call 911 and obtain the phone number. He contacted the

Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center, which provided the name and address of the phone’s

owner, who was identified as defendant. The phone was swabbed for DNA and sent to the Illinois

State Police Forensic Science Laboratory and analyzed by Jennnifer Belna, a forensic scientist in

biology and DNA. The Illinois State Police forensics DNA report from the phone swabs showed

at least three male contributors who were unidentified. Belna testified that she then received a

buccal swab sample from defendant and tested it. According to her, defendant was indicated as a

potential contributor in the mix of DNAs. According to Belna, defendant’s “male DNA profile

would be expected to occur in approximately one in 210 octillion unrelated individuals.” She

explained that an octillion “has 27 zeros behind it, so it would be 210 with 27 zeros.” She added,

“[W]hat that means when I say those numbers is that if I just randomly picked someone off the

street and I profile them, the probability that they are also included as a potential contributor is one

in 210 octillion.”

¶ 35 Fishbach was later shown the phone and believed it was defendant’s, and she gave

police the password. The police discovered selfie photos of defendant on the phone, along with

photos of defendant and Fishbach and copies of defendant’s tax documents.

¶ 36 A warrant was obtained for the phone’s location records, and the cell tower data

retrieved was given to City of Sterling police officer Kyle Wyckstandt, who used a program called

CellHawk to determine the phone’s approximate locations. An objection was raised to the

admission of the CellHawk location data, which was overruled. According to Wyckstandt,

CellHawk demonstrated that tower pings at 12:22 a.m. on June 1 locating the phone in an “area

just to the west of 900 3rd Street, which would have been the Western Apartments.” A text message

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sent from the phone at 11:19 p.m. on May 31 asked defendant’s mother to run him out to get gas.

¶ 37 c. Michael Poel

¶ 38 Illinois State Police Fire Marshal special agent arson investigator Michael Poel

testified that he was called to the scene of the fire at 1:05 a.m. and arrived about an hour later. Poel

testified that, in performing a fire inspection, he generally does a complete walk around the

building, going from outside to inside. He tries to walk from the areas of the least amount of

damage to the greatest, with the latter being the more likely site of the fire’s origin. Poel “didn’t

observe anything right off the start that would affect what I was seeing as to the area of fire origin.”

He said that “[t]here was no evidence that the fire started on the outside” and “all fire appears to

be coming from the interior of the structure.”

¶ 39 Poel said he found holes in the floor on the two staircases inside the main entrance.

According to Poel, the firefighters “had to stabilize a certain amount of the upper landing because

there were holes burned through the floor.” He said they then began “observing the fire patterns

within this entryway area.” He explained that, because heat rises, it will often create a “V pattern”

against the wall. He also looks at whether there are patterns on the stairs showing whether they

burned from above, as opposed to from below. Here, the stair railings had been burned. All of this

“tends to indicate” that “there was some type of fire on that floor.”

¶ 40 Poel explained that the next step was to determine where the fire had spread to, and

how, as well as assessing its ignition source. He would look for potential electrical causes, such as

a space heater, extension cord, or smoking material. Here, he examined electrical outlets in the

hallway, the water heater area, and laundry area downstairs. He would expect to find charring at

these locations if they were the origin of the fire, but he found nothing indicating an electrical cause

of the fire. He noted that the type of outlets and electrical box in the building do not resist heat well

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and often will become distorted or melted. That was not present here, and “the electrical box itself

was still completely intact.”

¶ 41 Poel concluded that burn holes in the foyer indicated that the fire was coming from

above and burning through, as opposed to a fire underneath the floor and burning upward and

through the floor. The plywood flooring material under the carpet showed burning from above, not

below. The carpet on top is not the type of material that burns easily without an accelerant. Poel

determined that “the greatest area of fire and fire origin was on the upper landing area as well as

the stairs to the lower landing area.”

¶ 42 Poel was also asked whether he searched for sources of the fire other than the two

points of origin near the stairs. He answered in the affirmative, explaining that he was “in every

apartment and looked, looked within all of the apartments; however, they did not appear to show

any—The damage we observed was the result of the original file [sic] not being the origin of the

fire.”

¶ 43 Poel said that a fire canine was brought in and found positive indications on the

charred wood of the upper landing. Samples were taken, “which showed terpenes.” However, Poel

explained, “terpenes are commonly found within wooden, particularly anything with pine or with

plywood so that in and of itself was, did not spark our, our full interest because it just commonly

occurs.” These samples were also tested and contained no flammable or combustible liquids. Given

these results, the canine’s finding terpenes did not “move the needle” for him on an accelerant.

¶ 44 Poel testified that it was “possible that if an ignitable liquid, such as gasoline, was

used to ignite a fire that there wouldn’t be evidence of ignitable liquid.” This could be the case

because “it simply may have burned completely away,” which does not happen often but is “not

unusual.” In addition, fire extinguishing operations would have put thousands of gallons of water

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into the building “that may have washed any combustible liquids away.” Gasoline could also

evaporate from the heat of the fire. As the fire burns, it will heat up whatever ignitable liquid may

be present, causing it to vaporize and burn. Here, at least enough burned away that no sample could

be obtained. This suggested to Poel that it was “a very quick and very hot fire,” which is unusual

without something combustible beyond just carpeting.

¶ 45 4. Defendant’s Fire Expert

¶ 46 Defendant called forensic fire consultant Marc Fennell as an expert witness. Fennell

described what he termed as “insufficient use of scientific method by the State” and explained that

he had employed the seven-step process found in National Fire Protection Association 921, Guide

for Fire and Explosion Investigations (NFPA 921). Fennell explained that under this approach,

called the systematic approach,

“we collect data, we define problems, and then we develop hypotheses. And part of

the hypotheses is, goes back to data collection.

So data collection could be witness statements, for fires it could be burn

patterns analysis, it could be looking at videos, body cams and all of that. That’s

data, that’s data collection. And then we develop hypotheses on how this fire

started.

And so, if we can come up with a testable hypotheses [sic], then we may

come up with the actual cause of the fire. But we also use that as origin too, so we

have to have an origin before a cause.

Those are the scientific methods in a nutshell.”

According to Fennell, “[f]ire investigators would use that” provision, but “it is a guideline, so you,

you are allowed to deviate [sometimes] but you have to be able to show, you know, how you

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deviate and sometimes you can infer, which means assume.”

¶ 47 Fennell was critical of the State, claiming that Poel did not look into all alternative

origins. He also opined that Poel’s analysis suffered from an expectation bias. He explained that

some investigators come up with a conclusion before they have all the data. He said expectation

bias is like using tunnel vision. He said that ruling out other causes of the fire requires testing and

eliminating every other hypothesis.

¶ 48 On cross-examination, Fennell acknowledged that NFPA 921 is a guideline and

that it is not required to be followed. He also agreed that no state law required it.

¶ 49 Fennell said he reviewed the fire report from Poel, which indicated two points of

fire origins, one of the first floor landing and another on the second floor landing. Fennell disagreed

with Poel that “there were two non-communicated separate fire origins.” According to Poel, “I

think they both do communicate based on the construction of that entryway.” Fennell explained,

“communication means do they talk to each other. I mean is there, is there a barrier between the

two.” He agreed that Poel’s finding of the area of the fire’s origin was also based upon eyewitness

observations.

¶ 50 Fennell said he did not believe that the State’s investigation was scientifically

supported and that he would look at other sources for a potential ignition source. For example, he

noted the reference to a potential gas smell noticed on the apartment property a few days before.

It could not have been natural gas because there is no natural gas in the building, but Fennell said

it could be methane from sewer gas, which can be explosive. Because of this potential, he felt that

there should have been a “deep dive” in the sewer piping. This would strengthen a case by

eliminating another possible cause. He later acknowledged that he had little information about

whether the smell was, in fact, sewer gas.

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¶ 51 He also pointed to a possible electrical origin. He stated, “Special Agent Poel said

he could eliminate electrical. And I didn’t see any documentation where that was done, other than

he said he could.” He testified further, “We do what is called arc mapping or arc survey, where we

physically inspect every wire and we look for beads.” There were also light switches, light fixtures,

and receptacles, which are all part of the electrical. While Poel said he could eliminate those

causes, Fennell said that he should have brought in a forensic electrical engineer to actually

eliminate them.

¶ 52 Fennell explained that “flashover” from a very hot fire can cause accumulating heat

to “bank down” until everything on the floor reaches ignition temperature. This can result in “a

false positive, if you will, on the burn patterns.” Fennell said there was no indication in the

information that he reviewed showing that the State, specifically Poel, did any testing to rule out

flashover. He also opined there was no documentation explaining how Poel eliminated electrical

causes as a possible origin. Absent examination of all potential ignition sources, the fire cannot be

classified as incendiary. Fennell thought there were no signs of an intentionally set fire and he

thought the State’s investigation was incomplete.

¶ 53 Fennell was examined on what he knew concerning the evidence of defendant

having brought a can of gasoline to the building:

“Q. Would your opinion about origin of this fire change if you knew that

somebody showed up at that building with a can of gas?

A. That would be new data so that would be another analysis that I would

have to do.

Q. Wasn’t that data in the discovery that you received?

A. There was an allegation but—

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Q. Okay.

A. —yes.

Q. So it was in there?

A. It was there, yes.

Q. Okay.

And you discounted it?

A. There was no test that came back positive for that.

***

Q. So you just discounted that somebody said he went there, that the

Defendant went there with a can of gas?

A. There is no physical evidence to support it. Correct, sir.”

¶ 54 When asked about the sample testing from the fire scene, Fennell said he “would

expect to find samples come back positive for accelerant.” However, he acknowledged that fire

departments put out fires with water and that water can wash away the source of a fire or at least

dilute it. Fennell further admitted that in his prior investigations of fires that were intentionally set,

there were times when they were set with gasoline, yet no gasoline was found in the samples. He

acknowledged that he knew of fires determined to have been fueled by gasoline, but where no

confirming evidence of gasoline had been found.

¶ 55 5. Verdict

¶ 56 Defendant was convicted on counts I to III (aggravated arson), count IV (residential

arson), and counts VIII to X (first degree murder).

¶ 57 C. Posttrial Motions and Sentencing

¶ 58 Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial,

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arguing that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was denied due

process and equal protection of the law, that he did not receive a fair trial under various articles of

the Illinois and United States Constitutions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

He further contended that he was prejudiced because “on the first day of trial, while the entire

venire was sitting in the courtroom, court security walked with and next to the Defendant into the

courtroom from a non-public door in the rear of the courtroom, as to give the venire the appearance

that the Defendant was in custody.”

¶ 59 Defendant’s motion was denied.

¶ 60 During the sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted the presentence investigation

report and heard arguments of counsel. It then accepted victim impact statements from Faith

Walker, parent of S.R.W., and the minor S.R.W.’s grandmother (who had recently died), which

was read on her behalf. The grandmother’s statement was short and discussed her bond with

S.R.W. and how much she missed S.R.W. and concluded with, “The monster that killed [S.R.W.]

took all of that away from me that day.”

¶ 61 Faith’s statement mentioned how much she missed her daughter and how she now

suffered from anxiety issues, including posttraumatic stress disorder, and concluded with her

remark that defendant had “single-handedly destroyed four families that night”: C.R.S.’s,

S.R.W.’s, Carrie Hose’s, and his own.

¶ 62 Alma Walker, C.R.S.’s mother, also gave a statement about her life without her

daughter and the type of person her daughter was before she died, and how she herself had spent

“six weeks in intensive ICU, learning how to breathe, talk, and walk again.” She concluded by

saying that “a monster like [defendant] should [never] be able to walk the streets freely again.”

¶ 63 Finally, attorney James Mertes, who was an attorney representing some of the

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victims’ estates and Alma civilly, read a statement in which he provided a glimpse of who each of

the victims might be today. He further spoke of the final sounds of the children’s voices as the

firefighters attempted to rescue them, as recorded by the firefighter’s body cameras. He concluded

by saying that “[t]he impact of these separate occurrences, each suffered as the result of one man’s

heinous acts, cannot be expressed in spoken words.” He added,

“[Defendant] murdered three beloved daughters. He maimed and scarred

three others.

Justice cannot be done in this courtroom.

Not today.

Not in this case.

The monstrosity of [defendant’s] crimes will escape the farthest reach of

justice.

No words could ever describe the full measure of the losses that he inflicted.

The world was just a better place when [S.R.W.], [C.R.S.] and Carrie [Hose]

were in it.”

¶ 64 Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for each murder and was further

sentenced to 30 years’ incarceration on each of the three aggravated arson counts and 15 years on

the residential arson count. All sentences were imposed consecutively, resulting in a cumulative

sentence of three life sentences plus 105 years’ incarceration.

¶ 65 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing that the trial court

(1) “did not take into consideration each and every factor in mitigation,” (2) “placed insufficient

weight on the factors in mitigation,” and (3) imposed a sentence that was “excessive in light of the

spirit and purpose of the law.” Defendant’s motion was denied.

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¶ 66 This appeal followed.

¶ 67 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 68 Defendant argues that (1) the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the admission of various

evidence; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing.

¶ 69 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 70 In People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28, the supreme court reiterated the familiar

standard applicable to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this court asks

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond

a reasonable doubt. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. A reviewing court

will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving

the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. All reasonable

inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State. Id. A criminal

conviction will not be overturned unless the evidence is so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt.”

¶ 71 In weighing the evidence, “a trier of fact need not search out all possible

explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 32

(citing Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37). Thus, we review the defendant’s convictions under a

manifest weight of the evidence standard. People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22.

¶ 72 According to defendant, the State failed to meet its burden in proving arson beyond

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a reasonable doubt. Section 20-1(a)(1) (West 2020) provides that “[a] person commits arson when,

by means of fire or explosive,” he knowingly “[d]amages any real property, or any personal

property having a value of $150 or more, of another without his or her consent.” Arson is classified

as a Class 2 felony (id. 20-1(c)) and provides the foundation for the State’s charges of murder in

this case. Defendant’s argument focuses on three main points. First, that the State’s witness

Fishbach was not credible because she admitted to being intoxicated and having used drugs on the

evening of the fire. Second, he argues that both Fishbach and Jesse did not want to be involved in

the investigation and delayed revealing their full information to the police. Third, defendant

contends that the State’s fire witness did not establish who, if anyone, caused the fire or where

defendant was when the fire started.

¶ 73 These arguments amount to little more than an attempt to reargue the evidence.

Defendant raised each of these points during cross-examination when attacking the credibility of

Fishbach and Jesse and further made similar arguments to the jury during closing arguments. Here,

the State admittedly presented its case based on circumstantial evidence, which it is entitled to do.

It is well settled that “the opportunity for commission of an arson, the motive inducing an arson

and the identity of a person accused of arson may all be established through circumstantial

evidence because the crime of arson is, by its very nature, secretive and usually incapable of direct

proof.” People v. Dukes, 146 Ill. App. 3d 790, 794 (1986); People v. Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d 400,

404 (1991). Moreover, a conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence as well as

direct evidence, “it being necessary only that the proof of circumstances must be of a conclusive

nature and tendency leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion and producing a reasonable

and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the crime.” Dukes, 146 Ill. App.

3d at 794 (citing People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 478, 484-85 (1977)).

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¶ 74 Our review of the trial testimony reveals a substantial amount of circumstantial

evidence against defendant. Two witnesses testified that defendant stated he planned to burn down

the apartment complex; defendant had his brother drive him to the apartment complex—with a

gasoline can in tow—shortly before the fire is believed to have started; defendant’s brother

dropped him off near the apartment complex, again in possession of the gas can; defendant’s

girlfriend testified that a gas can was missing from her garage; and defendant’s cell phone was

found roughly 20 feet from the apartment complex doors. Jesse testified that defendant called him

the next day asking if he had left his phone in Jesse’s vehicle. Additionally, Fishbach identified

the phone as likely that of defendant, gave the police the phone’s passcode, which on opening

revealed selfie photographs of defendant and photographs of himself and Fishbach, and tax

documents belonging to defendant. The police also dialed 911 on the phone, which led to

confirmation that defendant was the owner. Finally, Jesse testified that he saw defendant shortly

after the fire and defendant appeared uneasy and told Jesse he “was smoked.”

¶ 75 Defendant suggests that someone else, either Fishbach or Jesse, may have set the

fire. However, “[s]peculation that another person might have committed the offense *** does not

necessarily raise reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 404.

¶ 76 While defendant might question various aspects of each witness’s testimony, the

trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and

drawing reasonable inferences from it. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. On review, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the trier of

fact could have found that all elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Pollock,

202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002). We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is “unreasonable,

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improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). Based on a complete

review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.

¶ 77 B. Ineffective Assistance

¶ 78 Defendant acknowledges he has forfeited several issues relating to the admission

of evidence but argues that we may nevertheless consider these issues under the doctrine of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We employ the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), to evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Albanese,

104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must show that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79. “A defendant’s failure to

satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” People v. Webb, 2023 IL 128957, ¶ 21.

¶ 79 As is well settled, a defendant who fails to preserve an issue with a

contemporaneous objection and in his posttrial motion forfeits review of such issues unless he can

establish ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error. People v. Ortega, 2021 IL App (1st)

182396, ¶ 63.

¶ 80 1. Admission of Expert Testimony

¶ 81 Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

testimony of States’ witnesses, Poel and Dettman. According to defendant, trial counsel should

have objected to Poel’s opinions because they lacked scientific basis and relied on discredited

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methodology as to the origins of the fire. He further argues that Dettman was unqualified as an

expert to offer opinions and that he relied on discredited arson indicators, including Poel’s

conclusions.

¶ 82 In Illinois, there is no predetermined formula for determining how an expert

acquires specialized knowledge or experience as basis for qualifying to testify as expert witness;

the expert can gain such through practical experience, scientific study, education, training, or

research. Thompson v. Gordon, 221 Ill. 2d 414, 428-29 (2006). A witness is qualified to give expert

testimony if, “because of [the witness’s] skill, training, or experience, he is better able to form a

more accurate opinion as to the matter under consideration than is an ordinary person.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Davis, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2002). “The qualified expert’s

opinion must be based on scientific theories that have gained general acceptance in his or her

field.” People v. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶ 50. However, “[s]pecialized formal training

is unnecessary, and experience alone may qualify a person as an expert.” Davis, 335 Ill. App. 3d

at 17. The expert’s “knowledge [must be] based on information of the type reasonably relied on

by experts in the [witness’s] field.” Id. at 18. “The expert must offer the basis for his or her opinion

using a reasoned analysis or the testimony is rendered invalid.” Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st)

142879, ¶ 50.

¶ 83 The party seeking to have an expert testify bears the burden of establishing the

expert’s qualifications to render an opinion. People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (1978). Per Illinois

Rule of Evidence 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), a witness is qualified to give expert testimony if “(1) the

witness may be of assistance to the trier of fact; (2) the witness is qualified to give the testimony

sought; and (3) the testimony sought is supported by adequate facts, data, or opinions.” Ruffin

ex rel. Sanders v. Boler, 384 Ill. App. 3d 7, 18 (2008) (citing Michael H. Graham, Cleary and

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Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 702.1, at 610 (7th ed. 1999)).

¶ 84 Examining Poel’s qualifications, he served as a special agent for the Illinois State

Fire Marshal’s Office, Division of Arson Investigation, for just under 19 years. He held

certifications with the fire marshal’s office as an arson investigator, and he also had certifications

from the International Association of Arson Investigators and the National Association of Fire

Investigators. He further held a certification as a firefighter and had attended “numerous training

[courses] at the National Fire Academy and through these various organizations over the years.”

He said, as of June 1, 2020, his training was current. He also testified that he attended several

investigation classes and firefighting classes, “whether it be through the Illinois Fire Service

Institute or through the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.” He also testified that

he began working as a volunteer firefighter at the age of 16 and had held every position of rank at

the fire department, including chief of the Port Byron Fire Department. He served as a firefighter

for roughly 27 years. He estimated that he had spent over 3,000 hours training in either fire service

or fire investigation.

¶ 85 We note that Illinois Rule of Evidence 702 does not require the trial court to

“certify” an expert before allowing that witness to offer opinion testimony. People v. Pingelton,

2022 IL 127680, ¶ 62. Regardless, Poel was tendered to the defense for questioning and asked

whether he recalled the requirements for becoming a fire investigator. Defense counsel did not

object, and defendant now claims that the failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance. We

disagree. Under the standards of Rule 702, Poel was certainly qualified as an expert based on his

“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Ill. R. Evid. 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Even if

an objection had been made, the trial court would have acted well within its discretion in receiving

expert testimony from Poel. See City of Chicago v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran Church, 2016

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IL App (1st) 151864, ¶ 73 (“The decision of whether to admit expert testimony is within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.”).

¶ 86 Beyond Poel’s qualifications to offer expert testimony, defendant also contends that

his opinions were substantively defective, as they lacked a scientific basis and followed discredited

methodology. Thus, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to them. Again, we disagree. Even if an objection to such opinions had been lodged, the trial court

would have been well within its discretion to overrule it. The jury heard the criticisms of Poel from

defendant’s expert, Fennell, and it was for the jury to assess the credibility of each witness.

Fennell’s criticisms went to the weight of Poel’s opinions rather than their admissibility. See

Petraski v. Thedos, 382 Ill. App. 3d 22, 31 (2008) (“The factual basis for an expert’s opinion

generally does not affect his standing as an expert; it is for the [trier of fact] to determine the weight

of the opinion.”).

¶ 87 We do not believe defendant was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to object to

Poel’s testimony. Beyond the fact that the trial court could have admitted Poel’s testimony even if

an objection had been raised, we do not believe that Poel’s testimony would likely have affected

the outcome of this case in light of the other strongly incriminating evidence against defendant. In

determining whether a defendant was prejudiced by a counsel’s deficient performance, “prejudice”

exists only when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different, and a “reasonable probability” is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. People v. Frazier, 2017 IL App (5th) 140493,

¶ 20. The evidence here gave defendant a motive, reflected his incriminating statements about his

intentions, and placed him at the scene in possession of a gasoline can.

¶ 88 As for counsel’s failure to object to Dettman’s testimony, we note that he worked

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for the City of Sterling Fire Department as deputy fire chief and had been with the department for

25 years. He described his training as a “state mandated investigation training,” which “consisted

of 120 hours and ongoing education required every four years for recertification.” At the time of

the fire, he had completed a state-mandated fire investigation training and undergone ongoing

training every four years and had been certified in fire investigation since 2005. His duties included

fire investigation. Moreover, his involvement in the case was as an occurrence witness. He

assumed the role of incident commander upon his arrival at the scene and that he physically

inspected the apartment complex premises once the fire was extinguished. Dettman’s testimony

described what he observed, including burn patterns, the condition of outlets and electrical panels,

as well as the condition of the floor in the entranceway stairwells. On cross-examination, Dettman

admitted that he could not recall the training requirements for his fire certifications but said that

he nonetheless undertook the training.

¶ 89 Dettman was entitled to testify as to what he saw during his postfire inspection

(People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 75 (“A lay witness opinion must be based on the witness’s

personal observations and recollection of concrete facts.”)). Dettman described the condition of

the electrical outlets, the condition of the breaker box, the presence of holes on the floor, and the

nature of the damage throughout the complex, all of which he was entitled to do based on his

observations. We agree that Dettman’s largely factual testimony crossed into the realm of opinion

on a few occasions. However, a witness will be permitted to testify as an expert if that person’s

experience and qualifications afford him or her knowledge that is not common to laypersons and

where such testimony will aid the fact finder in reaching its conclusion. See Ill. R. Evid. 702 (eff.

Jan. 1, 2011).

¶ 90 Furthermore, for the reasons stated above, even if an objection from defense

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counsel could have kept the jury from hearing the few parts of Dettman’s testimony that can be

characterized as opinion, exclusion of such testimony would have had no impact on the outcome

here in light of the other substantial incriminating evidence.

¶ 91 2. Cell Phone Location Data

¶ 92 Defendant also raises two issues concerning the admission of the Verizon cell

phone data: (1) the adequacy of the Verizon business records certification under Illinois Rule of

Evidence 902(11) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018) and (2) the interpretation of that data by Wyckstandt via

the CellHawk program. Defendant attacks both the admission of the evidence and the adequacy of

his attorney’s resistance to it.

¶ 93 We find the import of this evidence to be so lacking in consequence that we will

deal with the issue summarily. The only possible significance of this evidence is not to show that

defendant was at the location of the fire, but that his cell phone was. However, other evidence

clearly established that defendant’s cell phone was at the location of the fire, so the presence or

absence of the other information complained of can have had no effect on the case. While

defendant argues that the cell phone data purported to show the movement of his phone over time,

including the time of its arrival at the scene, this does not add to the impact of the contested

evidence. Knowing that defendant’s cell phone was at the scene at about the time of the fire, it had

to have arrived there at some point. While defendant might imply that the cell phone was planted

at the scene by the true arsonist to implicate him, he cannot explain why such a person would have

placed it there at a time other than when the fire was set. In other words, arrival of the phone at the

time of the fire is consistent with both defendant’s guilt and his alternative hypothesis.

¶ 94 We reject defendant’s arguments on both issues.

¶ 95 3. Sentencing

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¶ 96 Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address

two points during his sentencing: admission of victim impact statements and application of section

5-8-4(f)’s upper limit on the imposition of consecutive sentences.

¶ 97 a. Victim Impact Statements

¶ 98 Defendant first argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not

objecting to reading of the various victim impact statements at sentencing, including the statement

of a legal representative of the two deceased minors.

¶ 99 It is unclear whether a hypothetical objection from counsel would have been well

founded. Victims are afforded the right to be heard at sentencing, and this right extends not only

to victims, but to their representatives. According to section 6(a) of the Rights of Crime Victims

and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 2024)),

“A crime victim shall be allowed to present an oral or written statement in

any case in which a defendant has been convicted of a violent crime ***. The court

shall allow a victim to make an oral statement if the victim is present in the

courtroom and requests to make an oral statement. An oral statement includes the

victim or a representative of the victim reading the written statement. The court

may allow persons impacted by the crime who are not victims under subsection (a)

of Section 3 of this Act to present an oral or written statement. A victim and any

person making an oral statement shall not be put under oath or subject to

cross-examination. The court shall consider any statement presented along with all

other appropriate factors in determining the sentence of the defendant or disposition

of such juvenile.”

¶ 100 This court has cautioned that Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), which

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established the admissibility of victim impact evidence at sentencing, “does not give the

prosecution a free rein to introduce and argue anything it wants.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 232-33 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in

People v. Hestand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 272, 280-81 (2005)). Thus, in the event that evidence is

introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the hearing fundamentally unfair, the due

process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) provides a mechanism for

relief. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. Whether the evidence here rises to that level is somewhat dubious.

¶ 101 Regardless of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this evidence,

we do not believe defendant can establish that he was prejudiced by it. Even if the issue had been

preserved, it is well settled that a sentencing judge’s reliance on an improper consideration does

not always require a reversal of the sentence. See People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1983);

People v. Sterling, 2025 IL App (4th) 240917-U, ¶ 31. Where, as here, it can be determined from

the record that the weight placed on an improperly considered factor was so insignificant that it

did not lead to a greater sentence, the sentence need not be disturbed. See Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d at 332-

33 (“[W]e are able to determine here that the length of defendant’s sentence was not increased

based on the circuit court’s [improper] statement that defendant had received compensation for

committing these offenses.”).

¶ 102 Upon reviewing the statements together with the trial court’s ruling, we conclude

that there is nothing in the record to show that the court relied on or considered these victim impact

statements. The court’s comments when imposing sentence never mentioned the victim impact

statements. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice from his ineffective assistance

claim, he likewise cannot satisfy the required prejudice under the doctrine of plain error, which he

invokes summarily in his reply brief. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005). We therefore

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conclude the issue has been forfeited.

¶ 103 b. Consecutive Sentences

¶ 104 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by imposing his sentences on all

convictions consecutively. Recall that the court imposed life sentences on defendant’s three first

degree murder convictions, 30 years’ imprisonment on each of his three aggravated arson

convictions, and 15 years’ imprisonment on his residential arson conviction. The court ordered

that all sentences were to be served consecutively. Sentences must be imposed consecutively

where “[o]ne of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted was first degree murder.” 730

ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2024). As noted above, defendant had one or more first degree murder

convictions, so it is undisputed that the law required his sentences be imposed consecutively.

¶ 105 While consecutive sentences are mandatory here, defendant notes that section

5-8-4(f)(2) imposes an upper limit on the total years to be served on consecutive sentences:

“[T]he aggregate of consecutive sentences for offenses that were committed as part

of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the

nature of the criminal objective shall not exceed the sum of the maximum terms

authorized under Article 4.5 of Chapter V for the 2 most serious felonies involved,

but no such limitation shall apply for offenses that were not committed as part of a

single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature

of the criminal objective.” Id. § 5-8-4(f)(2).

¶ 106 There is no dispute that defendant’s actions were part of a single course of conduct,

with no substantial change in the nature of his criminal objective. Therefore, our focus is on which

of the felonies we are to consider in interpreting and applying section 5-8-4(f)(2)’s cap on

consecutive sentences. Defendant argues that his two most serious felonies are two of his first

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degree murder convictions, for which he received a life sentence. If so, his other sentences could

not be imposed consecutively. The State, on the other hand, argues that the life sentences are not

considered in calculating the cap called for under section 5-8-4(f)(2). Because the maximum

possible sentence for the two most serious of the other convictions is 60 years for each offense,

the State argues that defendant’s aggregate sentence of 105 years’ imprisonment is within the 120

year cap.

¶ 107 According to People v. Terry, 183 Ill. 2d 298, 304-05 (1998), a natural life sentence

is not a term of years. There, the court was considering whether extended-term sentencing (which

is triggered by certain aggravating factors) was appropriate with a life sentence. Finding that the

life sentence had no term, the court concluded that a life sentence cannot be extended under section

5-8-2; instead, the “extended-term statute should be interpreted as applicable to the next most

serious offense of which the defendant was convicted.” Id. at 305.

¶ 108 Appellate cases have since applied Terry to other sentencing provisions, such as

section 5-8-4(c) concerning the imposition of permissive consecutive terms (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)

(West 2024)). See People v. Foster, 322 Ill. App. 3d 780, 788 (2000) (relying on Terry, the court

held “we will not consider first degree murder with a sentence of natural life as one of the most

serious felonies involved”); People v. Saunders, 235 Ill. App. 3d 661, 675 (1992) (same as Foster).

This precedent would lead us to conclude that we must not consider defendant’s life sentences in

calculating his maximum possible sentence for purposes of section 5-8-4(f)(2)’s cap on

consecutive sentences. Consequently, we must examine defendant’s other felony convictions and

determine which two of them constituted his most serious felonies.

¶ 109 Defendant’s next most serious convictions are for aggravated arson, which is a

Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/20-1.1(b) (West 2020). The maximum sentence of imprisonment for

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a Class X felony is “not more than 30 years,” and for an extended term, “not more than 60 years.”

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2024). The maximum terms which form the cap on consecutive

sentences under section 5-8-4(f)(2) include the maximum extended sentence. People v. Schneider,

2024 IL App (4th) 230524-U, ¶¶ 66, 68 (“[W]e calculate the maximum aggregate prison sentence

that defendant can serve for a single course of conduct based on the maximum authorized

extended-term sentence.”). Consequently, the “maximum terms authorized” for defendant’s two

most serious convictions—excluding the life sentences for first degree murder—is 60 years per

offense, or 120 years in total. Accordingly, the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences

totaling 105 years in the aggregate was not improper. There being no basis for defendant’s trial

counsel to have objected to the aggregate length of his consecutive sentences under section 5-8-

4(f)(2), his counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to do so. Because defendant also frames

this issue in the context of plain error, we find that there was no error, and therefore no plain error.

¶ 110 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 111 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on all issues.

¶ 112 Affirmed.

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