Ryan Franke v. Kenny Janes

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 26a0061p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

RYAN FRANKE,

│

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

> No. 25-5105

│

v. │

KENNY JANES, individually, │

Defendant-Appellee. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 3:23-cv-00119—Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge.

Argued: October 23, 2025

Decided and Filed: March 2, 2026

Before: MOORE, BUSH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Rob Astorino, Jr., STEIN WHATLEY ASTORINO, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky,

for Appellant. Mark A. Osbourn, BUSH & OSBOURN, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rob Astorino, Jr., STEIN WHATLEY ASTORINO, PLLC, Louisville,

Kentucky, for Appellant. Mark A. Osbourn, BUSH & OSBOURN, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky,

for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. In March 2022, police handcuffed and detained Ryan Franke

outside a local recreational center on suspicion of domestic violence against his ex-wife. After

handcuffing Franke, Officer Kenny Janes escorted him toward a police vehicle. During the walk

to the vehicle, Franke yelled out to nearby family members, which led Janes to apply pain

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 2

compliance techniques to keep Franke moving. Later, Janes allegedly twisted Franke’s wrist,

causing injury. Franke brought this civil rights action, claiming that Janes used excessive force.

The district court found that Janes is protected by qualified immunity and granted him summary

judgment on that basis. Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the need

for the amount of force applied, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND

for further proceedings.

I.

A. Factual Background

In March 2022, Hillview Police Officer Kenny Janes was dispatched to a local

community center on a “fight call,” a call that indicates “two or more parties are involved in a

physical altercation.” (Janes Dep., R. 26-7, PageID 154–55). Before Janes’s arrival, Ryan

Franke was at the community center attending his daughter’s basketball game. Following the

game, Franke and his former wife got into an argument. Afterward, when Franke was on his

way to the parking lot, he got into a physical altercation with a man who had laughed at Franke’s

interaction with his ex-wife. Franke and the man first exchanged words, then exchanged blows,

which Franke says were in self-defense on his part. Someone called the police.

Janes was one of several officers who responded to the scene. Janes, who spoke to a few

people on the scene before approaching Franke, wore a body camera that recorded his vantage

point. Shortly after Janes arrived, Franke can be heard saying, “He tackled me, and I f*cking

beat the sh*t out of him.” (Bodycam, 0:00:48–0:00:51). Around the same time, a bystander

speaking to Janes gave his account of the fight between Franke and the other man. According to

this bystander, the other man had attacked Franke.

What happened next led to Franke’s detention. Franke’s ex-wife (and her current

husband) walked toward Janes to speak with him. She told Janes about her argument with

Franke and described Franke as “mad” about something basketball-related. (Bodycam, 0:01:39–

0:01:42). She further relayed that during her argument with Franke, he had told her (1) to “shut

the f*ck up or I’mma knock your teeth out your throat”; (2) “You heard what the f*ck I said,

back the f*ck up”; and (3) that he was going to “knock [her] down, knock [her] out.” (Id. at

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 3

0:01:42–0:02:15). As Janes spoke with Franke’s ex-wife, he noticed redness on her neck and

asked her if Franke had touched her. She stated that Franke had “pushed [her]” “several times,”

and her husband chimed in that Franke had “shoved both of [them].” (Id. at 0:02:17–0:02:22).

She denied that Franke “grabbed” her neck, but she indicated (while gesturing with her arm) that

Franke “knocked his arm into [her]” and pushed her. (Id. at 0:02:47–0:02:56). She also advised

Janes that she and Franke had “been in court before” because Franke threatened her, “pushed

[her],” and “spit on her car, things like that.” (Id. at 0:02:55–0:03:20).

Sergeant Wyatt Rossell then approached and asked Franke’s ex-wife if she and Franke

had any “EPOs or DVOs,”1 which she denied. (Bodycam, 0:03:38–0:03:42). Speaking to

Rossell, Janes pointed out the redness on the ex-wife’s neck, an injury the ex-wife attributed to

Franke. She also stated that she wanted to press charges, reiterated Franke’s alleged statement

about knocking her teeth from her throat, and indicated that he had “done things before,”

including that she has “had a broken toe before, [and] he slammed [her] phone so [she] can’t call

anybody for help.” (Id. at 0:03:55–0:04:12). After a short back-and-forth, Rossell instructed

Janes to detain Franke.

Armed with the above information, Janes approached Franke and ordered him to put his

hands behind his back. Franke simultaneously asked why and “for what, sir?” (Bodycam,

0:04:35–0:04:45). Janes grabbed Franke’s wrist and advised him he was being handcuffed “for

domestic violence.” (Id. at 0:04:44–0:04:49). Franke denied doing anything to his ex-wife, and

Janes began patting down Franke, asking him if he had anything on his person that would “stick

[him]” or otherwise “piss [Janes] off.” (Id. at 0:05:24–0:05:30). Franke retorted, “You’re

pissing me off,” before Janes handcuffed and escorted Franke to a police vehicle. (Id. at

0:05:30–0:05:32).

1Kentucky courts may issue a “domestic violence order” (“DVO”) after an evidentiary hearing “if a court

finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again occur.” KY.

REV. STAT. § 403.740(1); see Davis v. City of Covington, No. 2:23-066, 2024 WL 2140220, n.4 (E.D. Ky. May 13,

2024) (explaining difference between DVO and emergency protection order (“EPO”)). An EPO, on the other hand,

may issue to cover the time until the evidentiary hearing if the court finds there is “an immediate and present danger

of domestic violence and abuse.” KY. REV. STAT. § 403.730(2)(a); Davis, 2024 WL 2140220, n.4.

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 4

En route to Janes’s vehicle, Franke denied “put[ting] [his] hands on” his ex-wife,

prompting Janes to respond that “the marks on her neck say otherwise, man.” (Bodycam,

0:05:56–0:06:03). “Hey,” Franke shouted toward his nearby family members, “they’re saying

she’s got marks on her neck! I didn’t touch her neck!” (Id. at 0:06:03–0:06:07). As Franke

yelled to his family, Janes lifted Franke’s left arm, said “Let’s go,” and hastened the pace toward

his police vehicle. (Id. at 0:06:06–0:06:08).

The two then made overlapping statements about what happened as Janes ushered Franke

toward the police vehicle. Franke repeatedly declared that Janes was “hurting” him and accused

Janes of “manhandling” him. (Bodycam, 0:06:10–0:06:38). He also denied “pulling away” from

Janes. (Id.). Janes, on the other hand, told Franke to “calm down,” denied manhandling Franke,

and ordered him several times to “stop pulling away” from him. (Id.). This exchange is heard in

the bodycam footage, but what happened physically is mostly obscured. According to Franke, at

some point during the walk, Janes put him in a “half nelson,” causing him to bend forward with

his hands raised up behind his back. (Franke Dep., R. 26-2, PageID 98, 100). At one point,

Franke’s flannel shirt rustled on screen—but it is difficult to discern whether that is from their

quickened pace or if this is the point Janes put Franke in a half nelson. The camera angle and the

competing statements by Franke and Janes also make it difficult to tell whether Franke “pull[ed]

away” from Janes. (Bodycam, 0:06:09–0:06:27). Janes cannot be seen twisting Franke’s wrist.

Unsurprisingly, once the dust settled, Franke and Janes continued to paint different

pictures of what happened. For his part, Franke testified that Janes “put[] [Franke] in a half

nelson, which kind of shove[d] [him] forward.” (Franke Dep., R. 26-2, PageID 98). According

to Franke, the bodycam shows Janes putting him in a half nelson when Janes “accuse[s] [Franke]

of pulling away from him,” at which point Franke claims Janes “grabs [Franke’s] wrist and

torques it to put [him] up against the Durango.” (Id.) Janes, on the other hand, testified that

Franke “pulled away from [him]” and made “sharp, quick jerking movements towards the

parking lot away from” Janes. (Janes Dep., R. 26-7, PageID 162–63). In response, Janes says he

“used pain compliance” to keep Franke moving forward. (Id. at PageID 163).

Once in the back of Janes’s police car, Franke repeatedly complained of wrist and

shoulder pain, so Janes loosened the handcuffs. Meanwhile, other officers reviewed video

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 5

footage and determined that Franke had not assaulted his ex-wife. Officers advised Franke not to

return to the community center and allowed him to leave without charges. Franke eventually had

surgery on his right wrist to repair the damage.

B. Procedural Background

Franke sued Janes, raising three claims: a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and negligence and battery claims under Kentucky law. After

the completion of discovery, Janes moved for summary judgment on all claims. Granting

summary judgment to Janes, the district court found that the totality of the circumstances favored

Janes’s use of force, entitling him to qualified immunity on Franke’s § 1983 claim. It also found

that state qualified immunity protected Janes from liability on Franke’s state battery claim, and

that a negligence claim could not co-exist with a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

Franke now appeals.

II.

“We review grants of summary judgment and qualified immunity de novo.” Novak v.

Federspiel, 140 F.4th 815, 820 (6th Cir. 2025). To obtain summary judgment, the movant must

show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In the context of qualified immunity, granting summary

judgment is inappropriate if “the facts alleged and evidence produced, viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that the officer violated a

clearly established constitutional right.” Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir. 2020).

Video evidence “capturing the events in question,” like the bodycam footage here,

“add[s] [a] wrinkle” to the usual summary-judgment standard. Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44

F.4th 427, 438 (6th Cir. 2022). Specifically, a court “may not adopt a ‘version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment’ that ‘blatantly contradict[s]’ the asserted

version of events such that ‘no reasonable jury could believe it.’” Raimey v. City of Niles, 77

F.4th 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007)). Any “gaps or uncertainties” in the video, however, are construed in the nonmovant’s

favor. Naji v. City of Dearborn, 120 F.4th 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 6

III.

A. Section 1983 Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity

Franke argues that the district court should not have granted summary judgment because

there are genuine disputes of material fact relevant to the objective reasonableness of Janes’s use

of force. We agree.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from suits for damages unless a

plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the

right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Which prong to

address first is left to our discretion. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). We

start with the violation prong.

1. Constitutional Violation

The question here is whether Janes used “gratuitous force” on Franke when he allegedly

twisted Franke’s wrist. See King v. City of Rockford, 97 F.4th 379, 398 (6th Cir. 2024). To be

sure, officers may “use some degree of physical coercion or threat” to effectuate an arrest or

investigatory stop. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97

F.4th 995, 1004 (6th Cir. 2024). Still, any such use of force must remain reasonable, judged

objectively. Saalim, 97 F.4th at 1004.

The reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends on the totality of the

circumstances. Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025). But three main factors frame the

inquiry: “the severity of the crime at issue”; “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others”; and “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

When reviewing an officer’s use of force, we are careful not to scrutinize law

enforcement action using 20/20 hindsight and “in the peace of [our] chambers.” Graham, 490

U.S. at 396. We recognize that officers are often embroiled in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving” circumstances that require “split-second judgments” about the degree of force called

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 7

for in a particular situation. Id. at 396–97. So we consider the reasonableness of an officer’s

conduct through an objective lens, looking at the circumstances from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene. Id. at 396. In doing so, we first consider the facts established in

any video evidence. Raimey, 77 F.4th at 447 (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). We then fill any

gaps in the video with evidence viewed in the nonmovant’s favor. Naji, 120 F.4th at 523. And

finally—taking all those facts together—we look at the officer’s conduct through an objective

lens. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

The district court found that each Graham factor weighed in Janes’s favor. We agree in

part. But, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Franke, there are genuine disputes

of material fact on the threat-to-safety and active-resistance factors.

a. Severity of the Crime

As an initial matter, “conduct that is not a violent or serious crime does not permit an

officer to use increased force absent other factors.” King, 97 F.4th at 394 (citation modified).

Here, Janes investigated two crimes: (1) the initial “fight call” involving a potential assault and

(2) Franke’s alleged domestic violence against his ex-wife.

i. Assault

Franke first quarrels with the district court’s finding that Janes’s use of force was

warranted based on his call to investigate an assault. The existence of some level of violence

associated with the underlying crime is a hallmark of weighing this factor in an officer’s favor.

See Graves v. Malone, 810 F. App’x 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2020). A potential assault fits in this

category. See id.; Correa v. Simone, 528 F. App’x 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2013).

Like the officers in Graves and Correa, Janes responded to a police broadcast for a

potential assault, here a “fight call.” (Janes Dep., R. 26-7, PageID 154). The nature of the call,

combined with Franke’s brutal proclamation that he had “f*cking beat the sh*t out of” a man

who attacked him, could lead a reasonable officer to believe that Franke was recently involved in

violent conduct (even if he was defending himself), and that his behavior could escalate.

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(Bodycam, 0:00:48–0:00:51). See Feagin v. Mansfield Police Dep’t, 155 F.4th 595, 605 (6th

Cir. 2025).

Franke says Janes did not consider Franke’s expletive-laden statement as a basis for his

arrest until Janes spoke with the ex-wife. But under the circumstances, a reasonable officer

could consider such a statement evidence of potential violence. Moreover, we do not consider

Franke’s statement in a vacuum; we consider all that was included in Janes’s knowledge at the

time he used the force. So excising the information Janes received from Franke’s ex-wife is

inappropriate. And despite his burden to show that Janes is not entitled to qualified immunity,

Franke points to no affirmative evidence showing Janes was unaware of Franke’s remark at the

time of his use of force. See Clark v. Stone, 998 F.3d 287, 298 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, we agree

with the district court that the circumstances presented during the assault investigation gave

Janes reason to believe that Franke engaged in physical violence that could justify the use of

some degree of force. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) (explaining that officer

“would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed” if officer reasonably but

mistakenly believed suspect “likely to fight back”), overruled in part on other grounds by

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223.

ii. Domestic Violence

Beyond the assault, Franke’s ex-wife’s allegations spurred Janes to investigate whether

Franke committed domestic violence. Domestic-violence calls can also often provide grounds to

use force. See Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, 821 F. App’x 604, 606, 609–10 (6th Cir. 2020)

(weighing severity factor “decisively” in officer’s favor after “respond[ing] to a domestic

violence call” with a “crazed” defendant with bloodshot eyes who was “covered in sweat,”

squeezing a woman’s “neck between his thighs,” and screaming about killing her); Goodrich v.

Everett, 193 F. App’x 551, 552, 555 (6th Cir. 2006) (determining circumstances supported

officer decision to use force after officers received “a call for assistance” with defendant

suspected of “aggravated domestic assault, a violent offense” that resulted in the victim

sustaining serious injuries). And from a reasonable officer’s perspective, Janes’s observation of

red marks on Franke’s ex-wife’s neck, her statements about recurrent domestic-violence issues,

her claims along with her husband’s that Franke had pushed them, and Franke’s violent

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 9

statements sufficiently evinced the possibility that Franke might become violent and that force

might be necessary to control the situation. Accordingly, this factor favors Janes.

b. Immediate Threat to Safety

Franke next argues that the district court erroneously found no genuine dispute of

material fact that he posed a threat to the safety of those at the scene. We agree.

The second factor asks if the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Here, gaps in the video evidence render the district

court’s conclusions on this factor speculative. See Hughey v. Easlick, 3 F.4th 283, 292 (6th Cir.

2021) (reversing grant of summary judgment to officer based on “obscured” dashcam footage

where “the handcuffing [was] not visible” and court could not “discern whether any violence

occurred.”). The district court found that Franke, who was “considerably agitated,” “stopped

walking, shouted towards his relatives, and struggled against Janes’s guidance towards the

cruiser.” (Op. & Ord., R. 55, PageID 567). The court further found that when Janes lifted

Franke’s arm, Franke told Janes to “[g]et off of” him and to “quit doing that[.]” (Id. (quotation

marks omitted)). And the district court pointed out that Janes had repeatedly ordered Franke to

“stop pulling away.” (Id.).

To start, there is no doubt Franke grew more agitated as events unfolded. Once

handcuffed, Franke’s tone became more aggressive and irritated (though he briefly calmed down

as he and Janes moved away from the crowd), he repeatedly swore and denied touching his ex-

wife, and he said Janes was “pissing [him] off.” (Bodycam, 0:05:00–0:05:32). Plus, once Janes

mentioned the marks on the ex-wife’s neck, Franke became more agitated. There is also no

dispute that Franke told Janes to get off him and to stop “doing that,” or that Janes repeatedly

ordered Franke to stop pulling away. (Id. at 0:06:07–0:06:30). In the district court’s view, a

reasonable officer could find that Franke “posed a threat when he was verbally and physically

combative” and appeared “uncooperative with Janes’s commands during the walk to Janes’s

cruiser.” (Op. & Ord., R. 55, PageID 567).

But there are genuine disputes of material fact on two central issues: (1) whether Franke

stopped walking; and (2) whether Franke struggled against Janes’s guidance to the police

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 10

vehicle. On the first issue, the video appears to show Franke still moving when he yells to his

family. (See Bodycam, 0:06:04–0:06:06). This raises a factual question of whether Franke was

disregarding Janes’s commands or being verbally or physically combative to the point that he

could be viewed as an immediate threat. Resolution of that factual question must be left to a

jury.

On the second issue, there is no way to tell from the video whether Franke actually

struggled against Janes’s movements to his police vehicle. See Hughey, 3 F.4th at 292. True,

Janes repeatedly says that Franke was pulling away from him. But overlapping those statements

are Franke’s own declarations that he was not pulling away from Janes and that Janes was

“manhandling” and “hurting” him. (Bodycam, 0:06:06–0:06:30). And because what happened

can be heard only on the bodycam, but not seen, the court must fill in any gaps with evidence

Franke has offered that is favorable to him. See Naji, 120 F.4th at 523. The district court did not

perform this last step. See Hughey, 3 F.4th at 292–93. Had it done so, it would have accepted

Franke’s testimony that when Janes “put[] [Franke] in a half nelson,” the move “shove[d] [him]

forward,” which, he says, is what led Janes to “accuse [Franke] of pulling away from him” and

then “torque[]” Franke’s wrist. (Franke Dep., R. 26-2, PageID 98; see id. at PageID 100).

Franke’s version of events creates a disputed question for the jury on whether he exhibited any

threatening behavior.

For his part, Janes appears to adopt the district court’s analysis that Franke posed an

immediate safety threat. (Appellee Br., ECF 21, 34–35). The district cited three cases to support

favoring Janes on this factor: (1) Siders v. City of Eastpointe, 819 F. App’x 381 (6th Cir. 2020);

(2) Bolden v. City of Euclid, 595 F. App’x 464 (6th Cir. 2014); and (3) Farris v. Oakland Cnty.,

96 F.4th 956 (6th Cir. 2024). The first two are distinguishable for the same reason: The force

used by the officers in Siders and Bolden happened before the suspects were handcuffed. See

Siders, 819 F. App’x at 383–86; Bolden, 595 F. App’x at 466. That matters because circuit

precedent bars officers from using “additional gratuitous force once a suspect has been

neutralized.” King, 97 F.4th at 398 (citation omitted); see Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Green

Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing that for over two decades it has been “clearly

established in this circuit that ‘a totally gratuitous blow’” to a handcuffed and non-resisting

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 11

suspect violates the Fourth Amendment) (citation omitted). And this makes sense because the

freedom of movement afforded an uncuffed suspect raises the potential for a dangerous

interaction with officers. But a cuffed suspect is significantly limited in the physical actions he

may take and is more susceptible to injury given the suspect’s inability to move his arms and

hands in even a defensive fashion. So a gratuitous shove, twist, or blow can have serious

consequences.

The district court cited the third case, Farris, for the proposition that “a reasonable officer

could believe that Franke posed a threat when he was verbally and physically combative and

appeared to be uncooperative with Janes’s commands during the walk to Janes’s cruiser.” (Op.

& Ord., R. 55, PageID 567). But this reliance is undermined by the existence of disputed

material facts; namely, whether Franke was “physically combative,” “uncooperative,” and

otherwise posed a threat to Janes, or whether Janes’s actions caused Franke’s apparent “pulling

away.” (Id.). After all, Franke testified that Janes’s half nelson move “shove[d] [Franke]

forward” and led Janes to declare that Franke was pulling away. (Franke Dep., R. 26-2, PageID

98). This, Franke says, is what led Janes to grab Franke’s wrist and painfully twist it. Janes’s

body camera footage does not blatantly undermine Franke’s testimony. Yet from Janes’s

perspective, Franke made “sharp, quick jerking movements” and “pulled away” from him,

necessitating his use of “pain compliance” to keep Franke moving. (Janes Dep., R. 26-7, PageID

162–63). All we have is conflicting testimony regarding whether Franke posed an immediate

threat to Janes’s safety. It is improper for us to make credibility determinations or weigh

competing evidence, so we leave that determination for the jury. See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d

375, 387 (6th Cir. 1994).

c. Resistance or Attempt to Flee

We also agree with Franke that the district court erred when it found there was no

genuine dispute of material fact that he resisted Janes’s attempts to detain him. Active

resistance, which the district court focused on, requires “some outward manifestation—either

verbal or physical” that suggests “volitional and conscious defiance.” Shumate, 44 F.4th at 446

(quoting Eldridge v. City of Warren, 533 F. App’x 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2013)). It is typically

“characterized by physical force, a show of force, or verbal hostility coupled with failure to

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 12

comply with police orders.” King, 97 F.4th at 395 (citation omitted). Though verbal hostility

can signify active resistance, verbal jabs and non-threatening language will not cross the

threshold into active resistance without overtly threatening speech or conduct. Shumate, 44 F.4th

at 447–48. All this stands in contrast to “[m]ere passive resistance,” which involves a “lack of

physical resistance or verbal antagonism.” King, 97 F.4th at 396 (citations omitted).

Here, the district court found that this third factor “weigh[ed] at least slightly in Janes’s

favor.” (Op. & Ord., R. 55, PageID 570). It concluded that Franke’s words, though vulgar, were

“not ‘overtly threatening.’” (Id. at PageID 569 (citation omitted)). We agree with this

conclusion. About two minutes elapsed between Janes ordering Franke to put his hands behind

his back and Franke entering the police vehicle. Though during those 120 seconds Franke used

expletives and expressed frustration with the situation, he never threatened Janes or others, nor

did he use language that could be interpreted as “volitional” or “conscious defiance.” See

Saalim, 97 F.4th at 1004–05 (citation omitted). So we agree with the district court that Franke’s

language (alone) did not show active resistance.

The district court then found that the bodycam footage showed Franke “paus[ing] and

separat[ing] his body from Janes’s to yell towards his family,” and, thus, although his “resistance

in this case might have been slight,” the bodycam showed that he “engaged in at least some

physical defiance of Janes’s instructions [while] moving him toward his cruiser.” (Op. & Ord.,

R. 55, PageID 569). But the court must take the facts in the light most favorable to Franke

unless video evidence blatantly contradicts his version. And there is no blatant contradiction

here. Viewed in the light most favorable to Franke and allowing all reasonable inferences in his

favor, the video depicts Franke continuously walking and never pausing when yelling to his

family. Although the district court concluded otherwise, a short window in the video shows

Franke still moving forward. The district court also noted Janes’s repeated instructions for

Franke to stop pulling away and Franke’s repeated assertions that he was not doing so. Yet,

here, we must accept that it was Janes’s conduct that propelled Franke away from Janes, not any

resistance on Franke’s part. And that means there are genuine issues of material fact on whether

Janes’s use of force was gratuitous. See Butler v. City of Detroit, 936 F.3d 410, 425 (6th Cir.

2019) (affirming denial of qualified immunity where plaintiff “was fully cooperative and yet was

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 13

gratuitously ‘slammed’ into the wall”). Because much of the physical interaction between

Franke and Janes is obscured from view due to the filming perspective, what happened is not

fully discernible. So, it is unclear on what undisputed basis the district court could conclude that

Franke paused, that he offered any resistance, and what, if any, effect Janes’s actions may have

had on Franke’s so-called “pulling away.” See Hughey, 3 F.4th at 292 (reversing grant of

summary judgment to officer when the district court relied on dashcam footage to find no

genuine dispute of material fact on whether he used excessive force, despite the plaintiff’s

“entire body save her right elbow [being] obscured”). For these reasons, the facts should be

weighed by a jury.

Three cases discussed by the district court, McCaig v. Raber, 515 F. App’x 551 (6th Cir.

2013) (cited by Franke); Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2015); and (3) King v. City

of Rockford, 97 F.4th at 379, do not sway our view.

In McCaig, we found no active resistance where an officer yelled an order “so loudly that

it hurt McCaig’s ear” and caused him to “jerk[] away.” Id. at 553 (quotation marks omitted).

Though the district court here found that Janes “did nothing similar” to cause Franke to

“reflexively pull away,” Franke says Janes’s actions caused him to involuntarily lurch forward.

(Op. & Ord., R. 55, PageID 569). Importantly, Franke’s version is not blatantly contradicted by

the video. Indeed, the video does not clearly depict what Janes did or did not do. The differing

accounts heard (but not seen) in the video, and provided in Franke’s and Janes’s depositions,

present jury questions.

Citing Rudlaff, the district court next correctly observed that the Fourth Amendment does

not have a de minimis resistance exception. 791 F.3d at 643. But we question its finding of

“slight” resistance and that the video shows Franke “engaged in at least some physical defiance

of Janes’s instructions moving him toward his cruiser.” (Op. & Ord., R. 55, PageID 569). To

reiterate, almost nothing can be seen on the video because of the camera angle and Franke’s

positioning. Assuming Franke’s alleged pause is part of this finding of slight resistance, its

existence is disputed. And the audio from the bodycam raises questions about whether Franke

“engaged in at least some physical defiance,” and whether Janes’s use of pain compliance caused

Franke to involuntarily “pull away” from Janes. (Id.) Also, Rudlaff’s utility is tempered by the

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 14

fact that it involved an unhandcuffed individual who resisted being handcuffed. See Rudlaff, 791

F.3d at 640. As discussed, Franke was already handcuffed during the walk to Janes’s vehicle.

Then, when Janes pressed Franke against the police vehicle, Franke claims—but the

viewer cannot see—that Janes was “manhandling” and “hurting” Franke. (Bodycam, 0:06:15–

0:06:30). Because the video is not conclusive on what happened, the court must look to other

evidence to fill those gaps. Here, those gaps are filled with disputed testimony that creates a

genuine issue of material fact. King supports this conclusion. The relevant part of that case

affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment where “the entire interaction” between

the officers and the individual “occur[red] outside the view of the dash camera footage.” King,

97 F.4th at 398. Genuine issues of material fact thus preclude summary judgment for Janes.2

2. Clearly Established

Janes did not address the clearly established prong below (other than with general

statements of case law), and now on appeal he says Franke’s rights were clearly established.

Franke, nonetheless, addresses the issue, as is his burden. See Clark, 998 F.3d at 298. And,

regardless of Janes’s acknowledgement that the law is clearly established, we may address the

clearly established prong because “whether the law is clearly established presents a purely legal

question that we need not leave to the district court to resolve.” Palma v. Johns, 27 F.4th 419,

442 n.6 (6th Cir. 2022), abrogated on other grounds by Barnes, 605 U.S. at 83, as recognized by

Booth v. Lazzara, 164 F.4th 581, 593 (6th Cir. 2026). Plus, the parties’ formulation defines the

right “at too high a level of generality.” Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 808 (6th Cir. 2024)

(citations omitted). So we consider it prudent to define the right “with enough specificity to

address ‘whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she

faced.’” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2018)).

2The parties discuss Franke’s surgeon, Dr. Amitava Gupta, and Janes’s police practices expert, John

Combs. These individuals were the subject of motions in limine that the district court denied as moot when it

granted summary judgment to Janes. We decline to address the parties’ arguments about Dr. Gupta and Combs and

leave it to the district court to address them in the first instance, should those motions be renewed. See Tilley v.

Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 777 F.3d 303, 314 (6th Cir. 2015) (declining to address issue before district court

has chance to address in first instance); Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1991)

(“[I]ssues not litigated in the trial court are generally not appropriate for appellate consideration in the first

instance.”).

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 15

A police officer violates a clearly established right when, at the time the officer

committed the challenged conduct, “the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Zakora v.

Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 465 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Officers are “not liable for bad

guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 644.

And although “a case on all fours with the instant fact pattern” is not necessary to show a clearly

established right, a plaintiff must identify “a sufficiently analogous case (or cases) from which a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Pleasant View

Baptist Church v. Beshear, 78 F.4th 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).

Here, assuming the factual disputes in Franke’s favor, the relevant question is whether it

was clearly established in March 2022 that a police officer violates a person’s rights during an

investigatory detention by using advanced pain compliance techniques—here a half nelson and

painfully twisting a wrist with enough force to cause an injury that required surgery—on a

handcuffed individual not resisting arrest. Binding caselaw shows that it was.

In 2021, we held in Hughey v. Easlick that it was “gratuitous violence” for an officer to

“vigorously yank[]” an individual’s arm as he handcuffed her, tearing her rotator cuff. 3 F.4th at

292. Next, in Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Green Twp., we reinforced that “gratuitous violence

inflicted upon an incapacitated detainee constitutes an excessive use of force.” 583 F.3d at 407

(citation modified). In doing so, we cited approvingly our unpublished decision in Pigram ex

rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199 F. App’x 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2006), where we held that slapping a

handcuffed plaintiff in the face using “relatively minimal” force, resulting in no injury, was also

“gratuitous violence.” Morrison, 583 F.3d at 407; see also Hughey, 3 F.4th at 292. And, in

Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, we concluded in November 2004 that it was excessive for

an officer to “push[] his entire weight against” an individual, grab her left arm (her right was

already handcuffed), and “twist[] it behind her with such force that he fractured it in several

places.” 389 F.3d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 2004). The throughline for these cases is that officers’ use

of violent force against unresisting detainees who are partially or fully handcuffed amounts to

gratuitous violence that violates the Fourth Amendment. Hence, these cases clearly establish

that a reasonable officer would have been on notice in March 2022 that it was unlawful to apply

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 16

pain compliance techniques like a half nelson and twisting of a wrist to a handcuffed individual

who offered no voluntary physical resistance.

B. State-Law Claims

1. Negligence

Franke also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his

state-law battery and negligence claims. He devotes little discussion in his opening brief (and

even less in his reply) to his state-claim arguments. The few pages of Franke’s state-law

argument focus on his battery claim and make no mention of his negligence claim. We therefore

consider the issue forfeited, affirm the district court’s dismissal of the negligence claim, and

consider only Franke’s state-law battery claim in this appeal. See Brown v. Louisville-Jefferson

Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 135 F.4th 1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 2025) (“In this Circuit, an appellant forfeits an

argument that he fails to raise in his opening brief.”).

2. Battery

On his battery claim, Franke argues summary judgment was inappropriate because Janes

is not entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law. We agree with Franke for the same

reasons underpinning our decision on federal qualified immunity.

In Kentucky, a battery is “any unlawful touching of the person of another, either by the

aggressor himself, or by any substance set in motion by him.” Browning v. Edmonson Cnty.,

18 F.4th 516, 531 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Ky. 2000)).

Under Kentucky law, police officers and other public officials have qualified immunity from

such claims if they were performing “(1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the

exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in

good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s authority.” Franklin v. Franklin Cnty.,

115 F.4th 461, 478 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001)).

We have previously held that deciding the amount of force required by a situation is a

discretionary act within the scope of a police officer’s authority under Kentucky law. See Reich

v. City of Elizabethtown, 945 F.3d 968, 982–83 (6th Cir. 2019); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 503.050 (use

No. 25-5105 Franke v. Janes Page 17

of physical force in self-protection) and 503.090 (use of physical force in law enforcement).

Thus, here, the only element at issue is “good faith.”

To show that Janes failed to act in good faith, Franke must show one of two things:

(1) that Janes violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right or (2) that there is

evidence that Janes willfully or maliciously intended to harm him. Bryant v. Pulaski Cnty. Det.

Ctr., 330 S.W.3d 461, 466 (Ky. 2011). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Franke,

he has offered facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Janes violated his clearly

established right to be free from the gratuitous use of force. So we need not consider the second

prong. See Reich, 945 F.3d at 983 (explaining that bad faith may be established by satisfying

either prong one or prong two). We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on

Franke’s state-law battery claim.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND

to the district court for further proceedings.