Com. v. Brown-Camp, B.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

BRYAN BROWN-CAMP : No. 977 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 1, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003503-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

MAURICE SMITH : No. 976 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 1, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003502-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., BECK, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 2, 2026

The Commonwealth appeals from the orders granting the petitions filed

by co-defendants Bryan Brown-Camp and Maurice Smith, pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). For the reasons discussed infra, we reverse

the orders granting relief.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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This homicide has a long history in this Court. 1 In 2017, Smith and

Brown-Camp were convicted by a jury of third-degree murder and conspiracy

to commit robbery for their involvement in the shooting death of Tevan

Patrick. According to the Commonwealth, on April 22, 2013, the co-

defendants had “lured the victim into their car to ostensibly commit a robbery,

but [ended up] kill[ing] him.” Commonwealth v. Brown-Camp (“Brown-

Camp I”), 209 A.3d 525, 2019 WL 310813, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(unpublished memorandum).

Since their jury trial, we have had multiple occasions to address the

propriety of their convictions. In doing so, we supplied the following

background and outline of the evidence produced at trial:

On April 25, 2013, the body of [Mr.] Patrick . . . was found inside

an abandoned property in Philadelphia. [Mr. Patrick] had been

shot nine times at close range. After an investigation, the

Commonwealth charged [Smith and Brown-Camp], with murder,

conspiracy to commit murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit

robbery, possession of a firearm prohibited, firearms not to be

carried without a license, carrying a firearm in Philadelphia, and

possession of an instrument of crime. A jury trial occurred from

February 22, 2017 to March 2, 2017.

....

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1 Indeed, this author alone has already drafted three non-precedential

decisions in prior appeals from orders disposing of the same PCRA petitions at

issue in the matters sub judice. See Commonwealth v. Brown-Camp, 336

A.3d 973, 2025 WL 817162 (Pa.Super. 2025) (non-precedential decision);

Commonwealth v. Brown-Camp, 287 A.3d 901, 2022 WL 16545564

(Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision); Commonwealth v. Smith,

287 A.3d 849, 2022 WL 6906967 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential

decision).

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The circumstantial evidence presented in this case weaves

together a tale of the actions of [Smith] and Brown-Camp

throughout the day on April 22, 2013. The day began with [Mr.

Patrick] sending a text message to Janeicia Jackson, Brown-

Camp’s girlfriend, requesting Brown-Camp’s new cell phone

number. Sometime after Jackson provided the number, Brown-

Camp called [Smith] and asked [Smith] to pick him up. [Smith]

and his girlfriend, Jackie Brown, picked up Brown-Camp in her

four[-]door silver Hyundai. [Smith] and Brown-Camp dropped

Brown off at work, at approximately 3:00 p.m., and borrowed her

car. Reginald Tyler, [Mr. Patrick’s] childhood friend, saw [Mr.

Patrick] get into a silver[,] four[-]door car at the Citgo Station in

Delaware. The phones of Brown-Camp and [Mr. Patrick] were

both utilizing a cell phone tower near the Citgo Station at 7:26

p.m. and were in contact with one another at that time. The

phones were geographically tracked to Southwest Philadelphia,

along with [Smith’s] cell phone. All three phones were utilizing

cell towers that covered that site where [Mr. Patrick’s] body was

recovered. The property where [Mr. Patrick’s] body was

recovered was an abandoned property where [Smith’s] cousin

stayed sometimes. [Mr. Patrick’s] cell phone went off-line at

approximately 10:00 p.m., somewhere over the Schuylkill River,

within a half-hour of being geographically located near Southwest

Philadelphia with the phones of [Smith] and Brown-Camp. When

the phone went offline, it was utilizing cell towers in the same area

as [Smith’s] phone, on the Schuylkill Expressway. Finally, [Smith]

is seen by Jackson arriving in Brown’s four[-]door silver car, a

little after 10:00 p.m., at [Smith’s] home, located at 3830 Parish

Street (which is a short distance from the Schuylkill Expressway).

[Mr. Patrick] is last seen at the Citgo Station in Delaware on April

22, 2013. The last time he is heard from is close to 9:30 p.m.

that evening when he states he is with Brown-Camp.

Commonwealth v. Smith (“Smith I”), 2019 WL 473575, at *1-2 (Pa.Super.

2019) (unpublished memorandum) (cleaned up).

Specifically, he sent two text messages shortly before his phone went

offline, which referred to Brown-Camp by his known nickname of “B-Y.” First,

at 9:22 p.m., Mr. Patrick texted a female friend that “if some fishy shit happen

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I was wit B-Y.” Id. He also texted Reginald Tyler that “if anything fishy

happened to me, B-Y did it.” Commonwealth v. Brown-Camp (“Brown-

Camp II”), 287 A.3d 901, 2022 WL 16545564, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-

precedential decision) (cleaned up). Importantly, “[a]round that time, the cell

phones of [Mr. Patrick], [Smith], and Brown-Camp were all traced in the area

of the abandoned house where [Mr. Patrick’s] body was found.” Smith I,

2019 WL 473575, at *2 (cleaned up).

Within the following week, Brown-Camp sought advice from his cousin,

Melissa Palmer, about potential questions that homicide detectives might ask

him because her ex-boyfriend had previously been investigated for and

convicted of murder.2 Brown-Camp explained that he had set up Mr. Patrick

and was being blamed for his death based upon text messages Mr. Patrick

sent. He admitted that he was present during the shooting, but was not the

one who shot Mr. Patrick. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/24/17 (morning), at 69.3

Meanwhile, Smith told Terry Kearney and William Cummings “that he

____________________________________________

2 At the subsequent trial, the Commonwealth frequently refreshed Ms.

Palmer’s recollection during her direct examination with her prior statement

to police.

3 The certified record contains two transcripts for February 24, 2017, both of

which are labeled Volume I. For ease of reference, we named the volume

containing the full testimony of Officer Raymond Andrejczak and Ms. Palmer

and the direct examination of Terry Kearney as the morning volume, and the

volume containing the remainder of Mr. Kearney’s testimony as the afternoon.

See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/24/17 (afternoon), at 5 (indicating that Mr. Kearney’s

cross-examination began at 3:16 p.m.).

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committed the murder during the course of a robbery that he and Brown-

Camp planned.” Smith, 2019 WL 473575, at *2 (cleaned up).

Eugene Baylor, an individual from the neighborhood who knew the co-

defendants, testified at trial that in the spring of 2013, Smith asked him about

serving in the Vietnam War and what it had felt like to kill someone. See N.T.

Trial, 2/27/17, at 31. Later, Smith showed Mr. Baylor a .22 caliber shell and

said “I did that.” Id. at 32-35. Mr. Baylor stopped Smith before he could say

anything else. Although Mr. Baylor admitted to frequent drug use in 2013,

which he used to purchase from the co-defendants, and having used heroin

the morning he testified, he had provided the same statement to police in

June of 2014. He further relayed that Brown-Camp was present for these

conversations.

We summarized the pertinent forensic evidence like so:

The Commonwealth’s evidence established that Mr. Patrick was in

full rigor mortis when he was found on April 25, 2013. Gary

Collins, M.D., conducted Mr. Patrick’s autopsy the following day,

at which time Mr. Patrick remained in full rigor. Dr. Collins

authored an accompanying report, but by the time of trial, no

longer worked at the medical examiner’s office in Philadelphia.

Therefore, the Commonwealth called Albert Chu, M.D., to testify

about the post-mortem findings. Smith’s trial attorney elicited on

cross-examination of Dr. Chu that rigor mortis typically starts

within a few hours of death and usually persists for roughly forty-

eight hours.

Commonwealth v. Brown-Camp (“Brown-Camp III”), 336 A.3d 973,

2025 WL 817162, at *2 (Pa.Super. 2025) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned

up). Thus, the standard window of rigor mortis indicated that Mr. Patrick’s

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death likely occurred sometime after April 22, in contravention of the

Commonwealth’s theory of guilt. Furthermore, during the autopsy, several

bullets and bullet fragments were recovered from Mr. Patrick’s body, four of

which were confirmed as .22 caliber. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/24/17 (morning),

at 29. Finally, Dr. Chu explained that two of the nine gunshot wounds were

fatal. The first, which penetrated Mr. Patrick’s brain, “in most cases, . . . will

cause immediate unconsciousness, if not death.” N.T. Jury Trial, 2/23/17, at

96. The gunshot wound that struck his skull but did not enter the brain, “could

have caused immediate incapacitation and/or death[.]” Id. at 98.

After hearing all this evidence, the jury adjudged Smith and Brown-

Camp guilty of third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery, and

“not guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, robbery, and

all firearms charges. On August 2, 2017, [Smith] and Brown-Camp were both

sentenced to an aggregate term of [twenty-two and one-half to forty-five]

years of incarceration.” Smith I, 2019 WL 473575, at *1 (footnote omitted).

The co-defendants’ post-trial proceedings did not follow identical paths.

Therefore, we separate out much of the timeline between 2017 and today by

each defendant and procedural stage. We begin with Brown-Camp’s post-trial

proceedings.

I. Brown-Camp Direct Appeal & First PCRA Petition

Brown-Camp’s direct appeal garnered him no relief in this Court or our

Supreme Court. Notably, he challenged, among other things, the admissibility

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of the text message Mr. Patrick sent to Mr. Tyler concerning B-Y being

responsible if anything “fishy” happened to Mr. Patrick. Since Mr. Tyler no

longer had the text message at the time of trial, the court permitted the

Commonwealth to introduce its contents through testimony. On direct appeal,

Brown-Camp argued that the testimony about the text message was

inadmissible hearsay. However, we did not reach the merits of that issue

because Brown-Camp’s counsel had waived it by only objecting at trial based

upon the best evidence rule.

Brown-Camp subsequently timely filed his first PCRA petition. Therein,

he argued, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the

text message as hearsay and for failing to call Dr. Collins as an expert witness

to rebut the Commonwealth’s theory of when Mr. Patrick died. That petition

resulted in the following disposition:

The PCRA court dismissed the claim without a hearing for lack of

merit. It offered no substantive analysis at the time it provided

Brown-Camp notice of its intent to dismiss, nor did it proffer any

explanation in the order of dismissal. In a later opinion to this

Court, the PCRA court described that it had concluded that,

although Brown-Camp established that a witness was willing and

able to testify, and counsel should have been aware of the

witness, he could not establish prejudice due to the overwhelming

evidence that Mr. Patrick was murdered on April 22, 2013. See

PCRA Court Opinion (Brown-Camp), 1/24/22, at 9-12.

Upon review, we determined that the PCRA court erred because

its conclusion was premised upon a credibility determination made

without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing[.]

....

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Consequently, we vacated the PCRA order dismissing that claim

and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the prejudice prong

of the ineffective assistance of counsel test for the claim

challenging trial counsel’s effectiveness in choosing not to call Dr.

Collins as an expert as to Mr. Patrick’s time of death.

Brown-Camp III, 2025 WL 817162, at *2-3. Similarly, we “vacate[d] the

portion of the PCRA court’s order denying relief for counsel’s failure to object

to the text message on hearsay grounds and remand[ed] for an evidentiary

hearing on the reasonable basis and prejudice prongs.” Brown-Camp II,

2022 WL 16545564, at *9. We now briefly set forth Smith’s post-trial

proceedings.

II. Smith Direct Appeal & First PCRA Petition

Like Brown-Camp, Smith filed a direct appeal to this Court from his

judgment of sentence. One of the issues he raised was whether the

Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. In

affirming, this Court set forth the body of evidence that had been introduced

against Smith, which we recounted hereinabove. Smith timely filed his first

PCRA petition after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of

appeal. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who submitted amended and

supplemental petitions, challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel’s

representation. Of particular importance to the instant appeal, Smith added

a claim, identical to that of Brown-Camp, that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance for failing to call a forensic expert to rebut the

Commonwealth’s theory as to when Mr. Patrick was killed. Ultimately, like

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with Brown-Camp, the PCRA court dismissed Smith’s petition without a

hearing.

Smith appealed that decision to this Court. In his concise statement,

he alleged for the first time “that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

for failing to challenge Smith’s conviction based upon a discrepancy between

the date of the crime on the bills of information (April 25) and the

Commonwealth’s theory at trial of when the murder occurred (April 22).”

Brown-Camp III, 2025 WL 817162, at *4. We granted PCRA counsel’s

petition to remand the matter so that new counsel could be appointed to

pursue the bills of information claim in the PCRA court and to re-raise any

original PCRA claims. See Commonwealth v. Smith (“Smith II”), 287 A.3d

849, 2022 WL 6906967 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision).

III. Post-Remand Joint Evidentiary Hearing & Granting of Relief

To recap, this Court vacated both orders denying PCRA relief as to the

co-defendants. We remanded for an evidentiary hearing in Brown-Camp’s

case, and the appointment of counsel in Smith’s. In compliance with our

directive, the PCRA court appointed new counsel to represent Smith. Although

it rejected his claim regarding the bills of information, the court scheduled a

joint evidentiary hearing on the co-defendants’ claims that their respective

trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to call Dr. Collins to refute the

Commonwealth’s trial theory that Mr. Patrick was shot and killed on April 22,

2013.

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By way of further background, Dr. Collins had authored a supplemental

report for Brown-Camp’s PCRA petition, which provided as follows:

[Dr. Collins] concluded that, based on the forensic evidence, it

was highly unlikely that Mr. Patrick was shot and killed on April

22, 2013, and opined instead that his time of death was sometime

between 5:00 p.m. on April 24 and 5:00 a.m. on April 25, 2013.

Additionally, Dr. Collins opined that the two penetrating gunshot

wounds to Mr. Patrick’s head would have been immediately

incapacitating and thus it was not possible that Mr. Patrick would

have been shot on April 22, 2013, and survived his injuries until

April 25, 2013.

Brown-Camp III, 2025 WL 817162, at *2 (cleaned up). He further clarified

that the two gunshot wounds to Mr. Patrick’s head would have caused death

“at most within [five] to [ten] minutes[.]” Amended PCRA Petition (Brown-

Camp), 12/28/20, at Exhibit K (Dr. Collins’s Report, 12/15/20, at 5).

We summarized the evidence adduced at the April 5, 2023 PCRA hearing

thusly:

Of relevance, Brown-Camp and Smith introduced a chart

cataloging the outside temperature in the area surrounding the

abandoned house from April 22 to April 25, 2013, and called as

witnesses the two pertinent medical examiners, Dr. Chu and Dr.

Collins. Smith also presented testimony from his trial counsel,

James Berardinelli, Esquire, regarding, inter alia, his investigation

into calling an expert witness and cross-examining Dr. Chu about

Mr. Patrick’s time of death. The Commonwealth put forward

Brown-Camp’s trial attorney, Ch[r]istopher Phillips, Esquire.

Dr. Chu explained that he was unaware of the Commonwealth’s

theory that Mr. Patrick died on April 22 when he testified at the

jury trial. While he could not opine as to a specific time of death

when asked at the PCRA hearing, he did provide a range. In doing

so, he noted that the duration of the different stages of rigor

mortis can be affected by the temperature where the body is kept.

Dr. Chu acknowledged that he did not know the temperature

inside the abandoned home where Mr. Patrick’s body was found

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or how that affected the duration of rigor mortis in this case.

Nonetheless, he declared, based upon the status of Mr. Patrick’s

rigor mortis and the outdoor temperatures during the relevant

period, that “it is possible he was killed on the 22 nd but it is

probably more likely he was killed closer to the 25 th.” He further

clarified: “In my opinion, and, again, this is all sort of subjective

based on observations of bodies, it is more likely that he was killed

on the 23rd, or the 24th, or even earlier on the 25th, yes but I can't

rule out that he was killed on the 22 nd.

Dr. Collins testified that he conducted the autopsy of Mr. Patrick.

His post-mortem findings included that Mr. Patrick remained in full

rigor at the time of the exam, which, as noted, was conducted on

April 26, 2013, one day after his body was found. Additionally,

Dr. Collins discerned that his body showed no signs of

decomposition, the internal organs were not dusky or discolored,

and there had been no indication of rodent or insect activity. In

consideration of these observations and the details reported from

the crime scene, Dr. Collins determined the time of death to be

“anywhere from most likely the 24 th or the 25th . . . maybe as

early as the 23rd but that's about it. Anything beyond that would

be highly unlikely.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/5/23, at 110; id. at 137

(maintaining even after cross-examination that it was “highly

unlikely” the shooting occurred on April 22). According to Dr.

Collins, a theory of death occurring on April 22 was “outside of

reason.” Id. at 113.

Attorney Berardinelli did not remember his preparation of Smith’s

case or whether he investigated bringing in his own expert witness

on this issue but conceded that he obviously did not present one.

Despite being unaware whether he made a conscious decision to

forego [sic] calling an expert witness on the issue, he admitted

that attacking the Commonwealth’s theory of the time of death

was important for undermining the evidence regarding when Mr.

Patrick last used his cell phone. Upon questioning by Brown-

Camp’s PCRA attorney about reaching out to Dr. Collins, he stated

that he believed that he could, and did, get the answers he wanted

on that issue from Dr. Chu during cross-examination. Attorney

Berardinelli further expounded upon the general pros and cons of

calling his own expert witness. Specifically, he noted that he

generally preferred to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory on

cross-examination, instead of via his own expert witness, because

cross-examination allows for an element of surprise that would be

dispelled if the Commonwealth were instead put on notice of the

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content of a defense expert’s report. He concluded that the

answers he elicited from Dr. Chu “gave [them] what [they]

wanted in terms of when rigor occurred.” Id.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Brown-Camp’s attorney provided

extensive argument on the expert witness issue, while Smith’s

attorney focused primarily upon the alleged prosecutorial

misconduct in failing to amend the bills of information, and

otherwise rested on the amended petitions filed before and after

remand as to the expert witness issue. Id. at 230-244 (argument

for Brown-Camp), 245-48 (argument for Smith).

Brown-Camp III, 2025 WL 817162, at *4–5 (cleaned up).

Following that hearing, the PCRA court “found that the co-defendants

were prejudiced by their attorneys’ failures to call Dr. Collins as an expert

witness at trial” and therefore granted their PCRA respective petitions and

ordered new trials. Id. at *5. In light of this determination, the court declined

to rule on the purported ineffectiveness of Brown-Camp’s counsel for failing

to object on hearsay grounds to the text message Mr. Tyler claimed he

received from Mr. Patrick stating that “B-Y” was responsible if anything

untoward happened to him. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/15/23, at 9 n.4.

IV. Commonwealth’s First PCRA Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed those rulings to this Court, and we

disposed of the cases in a single writing that remanded the matters, once

again, to the PCRA court. In conducting our analysis, we set forth the relevant

legal principles that guided our review both then and continues to do so now:

In every ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must “rebut the

presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance and prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the claim has

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arguable merit, (2) counsel’s action or inaction was not based

upon a reasonable trial strategy and (3) petitioner suffered

prejudice because of counsel’s act or omission.” Commonwealth

v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 454 (Pa. 2016) (cleaned up). This

three-pronged test was “originally established by the United

States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), and adopted by Pennsylvania appellate courts.”

Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 331 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(cleaned up). Failing to satisfy any prong of the Strickland test

is fatal to the ineffectiveness claim. See Commonwealth v.

Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 621 (Pa. 2024).

Where the ineffectiveness claim is premised upon counsel’s failure

to call an expert witness, our Supreme Court has explained the

particular modification of these three prongs thusly:

To satisfy the “arguable merit” prong for a claim of

ineffectiveness based upon trial counsel’s failure to

call an expert witness, the petitioner must prove that

an expert witness was willing and available to testify

on the subject of the testimony at trial, counsel knew

or should have known about the witness, and the

defendant was prejudiced by the absence of the

testimony. Prejudice in this respect requires the

petitioner to show how the uncalled witnesses’

testimony would have been beneficial under the

circumstances of the case. Therefore, the petitioner’s

burden is to show that testimony provided by the

uncalled witnesses would have been helpful to the

defense.

When assessing whether counsel had a reasonable

basis for his act or omission, the question is not

whether there were other courses of action that

counsel could have taken, but whether counsel’s

decision had any basis reasonably designed to

effectuate his client’s interest. This cannot be a

hindsight evaluation of counsel’s performance, but

requires an examination of whether counsel made an

informed choice, which at the time the decision was

made reasonably could have been considered to

advance and protect the defendant's interests. Our

evaluation of counsel’s performance is highly

deferential.

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Trial counsel need not introduce expert testimony on

his client’s behalf if he is able effectively to cross-

examine prosecution witnesses and elicit helpful

testimony. Additionally, trial counsel will not be

deemed ineffective for failing to call a medical,

forensic, or scientific expert merely to critically

evaluate expert testimony that was presented by the

prosecution. Thus, the question becomes whether or

not defense counsel effectively cross-examined the

Commonwealth’s expert witness.

Turning to the prejudice determination, the question

is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but

for trial counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.

Williams, 141 A.3d at 460, 463-465 (cleaned up).

To summarize, there are two prejudice questions a PCRA

petitioner must prove to sustain this type of ineffectiveness claim.

As in every case alleging ineffectiveness, a petitioner must

establish Strickland prejudice, i.e., a “reasonable probability”

that the result of the proceeding would have been different had

counsel called the witness. Id. at 465. Additionally, as part of

the arguable merit prong, a petitioner must show that the

testimony would be helpful.

Brown-Camp III, 2025 WL 817162, at *7–8 (ellipses and brackets omitted).

The Commonwealth argued that the PCRA court utilized the wrong

prejudice test in granting relief to the co-defendants. We reached the same

conclusion, explaining our findings in this way:

The PCRA court did not author an opinion to accompany its oral

order granting relief, and it did not clearly articulate the prejudice

test it was using when discussing its findings on the record.

Thereafter, in its [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(a) opinions, the PCRA court

framed its prejudice analyses within the context of prejudice as

required for the arguable merit prong when the assertion relates

to counsel’s failure to call a witness. See PCRA Court Opinion

(Smith), 9/19/23, at 8-9; PCRA Court Opinion (Brown-Camp),

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9/15/23, at 8. It also incorrectly declined to address the

reasonable basis prong in Smith’s case because it stated that we

remanded solely for the prejudice prong. See PCRA Court Opinion

(Smith), 9/19/23, at 9. Therefore, we agree that the PCRA court

utilized the wrong standard in assessing Strickland prejudice in

each case and improperly ignored the reasonable basis prong in

its Rule 1925(a) opinion in Smith’s case.

Id. at *9.

Nonetheless, our review of the record revealed that “the court clearly

determined, at the time it granted relief, that Smith had proved that Attorney

Berardinelli’s failure to investigate or call Dr. Collins was not reasonably

designed to effectuate his interest.” Id. at *11 (cleaned up). Therefore, we

ultimately rejected the Commonwealth’s claim that the PCRA court erred in

not considering the reasonable basis prong when granting relief, and affirmed

the court’s determination that Attorney Berardinelli had failed to act

reasonably in not calling Dr. Collins. Id. at *11.

Based on the foregoing, we vacated the PCRA orders that had granted

relief “and remand[ed] for the PCRA court to analyze, under the proper

Strickland standard, whether Brown-Camp and Smith proved prejudice on

their claims regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling an

expert witness on the forensic science surrounding Mr. Patrick’s time of

death.” Id. at *11. We clarified that “the question before the PCRA court on

remand [wa]s whether there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for [each

attorney’s] failure to call Dr. Collins, the result of [their] trial would have been

different.” Id. at *10 (cleaned up). Finally, we ordered the court to reduce

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its reasoning to writing in a final order either granting or denying relief as to

each co-defendant.

V. PCRA Remand for Prejudice Prong

On remand, the court appointed new counsel to represent Smith and

provided its analysis of the Strickland prejudice prong in final orders

disposing of the PCRA petitions. The court first noted the strong cell phone

evidence linking Brown-Camp, Smith, and Mr. Patrick together on the evening

of April 22, 2013. Specifically, that evidence established that the three men

“traveled together from the State of Delaware to southwest Philadelphia,

where [Mr. Patrick’s] body was recovered on April 25, 2013. [Mr. Patrick’s]

cell phone went off-line the evening of April 22, 2013, while traveling over the

Schuylkill River.” PCRA Court Opinion (Brown-Camp), 4/1/25, at 3.

The court then weighed what it deemed to be the strongest remaining

trial evidence against Brown-Camp with that cell-phone evidence, and

assessed whether the absence of Dr. Collins’s testimony prejudiced Brown-

Camp, along these lines:

In addition to the cell phone evidence, the Commonwealth also

introduced a statement by [Brown-Camp] to [Ms.] Palmer, who

testified that [Brown-Camp] admitted to setting up [Mr. Patrick]

to be robbed, that he picked up [Mr. Patrick] in Delaware, and that

[Mr. Patrick] had been shot, but not by him. However, [Ms.]

Palmer admitted that she was taking Percocet and Xanax, and had

just been released from an inpatient mental health facility and

could not remember dates or details she had told the detectives

in her statement. [Ms.] Palmer was then impeached with her prior

statement, and the court gave the jury the prior inconsistent

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statement charge stating they could use the prior statement

substantively.

The Commonwealth also introduced testimony from [Mr.] Baylor.

Mr. Baylor testified that in April 2013, he was smoking crack

cocaine and using heroin. Mr. Baylor also testified that he suffers

from [post-traumatic stress disorder], bipolar disorder, and manic

depression, for which he takes a number of medications. Mr.

[Baylor] was also convicted of burglary in 2006[,] and violated his

term of probation numerous times. Substantively, Mr. Baylor’s

testimony was largely irrelevant, as he testified that he stopped

[Smith] from making what Mr. Baylor expected would be an

incriminating statement.

Due to the impeachment evidence against the witnesses, the

Commonwealth’s evidence at trial was primarily based on the cell

phone records placing [the] co-defendant[s] with [Mr. Patrick] on

April 22, 2013. However, there was testimony that [Mr. Patrick’s]

body was in full rigor mortis when he was found on April 25, 2013.

The evidence presented at the April 5, 2023 evidentiary hearing

established that Dr. Collins was willing and able to testify at trial

that, in his medical opinion, the date of death was April 24th or

April 25th, which was even further removed from the evidence

placing [Brown-Camp] with [Mr. Patrick] at the time of his death.

This would have significantly strengthened the defense’s

argument that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Brown-Camp] was involved in

[Mr. Patrick’s] death. Given that the only other evidence

presented at trial outside of the cell phone testimony was through

witnesses with significant credibility issues, [the PCRA court

found] that [Brown-Camp] proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. If the jury believed the testimony from the forensic

pathologist that the time of death was two to three days after the

cell phone evidence placed [Brown-Camp] and his co-defendant

with [Mr. Patrick], the additional testimony from the forensic

pathologist likely would have changed the jury’s mind and resulted

in [Brown-Camp’s] acquittal.

Id. at 3-5 (cleaned up).

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In reaching its conclusion that Smith had proved prejudice, the court

conducted a practically identical analysis, noting the testimony provided by

both Mr. Kearney and Mr. Baylor were subject to bias and impeachment, and

therefore the strongest evidence, as with Brown-Camp, was that regarding

the proximity of the parties based upon their cell phones’ locations on April

22, 2013. See PCRA Court Opinion (Smith), 4/1/25, at 3-4.

Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court granted the PCRA petitions of

both Smith and Brown-Camp, and ordered new trials.

VI. The Present Appeals

The Commonwealth timely filed the instant appeals from the new orders

granting PCRA relief.4 In this Court, the Commonwealth presents a single,

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA court did not order the Commonwealth to submit a concise

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in either case, and none was filed.

However, the PCRA court did supply a Rule 1925(a) opinion in support of

affirmance as to each co-defendant.

The parties submitted several filings in this Court, with the Commonwealth

seeking to consolidate the two appeals, and Brown-Camp (1) opposing

consolidation and asking that his case instead be heard by a different panel

than Smith’s, and (2) requesting that portions of the Commonwealth’s brief in

the Smith appeal be stricken. We denied the Commonwealth’s motion to

consolidate and denied without prejudice Brown-Camp’s request for his case

to be assigned to another panel. Upon consideration by this panel, we have

chosen to consolidate these cases sua sponte into a single writing for ease of

disposition in light of the interrelated nature of these cases.

We deferred disposition of Brown-Camp’s motion to strike to the panel. As

has been borne out by the above procedural history, we are intimately familiar

with the facts underpinning these cases. Notwithstanding whether Brown-

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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identical issue in each case: “Did the [PCRA] court err by granting post-

conviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not

retaining a forensic pathologist, where defendant was not prejudiced by the

omission?” Commonwealth’s brief (Smith) at 4; Commonwealth’s brief

(Brown-Camp) at 4.

VII. Standard of Review & Relevant Legal Principles

We briefly reiterate the pertinent legal precepts guiding our analysis for

both appeals:

When reviewing an order granting PCRA relief, we must determine

whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by the

evidence of record and is free of legal error. Moreover, we will

not disturb the findings of the PCRA court unless those findings

have no support in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 154 A.3d 370, 377 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc)

(cleaned up). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA

court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the

____________________________________________

Camp has standing to ask this Court to strike portions of an appellant’s brief

in another matter, we note that just as a trial court in a bench trial, we are

limited by the facts of record and are more than capable of ignoring any

portion of a brief that is not grounded in fact or which improperly implicates

Brown-Camp. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 715 A.2d 1101, 1103 (Pa.

1998) (“The fundamental tool for appellate review is the official record of what

happened at trial, and appellate courts are limited to considering only those

facts that have been duly certified in the record on appeal.” (cleaned up));

Commonwealth v. McFadden, 156 A.3d 299, 309 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[A]

trial court acting as the fact-finder is presumed to know the law, ignore

prejudicial statements, and disregard inadmissible evidence.” (cleaned up)).

Thus, we deny Brown-Camp’s motion to strike portions of the

Commonwealth’s brief in Smith’s appeal.

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prevailing party at the trial level[,]” which was the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned

up). Further:

Success on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires

the petitioner to rebut the presumption that counsel rendered

effective assistance and prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that (1) the claim has arguable merit, (2) counsel’s

action or inaction was not based upon a reasonable trial strategy

and (3) petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel’s act or

omission.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 454 (Pa. 2016) (cleaned up).

Since the only prong of the co-defendants’ ineffectiveness claims that is

before us in these appeals is the prejudice prong, the salient “question is

whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for [each] trial counsel’s

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 465

(cleaned up). Our High Court has clarified that “[t]his does not mean a

different outcome would have been more likely than not; a reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome

of the proceeding. Still, a speculative or attenuated possibility of a different

outcome is insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1019 (Pa. 2019) (cleaned up).

Finally, the Strickland Court offered the following additional instruction

regarding the scope of a PCRA court’s review when assessing whether a

petitioner has proved prejudice:

In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness

claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge

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or jury. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by

the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been

affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive

effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering

the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated,

trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly

supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by

errors than one with overwhelming record support. Taking the

unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the

effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the

prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of

showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have

been different absent the errors.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–96.

VIII. Strickland Prejudice in Smith’s Case

We begin with the Commonwealth’s appeal in Smith’s case. At large,

the Commonwealth contests the PCRA court’s consideration of the evidence

produced at trial in finding prejudice as to Smith. To wit, it alleges that the

court failed to reckon with the statement of Mr. Cummings, to whom Smith

had confessed to murdering Mr. Patrick, and who otherwise provided

corroborating evidence to the other witnesses’ accounts of what happened on

April 22, 2013. See Commonwealth’s brief (Smith) at 35-36. The

Commonwealth also contends that the PCRA court mischaracterized and

inadequately weighed Mr. Kearney’s testimony, and ignored the possibility

that his pending federal matters could have been interpreted by the jury as

increasing the likelihood of him telling the truth, instead of serving to impeach

his credibility. Id. at 37-39. Further, it maintains that Mr. Baylor’s testimony

was more relevant than the court acknowledged. Id. at 39. Specifically, the

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Commonwealth insists that the court failed to view Smith’s statement to Mr.

Baylor about the .22 caliber bullet in its proper context, explaining in this

fashion:

First, [Mr.] Patrick was shot nine times with a .22 caliber gun.

Second, this conversation occurred in the context of defendant

asking Baylor what it was like to kill a person. The combination

of showing Baylor a .22 caliber bullet and telling him “I did that,”

in the context of a conversation about killing, is strong

circumstantial evidence that defendant Smith did, indeed, do that.

Id. (cleaned up, emphasis in original).

As further background relating to the Commonwealth’s claims, Mr.

Kearney testified that Smith was concerned about the text message Mr.

Patrick sent to Mr. Tyler about “B-Y,” and how it could implicate him. See

N.T. Jury Trial, 2/24/17 (morning), at 141, 148-49. Additionally, Smith

admitted to Mr. Kearney that he had set up Mr. Patrick for a robbery and then

shot Mr. Patrick in the head a few times when he tried to run away. Id. at

143-44. According to Mr. Kearney’s testimony, Brown-Camp never provided

any such confession to him, but would laugh whenever Smith talked about

shooting Mr. Patrick. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/24/17 (morning), at 150-51. Mr.

Kearney was adamant that although his police statement indicated that “they”

had both told him about the murder, his use of “they” when speaking to police

referred only to Smith. Id. at 152; N.T. Jury Trial, 2/24/17 (afternoon), at

21.

Our review of the certified record bears out that the evidence against

Smith established not only that he was with Brown-Camp and Mr. Patrick on

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April 22, but also that Smith boasted time and again that he shot Mr. Patrick

to death. He told Mr. Cummings that he killed Mr. Patrick. Smith also

confessed to Mr. Kearney that he shot Mr. Patrick in the head when he tried

to run away during the robbery and would joke about it in his presence.

Moreover, he showed Mr. Baylor a .22 caliber bullet, which was the caliber of

bullet recovered from Mr. Patrick’s body, and told him “I did that,” after a

conversation about what it felt like to kill someone. Finally, Mr. Patrick’s body

was recovered from an abandoned home that Smith’s cousin also utilized.

Hence, the addition of Dr. Collins’s testimony about a later date of death

would not conflict with Smith repeatedly declaring that he shot Mr. Patrick nor

meaningfully diminish the quantum of evidence connecting him to the murder.

The jurors could conclude that Smith killed Mr. Patrick on a later date,

consistent with the standard range for rigor mortis and Smith’s confessions,

or they could deduce that Smith shot Mr. Patrick on April 22 around the time

that Mr. Patrick’s phone went offline, and the environmental conditions were

such that rigor mortis did not follow its usual schedule.

Phrased differently, in light of the incredibly damning evidence against

Smith, the unlikelihood of Mr. Patrick’s death occurring on April 22 based upon

it being inconsistent with the normal rigor mortis timetable would “have had

an isolated, trivial effect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; Id. (“[A] verdict or

conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been

affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).

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Thus, we agree with the Commonwealth that the PCRA court erred in

determining that Smith suffered prejudice based upon the failure to call Dr.

Collins. Since we conclude that Smith failed to prove prejudice on his

ineffectiveness claim, we reverse the PCRA court’s order granting his petition.

IX. Strickland Prejudice in Brown-Camp’s Case

We now turn to the Commonwealth’s appeal in Brown-Camp’s case. It

again argues that the PCRA court erred by not including certain pieces of trial

evidence within its prejudice analysis. Specifically, it assails the court’s failure

to address the text message Mr. Patrick sent to Mr. Tyler on April 22, as well

as Mr. Kearney’s related testimony. See Commonwealth’s brief (Brown-

Camp) at 45-46. Since the text message had not been deemed inadmissible

by any formal ruling, the Commonwealth insists that it was “part of the totality

of the evidence that must be considered when conducting the prejudice

analysis.” Commonwealth’s reply brief (Brown-Camp) at 12 n.5. Similarly, it

alleges that the PCRA court “erroneously concluded that [Ms.] Palmer’s trial

testimony was unreliable[.]” Commonwealth’s brief (Brown-Camp) at 43.

The Commonwealth also laments the PCRA court’s simplification of Dr.

Collins’s testimony in which he had conceded that, while it was highly unlikely

that Mr. Patrick died on April 22, it was not impossible. Id. at 50.

Furthermore, it contends that the PCRA court did not credit Dr. Chu’s

testimony, which had explained that notwithstanding the difficulties of precise

dating, Mr. Patrick could have died on April 22. Id. at 50-51. It maintains

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that Brown-Camp had put forth a challenge to the date of death at trial based

upon the length of time that Dr. Chu testified rigor usually lasts, and therefore

the argument “had already been fully presented to the jury.” Id. at 51. In

sum, the Commonwealth concludes that the court erred because “both experts

could not rule out the Commonwealth’s theory of the case, that [Mr. Patrick]

died on April 22, 2013.” Id. at 53 (emphasis in original).

At the outset, we observe that the Commonwealth’s argument rests

upon a misapplication of the prejudice standard. Brown-Camp did not need

to disprove the Commonwealth’s theory of the case to prove a reasonable

likelihood that the outcome would have been different. Instead, he must have

demonstrated that had counsel not erred, there would have been reasonable

doubt in some of the jurors’ minds as to whether he was guilty of third-degree

murder.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Commonwealth that we do not adjudge

prejudice on a diminished record because, as with a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, our review requires us to

consider the PCRA court’s factual findings and “the evidence of record, viewed

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Burkett,

5 A.3d at 1267 (cleaned up). Moreover, when the PCRA court considers

whether a petitioner has proved prejudice for an ineffectiveness claim, it must

do so upon the totality of the evidence presented to the jury, “[t]aking the

unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the

errors on the remaining findings[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.

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While the court must conduct such an analysis and therefore should

have included such evidence as the text message in its consideration, the

PCRA court need not detail in its writing every piece of evidence proffered

during a murder trial. Indeed, the PCRA court explained that it was not

providing a full accounting of the evidence presented at trial because the

evidence has been discussed ad nauseum by this Court, the trial court, and

the PCRA court over the last six years. See PCRA Court Opinion (Brown-

Camp), 5/1/25, at 3 n.1. Instead, it focused upon what it deemed the

Commonwealth’s strongest evidence.

However, our review reveals that the court’s finding of Strickland

prejudice cannot be supported by the trial record. As recounted at length

hereinabove, the evidence presented to the jury painted a clear picture of:

(1) Brown-Camp setting up Mr. Patrick to be robbed by Brown-Camp and

Smith; (2) the three being together on the evening of April 22; and (3), when

Mr. Patrick tried to foil the planned robbery and run away, Smith shot him to

death. Brown-Camp admitted to setting up Mr. Patrick for the robbery and

being present for the shooting. He merely claimed that he was not the one

who pulled the trigger. Finally, Mr. Patrick alerted two different individuals

that if anything happened to him, Brown-Camp was responsible.

As with Smith, the introduction of Dr. Collins’s testimony about the usual

parameters of rigor mortis could only “have had an isolated, trivial effect”

upon the exhaustively inculpatory evidence adduced during the four-day

murder trial against Brown-Camp. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; Id. (“[A]

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verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to

have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).

Accordingly, we also reverse the PCRA court’s order granting Brown-Camp

relief because he failed to prove prejudice.

In doing so, we note that the PCRA court, despite holding a hearing as

previously directed by this Court, has not yet ruled on Brown-Camp’s PCRA

claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise a

hearsay objection to the text message Mr. Patrick sent to Mr. Tyler implicating

Brown-Camp. Thus, we remand solely for the PCRA court to enter a final order

as to whether Brown-Camp is entitled to PCRA relief based upon that

ineffectiveness claim.

X. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the PCRA court’s orders granting

relief to Smith and Brown-Camp, remand with instructions to the PCRA court

in Brown-Camp’s case, and reinstate Smith’s judgment of sentence.

PCRA order granting relief to Brown-Camp reversed. Case remanded

with instructions.

PCRA order granting relief to Smith reversed.

Jurisdiction as to both cases relinquished.

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Date: 3/2/2026

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