The opinion
Filed 3/2/26 P. v. Ryan CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088831
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF197971A)
v.
NATHAN JOSEPH RYAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. J. Eric
Bradshaw, Judge.
Elisa A. Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Lowe and Barton
Bowers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and De Santos, J.
INTRODUCTION
The trial court denied defendant Nathan Joseph Ryan’s petition for mental health
diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1.1 The court found him eligible but not
suitable for diversion, reasoning that defendant targeted vulnerable victims. Defendant
subsequently pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and was sentenced to two
years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for mental health diversion. We agree that the court applied an incorrect legal
standard in ruling on his petition. We thus conditionally vacate defendant’s no contest
plea, conditionally reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings
consistent with section 1001.36.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
On January 7, 2024, Carlos R. was waiting near a store in Bakersfield with his
backpack hanging from the arm of his walker. Defendant approached Carlos and offered
to carry the backpack, but Carlos declined the assistance. Defendant warned Carlos that
he had a knife if Carlos did not give defendant the backpack. Carlos was scared and
screamed in panic. Defendant took his backpack.
The District Attorney of Kern County filed an information on February 15, 2024,
charging defendant with second degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c)) and alleging five
aggravating sentencing factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)–(3), (9) & (b)(1)).
Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations. Defendant filed a motion for
mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36 on June 27, 2024. The trial court
denied the motion.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
Defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty, entered a new plea of no contest, and
admitted the allegations. The trial court found defendant ineligible for probation and
sentenced him to the lower term of two years in prison.
Defendant filed a timely appeal on October 22, 2024.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
Defendant supported his motion for diversion with an “Adult Transition Team
Eligibility Report” (some capitalization omitted) authored by a behavioral health
therapist. The report “offered” diagnoses of “Schizophrenia, Unspecified [¶] Alcohol use
Disorder, Severe [¶] Cannabis use Disorder, Severe [¶] Amphetamine-type substance use
disorder, severe [¶] [and] Other hallucinogen use disorder, Moderate.” According to the
behavioral health therapist, the listed conditions cause significant impairments in
defendant’s daily functioning that might benefit from outpatient mental health services to
decrease those impairments and help decrease defendant’s risk of recidivism. The court
was provided the police report of the incident that described defendant’s statements after
the robbery. Defendant claimed that a voice told him to grab the backpack from Carlos
and that defendant was schizophrenic and bipolar. Defendant also admitted that he used
methamphetamine and marijuana and drank alcohol. While defendant was not sure what
he intended to do with the backpack, he believed that he would probably go through it
later. Defendant denied threatening Carlos or brandishing a knife.
The prosecutor’s written opposition to defendant’s motion provided information
that defendant has a prior wardship felony conviction related to his commission of oral
copulation with a minor under age 14 (former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)).
At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the prosecutor argued that the behavioral
health therapist’s qualifications had not been established, her report was hearsay, and
defendant selected a vulnerable victim for his crime and posed an unreasonable risk to the
community. The court overruled the prosecutor’s objection to the behavioral health
3.
therapist’s report and recounted the facts of the offense as set forth in the complaint and
preliminary hearing transcript, recognizing that defendant had a knife in his pocket when
arrested. The court agreed that defendant was eligible for mental health diversion based
upon his motion but concluded that it did not know enough of the facts to make a finding
by clear and convincing evidence that he was a threat to society because he would
commit a super strike.
The court recognized that defendant was not statutorily ineligible for mental health
diversion just because he has a section 288 prior conviction but considered that it was a
significant enough concern for the Legislature that it amended section 1001.36 so that
defendants currently charged with violating section 288 would not be eligible for
diversion. The court noted that defendant’s prior offense reflects a legislative concern to
protect victims considered vulnerable because they are under the age of 18 years.2 The
court observed that Carlos, the victim in the instant case, was vulnerable because he
required the use of a walker. The court expressed concern that “the information, as
limited as it is to the Court, [is] that he targets easy victims.” Although the court
recognized that there might be factors in mitigation as to defendant’s prior offense, it
concluded, “I’m going to find the defendant eligible, but unsuitable because he targeted
[vulnerable] people.” Defense counsel added that defendant had been 13 years old at the
time of the section 288 offense, but this information did not change the court’s ruling.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s order denying mental health diversion for abuse of
discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary
or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its
2 The reporter’s transcript uses the word “voluntarily,” but we believe that this is a mistake
as the court was discussing defendant’s targeting of “easy victims” and the word “voluntarily”
appears out of context given the court’s discussion.
4.
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].” (Id. at p. 449.) We presume a trial court’s order is correct and
indulge all intendments and reasonable inferences to support it. (People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume a trial court
knew the law and followed it. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) But
where a court’s ruling clearly expresses the legal and factual basis for its resolution of
controverted issues, an appellate court will not imply findings the trial court did not
make. (See, e.g., Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995)
39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384.)
Section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1)(2) provides that a defendant is eligible for
mental health diversion if (1) they present evidence that in the last five years they have
been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental disorder as identified in
the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and
(2) their mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense. As to the second criteria, “[i]f the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental
disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor
in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was
not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s
involvement in the alleged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
If a defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements in section 1001.36,
subdivision (b), the court then must consider whether the defendant is suitable for
diversion based on the following criteria set forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c):
(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder that caused, contributed to, or motivated the defendant’s criminal
behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to
diversion and waives their right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an
5.
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18,3 if treated in
the community.
The court, in its discretion, may order the defendant to diversion if it finds the
defendant both eligible and suitable (§ 1001.36, subd. (a)) and “is satisfied that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant” (id., subd. (f)(1)(A)(i)).
Thus, a diversion order is expressly discretionary with the court, even when all of the
criteria are met. (See § 1001.36, subd. (a) [“the court may, in its discretion” grant pretrial
diversion if the defendant satisfies eligibility requirements and the court determines the
defendant is suitable].) However, this residual discretion “must be exercised ‘ “consistent
with the principles and purpose of the governing law.” ’ ” (Vaughn v. Superior Court
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135; accord, Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892.)
“The stated purpose of mental health diversion ‘ “is to keep people with mental
disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice system while protecting public
safety, to give counties discretion in developing and implementing diversion across a
continuum of care settings, and to provide mental health rehabilitative services.” ’ ”
(Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 691.) Legislative history
confirms there is “a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders
because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the
community.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 892–893.)
3 The “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” contained in section 1170.18 is
defined as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony,” within the
meaning of section 667, which lists eight offenses that include sexually violent offenses, oral
copulation with a child under age 14, homicide or attempted homicide, solicitation to commit
murder, assault with a machinegun on a peace officer, possession of a weapon of mass
destruction, and any serious or violent felony offense punishable by life imprisonment or death—
offenses colloquially referred to as “super strikes.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I)–(VIII); People
v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149.)
6.
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
mental health diversion. The People agree. We accept the People’s concession. In this
case, we agree with the parties that the record shows that the trial court’s ruling failed to
apply the correct legal standards to defendant’s diversion request.
As noted above, after finding defendant eligible, the court denied him diversion
because he was unsuitable based on the determination that he targeted vulnerable people.
This ruling rests on a legal error because the court did not apply the four statutory
suitability criteria found in section 1001.36, subdivision (c), which require the court to
consider whether his symptoms would respond to mental health treatment; whether he
consented to diversion and waived his right to a speedy trial; whether he agreed to
comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and whether he would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (See, e.g., Grossmont Union High School
Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 584 [trial court applied
an incorrect legal standard when it did not apply one of the essential components for
deciding whether fees should be awarded under the applicable fee statute].)
Additionally, “denial of mental health diversion using [a court’s] residual
discretion should be limited to those situations where the purposes of the statute would
not be achieved.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.) Here,
the trial court relied on its observation that defendant targeted vulnerable victims but
failed to tie that observation to achieving the purposes of the statute, and the “ ‘strong
legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of
such treatment to both the offending individual and the community.’ ” (Gomez v.
Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.)
By applying the wrong legal standard, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. (See People v. Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
7.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s no contest plea is conditionally vacated, and the judgment is
conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct new
proceedings on defendant’s motion for mental health diversion in accordance with
section 1001.36 and consistent with this opinion. If the trial court grants defendant’s
motion for mental health diversion, the no contest plea is vacated and the judgment is
reversed. If the trial court again denies mental health diversion, defendant’s no contest
plea and the judgment shall be reinstated.
8.