The opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-12405
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SAMUEL KNOWLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:00-cr-00425-JIC-6
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Knowles, proceeding with counsel, appeals the dis-
trict court’s order denying his pro se third motion for a new trial.
He was found guilty of conspiring to import cocaine from June
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12405
1995 to April 1996, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(i), and
960(b)(1)(B)(ii), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (Count 1), and
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine from June
1995 to April 1996, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A)(ii), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 2). On
appeal, Knowles argues that the district court abused its discretion
in summarily denying his third pro se motion for a new trial based
on its finding that he was unable to establish equitable tolling to
overcome the time bar for motions for a new trial. After careful
review, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th
Cir. 1985). “A district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies
the law in reaching its decision or bases its decision on findings of
fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d
1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). We construe docu-
ments filed pro se liberally. United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 792
(11th Cir. 2009).
A judge has no power to order a new trial on his own mo-
tion. United States v. Eaton, 501 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1974). 1 Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 governs motions for new trial. The
broad standard for granting a new trial is whether the verdict must
be set aside in “the interest of justice.” United States v. Vicaria, 12
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October
1, 1981.
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25-12405 Opinion of the Court 3
F.3d 195, 198 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 33). If “the
acumen gained by a trial judge over the course of the proceedings
[makes] him well qualified to rule on the basis of affidavits without
a hearing,” then the district court does not err in declining to hold
an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial. United States
v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (5th Cir. 1977).
A motion for new trial generally must be filed within 14 days
after the verdict is returned. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2). The period
commences on the day after the verdict is returned. United States
v. Hill, 177 F.3d 1251, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 1999). An exception exists,
however, for motions based on newly discovered evidence, which
may be filed within three years of the return of the verdict. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 33(b)(1).
The timeliness of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial is not a
jurisdictional question but, rather, a claim-processing rule. Eberhart
v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005). The deadline for filing a
motion for a new trial, based on any ground other than newly dis-
covered evidence, is rigid. United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121,
1154 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding the district court’s denial
of a renewed motion for a new trial based on the interests of justice
under Rule 33(b)(2) where the motion was untimely). The govern-
ment can forfeit its defense of untimeliness if it fails to raise the
defense before the district court reaches the merits of the Rule 33
motion. See Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12405
In the habeas context, where we commonly encounter eq-
uitable tolling claims, we’ve held that equitable tolling is an ex-
traordinary remedy, typically applied sparingly to rare and excep-
tional circumstances. Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th
Cir. 2005) (habeas). For equitable tolling to apply, the movant
must show (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way to pre-
vent timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (ha-
beas). For equitable-tolling purposes, only reasonable diligence is
required, not “maximum feasible diligence.” Id. at 653 (citation
modified). The focus of the “extraordinary circumstances” inquiry
“is on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas
petition . . . and whether the conduct of others prevented the peti-
tioner from timely filing.” Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th
Cir. 2006) (habeas) (citation modified). Moreover, to show extraor-
dinary circumstances, a defendant must show a “causal connection
between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and the late filing
of the petition.” San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir.
2011) (habeas).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sua
sponte denying Knowles’s third motion for a new trial -- seeking a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence that the government
allegedly utilized information in the instant case from a case where
they lacked jurisdiction and that they allegedly prosecuted
Knowles on an apparently flawed theory of conspiracy. As the rec-
ord reflects, Knowles was convicted by a jury in 2008 and he filed
his third motion for a new trial in 2025, which is well after the
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25-12405 Opinion of the Court 5
three-year window provided by Rule 33. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1).
Thus, Knowles’s motion was untimely under Rule 33.
Moreover, even if we assume that equitable tolling applies
to Rule 33 motions, Knowles has failed to establish the elements
for equitable tolling of the three-year limitations period for mo-
tions for a new trial. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. While Knowles
based his claim of newly discovered evidence on a presentence in-
vestigation report (“PSI”) and a United States Marshals Service
(“USMS”) report, they are insufficient to toll the Rule 33 time bar.
Indeed, Knowles was not obstructed by “extraordinary circum-
stances” from obtaining his PSI sooner; to the contrary, he affirmed
during his 2008 sentencing hearing that he had received and re-
viewed a copy of his PSI. Nor has he explained how he was ob-
structed by “extraordinary circumstances” from obtaining the
USMS report, especially since he received it through a Freedom of
Information Act request and since he likely had personal
knowledge of its contents, which included basic biographical and
criminal record information about Knowles and his known associ-
ates.
As for Knowles’s claim that the district court could not sua
sponte deny his motion because he was entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard, he provides no binding authority support-
ing his position. In any event, Knowles was given an opportunity
to be heard -- he specifically addressed the issues of timeliness and
equitable tolling in his motion. Further, the district judge had the
“acumen” to adequately rule on the motion for new trial without
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12405
an evidentiary hearing because he had presided over Knowles’s
trial and sentencing and was clearly familiar with the record. Ham-
ilton, 559 F.2d at 1373–74.
In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Knowles’s motion sua sponte because his motion was
clearly outside the three-year window and Knowles failed to estab-
lish the elements for equitable tolling. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.