The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1827-24
JASON A. RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________
Argued January 29, 2026 – Decided March 2, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson, and
Puglisi.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PFRS No. xx5260.
Steven J. Kossup argued the cause for appellant.
Kimberly L. Forino argued the cause for respondent
(Gebhardt & Kiefer, PC, attorneys; Kimberly L. Forino,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Jason A. Rodriguez was permanently injured while trying to
restrain a combative inmate. He appeals from the February 12, 2025 Board of
Trustees (Board) of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System's denial of his
application for accidental disability retirement benefits (ADRB). Based on our
review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we reverse.
I.
Petitioner was employed as a corrections officer with the Bergen County
Sheriff's Office since 2008. He was promoted to sergeant in 2020. On February
14, 2022, petitioner's coworker, Sergeant Khalid Abdellatif, announced over the
radio he was escorting an inmate 1 to the medical unit. Sergeant Abdellatif
escorted the inmate with two other officers. Petitioner met Sergeant Abdellatif
and the other officers in the medical unit so he could be available in case
assistance was needed and stood nearby to observe the situation.
Sergeant Abdellatif explained to the inmate, in front of petitioner, he was
in the medical center because he was going to be placed in prehearing detention,
but before the officers could do so, he had to undergo a mandatory medical
1
The inmate was wearing a red wristband, which indicates to officers the inmate
is considered "high security." However, petitioner testified he did not see the
band on the inmate that day, as the inmate was handcuffed behind his back and
petitioner was standing in front him.
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evaluation. The inmate began yelling and cursing at the officers, stating he did
not want to be evaluated and "just wanted to go" to prehearing detention.
Sergeant Abdellatif again informed the inmate he had to be evaluated before he
could be placed in detention and directed the inmate to sit in a plastic chair so
the nurses could begin the evaluation. The inmate grew more agitated,
continued to curse at the officers, and refused to comply with their orders.
Sergeant Abdellatif attempted to calm the inmate, but to no avail.
Sergeant Abdellatif next tried to physically direct the inmate to sit in the chair,
however, the inmate kicked the chair away and "[h]is aggressive behavior
escalated." The officers then placed the chair near the inmate and again tried to
sit the inmate in it. At this time, one of the officers called a "level three" over
the radio, indicating an inmate and officers were involved in a physical
altercation.
The officers managed to get the inmate into the chair, but he continued to
resist their control by flailing and attempting to lunge his body out of the chair.
At this juncture, petitioner intervened by approaching the inmate, crouching
down in front of him, and grabbing the inmate's right leg. The inmate's left leg
remained unsecured. Meanwhile, the other officers continued to attempt to
restrain the inmate's upper body. However, the inmate, who was still handcuffed
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3
behind his back, began to get out of the chair. As petitioner lifted the inmate's
right leg to force him to sit back in the chair, the inmate kicked petitioner's right
arm with his left leg. Petitioner then stepped away and yelled out in pain. The
inmate was ultimately restrained on the ground by several officers. Due to the
severity of the incident, the officers placed the inmate in a restraint chair with
leg shackles and a spit mask. Petitioner testified this was the first time he was
attacked by an inmate.
Petitioner sought treatment for the injury to his right arm that day in the
emergency room. Approximately six months later, he had shoulder surgery.
The inmate was later criminally charged with aggravated assault of petitioner
and ultimately pled guilty to fourth-degree aggravated assault.
Petitioner filed an application for ADRB in April 2023. In September
2023, the Board granted him ordinary disability retirement benefits, finding he
was "totally and permanently disabled from the performance of his regular and
assigned duties." The Board acknowledged the traumatic event was
"identifiable as to time and place," and petitioner's injury was a result of the
incident. It further found the injury "occurred as a result of the performance of
his duties" and not the result of his willful negligence. However, it denied
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4
petitioner's application for ADRB because it determined the injury he had
suffered was not "undesigned or unexpected."
Petitioner appealed the Board's decision, and the matter was transferred
to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). The hearing took place in July 2024. In December 2024, the ALJ
issued her initial decision, in which she affirmed the Board's denial of ADRB.
The ALJ found the inmate's "aggressive behavior escalated" during the
attempts to restrain him, and he flailed about in the chair and "physically
resisted" when the officers tried to subdue him, ultimately kicking petitioner as
he tried to secure the inmate's right leg. She further noted:
The only issue in dispute here is whether the
"undesigned and unexpected" prong of the
traumatic[]event requirements of the Richardson [2] test
has been satisfied with regard to the . . . incident. The
Board has conceded . . . petitioner meets the other
Richardson factors.
....
While [petitioner] maintains that the inmate's
behavior and kick were sudden and unexpected, I am
unpersuaded given my review and consideration of the
surveillance video, testimony[,] and other evidence
presented. Before stepping in to assist in restraining
the inmate, [petitioner] observed the inmate's
2
Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189 (2007).
A-1827-24
5
aggressive behavior escalate and [was aware] that a
"level three" had been called. He saw the inmate use
his feet combatively, and he observed the inmate
aggressively resist the officers by flailing and
attempting to lunge out of the chair. After witnessing
the inmate's combative behavior escalate, and after the
inmate had exhibited the use of physical force, . . .
[petitioner] stepped in and grabbed the inmate's right
leg while the other officers attempted to restrain the
inmate's upper body and hold him in the chair.
[Petitioner] was aware that the inmate's left leg was . . .
unsecured while he held on to and lifted the right leg.
The record is unclear why the left leg was . . .
unsecured, but given the inmate's behavior, one would
reasonably expect that he would continue to kick out,
even, or more so, when his leg was grabbed. . . .
. . . The fact that leg shackles and a restraint chair
were ordered by [petitioner] after he was kicked does
not establish that the event itself was rare,
extraordinary, undesigned[,] or unexpected. Moreover,
the fact that [petitioner] filed criminal charges against
the inmate . . . and that the inmate [later] ple[d] guilty
to [the] aggravated assault charge does not bolster
[petitioner's] position that the event was undesigned
and unexpected.
The ALJ distinguished Richardson, noting the inmate there exerted
exceptional force in an "unexpected" manner, whereas in the present case, the
inmate whom petitioner was attempting to restrain did not exert exceptional
force, and the inmate's behavior was not "unexpected." She concluded, "the
injuries suffered by [petitioner] while restraining the inmate were the
consequence of his ordinary work effort."
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Petitioner filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. On February 12, 2025,
the Board adopted the ALJ's decision affirming the Board's denial of petitioner's
application for ADRB.
II.
Petitioner argues on appeal he was disabled as the direct result of a
traumatic event that was undesigned and unexpected, and the Board erred in
adopting the ALJ's decision denying his ADRB. He asserts the Board
incorrectly determined, since the assault and injury occurred during petitioner's
regular or assigned duties, the work effort was "ordinary" and was not
"undesigned or unexpected." Petitioner further maintains the Board erred in its
determination his injury stemmed from "normal work effort."
We are cognizant appellate review of an administrative agency's final
determination is limited. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). Our courts generally "recognize that agencies have
'expertise and superior knowledge . . . in their specialized fields.'" Hemsey v.
Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009) (omission in
original) (quoting In re License Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (2006)).
"[A]n appellate court ordinarily should not disturb an administrative
agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that[:] (1)
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the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In
re Virtua-W. Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422
(2008). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious[,] or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the
administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.
2006).
Even so, "in reviewing agency actions, an appellate court is 'in no way
bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly
legal issue.'" Hemsey, 198 N.J. at 224 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483
(2007)). "While we must defer to the agency's expertise, we need not surrender
to it." N.J. Chapter of Nat'l Ass'n of Indus. & Off. Parks v. N.J. Dep't of Env't
Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div. 1990). We do not automatically
accept an agency's interpretation of a statute or a regulation, and we review
strictly legal questions de novo. Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret.
Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 165, 170-71 (App. Div. 2018).
Petitioner argues the ALJ's factual findings, as adopted by the Board,
support the award of ADRB. Specifically, he points out the ALJ found he was
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8
performing his duties at the time he was injured. Petitioner asserts the Board
erred in failing to follow Richardson and in denying his application for ADRB.
Petitioner further asserts the Board erred in determining the incident that
caused his injury was from "ordinary work effort." He contends it incorrectly
interpreted Richardson regarding its discussion of Russo v. Teachers' Pension &
Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142 (1973). See Richardson, 192 N.J. at 201. He
maintains in Russo, our Supreme Court denied the award of ADRB because the
decedent suffered a fatal heart attack due to his pre-existing heart condition,
which the Court determined "was [solely] the result of 'doing his usual work in
the usual way'" and "not by an external traumatic event." See ibid.
Petitioner relies on Gable v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees'
Retirement System for the proposition that, although attacks on corrections
officers can occur during their course of work, it is not something they expect
in their normal routine. See 115 N.J. 212, 224 (1989). Furthermore, he contends
the Board erred by finding the incident here was not extraordinary enough to
warrant ADRB.
Petitioner alleges the ALJ incorrectly found the inmate did not exert
"exceptional force" to trigger the "undesigned and unexpected" threshold. He
maintains there is no "specific level of force required" under Richardson, and
A-1827-24
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only external force is needed. Since the inmate's act of kicking petitioner
directly resulted in his disability, the incident constitutes adequate grounds for
awarding ADRB.
Petitioner contends the ALJ's suggestion "[petitioner] should have
grabbed both [of the inmate's] legs . . . was unwarranted [and] contrary to [his]
training . . . and . . . to the physical evidence which showed another officer was
in between the [inmate's] legs . . . when [petitioner] grabbed one [of the inmate's]
leg[s]." He asserts "[t]he ALJ should not have made these . . . speculations,"
especially because the Board "had already admitted . . . [petitioner] was not
willfully negligent in any way."
Petitioner further points out the ALJ determined: (1) the inmate kicking
petitioner was not visible on the surveillance video; and (2) the record was
"inconclusive" as to whether the inmate intended to kick him. He notes the ALJ
found he was in fact kicked, making it irrelevant whether the kick was visible
on the video. He also asserts there is no requirement he has to prove the intent
of the inmate in order to demonstrate entitlement to ADRB under N.J.S.A.
43:16A-7. Nevertheless, petitioner notes the inmate admitted his intent to kick
him in the subsequent criminal proceeding. He also relies on the Attorney
General Guidelines for the proposition the use of force is never considered
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"routine," contrary to the ALJ's finding this incident resulted from ordinary work
effort. Petitioner concludes the incident was sudden and unexpected
notwithstanding his training.
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43(a) provides, in part, accidental disability retirement
benefits may be obtained "if [an] employee is permanently and totally disabled
as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the
performance of his regular or assigned duties." Our Supreme Court in
Richardson clarified the phrase "result of a traumatic event" applicable to
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43(a) by establishing a five-part test a claimant seeking ADRB
must satisfy. 192 N.J. at 212-13. The list includes:
1. that [the member] is permanently and totally
disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undesigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to
the member (not the result of pre-existing
disease that is aggravated or accelerated by
the work);
3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a
result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the
A-1827-24
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member's willful negligence; and
5. that the member is mentally or physically
incapacitated from performing his usual or any
other duty.
[Ibid.]
"Thus, a member who is injured as a direct result of an identifiable,
unanticipated mishap has satisfied the traumatic event standard." Id. at 213.
In Richardson, the petitioner, a corrections officer, was injured while
attempting to subdue an inmate. Id. at 214. The petitioner responded to an
emergency call for assistance from officers dealing with an unruly inmate. Id.
at 193. They attempted to restrain the inmate so they could handcuff him behind
his back, and in doing so, they wrestled the inmate to the ground on his stomach.
Ibid. The petitioner straddled the inmate to hold him down, but the inmate
continued to struggle by kicking, punching, and throwing his body around. Ibid.
As the petitioner reached for a pair of handcuffs, the inmate pulled his arm loose
and forcefully jerked up from the ground, knocking the petitioner backwards.
Ibid. The force of the fall caused the petitioner to fall back onto his left hand
and hyperextend his wrist. Ibid. It was later found the petitioner had suffered a
complete tear of a ligament, and surgery to repair the injury was unsuccessful.
Ibid.
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The petitioner filed for ADRB, and the Board denied the application
because it found "[the petitioner] did not suffer a traumatic event as required by
the statute." Id. at 194. Similarly, "the ALJ determined that the . . . incident did
not constitute a traumatic event, because [the petitioner]'s response was part of
the ordinary duties of a corrections officer." Ibid. The Board adopted that
decision, and this court affirmed, noting the petitioner's "injury also did not
satisfy the great-rush-of-force prong of the traumatic event standard." Ibid.
Our Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Board's argument "that because
subduing an inmate is part of the anticipated work of a corrections officer and
was not unexpected or unintended, [the petitioner] cannot satisfy the traumatic
event standard." Id. at 213. It concluded the Board "misread[]" the statute. Ibid.
Instead, the Court stressed the statute's requirement the traumatic event "occur
'during and as a result of the performance of [the member's] regular or assigned
duties.'" Ibid. (alteration in original). The Richardson Court recognized "an
injury generated by a great rush of force is one example that will satisfy the
traumatic event standard, but not the only example." Id. at 192.
The Court also presented several other examples of "undesigned or
unexpected" events occurring during a member's regular or assigned duties,
stating: "A policeman can be shot while pursuing a suspect; a librarian can be
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hit by a falling bookshelf while re-shelving books; [and] a social worker can
catch [their] hand in [a] car door while transporting a child to court." Id. at 214.
"Each of those examples is . . . undesigned and unexpected," and "[t]hus, each
meets the traumatic event standard." 3 Ibid. The Court emphasized the "polestar"
of the inquiry was "whether, during the regular performance of [the petitioner's]
job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in
combination with the work, has occurred and directly resulted in the permanent
and total disability of the member." Ibid.4
The Court noted when it previously "used the phrase 'some kind of
3
The Court also discussed other situations to provide guidance. For example,
"a police officer who has a heart attack while chasing a suspect has not
experienced a traumatic event," because there, "work effort, alone or in
combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury." Id. at 213.
Conversely, "the same police officer, permanently and totally disabled during
the chase because of a fall, has suffered a traumatic event." Ibid. Additionally,
"the gym teacher who develops arthritis from the repetitive effects of his work
over the years has not suffered a traumatic event," as "[h]is disability is the result
of degenerative disease and is not related to an event that is identifiable as to
time and place." Ibid. "On the contrary, the same gym teacher who trips over a
riser and is injured has satisfied the standard." Ibid.
4
The Court further commented, "[i]mportantly, in Cattani[ v. Board of Trustees,
Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 69 N.J. 578 (1976)], we never
suggested that a traumatic event could not occur during ordinary work effort,
only that work effort that aggravates or accelerates pre-existing disease could
not be the traumatic event." Id. at 202.
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external force,' the focus was on 'external' as it had been [used in prior cases].
'Force' was meant simply as an external . . . cause outside the member himself.
It was not an affirmative requirement of extreme violence . . . ." Id. at 212.
Indeed, "the member did not have to be struck by lightning or hit by a truck.
The point was that injury resulting from a member's pre-existing disease, even
if combined with the exertions of work effort, was not an external force and thus
not a traumatic event." Ibid.
Moreover, the Richardson Court cited favorably to its prior decision in
Gable, noting it "recognized the 'actions of an unruly inmate' as the necessary
qualifying external force distinct from an employee's 'own conduct.'" Id. at 208;
see also Gable, 115 N.J. at 222. The Court's observations in Gable are
instructive here, particularly where it noted:
We recognize that a corrections officer's job is
dangerous. There is always the possibility that [they]
will be attacked violently by an inmate. . . . These
occurrences, however, while occupational hazards, do
not occur frequently enough to constitute normal stress
or strain. Although a corrections officer, such as
Gable[,] . . . may realize that there is a "potential that
[they] will be called upon to subdue an inmate, an
officer does not expect [their] daily routine will
normally involve being struck by an aggressive or
escaping inmate."
[115 N.J. at 223-24.]
A-1827-24
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The Court further added, "[m]erely by performing their jobs, corrections officers
do not 'voluntarily' assume the risk of being assaulted by an unruly inmate"
because they "are not hired to be punching bags." Id. at 224.
Applying the above principles, we conclude the Board, in adopting the
ALJ's initial decision, erred in denying petitioner's ADRB. Contrary to the
ALJ's determination, the facts in Richardson are substantially similar to the facts
in this appeal. Petitioner responded to assist other officers in attempting to
subdue a combative inmate, who was kicking and behaving erratically.
Moreover, both petitioner here and the petitioner in Richardson sustained an
injury generated from their encounter with an inmate and the external force used
by the inmate. See 192 N.J. at 192. The effort exerted by the corrections officers
in both matters was not part of the normal stress or strain of the job.
Furthermore, there is no suggestion petitioner's injury stemmed, in any part,
from a pre-existing disease. A police officer getting shot in the line of duty is
something we recognize can occur during the course of an officer's work.
However, that does not mean the shooting is "expected," thereby removing the
traumatic incident from the Richardson framework. So too, while the assault
here may have been a recognized occupational hazard for a corrections officer,
it was nevertheless undesigned or unexpected for the purposes of Richardson.
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We further note that although being assaulted may be a work-related risk
for corrections officers, we are unpersuaded by the Board's finding petitioner's
injury was "the consequence of his ordinary work effort." As noted in Gable,
the mere possibility a corrections officer may be subjected to an assault in the
course of their employment does not necessarily imply an officer expects to be
attacked by a combative inmate during the normal course of their employment.
See 115 N.J. at 223-24. Likewise, the Attorney General Guidelines suggest the
use of force is never to be considered routine and "shall only be used as a last
resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably
be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical
deployment[,] or de-escalation techniques." See Off. of the Att'y Gen., Law
Enf't Directive No. 2021-14, Directive Updating Statewide Use of Force Policy,
at 2 (Dec. 28, 2021). Moreover, the only type of force required for an event to
qualify as a traumatic event is "an unexpected external happening that directly
causes injury." Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212.
The Board contends "despite . . . never being asked to assist, [petitioner]
chose to crouch down in front of the inmate while [the inmate] kicked his legs
out combatively and [he] grabbed the inmate's flailing right leg only, leaving the
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flailing left leg completely unsecured." 5 To the extent the Board is suggesting
petitioner had no obligation to intervene, we reject that contention. The Gable
Court noted:
Nor do we want to discourage police officers from
chasing criminal suspects. If law[]enforcement officers
act cautiously, they will not get injured—but they will
also not be doing their jobs properly, and the public will
not be as well protected.
[115 N.J. at 224.]
Given the facts here are not materially different than those in Richardson,
we are constrained to reverse the Board's final agency decision and direct the
award of ADRB to petitioner.
Reversed.
5
The ALJ noted it is unclear why the inmate's left leg was unsecured during the
struggle, and "one would reasonably expect [the inmate] would continue to kick
out, even . . . more so, when his [right] leg was grabbed." Contrary to the ALJ's
suggestions, there was no indication petitioner was somehow negligent in
grabbing the inmate's right leg, as opposed to both legs, when he became
involved in the fracas in an attempt to subdue the inmate. In fact, the Board
acknowledged petitioner's injury was not the result of any willful negligence
under the fourth element of Richardson.
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