TIRADO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTONIO M. TIRADO, )

Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. 25-263 Erie

v. )

)

OFFICER FRANCIS FUSCO, et al., ) District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

L INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Antonio M. Tirado, an adult resident of Erie County, Pennsylvania, commenced

this proceeding on August 21, 2025, by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No.

1] and attaching to it a “complaint” directed against the following named Defendants: Officer

Francis Fusco (“Fusco”) and Trooper James Bablak of the Pennsylvania State Police; Sgt.

Landfried and “John Doe in Car #23” of the Erie Police Department; Magisterial District Judges

Thomas Carney and Paul Bizzaro; Erie County Assistant District Attorney Jeremy Lightner; Erie

County Public Defender Rachel Glasoe; the City of Erie; and the Pennsylvania State Police

(“PSP”).

This action arises from a traffic incident that occurred on August 17, 2020. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Fusco, “driving a PSP patrol vehicle with Sgt. Landfried in the passenger

seat and his passenger door open, intentionally struck Plaintiff’s motorcycle” causing Plaintiff to

be “thrown into the open passenger door.” (ECF No. 1-1, at {§ 2-3). Plaintiff alleges further that,

“[flollowing the strike, [he] was assaulted while restrained, transported to a police station instead

of a hospital, denied timely medical care, and later subjected to fabricated charges.” (Id. at {{ 5).

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that “[c]ritical surveillance and video evidence was suppressed, the

l .

criminal docket number was altered, and Plaintiff's counsel failed to preserve or present

exculpatory material in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” (Id. at { 6).

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff asserts ten causes of action against

unidentified Defendants:

Count I — Excessive Force

Count II — False Arrest/Unlawful Seizure

Count III — Malicious Prosecution □

Count IV — Denial of Medical Care

Count V — Failure to Intervene

Count VI — Monell Liability

Count VII — Civil Conspiracy

Count VII — Brady Violations

Count IX — Judicial Misconduct

Count X — Ineffective Assistance

As relief for his claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as

declaratory and injunctive relief.

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed the district courts

to utilize a two-step analysis to determine whether to direct service of a complaint where the

plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. See Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n. 1 Gd

Cir.1990). “First, the district court evaluates a litigant's financial status and determines whether

(s)he is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a). Second, the court assesses the

complaint under [§ 1915(e)(2)'] to determine whether it is frivolous.” Id. (citing Sinwell v.

Shapp, 536 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.1976)); Schneller v. Abel Home Care, Inc., 389 F. App'x 90, 92 (3d

! This provision was formerly codified as 28 U.S.C. §1915(d).

2 .

Cir. 2010). The Court finds that Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee.

Thus, he will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as amended, “[t]he court shall dismiss the case at any

time if the court determines that ... (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” A claim is frivolous if it: 1) is based upon an indisputably

meritless legal theory and/or, 2) contains factual contentions that are clearly baseless. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under §1915(e) is

governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which

requires the court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). However, before dismissing a complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915, a court must grant the plaintiff

leave to amend his complaint, unless the amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson

v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

B. Statute of Limitations

It is evident from the face of the complaint that a number of Plaintiff?s claims are barred

by the applicable statute of limitations. It is well established that the federal courts must look to

the relevant state statute of limitations for personal injury claims to determine the applicable

limitations period. Sameric Corp. Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 1998)

(internal citations omitted). In this regard, federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania have adopted

Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, in

determining that an action must be filed no later than two years from the date the cause of action

accrued. Id. at 599-600.

Under federal law, “‘the statute of limitations begins to run on the first date that the

injured party possesses sufficient critical facts to put him on notice that a wrong has been

committed and that he need investigate to determine whether he is entitled to redress.’” Kichline

v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 800 F.2d 356, 359 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108

(1986), quoting Zeleznick v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1985). Thus, in general, a

claim accrues in a federal cause of action “as soon as a potential claimant either is aware, or

should be aware, of the existence of and source of injury, not when the potential claimant knows

or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong.” Keystone Insurance Co. v. Houghton,

863 F.2d 1125, 1127 Gd Cir. 1988).

Here, the incidents that form the basis of Plaintiff's claims under Counts I (excessive

force), II (false arrest/unlawful seizure), IV (denial of medical care), and V (failure to intervene),

all are alleged to have occurred on or soon after August 17, 2020, five years prior to the filing of

this action. Thus, those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and will be

dismissed.

As for Plaintiff's claims of Monell liability (Count VI) and civil conspiracy (Count VID,

it is unclear when Plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of such claims since the

complaint contains no allegations whatsoever to support them. That being said, the last incident

referenced in the complaint from a chronological standpoint is the refiling of Plaintiffs criminal

charges at a different criminal docket number in May 2021 (ECF No. 1, at p. 4, § 45; ECF No. 1-

15, at p. 1). Using this date as the latest date Plaintiff would or should have had knowledge of the

underlying basis for his claims at Counts VI and VII, such claims still fall well beyond the reach

of the applicable statute of limitations and will be dismissed accordingly.

Cc Malicious Prosecution

In Count III of the complaint, Plaintiff asserts a malicious prosecution claim stemming

from the nine-month delay in filing criminal charges against him. To establish a malicious

prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant initiated

criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated

the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose othe

than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty

consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr,

477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007), citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.

2003).

Here, Plaintiff is unable to establish a malicious prosecution claim, as a matter of law,

because he has not shown that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in his favor. In fact, at

the time of the filing of the instant lawsuit, it appears that the criminal proceedings were still

pending. As a result, Count III of the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous

D. Counts VIII, [X and X

The last three causes of action asserted by Plaintiff all fail because they are not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, Count VIII asserts a claim based on Brady

violations, which is a claim sounding in habeas corpus and, therefore, inappropriate under

Section 1983. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536 (2011) (“Brady claims have ranked

within the traditional core of habeas corpus and outside the province of § 1983”).

Plaintiff's remaining claims — judicial misconduct (Count IX) and ineffective assistance

(Count X) - are premised on alleged constitutional deficiencies in his criminal case. Though not

at all clear, Plaintiff appears to contend that, during those proceedings, he was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and subjected to judicial misconduct. “[T]o recover damages for

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintitf must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [.]” Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (footnote and citation omitted). Likewise, a plaintiff is not entitled to

declaratory relief if success on his claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a not-

yet-invalidated conviction or sentence. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997).

Here, the complaint indicates that Plaintiff's criminal proceedings were still ongoing at

the time this case was filed and, thus, there has been no conviction, let alone a conviction that

has not yet been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's

claims under Counts IX and X because they are not cognizable under § 1983.

tl. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff would not be able to cure any of the foregoing deficiencies by

amendment, the “complaint” must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). □

An appropriate Order follows.