Peters

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SCOTT PETERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-1759-NJR

J.B. PRITZKER, LATOYA HUGHES,

ANTHONY WILLS, FRANK

LAWRENCE, JOLENE KUHNERT,

JENNIFER BARKER, WEXFORD

HEALTH SOURCES, INC., KANANBIR

SANDHU, DAVID EILAND,

WYSHNYTZKY, MILLER, NORTEN,

JANE DOE #1, C. RUNGE, SERGEANT

AIKENS, LIEUTENANT PURDY,

ANGELA CRAIN, MAJOR BERNEIZ,

OFFICER WALKER, JOHN DOE #1,

BRUNLEE, BRIDGES, LIEUTENANT

CALEWINE, CARRIAGE, KWAME

RAOUL, and JEREMIAH BROWN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Scott Peters, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is

currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Menard Correctional

Center.

This matter is before the Court on several motions filed by Peters in response to

the Court’s Order denying his motions for temporary restraining order (Doc. 6). Peters

filed a Motion to Stay and Objection (Doc. 7), as well as an Objection (Doc. 9) to the Order.

Peters also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Alter/Amend (Doc. 10).

BACKGROUND

Peters filed his original Complaint alleging various constitutional violations that

he experienced while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center in October 2023

(Doc. 1). Along with his Complaint, Peters filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 4) and two motions for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary

injunction (Docs. 2 and 3). Peters argued that high-ranking officials at IDOC caused

systematic failures and/or policies that resulted in the failure to provide constitutionally

adequate medical and dental care to Peters. He sought an order for constitutionally

adequate care. The Court denied the motions because Peters failed to demonstrate a

likelihood of success on the merits and that he was facing irreparable harm (Doc. 6).

The Complaint in this case focused on dental care that Peters received in October

2023, as well as a disciplinary ticket he received and his placement in segregation after

the dental procedure (Doc. 6, p. 6). Those incidents took place while he was at Menard

Correctional Center. But Peters was no longer at Menard; he was, and still currently is,

housed at Lawrence Correctional Center. His motions failed to indicate the current state

of his dental condition or provide any details regarding his current care (Id.). Peters

alleged that numerous high-ranking officials were involved in creating the

unconstitutional policies that led to his inadequate dental care, seeming to suggest that

those policies were currently impacting his dental care at Lawrence. But again, Peters

failed to expound on the dental care he had received since arriving at Lawrence. As to

whether he was facing irreparable harm, Peters merely stated that he continued to suffer

cruel and unusual punishment. Because Peters failed to demonstrate that he was entitled

to injunctive relief, his motion was denied (Doc. 6).

In response to the Court’s Order, Peters first filed a motion to stay and objection

(Doc. 7). Peters indicated that his claims regarding his current access to dental care at

Lawrence were premature because he had not yet exhausted those claims pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). He requested to stay his request for an injunction until his claims

could be better developed (Id. at p. 1).

Peters later filed a motion to extend the time for filing a motion to alter or amend

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) asking that his motion be

accepted by the Court (Doc. 10). With that motion he filed an “objection” to the Court’s

order denying his request for injunctive relief (Doc. 9). Peters asked the Court to

document his objection and reconsider its decision as premature because the Court chose

not to hold a hearing or obtain briefing from Defendants (Id.). Peters argued that the high-

ranking officials identified in his Complaint had a policy or practice of “diffused

responsibility” and a “policy of inaction” that caused constitutional deprivations. Peters

further argued that there was a systemic failure of the healthcare system at IDOC which

impacted care at all prisons, including Menard and Lawrence (Id. at p. 3).

As an example, Peters pointed to a practice of what he labels “diffused

responsibility,” providing an example of a doctor prescribing an inmate a medication

with an end date and that doctor leaving or failing to renew the medication for several

days after the expiration of the medication (Id. at pp. 3-4). Peters argued that such delays

cause inmates injury and even death. Peters noted that he recently was subjected to this

practice when his PTSD medications were delayed (Id. at p. 4). Peters further argued that

his request for injunctive relief was proper, despite his transfer to another prison, because

he alleged unconstitutional policies and practices of high-ranking officials that led to

delays in his care (Id.). Peters pointed to injuries he suffered while in the military,

including degenerative spinal damage, issues with his vision, and mental health issues

that are ongoing (Id. at p. 5). Peters acknowledged that his Complaint focused on his

dental care but argued that his request for injunctive relief was for all care (Id.).

DISCUSSION

As to the motion to reconsider, “whether a motion filed within [28] days of the

entry of judgment should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the

substance of the motion, not on the timing or label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517

F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir.

2006)). Nevertheless, a motion to reconsider filed more than 28 days after entry of the

challenged order “automatically becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.” Hope v. United States,

43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.

1992)). Peters requests that the Court consider his motion outside of the 28 days because

of delays in receiving the Court’s Order and in accessing legal materials to draft a

response.

A motion to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) may only be

granted if a movant shows there was a mistake of law or fact or presents newly

discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Cincinnati Life Ins.

Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blue v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,

698 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir. 2012)). “‘[M]anifest error’ is not demonstrated by the

disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or

failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606

(7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) relief is “an extraordinary

remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” McCormick v. City of Chicago,

230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Board of Educ. of Ford Heights, Ill.,

32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)). Rule 60(b) allows a court “to address mistakes

attributable to special circumstances and not merely to erroneous applications of law.”

Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). It is also

not an appropriate vehicle for rehashing old arguments or for presenting arguments that

should have been raised before the court made its decision. Russell, 51 F.3d at 749;

Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).

Although Peters asked to consider his motion as an untimely motion to reconsider

pursuant to Rule 59(e) (Doc. 10), he labeled his actual motion as an “objection” to the

dismissal of his request for injunctive relief (Doc. 9). In any event, his motion fails under

either the Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) standard. Peters appears to merely take umbrage with

the Court’s decision to deny his request. His mere dissatisfaction with the Court’s Order

is not a basis for reconsideration. He also fails to offer any newly discovered evidence.

Instead, Peters argues that because he alleged high-ranking officials had policies

and practices that impact care at all prisons, he should be able to seek injunctive relief for

his current care at Lawrence Correctional Center. But, as the Court previously pointed

out in denying his motions for injunctive relief, the Complaint in this case focuses on

dental care Peters received at Menard in 2023. Although he alleges that certain policies

and practices led to the care he received, his Complaint does not focus on the current care

he is receiving at Lawrence. Nor did it appear to focus on all medical care he received at

Menard and Lawrence for PTSD and degenerative spinal issues. A request for a

preliminary injunction must be “tailored to the claims” in the Complaint. Tatum v. Hunter,

Case No. 23-2253, 2024 WL 3177132, at *1 (7th Cir. April 2, 2024). Here, the Complaint is

about dental and ADA claims, but Peters seeks injunctive relief for all medical care,

including his mental health and degenerative conditions. These are additional claims not

related to the claims in his lawsuit.

Further, his motions were previously denied because Peters failed to offer any

evidence regarding his current care at Lawrence. In his “objection,” he presented the

Court with a hypothetical about access to medications. Although Peters noted that he

“recently” experienced issues with his PTSD medications, he cited to another of his cases

in this district, Peters v. Rauner, et al., Case No. 20-cv-00689-DWD (filed July 14, 2020). In

that case, Peters alleged that his benzodiazepines were improperly discontinued in 2018.

Case No. 20-cv-00689-DWD (Doc. 197, p. 2). But Peters has offered no evidence about his

current access to medications, medical care, or dental care at Lawrence. In fact, a

subsequent motion for temporary restraining order filed by Peters was denied because

he failed to describe his current conditions and actions of officials as it relates to his need

for care for those conditions (Doc. 16). Thus, he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of

success on the merits and his motions for injunctive relief were properly denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Peters’s motions and objections to reconsider the

denial of his request for injunctive relief (Docs. 7, 10) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 23, 2026

neff ong

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge