NOEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RYAN SCOT NOEL, )

Plaintiff,

VS. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-23

) Judge D. Brooks Smith

STEPHEN JAMES MIKSICH, JR.; and )

TIMOTHY JAY CAMPOLONG, JR.., )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER OF COURT

On November 15, 2020, a fight between pro se Plaintiff, Ryan Noel, and

Defendants, Officers Stephen Miksich and Timothy Campolong, spilled out of a

holding cell and into a hallway of the Altoona Police Department. Fists flew, shouts

rang out, and ultimately, Noel caught an aggravated assault charge and Miksich and

Campolong got dragged into a federal civil suit. All three concede that the altercation

never should’ve occurred. Miksich speculated that he could’ve defused tensions if

he’d been “a little bit calmer.” (ECF No. 74-4 at 9). Campolong acknowledged that

he threw the first punch after bumping his head against a wall, which he mistook for

Noel striking him. (ECF No. 74-3 at 13). And Noel regretted his role, reflecting that

he “should have just let [the officers] say what they said and that would have been

it.’ (ECF No. 72-8 at 6). Whatever the benefits of hindsight, the three men find

themselves opponents once again—this time on either side of the “v.” Noel alleges

that Miksich and Campolong violated his civil rights. The officers have moved for

summary judgment on all claims. For the following reason, their motion will be

granted, in part, and denied, in part.

I. Factual Background

On November 15, 2020, police arrested Ryan Noel at a residence in Altoona,

Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 71 § 1). While being transported in a police cruiser, en route

to the Altoona Police Department, Noel swallowed five grams of meth that officers

had failed to detect during their initial search. Ud. J] 2—3). Hours later, alone in the

City lockup and under the influence, Noel began shouting and pounding on his cell

door. (Id. § 8). Officer Miksich ordered Noel to stop, but he refused. (/d.).

Miksich then entered the cell, with Officer Campolong following behind him.

(Id. § 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 31; ECF No. 75-2 at 01:53—57). In an effort to calm Noel,

Miksich placed his hands on Noel’s shoulders and sat him on the cell’s bench. (ECF

No. 71 ¥ 10). Noel returned to his feet, but Campolong quickly forced him back onto

the bench. (/d.). When Noel rose for a second time, Miksich and Campolong decided

to handcuff him. § 12). As they attempted to do so, however, Noel lunged at

Miksich. (/d.). In response, Miksich backpedaled and pushed Noel away, which

caused both Noel and Campolong to tumble over the bench, into the small space

between it and the toilet. Ud. J 13). As he fell, Campolong’s head hit the cell wall.

(ECF No. 74-3 at 12). He then struck Noel, mistaking the impact with the wall for

Noel’s “punch[ing him] in the face.” (ECF No. 74-5 at 5; ECF No. 75-2 at 02:18—

24). A skirmish ensued, during which Campolong threw additional punches, (ECF

No. 75-2 at 02:24-37), and Noel raised his arms, possibly to “defend himself,” (ECF

No. 40 at 4; ECF No. 74-1 4 14), and attempted to swing back, (ECF No. 74-5 at 33;

ECF No. 75-5 at 02:34—-42).

Eventually, at Miksich’s direction, other officers managed to extract Noel □

from the cell and carry him out into the hallway. (ECF No. 71 4 15; ECF No. 75-2

at 02:37-45). They wrestled him onto his stomach and “scream[ed] give your arms,

give me your hands, give me your hands.” (ECF No. 74-4 at 6). But “with 4 officers

on him” and his “arms .. . pinned underneath,” Noel could not comply. U/d.). To

overcome what he perceived as resistance, Campolong struck Noel in the back

“about 5” times. (ECF No. 74-3 at 8).

With the situation spiraling, Miksich “yelled for everyone to stop.” (ECF No.

74-4 at 6). To him, “it seemed like” the officers were “fighting each other.” (/d.). He

“told Campolong to move along because he was [in] a highly agitated state,” and

then worked with the remaining officers to cuff Noel and place him in a restraint

chair. (id.). About two hours later, officers removed Noel from the chair and

transported him to Blair County Prison. (ECF No. 74-1 4 17). At the prison, Nurse

Suzanne Feathers performed a routine medical screening and documented “multiple

red marks all over both [of Noel’s] arms, both hands and some on his head.” (ECF

No. 72-18 at 1, 3). As treatment, Noel received “ice” and “Ibuprofen.” (ECF No. 72-

7 at 39).

After the incident, Campolong “dr[e]w up a criminal complaint,” (ECF No.

74-5 at 34), charging 21 counts ranging from aggravated assault to resisting arrest,

(ECF No. 17-3 at 2-3). Noel ultimately pled guilty to “aggravated assault of Officer

Campolong,” (ECF No. 72-7 at 42), in violation of Pa. Cons. Stat. 18 § 2702(a)(3),

(ECF No. 17-3 at 5). The other charges were either withdrawn or dismissed. (/d. at

5-7).

II. Procedural History

On February 15, 2022, while incarcerated at Blair County Prison, Noel filed

a pro se Complaint against Campolong, Miksich, the Altoona Police Department,

and Altoona City Hall. (ECF No. 4). Three months later, Defendants moved for

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 16). Noel

conceded that he had nothing to support his claims against the Police Department or

City Hall, so the Court dismissed them as parties. (ECF No. 40 at 6). As to

Campolong and Miksich, the Court converted the motion to dismiss to one for

summary judgment and denied it. (/d. at 14). That disposition, however, was without

prejudice, allowing Campolong and Miksich the option to file a second motion for

summary judgment “based on a more complete record.” (/d. at 13). Defendants

exercised that option on March 7, 2025, (ECF No. 69), when they filed a new motion

seeking summary judgment on Noel’s five remaining claims.

II. Legal Standard

A Court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact is present

when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally

find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof.” Doe v.

Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007). In assessing a motion for

summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Matreale v.

N.J. Dept of Mil. & Veterans Affs., 487 F.3d 150, 152 Gd Cir. 2007). But where

video evidence exists, the facts “depicted by the videotape” will control, and

assertions that contradict the footage are to be ignored. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380-81 (2007).

IV. Analysis

Noel’s Complaint contains five claims. The first four—brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. Section 1983—allege violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights based on: (1) excessive use of force during the incident at the Altoona Police

Department; (2) failure to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force; (3)

inadequate medical care following the incident; and (4) the decision to place him in

a restraint chair for two hours. The fifth claim alleges assault and battery under

Pennsylvania state law. For the following reasons, the first and fifth claims must

proceed to trial. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the other three.

a. Excessive Use of Force

Whether an exercise of force qualifies as “excessive” turns, in part, on the

status of the person against whom that force is deployed. The Eighth Amendment

protects convicted criminals from “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIII. But “pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished

at all.” Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2021). Their claims

proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and to prevail, they

“must show only that the force purposefully or knowingly used against [them] was

objectively unreasonable.” /d. Any such use of force “amount[s] to punishment of

the detainee” and violates his constitutional rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979). The Supreme Court has identified six, non-exhaustive factors that bear on

the question of reasonableness:

[(1)] the relationship between the need for the use of force

and the amount of force used; [(2)] the extent of the

plaintiff’s injury; [(3)] any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; [(4)] the severity of

the security problem at issue; [(5)] the threat reasonably

perceived by the officer; and [(6)] whether the plaintiff

was actively resisting.

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).

In its prior order on summary judgment, the Court applied these factors to

Noel’s case and concluded that a reasonable jury could find for him on his excessive

force claim. (ECF No. 40 at 6-11). Its analysis involved a review of the video

evidence and consideration of the parties’ competing narratives. And though

Defendants have now proffered additional evidence, none of it diminishes the

durability of the initial ruling. A reasonable jury could still conclude that Defendants

used excessive force against Noel for the same reasons enumerated in the previous

order.

But Defendants insist that the question should never reach a jury because: (1)

Heck v. Humphrey bars Noel’s claim; (2) issue preclusion controls the outcome;

and/or (3) qualified immunity shields them from liability. None of these arguments

carry the day.

i. Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that:

[I]In order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render

a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

512 U.S. at 486-87. This so-called “favorable termination rule,” Feliz v. Kintock

Grp., 297 F. App’x 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2008), prevents a civil rights plaintiff from

prevailing on a claim when his success depends on a finding that contravenes a prior

conviction. In Heck, for example, a man convicted of voluntary manslaughter

attempted to bring a Section 1983 claim against the attorneys who prosecuted him,

alleging that they engaged in an unlawful investigation and destroyed exculpatory

evidence that would have proved his innocence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478-79. The

Supreme Court refused to permit him to pursue this claim because, if successful, it

would have “demonstrate[d] the invalidity of [an] outstanding criminal judgment

against” him. Jd. at 487. Defendants argue that the same logic bars Noel from

bringing an excessive force claim against them because his success on that claim

would undermine the validity of the aggravated assault charge he pled to.

But Heck does not categorically bar a plaintiff convicted of assaulting an

officer from bringing an excessive force claim against that officer. See Lora-Pena v.

FBI, 529 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2008); Garrison v. Porch, 376 F. App’x 274, 278

(3d Cir. 2010); Jacobs v. Bayha, 616 F. App’x 507, 513 d Cir. 2015). The question

is whether the “specific factual allegations in the complaint are necessarily

inconsistent with the validity of the conviction.” Jacobs, 616 F. App’x at 513. And

“convictions for resisting arrest and assaulting officers” are not necessarily

“inconsistent with a holding that the officers, during a lawful arrest, used excessive

(or unlawful) force in response to [a plaintiffs] own unlawful actions.” Lora-Pena,

529 F.3d at 506. In fact, courts “have generally held that the mere fact of a conviction

for assault or similar conviction arising out of the same incident does not

automatically preclude recovery on an excessive force claim brought under § 1983.”

Garrison, 376 F. App’x at 278. In Garrison, for instance, the Third Circuit reversed

a District Court’s entry of summary judgment based on Heck’s favorable termination

rule because, although the plaintiff had pled guilty to assaulting the arresting officer,

that did “not automatically mean that there [was] no use of force that [the officer]

could have used in response which could have risen to the level of unreasonable and

excessive.” Id: The same applies to Noel.

Defendants emphasize that aggravated assault under Pa. Cons. Stat. 18

§ 2702(a)(3) is defined as “attempt[ing] to cause or intentionally or knowingly

caus[ing] bodily injury to [a police officer] in the performance of a duty.” (emphasis

added). As they see it, an officer performing a duty cannot simultaneously engage in

the use of excessive force. Binding precedent compels a different conclusion. See

Lora-Pena, 529 F.3d at 506 (“It is conceivable that a law enforcement officer, acting

within the scope of his official duties, may use force that is excessive in effectuating

a lawful arrest.”). A reasonable jury could conclude both that Noel assaulted Officer

Campolong and that Defendants employed excessive force when restraining Noel.

Because neither premise contradicts the other, Heck is inapposite to the current case.

ii. Issue Preclusion

Sounding in a similar register, Defendants also argue that issue preclusion

prevents Noel from raising an excessive force claim. “Congress has specifically

required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments

whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). Pennsylvania

law “give[s] preclusive effect to state-court judgments” and “precludes relitigation

of an issue determined in a previous action” when:

(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one

presented in the later action; (2) there was a final

adjudication on the merits; (3) the party against whom the

plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the

prior case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against

whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding;

and (5) the determination in the prior proceeding was

essential to the judgment.

Off. of Disciplinary Couns. v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (Pa. 2005). As such,

a criminal defendant’s criminal conviction (like Noel’s conviction for aggravated

assault) “collaterally estops [the] defendant from denying his acts in a subsequent

civil trial.” Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996).

The upshot is that Noel may not argue that he did not assault Officer

Campolong. But for the same reasons just discussed with respect to Heck, the assault

conviction is not a bar to an excessive force claim. Two things can be true: (1) Noel

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assaulted Officer Campolong; (2) Defendants used excessive force against Noel.

Issue preclusion on the former does not resolve the latter.

iii. Qualified Immunity

Defendants’ attempt to invoke qualified immunity also fails. “The doctrine of

qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). To evaluate a defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity at summary

judgment, “a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has... shown...

make out a violation of a constitutional right” and “whether the right at issue was

‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Jd. at 232. A

constitutional right is “clearly established” when “every ‘reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 US. 635, 640 (1987)). In

making this determination, courts must “fram[e] the right in light of the specific

context of the case” and draw “all reasonable inferences . . . in the nonmovant’s

favor.” Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 228 (Gd Cir. 2023). They must then search for

“closely analogous caselaw,” though “a precise factual correspondence between the

case at issue and a previous case” is not a prerequisite to finding a right clearly

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established. Id. at 231-32 (citation modified). The question is whether precedent

places the “question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. We place “the

burden of persuasion at a summary judgment proceeding on the party asserting the

affirmative defense of qualified immunity.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d

Cir. 2014). Defendants must, therefore, “show that there [is] no genuine dispute of

material fact to refute their contention that they did not violate [the plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights . . . or show that reasonable officers could not have known that

their conduct constituted such a violation when they engaged in it.” Jd.

To prevent analogy to caselaw—and thereby muddy the precedential waters—

Defendants frame the right at issue here with preposterous precision, characterizing

the question as “whether it is unconstitutional for a police officer to punch a pre-trial

detainee multiple times when that detainee causes the officer to tumble into a

cramped corner of a holding cell and throws punches at that officer and pleads guilty

to aggravated assault of the officer.” (ECF No. 70 at 17). While qualified immunity

demands “specificity,” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015), the sort of pedantic

granularity that Defendants muster would transform the doctrine into an

impenetrable shield. No two cases will ever entail exactly the same facts. See Wilson

v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (“This is not to say that an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously

been held unlawful.”). Courts must frame rights in a manner that protects officials

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from liability for actions taken on the “sometimes hazy border between excessive

and acceptable force.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation

modified). This is achieved when officials are denied qualified immunity for conduct

that they reasonably ought to have understood as unlawful. See Halsey, 750 F.3d at

295.

Third Circuit caselaw clearly establishes that “striking a physically restrained

and nonthreatening” pre-trial detainee constitutes excessive force in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 197. Noel, of course, was not “physically

restrained and nonthreatening” during the entirety of the incident at the Altoona

Police Department; he pled guilty to aggravated assault, after all. But although

“reasonable officers dealing with an undisputedly assaultive inmate could disagree

as to whether force of the type used against [Noel] was excessive, such a legal

conclusion in this case rests on a factual presumption that is inappropriate on

summary judgment.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir. 2009). “A dispute

of material fact exists as to [when Noel] ceased resisting.” Id.

As the Court’s prior order on summary judgment states, the available video

footage “does not clearly show whether,” during the altercation in the cell, Noel “is

attempting to strike Defendant Campolong or raising his arms over his head to

defend himself, but it is clear that Defendant Campolong repeatedly punches down

on [Noel].” (ECF No. 40 at 4). The barrage of punches could certainly qualify as □

13

excessive under the circumstances. As for what occurred in the hallway, Miksich’s

own testimony posits that the officers were “fighting each other” and that Noel was

not resisting but rather unable to comply with their orders to give them his hands

because he had “4 officers on him” and his “arms . . . pinned underneath.” (ECF No.

74-4 at 6). Despite this, Campolong struck Noel about five times while in “a highly

agitated state.” (/d.). A jury could conclude that, at some point during this course of

events, Noel ceased resisting, but Defendants continued to use a degree of force that

qualified as excessive. In fact, this possibility is exactly what prompted the Third

Circuit to reverse an award of qualified immunity in Giles. The plaintiff in that case

pled guilty to assaulting a police officer, but the Third Circuit denied the officer

qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s excessive force claim because disputes of fact

left open the possibility that the officer employed excessive force after the plaintiff

had been subdued. See Giles, 571 F.3d at 327. The same rationale applies here.

b. Failure to Intervene

Provided “there is a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene,” “a

police officer has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a victim from another

officer’s use of excessive force.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir.

2002). An officer who shirks this duty acts with “deliberate indifference,” Bistrian

v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 371 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2024), the standard

14

applicable to both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, see Burton v. Kindle,

401 F. App’x 635, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2010). “[T]he duration of the incident is key to

determining whether there was a reasonable opportunity” to intervene. E/ v. City of

Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2020). An event that “lasts about fifteen

minutes” or “unfolds in multiple stages” often at least raises a genuine issue of fact

as to whether an officer had a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene. Jd.;

see Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 244 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Whether the officer had

a ‘realistic opportunity’ to intervene is normally a question for the jury.”).

Sometimes, though, a case involves an incident so brief that only a clairvoyant

officer could intercede to prevent it. See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 479 (3d Cir.

2018) (holding that an “incident’s brevity . . . defeats [the plaintiff’s] failure-to-

intervene claim”). Under those circumstances, the officer is entitled to summary

judgment. See El, 975 F.3d at 335-36. I conclude that those circumstances are

present here.

Noel alleges that Officer Miksich failed to intervene and protect him from

abuse. But while it is true that Miksich did not anticipate and avert the scuffle, the

record demonstrates that he reacted reasonably and deescalated to the extent he

could. About “45 seconds” elapsed “from the time [Campolong] entered the cell until

the time [Noel] was in handcuffs.” (ECF No. 74-3 at 13). During those 45 seconds,

Miksich rallied his fellow officers to help extricate Noel from the cell, (ECF No. 74-

15

4 at 6), restored order after officers began “fighting each other,” (id.), and directed

Campolong “to move along,” recognizing that he was “highly agitated” and that his

continued presence might provoke further trouble, (id.). No reasonable jury could

confuse these actions for deliberate indifference toward Noel’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

c. Inadequate Medical Care

Bumps, scrapes, and scratches are unpleasant, but they are not the sorts of

injuries for which people typically seek professional medical treatment, so the delay

or denial of such treatment is no affront to the Constitution. The incident at the

Altoona Police Department left Noel with “bruises,” (ECF No. 72-1 at 3), “a minor

scratch,” (ECF No. 72-5 at 2), “red marks” on his arms, hands, and face, (ECF No.

72-18 at 3), and perhaps “a split lip,” (ECF No. 74-1 4 17). After two hours in a

restraint chair, officers transported him to Blair County Prison where a nurse gave

him ice and Ibuprofen. (ECF No. 72-7 at 39). That does not constitute deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, so Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment “when they act deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs by intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation modified). While

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acknowledging that the Eighth Amendment represents the “floor,” Hubbard vy,

Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2005), and that pretrial detainees are “entitled to

greater constitutional protection,” id. at 167 n.23, the Third Circuit has usually

assessed pretrial detainees’ claims for inadequate care under “the same standard used

to evaluate claims brought under the Eighth Amendment,” Thomas v. City of

Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 n.23 Gd Cir. 2023). See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003). To prevail, then, a pretrial detainee

“must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by [] officials that

indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. Noel cannot

make either showing.

“A medical need is ‘serious,’ . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr.

Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). As a general rule,

split lips and bruises do not rise to this level. See Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879,

891 (7th Cir. 2006); Bilby v. Hoffman, No. 3:14-cv-2470, 2016 WL 859672, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2016) (collecting cases). And nothing in the record could lead a

reasonable jury to conclude that Noel is an exception to the general rule.

Nor does the record permit a finding of deliberate indifference. Noel’s

behavior after the incident (amiably chatting with the officer watching him), (ECF

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No. 72-9 at 3), would not have alerted that officer (or anyone else) to the possibility

of a serious medical need. “A prison official can be found deliberately indifferent

only if the official is ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and also draws the inference.’” Tapp v. Proto,

718 F. Supp. 2d 598, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994)). Noel does not contend that he ever asked for medical treatment prior to

receiving it. And Nurse Feathers’ “patient note” confirms that Noel suffered only

minor injuries, (ECF No. 72-18 at 3), for which he received ice and Ibuprofen, (ECF

No. 72-7 at 39). So not only did he not sustain serious injuries, he also failed to

behave in a manner that would have put a reasonable officer on notice of possible

serious injuries. (See ECF No. 75-4 at 01:00—-04:20). His claim for inadequate

medical care, thus, fails.

d. Restraint Chair

The Third Circuit analyzes placement in a restraint chair “under the Supreme

Court’s excessive force .. . jurisprudence.” Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 178 (3d

Cir. 2015). As applied to pretrial detainees, that jurisprudence requires an assessment

of “the reasonableness of the force used” to determine whether it amounts to

punishment. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. When it comes to mechanical restraints, the

Supreme Court has held that “(1) where the inmate had already been subdued,

handcuffed, and placed in leg irons, and (2) there was a clear lack of an emergency

18

situation such that any safety concerns had long since abated, then (3) subjecting the

inmate to substantial risk of physical harm and unnecessary pain serves no

penological justification.” Young, 801 F.3d at 180 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 738 (2002) (citation modified)). Though these factors arose in the context of a

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Third Circuit has applied them to pretrial

detainees. See Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.Ath 76, 89 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing to

Young and evaluating whether the pretrial detainee alleging a violation of her

Fourteenth Amendment rights posed a threat to herself or others at the time she was

placed in a restraint chair).

But, to reiterate, “pretrial detainees . . . cannot be punished at all.” Jacobs, 8

F.4th at 194. That complicates the analogy to the Hope factors because those factors

turn on the “penological justification” (or lack thereof) for “subjecting [an] inmate

to substantial risk of physical harm and unnecessary pain.” Young, 801 F.3d at 180.

But there is vo justification for punishing a pretrial detainee, regardless of whether

the punishment includes a “substantial risk of physical harm and unnecessary pain.”

See Younger v. Gross, No. 20-878, 2023 WL 2433363, at *13 n.15 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9,

2023) (noting that the Hope test cited in Young “arises out of the Eighth Amendment

‘cruel and unusual punishment’ context, which is a more difficult standard for a

convicted prisoner to meet than the Fourteenth Amendment standards protecting

pretrial detainees . . . against being ‘punished’”). That raises the question: must a

19

pretrial detainee prove the absence of “penological justification” when raising a

restraint claim under the Fourteenth Amendment? Or is it sufficient to show that he

had been subdued, safety concerns had abated, and he was nevertheless strapped to

a chair (i.e., punished)?

The distinction matters because Noel has not established that his placement in

the restraint chair caused or risked substantial physical harm or unnecessary pain.

So to the extent that Hope maps neatly onto a pretrial detainee’s restraint claim,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. On the other hand, a reasonable jury

could conclude that officers subdued Noel prior to placing him in the restraint chair

and that no exigent circumstances warranted such restraint (a prison break this was

not). The caselaw leaves open whether those facts, alone, can prove that officers

subjected Noel to punishment in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause. That uncertainty, ironically enough, brings clarity. The dearth of

applicable caselaw makes this one of those situations that exists at the “sometimes

hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” Couden, 446 F.3d at 492

(citation modified). As a result, even if placing Noel in a restraint chair violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, that right was not “clearly established”

at the time, so Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

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e. Assault and Battery

As it relates to Noel’s state-law assault and battery claims, Defendants

essentially reprise their Heck v. Humphrey and issue preclusion arguments. Both

arguments fail for the reasons previously discussed. A jury could find Defendants

liable of assault and battery without invalidating Noel’s aggravated assault

conviction. And issue preclusion only prevents Noel from denying that he assaulted

Officer Campolong. It does not determine, one way or another, whether Campolong

also assaulted Noel.

V. Motion to Strike

In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Noel filed what he

titled “Plaintiffs’ Motion In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment.” (ECF No. 74). Defendants countered with a motion to strike and clarify.

(ECF No. 76). The motion asks “that the Court enter an order construing [Noel’s]

filing . . . as a brief opposing Defendants’ summary judgment motion.” (/d. at 1).

The Court will oblige; a review of Noel’s submission reveals that it is unmistakably

an opposition brief, not a new motion.

Alongside his opposition brief, Noel also filed a “Declaration in Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion of Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 74-1). This document

represents Noel’s attempt at a concise statement of undisputed facts. Defendants’

motion to strike requests that the Court either strike this submission “because it does

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not comply with Local Rule 56(B)(1)” or “excuse them from filing a responsive

concise statement to” it. (ECF No. 76 at 2-3).

Under Local Rule 56(B)(1), a concise statement of material facts “must cite

to a particular pleading, deposition, answer to interrogatory, admission on file or

other part of the record supporting the party’s statement, acceptance, or denial of the

material fact.” LCvR 56(B)(1). Noel offered no such citations. But he did attach a

series of annotated exhibits from which his proposed facts purportedly derive. (See

ECE Nos. 74-3, 74-4, 74-5). Because he is pro se, the Court has considered those

proposed facts to the extent they “specifically contradict Defendant[s’] statement of

facts” and “are supported by the record.” Hughes v. Allegheny Cnty. Airport Auth.,

No. 15-221, 2017 WL 2880875, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017). This is consistent

with a District Judge’s duty “to conduct a full analysis to determine whether granting

summary judgment [is] appropriate.” Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604,

614 (3d Cir. 2018). And, as Defendants themselves stated, “the Court is aware of

Defendants’ record evidence supporting their summary judgment motion.” (ECF No.

76 at 3). Accordingly, I have what is necessary to discern the undisputed facts in this

case. Given that, the Court will not strike Noel’s proposed statement of facts but will

excuse Defendants from filing a responsive statement. Defendants are assured that

the Court will not treat the absence of a responsive statement as an admission to any

of Noel’s averments.

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ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, this 23" day of February, 2026, for the reasons set forth herein,

it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.

69) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Summary judgment is granted with

respect to Plaintiff’s claims alleging failure to intervene, inadequate medical care,

and placement in a restraint chair. Summary judgment is denied on Plaintiff’s

excessive force and state-law assault and battery claims.

It is further ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike and clarify (ECF

No. 76) is granted, in part, and denied, in part. The Court construes Plaintiff’s

“Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” (ECF No.

74) as a brief opposing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Further,

Defendants need not file a responsive concise statement of facts to Plaintiff's

statement of facts (ECF No. 74-1). The motion is DENIED in all other respects.

/s/ D. Brooks Smith

D. Brooks Smith

United States Circuit Judge

Sitting by Designation

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