The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RONNIE LYLES,
No. 23-cv-1034 (MEF)(JBC)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
MALACHIA BRANTLEY,
Defendant.
* * *
For the purposes of this brief Opinion, the Court largely
assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of
this case.
* * *
Some background:
A prisoner1 (“Prisoner”) was held at Northern State Prison, a
facility in Newark. See Complaint for Trial & Jury Demand
(“Complaint”) (ECF 1) at 1.
The Prisoner adheres to a Native American religion, see id. ¶ 6,
and contends that, in prison, his ability to freely practice his
faith has been improperly restricted.
For example, certain religious practices require dancing, but
dancing was not permitted to the Prisoner during the time
generally allocated by the facility for inmate prayer. See
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (ECF 29-2) ¶¶ 47-48. And
another example: religious observances that make use of
1 Ronnie Lyles.
kinnikinnick2 and smudging3 need to be undertaken outdoors, see
id. ¶¶ 16-17 --- but the outdoor sessions were sometimes
canceled or shortened. See id. ¶ 67; Plaintiff’s Deposition
(ECF 29-6) at 81:4–24, 84:22-86:24.
* * *
In light of the above, the Prisoner, acting without a lawyer,
sued the supervisor of religious services4 at Northern State
Prison (“Supervisor”).
The Prisoner pressed claims under (i) the First Amendment to the
Constitution, see Complaint ¶¶ 8-15, and (ii) the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. See id. ¶¶ 16-23.
The Prisoner sought, among other things, damages and an
injunction. See id. at 6.
The Supervisor has now moved for summary judgment. See Brief in
Support of the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 29-
1) at 24–26. Among other things, he contends that he is
entitled to qualified immunity on the Prisoner’s First Amendment
claims. See id. at 4-23, 26–29.
* * *
“Qualified immunity shields . . . state officials . . . unless a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a .
. . right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 735 (2011) (cleaned up).
2 Kinnikinnick is a “mixture of items such as, but not limited
to, bark, dried leaves, sage, cedar, sweet grass, corn pollen
and/or sometimes tobacco,” which may be used with a prayer pipe.
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 13, 16–17.
3 Smudging is “as an act of worship in Native American religion
which includes small amounts of cedar, kinnikinnick, sage,
sweet-grass and/or high-grade tobacco that are placed in an
abalone shell and lit. The worshipper lets the mixture smolder,
then draws the smoke toward the heart and over the head to
receive its blessing.” Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶
15.
4 The Reverend Malachia Brantley.
[O]nce the defendant[] ha[s] started things
off by raising qualified immunity, who has to
come forward and show what the “clearly
established” law actually is?
The plaintiff.
If [t]he [plaintiff] does not come forward
with sufficiently on-point indications5 that
the relevant law is “clearly established,”
then the defendant gets qualified immunity.
Courney v. City of Englewood, 793 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621-22 (D.N.J.
2025) (citing numerous cases).
But this sort of legal research can be difficult for an
incarcerated pro se plaintiff to realistically do. Moreover, First
Amendment free exercise law, already fairly complex, has undergone
some meaningful changes in recent years. And how free exercise
law operates in prison --- that folds in another set of questions
to ask and answer.6
Against this backdrop, the Court will not now resolve the
Supervisor’s summary judgment motion. Rather, the Court will
administratively terminate the motion for now, with an eye to
possibly appointing pro bono counsel.
A lawyer would be able to more efficiently do any necessary
“clearly-established” legal research, and advise the Prisoner more
generally --- as to whether his backwards-looking damages claim is
viable, and as to practical-minded ways to ensure on a going-
forward basis that the Prisoner, now relocated to a different
facility, is able to practice his faith.7
5 What is needed is “not . . . a case directly on point, but
existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional
question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12
(2015) (cleaned up).
6 “[N]o one needs to come forward with any authority when the
alleged violation of law is entirely obvious.” Courney, 793 F.
Supp. 3d at 622 n.15. But that is not this case.
7 As noted, the Prisoner has been moved to a new facility. See
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 9-10 (showing
transfer); Certification of the Defendant (ECF 29-14) ¶ 1. And
that may well mean that the Prisoner’s forward-looking claims
against the Supervisor are now moot. See, e.g., Banks v. Sec’y
* *x *
An appropriate order follows.
ON this 2nd day of February, 2026.
Michael E. Farbiarz, U.S.D.Jd.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 601 F. App’x 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2015); Sutton
v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003).