Mejia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MICHAEL MEJIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25-cv-01453-MMM

)

STERLING ADAMS, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se on an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The Motion for Leave to Amend [11] is

GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations

as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645,

649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.

Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”

Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s amended complaint appears to incorporate by reference the original

Defendants, though his omission of grievance-related claims may work an

abandonment of certain Defendants. The current named Defendants are: Internal

Affairs Officer Sterling Adams, John Does 1 and 2, Reviewing Officer A. Thompson,

Lieutenant C. Myers, Grievance Officer Kellie Dennis, Warden Cherryle Hinthorne,

Administrative Review Board member Ryan Kilduf, Lieutenant Shawn Thrush,

Correctional Officer Mason Guerra, and Illinois Department of Corrections Director

Latoya Hughes.

Investigative Report Issues

On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in segregation at Illinois River Correctional

Center. On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff was served with an Investigative Disciplinary Report.

The Investigative Report was authored by Defendant Myers, reviewed by Defendant

Thompson, investigated by Doe 2 and reviewed by Doe 1. The Investigative Report

“listed Plaintiff in observation as Kevon Cooper ID# Y53375. Ironically, it then goes on

to state that ‘Mejia identified by state issued ID and O360 [Offender 360 housing

placement software].’” Plaintiff alleges these Defendants thereby violated Plaintiff’s due

process rights.

Disciplinary Report Issues

On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff was taken to the small room at the end of the seg.

wing, still at Illinois River Correctional Center. Defendant Adams attempted to question

Plaintiff. Plaintiff writes, “Adams attempted to get Plaintiff to agree to work for him as

his snitch/informant.” Based on the documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint,

Adams was questioning Plaintiff regarding allegations that another inmate entered

Plaintiff’s cell and engaged in a fight with Plaintiff. Plaintiff refused to “work for

Adams as a snitch/informant.” Adams threatened to issue Plaintiff a disciplinary report

and to ensure he would be found guilty thereon.

On May 11, 2023, Adams issued what Plaintiff asserts was a false and retaliatory

Disciplinary Report. That Disciplinary Report charged Plaintiff with: 110 Impeding an

Investigation, 214 Fighting, 308 Giving False Information to an Employee, and 601

Aiding and Abetting Unauthorized Movement. Plaintiff asserts Adams violated

Plaintiff’s “First Amendment Rights Not To Be A Snitch.”

Plaintiff went before an Adjustment Committee comprised of Defendants Thrush

and Guerra on May 19, 2023. Plaintiff was found guilty on the charges. The 601 charge

was later expunged. Plaintiff alleges Thrush and Guerra violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights through the way they handled the hearing, and the evidence they

considered and did not consider. He alleges Adams conspired with them to influence

their decision. The Committee heard Plaintiff’s proceeding after eleven days even

though the policy called for no more than seven days on the underlying charge.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s amended allegations do not state a claim for relief.

First, Plaintiff does not state a First Amendment claim. To state such a claim

Plaintiff must allege that he was penalized for engaging in protected speech. See Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir.

2009). Refusing to assist in the investigation of a prison security violation is not

protected speech. Caffey v. Maue, 679 F. App’x 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2017).

Prison administrators often use the “stick” of withholding amenities and

privileges to facilitate cooperation with their goals. See United States v.

Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing federal Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program). More importantly, prisoners may be compelled

to disclose information during internal investigations provided they are

not punished for refusing to make self-incriminating statements without

immunity. Riggins v. Walter, 279 F.3d 422, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). Caffey never

hinted that answering the investigators’ questions might incriminate him,

so he was not privileged to refuse.

Id.

Here, when Plaintiff failed to cooperate and assist the investigation, he was,

permissibly, charged with impeding the investigation along with other related charges.

Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible First Amendment claim.

Plaintiff’s allegations also do not state a Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim against any Defendant, because he has not alleged that he was deprived by the

state of any protected interest.

“When an inmate is placed in conditions more restrictive than those in the

general prison population, whether through protective segregation like suicide watch or

discretionary administrative segregation, his liberty is affected only if the more

restrictive conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or if he

remains subject to those conditions for a significantly long time.” Earl v. Racine Cty. Jail,

718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2013); Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013)

(holding that the plaintiff’s six months and one day in disciplinary segregation did not

implicate liberty interest because he was allowed yard time and weekly showers and

was not deprived of all human contact or sensory stimuli); see also Singh v. Gegare, 651 F.

App’x 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the plaintiff’s 105 days in disciplinary

segregation did not implicate liberty interest because “he was permitted several hours

of yard time and several showers each week, as well as authorized to leave his cell for

visits and appointments”).

When assessing a claim related to disciplinary segregation, “the key comparison

is between disciplinary segregation and non-disciplinary segregation rather than

between disciplinary segregation and the general prison population,” Wagner v. Hanks,

128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997), “because, in every state’s prison system, any member

of the general prison population is subject, without remedy, to assignment to

administrative segregation or protective custody at the sole discretion of prison

officials.” Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that plaintiff’s “discipline in segregated confinement did

not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest” because “disciplinary segregation, with

insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation and protective custody” and thus, the plaintiff’s

“confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either

duration or degree of restriction”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he was held in segregation four days beyond the

maximum sentence for the discipline he was charged with. This period is insufficient to

indicate a loss of any protected liberty interest. And Plaintiff has not alleged that that

the conditions in disciplinary segregation were significantly and atypically harsh

compared to the conditions in administrative or protective custody segregation, which

are, by definition, already harsh and difficult.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Motion for Leave to Amend [11] is GRANTED.

2. Pursuant to its merit review of the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff has

been allowed to amend, clearly states his allegations, and fails to state a

claim for relief. Further amendment would be futile.

3. Case dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and judgment to

enter.

Entered this 27th day of February, 2026.

s/Michael M. Mihm

MICHAEL M. MIHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE