Tennison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

PAULETTE TENNISON, as

Administrator of the Estate of John

Scott, Jr., deceased,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-1466-HDM

CITY OF DECATUR, ALABAMA,

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises from an encounter involving the late John Scott, Jr., and police

officers from the City of Decatur and the City of Priceville. (See Doc. 1). The

complaint alleges that on April 15, 2025, officers from Priceville and Decatur were

trying to coax Scott into an ambulance, (id., ¶¶ 20–21), when some unnamed officers

used various forms of force on Scott, (id., ¶¶ 28–30). The complaint repeatedly

references alleged uses of force by “Decatur police officers” and includes identical

allegations against “Priceville Alabama police officers” without specificity as to the

identity or number of these officers. (See id., ¶¶ 38–49). The complaint alleges that

Scott died as a result of this encounter with police. (Id., ¶ 104).

Plaintiff Paulette Tennison, as administrator of the Estate of John Scott, Jr.,

brought this action against twenty Defendants: the City of Decatur, Alabama

(“Decatur”); Eli Carnes; Jonathan Espino; Landon Wallace; Keith Rutherford;

Officer Pedro; Mike Burleson; Morgan County Sheriff’s Office (“the Sheriff’s

Office”); Martha Hudson-Pepper; Susan Gooch; Brian Handcock; Levi Denney;

Jesse Hills; Sabrina Brown; George Sales; Mr. Kikut; Donald Whitt; Jesse Garcia;

the City of Priceville, Alabama (“Priceville”); and Garry Chapman. (See id.). Ms.

Tennison has since voluntarily dismissed her claims against Priceville and Chapman.

(Doc. 3; Doc. 5).

Ms. Tennison has brought a thirty-count Complaint. (See Doc. 1). These

counts are:

1. Count I: § 1983 (Fourth Amendment), against Decatur, (id. at 20–23);

2. Count II: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against Decatur, (id. at 23–25);

3. Count III: Wrongful Death, against Decatur, (id. at 26–29);

4. Count IV: Monell Claim, against Decatur, (id. at 29–32);

5. Count V: Assault & Battery, against Decatur, (id. at 32–33);

6. Count VI: § 1983 (Fourth Amendment), against Carnes, Espino, Wallace,

Rutherford, Pedro, and Burleson, (id. at 34–37);

7. Count VII: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against Carnes, Espino,

Wallace, Rutherford, Pedro, and Burleson, (id. at 37–39);

8. Count VIII: Wrongful Death, against Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford,

Pedro, and Burleson, (id. at 40–42);

9. Count IX: Monell Claim, against Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford,

Pedro, and Burleson, (id. at 42–46);

10. Count X: Assault & Battery / Wrongful Death & Survivorship, against

Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford, Pedro, and Burleson, (id. at 46–48);

11. Count XI: § 1983 (Fourth Amendment) against Priceville, (id. at 48–51);

12. Count XII: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against Priceville, (id. at 51–

54);

13. Count XIII: Wrongful Death, against Priceville, (id. at 54–56);

14. Count XIV: Monell Claim, against Priceville, (id. at 57–60);

15. Count XV: Assault & Battery, against Priceville, (id. at 60–61);

16. Count XVI: § 1983 (Fourth Amendment), against Garry Chapman, (id. at

62–64);

17. Count XVII: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against Garry Chapman,

(id. at 64–67);

18. Count XVIII: Wrongful Death, against Garry Chapman, (id. at 67–69);

19. Count XIX: Monell Claim, against Garry Chapman, (id. at 70–73);

20. Count XX: Assault & Battery / Wrongful Death and Survivorship, against

Garry Chapman, (id. at 73–75);

21. Count XXI: § 1983 (Fourth Amendment), against the Sheriff’s Office,

Hudson-Pepper, Gooch, Handcock, Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut,

Whitt, and Garcia, (id. at 75–78);

22. Count XXII: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against the Sheriff’s Office,

(id. at 78–80);

23. Count XXIII: Wrongful Death, against the Sheriff’s Office, Hudson-

Pepper, Gooch, Handcock, Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut, Whitt, and

Garcia, (id. at 81–83);

24. Count XXIV: Monell Claim, against the Sheriff’s Office, (id. at 83–86);

25. Count XXV: Assault & Battery / Wrongful Death and Survivorship, against

the Sheriff’s Office, (id. at 86–88);

26. Count XXVI: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against Hudson-Pepper,

Gooch, Handcock, Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut, Whitt, and Garcia,

(id. at 88–95);

27. Count XXVII: § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment), against Hudson-Pepper,

Gooch, Handcock, Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut, Whitt, and Garcia,

(id. at 95–98);

28. Count XXVIII: Wrongful Death, against Hudson-Pepper, Gooch,

Handcock, Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut, Whitt, and Garcia, (id. at

98–101);

29. Count XXIX: Monell Claim, against Hudson-Pepper, Gooch, Handcock,

Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut, Whitt, and Garcia, (id. at 101–105);

and

30. Count XXX: Assault & Battery/Wrongful Death and Survivorship, against

Hudson-Pepper, Gooch, Handcock, Denney, Hills, Brown, Sales, Kikut,

Whitt, and Garcia, (id. at 105–107).

Three motions to dismiss are before the court: (1) a motion by the Sheriff’s

Office, (doc. 29); (2) a motion by Brown, Denney, Garcia, Gooch, Handcock, Hills,

Hudson-Pepper, Kikut, Sales, and Whitt, (doc. 27); and (3) a motion by Burleson,

Carnes, Decatur, Espino, Pedro, Rutherford, and Wallace, (doc. 35). Between these

three motions, all eighteen remaining defendants have moved for dismissal on all

counts against them.

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[C]omplaints alleging discrimination . . . must meet [this] plausibility standard

. . . .” Henderson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 436 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir.

2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Conclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not

prevent dismissal.” Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action is inadequate. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007).

Additionally, a pleading will not survive a motion to dismiss if it lumps

multiple claims and allegations together in a vague, disorganized manner, making it

difficult to tell which facts support which legal claims or which defendant is

responsible for what action. See, e.g., Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,

792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015). This is because Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8 requires that a pleading “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8

also states that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(d)(1). Similarly, Rule 10 directs that “[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each

claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate

count.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Pleadings that violate either, or both, of these rules are “disparagingly referred

to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. The Eleventh Circuit has

“little tolerance” for such pleadings, since they “waste scarce judicial resources,

inexorably broaden[] the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court

dockets, and undermine[] the public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v.

Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2021) (Tjoflat, J.,

concurring) (“Our district courts have neither the manpower nor the time to sift

through a morass of irrelevant facts in order to piece together claims for plaintiff’s

counsel.”).

DISCUSSION

Defendant Morgan County Sheriff’s Office moves to dismiss on the basis that

a sheriff’s office is not an entity subject to suit under Alabama law. (Doc. 29). The

remaining Defendants move to dismiss for numerous reasons, including on the basis

that Ms. Tennison’s complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading. (Doc.

29; Doc. 35). Each of these three motions is due to be GRANTED.

I. Withdrawn Pleadings

Ms. Tennison has voluntarily dismissed two Defendants, thereby eliminating

several claims, and has conceded in her response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss

that numerous other claims and arguments should be withdrawn. (See Doc. 3; Doc.

41). First, Ms. Tennison’s dismissal of Chapman and Priceville gets rid of Counts XI

through XX, as each of these counts solely implicates either Chapman or Priceville.

(See doc. 1 at 48–75). Second, Ms. Tennison concedes that the Sheriff’s Office is not

recognized as a legal entity subject to suit under Alabama law. (Doc. 41 at 3). See

also King v. Colbert Cnty., 620 So. 2d 623, 626 (Ala. 1993). Accordingly, Ms.

Tennison moves to amend her complaint to substitute Morgan County Sheriff Ron

Puckett in place of the Morgan County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 41 at 3–4). Third, Ms.

Tennison voluntarily withdraws her claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Decatur and Puckett (assuming a substitution of Puckett for the Sheriff’s

Department) based on respondeat superior. Id. at 4. Accordingly, Ms. Tennison

voluntarily dismisses Counts I, II, XXI, and XXII of her Complaint. Id. Fourth, Ms.

Tennison admits that claims asserted on behalf of “heirs and beneficiaries” of Scott

are improper. Id. Ms. Tennison states that the proper plaintiff in this action is

“Paulette Tennison, as Administrator of the Estate of John Scott, Jr.,” and withdraws

any references to other plaintiffs. Id. Fifth, Ms. Tennison concedes that she may not

bring Monell claims against individual, non-policy-making individual officers, and

accordingly voluntarily withdraws Counts IX and XXIX of her complaint. Id. Sixth,

Ms. Tennison concedes that claims for assault and battery abated upon Scott’s death,

and she accordingly voluntarily withdraws Counts V and XXV along with references

to assault and battery in Counts X and XXX. Id.

While these voluntary dismissals and concessions may be helpful and

necessary, they do not cure the structural deficiencies discussed below. Accordingly,

the court addresses whether the complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun

pleading.

II. Shotgun Pleading

Shotgun complaints generally come in four flavors. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at

1321. As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, these categories generally include:

“[1] a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts

the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count

to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of

the entire complaint[;] . . . [2] a complaint . . . replete with conclusory,

vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular

cause of action[;] . . . [3] one that commits the sin of not separating into

a different count each cause of action or claim for relief; and [4] [a

pleading that] assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which

acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought

against.”

Id. at 1321–23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that

they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants

adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests.” Id. at 1323. When faced with such a pleading, a defendant should not answer

the complaint, as doing so would lead to chaos in discovery. See, e.g., Paylor v.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1126–27 (11th Cir. 2014). Rather, the Eleventh

Circuit has stressed that a district court must strike such a pleading, even where a

defendant has not requested as much. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898

F.3d 1348, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2018).

In this case, the complaint bears several hallmarks of a shotgun pleading. First,

every single count of the complaint expressly incorporates over 100 paragraphs of

preliminary, jurisdictional, party, and factual allegations, regardless of what the

claim is and against which defendant it is asserted. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 106, 117, 131,

140, 162, 172, 183, 196, 205, 227, 238, 249, 263, 272, 294, 304, 315, 329, 338, 360,

371, 382, 396, 405, 426, 436, 469, 487, 496, 518). See also Johnson Enters. of

Jacksonville v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that

impermissible shotgun pleadings “invariably begin with a long list of general

allegations, most of which are immaterial to most of the claims for relief” and then

“[t]he general allegations are incorporated by reference into each count of the

complaint.”). Since all 105 paragraphs are incorporated into every single count,

despite many of those allegations pertaining to different defendants and different

theories of liability, a reader of the complaint “must speculate as to which factual

allegations pertain to which count.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d

1353, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997). This undifferentiated mass incorporation of factual

paragraphs into each claim renders the complaint a shotgun pleading. See, e.g.,

Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1359 n.9 (finding a complaint was “an all-too-typical

shotgun pleading” where each count incorporated by reference all forty-three

paragraphs of factual allegations, many of which related to only one or two counts);

Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1325 (finding a pleading that “indiscriminately

incorporate[d] and repeat[ed] 249 numbered paragraphs of factual allegations—

spanning fifty pages—into nine of the nineteen counts, without any effort to connect

or separate which of those 249 factual allegations relate[d] to a particular count” was

a shotgun complaint); Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1356 (describing as an

“incomprehensible shotgun pleading” a complaint which alleges numerous “claims

and incorporates by reference all of its factual allegations into each claim, making it

nearly impossible for Defendants and the Court to determine with any certainty

which factual allegations give rise to which claims for relief.”); Garcia v. Dorning,

No. 5:17-cv-01957-LCB, 2020 WL 5095296, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2020)

(finding a fourth amended complaint was a shotgun pleading where plaintiff

incorporated all eighty-nine factual allegations into each count, since her

incorporation of such “large swath[s] of facts” included irrelevant information about

other claims and issues with other defendants), aff’d sub nom., Garcia v. Madison

Cty. Ala. Sheriff’s Off., 2021 WL 3238813 (11th Cir. July 30, 2021) (upholding

dismissal of shotgun pleading since “each count . . . re-allege[d] large portions of

factual allegations, many of which had no clear tie to the count into which it was

incorporated”).

Moreover, many of the counts include allegations referencing alleged acts or

omissions without delineating precisely what conduct is the subject of the particular

allegation. For instance, Count I references the “conduct and actions” of Decatur

through unspecified “agents, employees, officers, and/or deputies.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 109,

114). Although Ms. Tennison does include some alleged uses of force within Count

I, any notice this might have provided is negated by the qualifier that the claims

against the City are “not limited to” those types of force. (Id., ¶ 108). Elsewhere in

the pleading, Ms. Tennison ambiguously alleges Scott died as a “result of one or

more aforementioned acts and/or omissions,” without making clear exactly which

“acts” or “omissions” form the basis of the claim (and which particular Defendant

allegedly committed these unknown “acts” or “omissions”). (See id., ¶¶ 137, 193).

Similarly, in Count IV, Ms. Tennison broadly refers to a “policy, custom and/or

practices” of Decatur “as described herein” within the count titled “Monell Claim”

against Decatur. (Id., ¶¶ 150–151). Yet because the complaint contains scattershot

conclusory allegations regarding various “policies” or “practices” of Decatur

throughout the pleading, and some of which (like the alleged “STATS” policy) are

not mentioned anywhere in Count IV (the “Monell Claim” against Decatur), Decatur

is left to guess which alleged policies or practices underpin the § 1983 claims against

it.

While a complaint should be dismissed if it qualifies as any one of the “four

rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings” identified by the Eleventh Circuit,

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321, Tennison’s complaint falls into more than one category.

The complaint falls into the third Weiland category because it “commits the sin of

not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. at

1322–23. For example, the titles of Count I against Decatur and Count VI against

Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford, Pedro, and Burleson collectively each cite the

expansive reaches of § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. (See Doc. 1 at 20, 34).

Within each of these Counts, there are references to multiple events and theories of

liability, including allegations as to the use of excessive force, failing to warn of the

use of force, failing to recognize or consider a “mental health episode,” failing to

supervise, failing to train, and failing to provide medical care, among others. (Id., ¶¶

108–13, 174–79). Similarly, Counts II and VII, which purport to bring Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Decatur and Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford, Pedro,

and Burleson respectively, also refer to multiple theories of liability within a single

count, as each of these counts include allegations regarding a “constitutional right to

associate with family members,” substantive due process, and receipt of “necessary

medical care.” (Id., ¶¶ 119, 120, 122, 185, 186, 188).

Likewise, the combination of many causes of action against many defendants

in a single count results in a confusing mixture of claims. Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX,

and X all lump together claims against Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford, Pedro,

and Burleson within a single count. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 172–82, 183–95, 196–204, 205–26,

227–37). Not only are Carnes, Espino, Wallace, Rutherford, Pedro, and Burleson

grouped together in Count VI with no delineation of any of their roles in the alleged

events at issue, but Ms. Tennison appears to simultaneously allege within this count

that each of these Defendants are responsible under fifteen different theories of

liability. (Id., ¶ 179) (asserting in fifteen distinct sub-paragraphs different theories

based upon different facts). The Eleventh Circuit and district courts have repeatedly

labeled pleadings committing this “sin” as impermissible shotgun complaints. See,

e.g., Fletcher v. City of Madison, 2025 WL 1074415, at *10 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025)

(affirming dismissal on shotgun pleading grounds where pleading asserted “multiple

claims as to multiple occurrences against multiple defendants under multiple

theories all into one count”).

Additionally, the complaint falls into the fourth Weiland category, as it

“assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of

the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the

defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. The complaint

is replete with references to “Eli Carnes, Jonathan Espino, Landon Wallace, Keith

Rutherford, Officer Pedro, and Mike Burleson” collectively, without any specificity

regarding which defendant allegedly took which action. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 173–75, 184,

198–01, 206, 228). The complaint does the same with respect to “Martha Hudson-

Pepper, Susan Gooch, Brian Handcock, Levi Denney, Jesse Hills, Sabrina Brown,

George Sales, Mr. Kikut, Donald Whitt, [and] Jesse Garcia.” See id. at 81, 88, 95,

98, 101, 105. Furthermore, Ms. Tennison repeatedly references the acts or omissions

of undefined groups of people, such as “Decatur police,” “Decatur police officers,”

“Defendant law enforcement officer,” and “law enforcement” generally, often

without any indication as to who these alleged “officers” are or if this term even

includes one or more of the named defendants. (Id., ¶¶ 13, 15–16, 19–20, 22, 26, 28,

30, 38, 40, 42, 44, 52, 53, 177, 179).

Rather than differentiate which person is responsible for which act, Ms.

Tennison instead appears to be imputing the alleged actions to the group as a whole,

which does not adequately give each of these Defendants notice of the claims against

them. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 n.14 (citing Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282,

1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The complaint is replete with allegations that ‘the

defendants’ engaged in certain conduct, making no distinction among the fourteen

defendants charged, though geographic and temporal realities make plain that all of

the defendants could not have participated in every act complained of.”).

These various characteristics make the complaint, (doc. 1), an unacceptable

shotgun pleading under Eleventh Circuit precedent. As such, this action must be

dismissed, as allowing it to proceed under the current complaint would “waste scarce

judicial resources, inexorably broaden[] the scope of discovery, [and] wreak havoc

on [any future] appellate court docket[].” Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1295 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss, (doc. 27; doc. 29;

doc. 35), are GRANTED, and Ms. Tennison’s complaint, (doc. 1), is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Ms. Tennison’s motion to amend her complaint in order

to substitute Morgan County Sheriff Ron Puckett for the Morgan County Sheriff's

Office, (doc. 41), is DENIED AS MOOT. Because the complaint must—if Ms.

Tennison wishes to proceed with her case—be repleaded in its entirety, the proposed

substitution may be addressed in an amended complaint. Thus, Ms. Tennison has

until on or before March 28, 2026, to file an amended complaint in compliance with

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10 and with this Opinion. Failure to timely

file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of this action without further

notice. The stay that this court entered pending resolution of Defendants’ motions to

dismiss, (doc. 49), is lifted.

DONE and ORDERED on February 26, 2026.

(AOI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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