Sanders

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DAMONE WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

22-CV-858-SDD-RLB

DARRYL SANDERS, ET AL.

RULING

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment' filed by Defendants Darryl Sanders (“Sanders”) and the City of Baton Rouge

(collectively, “Defendants’). Plaintiff Damone Williams (‘“Plaintiff’) filed an Opposition? to

this motion, to which Defendants filed a Reply.* For the reasons set forth below, the

Motion shall be granted.

I. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: LOCAL RULE 56

This Courts Local Rule 56 requires parties submitting a motion for summary

judgment and an opposition thereto to also file statements of material facts.4 Each fact,

denial, and qualification asserted in these statements shall be supported by a record

citation.’ “Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if

supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless

properly controverted.”° Each assertion of fact “shall be followed by a citation to the

specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion.”” The

1 Rec. Doc. 41.

2 Rec. Doc. 44.

3 Rec. Doc. 49.

4M.D. La. Local Rule 56(b)—(c).

5 Id.

§ M.D. La. Local Rule 56(f).

7 Id.

Court has “no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not

specifically referenced in the parties’ separate statement of facts[,]” and thus “may

disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material

properly considered on summary judgment.”8

Here, Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts® (“SUMF’) includes no

record citations to support the asserted facts. However, the Memorandum in Support'® of

the Motion repeats most of the facts set forth in the SUMF, and the facts in the

Memorandum in Support are supported by citations to the record.’ The Court, therefore,

will consider these asserted facts to be properly supported. Additionally, unless otherwise

indicated, all facts cited from the SUMF are undisputed or improperly disputed and thus,

deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56(f).

ll. BACKGROUND

This is an excessive force case. On January 18, 2022, Sanders was a Baton

Rouge Fire Department arson investigator with police authority.'* On that day, he was

getting his hair cut at Four Way Barber Shop at 805 Eddie Robinson Sr. Drive in Baton

Rouge.'? Sanders was on duty at all relevant times, and his city-issued Ford F-150 was

parked across the street on the east side of Eddie Robinson Sr. Drive, facing north.'4

Barber Calvin Stephen (“Stephen”) and customer Gerard Torry (“Torry”) were also in the

8 McGhee v. Fay Servicing, LLC, 21-652-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL 2335376, at *2 (M.D. La. Mar. 2, 2023)

(quoting M.D. La. Local Rule 56(f}).

® Rec. Doc. 41-2.

10 Rec. Doc. 41-1.

't See e.g., Rec. Doc. 41-1, p. 1 (citing Def. Ex. 2, p. 39; Def. Ex. 5, pp. 9-11).

'2 Defendants’ SUMF, Rec. Doc. 41-2, J 2.

13 Id, at 2.

Rec. Doc. 44, pp. 2-3; Rec. Doc. 41-1, p. 2.

barbershop.’ Ray Williams (“Williams”) entered the barbershop later, around 11:30

a.m.'6

Around that time, Plaintiff was naked and walking southward on Eddie Robinson

Sr. Drive.’ Plaintiff approached Sanders’s truck and struck its driver's side window with

a backpack.'® Plaintiff repeatedly hit the window with the backpack until the window was

pushed into the truck.'? Plaintiff attempted to open the door with the handle and then

reached his head and left arm into the opening where the window used to be.2° Sanders

shouted verbal commands to Plaintiff and allegedly identified himself as police." Plaintiff

did not comply with Sanders’s verbal commands and continued to reach inside the truck.?2

Sanders knew Plaintiff was within arm’s reach of Sanders’s loaded assault rifle that

was wedged between the truck’s driver’s seat and center console.?° The loaded rifle was

in plain view*4 and visible through the truck’s front windshield.2® Sanders believed Plaintiff

was reaching for the assault rifle to turn and shoot at Sanders and other nearby citizens.”°

Plaintiff continued to reach inside the truck and grabbed at something,?’ so Sanders shot

at him and missed.” Plaintiff briefly turned toward the sound of the gunshot, but he quickly

18 Rec. Doc. 41-2, 3.

16 fd,

7 Id. at J 1.

18 Rec. Doc. 44-1, 9 4; Rec. Doc. 44, p. 3; Video of Shooting, Rec. Doc. 45-4, at 0:07.

18 Rec. Doc. 45-4, at 0:07-0:17. The tint on the window held the broken pieces together. Rec. Doc. 45-5,

p. 19; Rec. Doc. 45-10, p. 41; Rec. Doc. 45-11, pp. 16—17.

20 Rec. Doc. 45-4, at 0:18-0:21. Plaintiff contends the Video is the best evidence of this event. Rec. Doc.

97.

21 Rec. Doc. 44-1, J] 8. Plaintiff disputes whether Sanders identified himself as police. /d.; Rec. Doc. 44, p.

3.

22 Rec. Doc. 41-2, J 9. Plaintiff disputes what Sanders said, but he does not dispute, or provide record

citations supporting a dispute regarding, the facts asserted in this sentence. Rec. Doc. 44-1, | 9. Therefore,

these facts are deemed admitted pursuant to M.D. La. Local Rule 56(f).

23 Rec. Doc. 41-2, 11.

24 Rec. Doc. 44-1, J 11.

25 Rec. Doc. 45-11, pp. 29-31.

26 Rec. Doc. 41-2, J] 12.

27 Rec. Doc. 45-4, at 0:18-0:21.

28 Id; Rec. Doc. 41-2, 7 13.

turned his attention back to the truck.?° He pulled the smashed window from the inside of

the truck, and he attempted to pull the glass completely off the truck.°° Sanders allegedly

shouted another verbal command before firing a second shot. The second gunshot hit

Plaintiff, and he dropped to the ground.** Sanders yelled for someone to call 911 and got

towels from Stephen so he could render aid to Plaintiff.°°

As Sanders walked toward Plaintiff to render aid, Plaintiff jumped up from the

ground and opened the driver's side door of the truck.*4 Plaintiff allegedly grabbed the

assault rifle and attempted to point it at Sanders.*° Sanders closed the distance between

himself and Plaintiff, and he struggled to gain control of the rifle from Plaintiff.2° During

this struggle, Sanders heard the safety device click as Plaintiff tried to manipulate it and

pull the trigger.°” Sanders fought for control of the charging handle on the rifle because

Plaintiff could not fire the weapon as long as the handle was held back.*® Stephen and

Torry were outside of the barbershop, approximately twenty feet away from Sanders and

Plaintiff, as this scuffle occurred.°° As he struggled to overcome Plaintiff, Sanders fired

his weapon at Plaintiff.4° Plaintiff fell to the ground with the rifle in his hand.41 Sanders

took the rifle from Plaintiff and placed it on a nearby bench.4? Sanders then called the

29 Rec. Doc. 45-4, at 0:22-0:24. □

30 Id,

1 Rec. Doc. 41-2, 4 15. Plaintiff disputes whether any commands were shouted before the second shot

because none are audible in the Video. Rec. Doc. 44-1, J 15.

32 Rec. Doc. 45-4, at 0:24-0:26.

33 Rec. Doc. 41-2, J] 16.

34 Id. at 917. □

36 /d. Plaintiff disputes whether he was grabbing the rifle. Rec. Doc. 44-1, 17.

36 Rec. Doc. 41-2, 18; Rec. Doc. 44, p. 4.

37 Rec. Doc. 41-2, J 18.

38 fd. at J 19.

39 Id. at J 22.

40 fd, at J] 20.

41 Id.

42 Id. at J] 21.

police and reported the shooting.4* A warrant for Plaintiffs arrest was later issued,

charging him with Attempted First Degree Murder, Aggravated Burglary, and Obscenity

(Felony Grade).*4

On November 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging Sanders’s

use of deadly force violated federal and state law.*® Specifically, Plaintiff asserted federal

excessive force claims and state law claims of aggravated battery and vicarious liability.4

Defendants filed this Motion, claiming Sanders’s use of force was objectively reasonable,

and he is entitled to qualified immunity for all claims against him.4” Defendants further

assert that in the absence of an underlying tort, the vicarious liability claims against the

City of Baton Rouge must also be dismissed.*8

Il. LAW AND ANALYSIS

a. Summary Judgment Standard .

In reviewing a party’s motion for summary judgment, the Court will grant the motion

if (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the mover is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.*® This determination is made “in the light most favorable to the

opposing party.”°° A party moving for summary judgment “must “demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” but need not negate the elements of the

43 Id.; Rec. Doc. 44, p. 4.

44 Rec. Doc. 41-2, J 26.

45 Rec. Doc. 1.

48 Id,

47 Rec. Doc. 41-1.

48 Id.

49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

50 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.

654, 655 (1962); 6 V. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15(3) (2d ed. 1966)).

nonmovant’s case.’””' If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must

show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the

existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”52

However, the non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by

only a scintilla of evidence.’”54

Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ All reasonable factual

inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.5> However, “[t]he Court has no duty

to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary

judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely

how this evidence supports his claim.”°°> Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific

facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment; the plaintiff cannot rest on his

allegations to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to support

the complaint.’ Likewise, the “fundamental rules governing summary judgment’®®

prohibit the Court from weighing evidence or making credibility determinations. “By

choosing which testimony to credit and which to discard, ‘[a] court improperly ‘weigh[s]

Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003) (quoting Little

v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323~25 (1986).

52 Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Morris v. Covan World

Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).

54 Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).

5° RSR Corp. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).

5? National Ass’n of Gov't Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.

1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

68 Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 236 (5th Cir. 2015).

the evidence.’”®?

b. Section 1983 Claims and Qualified Immunity

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.®°

Plaintiff alleges that Sanders violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

excessive force. Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in their performance

of discretionary functions unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional

right.6" “Once raised, a plaintiff has the burden to rebut the qualified immunity defense ‘by

establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.

We do not require that an official demonstrate that he did not violate clearly established

federal rights; our precedent places that burden upon plaintiffs.’”62

The qualified immunity defense presents a two-part inquiry: “(1) whether the facts

alleged or shown by the plaintiff made out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2)

whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant's alleged

misconduct.”6* A court may address either part of the two-part inquiry first.® “This inquiry

focuses not on the general standard—when may an officer use deadly force against a

suspect?—but on the specific circumstances of the incident—could an officer have

°° Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 245 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.

650, 657 (2014)).

6° See Lefall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist, 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1994).

81 See Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009).

82 Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pierce v. Smith,

117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997)).

63 Ontiveros, 564 F.3d at 382.

64 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).

reasonably interpreted the law to conclude that the perceived threat posed by the suspect

was sufficient to justify deadly force?’®> Qualified immunity will protect “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”6°

1. Excessive Force

To prevail on an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) injury (2)

which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3)

the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.”*” The reasonableness of the use

of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

than with 20/20 hindsight.’"°® The Court must give “careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”©°

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit instructs that the second

factor—whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers—is

“the most important.””° “The ‘[u]se of deadly force is not unreasonable when an officer

would have reason to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or

others.”””' When assessing reasonableness, the Court must allow “for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a

85 Ontiveros, 564 F.3d at 383 n.1 (emphasis added).

66 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

87 Malbrough v. Stelly, 814 F. App'x 798, 802-03 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d

124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008)).

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

70 Walbrough v. Stelly, 814 F. App'x 798, 803 (5th Cir, 2020).

™ Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 2016) (brackets in original) (quoting

Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 2011)).

particular situation.”’? Because Sanders utilized deadly force, the Court’s focus in the

objective reasonableness balancing test is on the second Graham factor: whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.”°

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force

claim because Sanders’s use of deadly force was not clearly excessive or objectively

unreasonable.’4 Again, the essential elements of Plaintiff's excessive force claim are: “(1)

injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive,

and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.”” It is undisputed that

Sanders shot Plaintiff; therefore, the injury element is satisfied. Because Sanders used

deadly force to “seize” Plaintiff, the relevant Fourth Amendment questions are elements

(2) and (3), which Defendants contend are not satisfied because the force used was

neither excessive nor unreasonable.

Plaintiff argues a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding what crime he

committed when Sanders utilized lethal force; thus, summary judgment must be denied.”6

Though the parties disagree about which crime appropriately fits Plaintiffs acts, this

dispute is not material to the Court’s analysis. Rather, the Court's inquiry focuses on

whether “an officer would have reason to believe that the suspect poses a threat of

serious harm to the officer or others.””” As discussed below, a reasonable officer in

Sanders’s position would have reason to believe the suspect posed a threat of serious

72 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.

Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (Sth Cir. 2021); Romero v. City of Grapevine, Tex., 888

F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018).

74 Rec. Doc. 41-1, p. 15.

Malbrough v. Stelly, 814 F. App'x 798, 802-03 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d

124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008)).

76 Rec. Doc. 44, p. 10.

7” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021); Romero v. City of Grapevine, Tex., 888

F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018),

harm, so Sanders’s actions do not amount to excessive force.

2. The First and Second Shots

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute in the facts leading up

to and including the first and second shots. Plaintiff claims whether Sanders identified

himself as law enforcement and what commands he gave are disputed facts.” However,

Plaintiff offers no evidence to support this. Instead, he offers Sanders’s deposition

testimony wherein Sanders claims he identified himself as police and gave commands to

Plaintiff.’? Additionally, Plaintiff provided the Court with testimony from three

eyewitnesses within earshot during the incident, all of whom testified that Sanders

shouted verbal commands to Plaintiff before shooting, which commands Plaintiff

ignored.®° Plaintiff, therefore, has not presented any competent summary judgment

evidence to controvert the testimony of Sanders or the eyewitnesses. In the absence of

such controverting evidence, the Court cannot assume that Plaintiff “could or would prove

the necessary facts” to survive summary judgment.®'

Plaintiff also contends that it has not been established whether he was aware that

the rifle was in the truck when he started hitting the window.®? Relying on Sanders’s

deposition testimony, Plaintiff claims he could not have seen the rifle through the driver’s

side window due to the window tint.® However, Plaintiff also asserted that the rifle was in

plain view,® which assertion is supported by Williams’s deposition testimony that the rifle

7 Rec. Doc. 44, p. 13.

78 Rec. Doc. 44, p. 13; Rec. Doc. 45-2, p. 42.

8° Rec. Doc. 45-5, pp. 17-18; Rec. Doc. 45-10, pp. 13, 32; Rec. Doc. 45-11, p. 17. Though the testimony

is inconsistent regarding what Sanders specifically said, the testimony consistently shows that Sanders

gave verbal commands to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff ignored said commands.

81 Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 279 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).

82 Rec. Doc. 44, p. 11.

83 Rec. Doc. 44, p. 11.

84 Rec. Doc. 44-1, 7 11.

10

was visible through the front windshield.®> Notwithstanding whether Plaintiff knew the rifle

was in the truck before he broke the window, his video evidence shows the first shot was

not fired until after he completely pushed in the driver’s side window and reached his left

arm and head into that window.®

After the first shot was fired and missed, the video evidence shows Plaintiff briefly

turned toward the sound.®”? He then resumed reaching into the truck and pulled the

smashed window outside the truck. Sanders then fired the second shot, which struck

Plaintiff.

It is undisputed that Sanders knew a loaded AR-15 was between the driver's seat

and center console of his city-issued truck when he saw Plaintiff reach into the driver’s

side window. Deadly force is justified when an officer reasonably believes the individual

is reaching for a gun, even if the officer had not yet seen the gun when he fired or when

no gun was ever found at the scene.®8 “Officers are not required to ‘wait until a defendant

turns towards them, with weapon in hand, before applying deadly force to ensure their

safety.’’®° Thus, a reasonable officer on the scene, who knew a loaded AR-15 was within

Plaintiff's reach, could have reasonably believed Plaintiff posed a serious threat of harm

to the officer or the nearby citizens.

Sanders’s use of deadly force when he fired the first two shots was not clearly

excessive or unreasonable; therefore, Sanders did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional

rights when he fired those shots. As suck, Sanders is entitled to qualified immunity, and

85 Rec. Doc. 45-11, pp, 29-31.

86 Rec. Doc. 45-4.

87 Id,

88 Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2021).

8° Martin v. Petty, 699 F. Supp. 3d 547, 557 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 602

(5th Cir. 2020)).

11

Plaintiff's claims of excessive force as to the first two shots must be dismissed.

3. The Third Shot

Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate an issue of material fact regarding the facts

leading up to and including the third and final shot. It is undisputed that after being shot,

Plaintiff got off the ground, opened the driver's side door of the truck, and fought with

Sanders over control of the rifle.%° It is also undisputed that during this struggle, Sanders

heard Plaintiff attempting to manipulate the rifle’s safety and to pull the trigger.®’

Additionally, at least two bystanders were only twenty feet away during the confrontation.

While struggling over the rifle with Plaintiff, Sanders fired his weapon at Plaintiff. The shot

struck Plaintiff, and he fell to the ground with the rifle in hand.

Plaintiff claims “there is significant disagreement between various eyewitnesses”

whether Plaintiff ever possessed the rifle.°° He acknowledges that Sanders, Stephen, and

Torry all testified that Plaintiff grabbed the rifle and then fought over it with Sanders.%

However, Plaintiff the testimony of Frederick Simonson (“Simonson”) and Williams’s

police statement as evidence of a factual dispute on this issue.% But this evidence is

unavailing. Simonson testified that the truck door was open and blocking his view of the

incident, so he was not in a position to observe if there was anything in Plaintiff's hands.%

The Court also viewed the video of Williams’s statement to the Baton Rouge Police

Department wherein Williams stated that Plaintiff did not “get his hand on the rifle, | don’t

80 Rec. Doc. 41-2, I] 17-18; Rec. Doc. 44, p. 4.

*1 Rec. Doc. 41-2, J 18.

2 fd. at J 20.

Rec. Doc. 44, p. 17.

94 Id. at pp. 17-18.

fd. at p. 18.

Rec. Doc. 45-12, pp. 10, 13.

12

think—,” after which the officer began asking him another question.’ In his subsequent

deposition, Williams clarified that after Plaintiff got off the ground following the second

shot, Williams went to the back of the barbershop, so he did not see anything that

happened after that, including when Plaintiff opened the truck door or when Sanders fired

the third shot.°° Because neither Williams nor Simonson were in a position to see whether

Plaintiff had the rifle in his hand before the third shot, their testimony/statement does not

controvert Defendants’ evidence such that it creates a genuine dispute of material fact.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs Response to Statement of Material Facts®® and his own

factual narrative'°° suggest that he agrees that he possessed the rifle. First, Plaintiff did

not dispute Defendants’ claim that Sanders took the rifle from Plaintiff.1°' Second, Plaintiff

specifically stated, “Plaintiff Williams fell to the ground and Defendant Sanders was able

to take the rifle out of his hands.”'°* Because Plaintiff acknowledges that he possessed

the rifle, and he has provided no summary judgment evidence to the contrary, his

possession of the rifle is undisputed.

Plaintiff shifts arguments and claims the third shot was excessive and

unreasonable because, at the time of the third shot, Sanders was the aggressor based

upon the previous two shots. Plaintiff also argues Sanders brought the struggle on

himself by having the rifle in his truck in violation of police department procedure.’ This

argument relies on Louisiana’s aggressor doctrine statute.’ Plaintiff's reliance on this

87 Rec. Doc. 45-15, 5:21-5:24.

88 Rec. Doc. 45-11, pp. 13-15, 17-18.

89 Rec. Doc. 44-1.

100 Rec. Doc. 44, pp. 2-4.

101 Rec, Doc. 44-1, J 21.

102 Rec. Doc. 44, p. 4.

103 fd, at pp. 17-21.

104 fd at p. 18 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. 14:21).

13

state-law aggressor doctrine is misplaced.'° First, Plaintiff's argument that Sanders was

the aggressor is based on an assumption that the first two shots were unreasonable, but

as discussed above, those shots were reasonable under the circumstances. Second, §

1983 liability “cannot be premised on the fact that an officer ‘creates the need’ to use

excessive force by failing to follow police procedure.”'°° Thus, the argument that Sanders

brought the difficulty on himself by failing to follow department-wide firearm storage

procedures also fails.

Sanders fired the third shot while he and Plaintiff were struggling for control over

Sanders’s loaded AR-15, with bystanders only twenty feet away. Sanders only fired after

Plaintiff continued attempting to turn off the safety and fire the rifle. A reasonable officer

on the scene in those circumstances could have reasonably believed Plaintiff posed a

serious threat of harm to the officer and the nearby citizens.

Accordingly, the competent summary judgment evidence establishes that

Sanders’s use of deadly force when he fired the third shot was not clearly excessive or

unreasonable and thus not a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Court finds

that Sanders is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

of excessive force as to the third shot.

c. State Law Claims

Plaintiff has asserted state law claims of aggravated battery and vicarious liability

against Sanders and the City of Baton Rouge, respectively.’°’ In Louisiana, corrections

105 The Court notes that the Louisiana Supreme Court has found that the aggressor doctrine “no longer has

a place in Louisiana tort law.” Landry v. Bellanger, 2002-1443 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 943, 953.

108 Malbrough v. City of Rayne, 10-107, 2019 WL 1120064, at *6 (W.D. La. Mar. 11, 2019) (quoting Hover

v. Brenner, 229 F.3d 1147 (5th Cir. 2000)).

107 Rec. Doc. 1, If] 16-18.

14

officers cannot be held liable for use of force, unless that force is excessive.'°8 “Under

Louisiana law, the same standard is used in analyzing a state law claim of excessive force

as a federal constitutional claim—reasonableness under the circumstances.”!°9

Additionally, Louisiana’s state law qualified immunity is “[i]Jdentical to the federal

standard.”"'° Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the state law

claims is granted for the same reasoning and analysis discussed above. Because Plaintiff

claims against Sanders cannot be sustained, it follows that his claim of vicarious liability

against the City of Baton Rouge also fails.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues

of material fact that preclude summary judgment, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment'"' is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

The upcoming jury trial and all related deadlines are hereby canceled.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on this’ day, February 2026.

SHELLY D. ne

CHIEF DIST JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

108 Fontenot v. Gusman, No. 11-1772, 2012 WL 5196426, at *17 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2012)

109 Escort v. Miles, No. 6:17-CV-00484, 2018 WL 3580656, at *8 (W.D. La. July 25, 2018).

110 Id, See also, Perrilloux v. City of Kenner, No. 08-4287, 2009 WL 10680057, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 9, 2009).

111 Rec. Doc. 41.

15