The opinion
Filed 2/26/26 (unmodified opn. attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SIMON SEMAAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G064385
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01352827)
ROBERT P. MOSIER et al.,
ORDER MODIFYING
Defendants and Respondents. OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING; NO CHANGE
IN JUDGMENT
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 5, 2026, be
modified as follows:
On page 16, after the first full paragraph, insert the following
two paragraphs:
“In a petition for rehearing, Plaintiffs for the first time cite Leon
v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910 (Leon) and argue it
“negates the reasoning” for extending quasi-judicial immunity to court-
appointed receivers. In Leon, the California Supreme Court held that
Government Code section 821.6, which immunizes public employees
from liability for “instituting or prosecuting any judicial or
administrative proceeding” within the scope of their employment, does
not confer immunity from claims based on other injuries inflicted in the
course of law enforcement investigations. (Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 915.) The Leon court explained that section 821.6 was part of the
Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), which “abolished
common law tort liability and immunity for public entities and
replac[ed] it with ‘a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the
liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for
torts.’” (Leon, at pp. 917-918.)
The present case concerns common law quasi-judicial immunity
for court-appointed receivers, not statutory immunity of public
employees engaging in law enforcement. The Government Claims Act
“was not intended to override common law quasi-judicial immunity.”
(Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 857.)”
There is no change in the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED.
2
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
BANCROFT, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
3
Filed 2/5/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SIMON SEMAAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G064385
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01352827)
ROBERT P. MOSIER et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly A. Knill, Judge. Affirmed.
Bunt & Shaver and David N. Shaver for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Zelms, Erlich & Lenkov, Rinat Klier Erlich and Suzanna Harman
for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs 1 appeal from the trial court’s order granting the special
motion of defendants Robert P. Mosier and Mosier & Company, Inc. 2 to strike
Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16. 3 Plaintiffs alleged that Mosier, the court-appointed
receiver in a criminal prosecution against plaintiff Simon Semaan, had
breached fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs by not complying with a court
order to liquidate certain investment accounts.
We affirm. We hold that a court-appointed receiver is protected
by quasi-judicial immunity for the receiver’s discretionary acts and decisions.
Because Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Mosier’s discretionary decisions made
in his capacity as court-appointed receiver, Plaintiffs did not meet their
burden of proving their claims have the minimal merit necessary to survive
an anti-SLAPP motion. As an antecedent to that holding, we conclude
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants arose out of constitutionally protected
activity under section 425.16(e)(4), and Plaintiffs have forfeited any
argument to the contrary.
1 Plaintiffs are Simon Semaan, Pierrette Semaan, Mia Semaan,
Simon Semaan, Jr., Me.S. (a minor), and Gilberte Semaan.
2 We refer to Robert P. Mosier as Mosier, and to Moiser and
Mosier & Company, Inc. together as Defendants.
3 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29
Cal.4th 53, 57.) Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated. We refer to section 425.16, subdivision
(e) as section 425.16(e) and to the special motion authorized by section
425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as an anti-SLAPP motion.
2
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs alleged the following in their complaint against
Defendants.
In September 2021, the State of California filed a felony
complaint against plaintiff Simon Semaan charging him with seven counts of
violating Insurance Code section 11760, subdivision (a) for allegedly making
knowingly false or fraudulent statements of fact material to the
determination of a premium rate. At the same time, the State brought an ex
parte application for an order to show cause and temporary restraining order
to preserve assets subject to levy under Penal Code section 186.11. The court
issued a temporary restraining order and appointed Mosier as receiver.
Accounts and assets identified in an attachment to the temporary restraining
order were seized and frozen.
On October 12, 2021, the criminal court issued an order to banks
and financial institutions notifying them of the temporary restraining order,
the appointment of a receiver, and the seizure and freezing of accounts. The
order to the banks and financial institutions also identified five
TDAmeritrade accounts (account Nos. 7818, 5578, 3197, 3199, and 3201)
which were excluded from the temporary restraining order.
On December 7, 2021, the criminal court issued an order on the
receiver’s first petition for instructions. This order included the following
provision: “[T]he Receiver is ordered to liquidate all stock holding[s] into cash
as soon as practicable after the signing of this order and hold the cash in the
accounts subject to further order of the Court.”
As of January 25, 2022, Mosier had not liquidated the stock
holdings into cash. On that date, Mosier, as receiver, filed a second petition
for instructions regarding the liquidation of investment accounts. In that
3
petition, Mosier alleged that TDAmeritrade had imposed as a requirement on
closing the accounts that the receiver use his personal and company tax
identifications and his personal information, which would have the effect of
making the receiver the beneficial owner of the accounts and subjecting the
receiver to tax consequences. Mosier alleged that requirement was “non-
standard and unacceptable.”
On February 3, 2022, the court issued an order relieving Mosier
as receiver and appointing a successor receiver. Plaintiffs assert that Mosier
was relieved as receiver for failing to liquidate the investment accounts;
however, the order does not give a reason for replacing him.
In March 2022, Mosier filed a motion seeking approval of his
final account and an order barring any claims against him. The Plaintiffs
opposed that motion and requested permission to sue the receiver for failure
to comply with the December 7, 2021 order. The court ruled that it would not
maintain jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit against Mosier as receiver and
stated it was not making any rulings or findings on whether the receiver was
personally liable based on his compliance or noncompliance with the
December 7, 2021 order.
Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Mosier’s failure to liquidate
the investment accounts they suffered damages in the amount of
$1,180,854.95, which was the reduction in value of those accounts from
December 8, 2021 to February 3, 2022.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2023, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for breach of
fiduciary duty against Defendants. Defendants filed an answer and the anti-
SLAPP motion. In a declaration submitted with the anti-SLAPP motion,
Mosier stated that in the weeks following the issuance of the December 7,
4
2021 order, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and Simon Semaan
continued settlement negotiations. As a consequence, Mosier was “reluctant
to launch into a protracted and expensive process of pursuing the remaining
TDAmeritrade accounts, as these actions would likely be reversed as result of
a settlement that would return control of these investment accounts to Simon
Semaan.”
Plaintiffs filed opposition to Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
With the opposition, Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from a certified public
accountant and court-appointed receiver who declared, among other things,
that the requirements imposed by TDAmeritrade to closing the investment
accounts were not nonstandard and did not justify Mosier’s delay in
liquidating those accounts.
In granting Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court
concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of protected activity because they
were based on acts falling within Mosier’s course of appointment as receiver.
The court also concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown their claims had the
requisite minimum merit because (1) Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim
came within the litigation privilege and (2) Mosier was protected by quasi-
judicial immunity.
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary of anti-SLAPP Law and
Standard of Review
“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
5
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Anti-SLAPP motions are resolved through a two-step analysis.
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) At the first step, the
defendant bears the burden of showing the challenged allegations or claims
arise out of activity protected under section 425.16. (Park v. Board of Trustees
of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park); Baral, at
p. 384.) If the defendant meets this burden, then, at the second step, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the claims have at least
“‘minimal merit’” (Park, at p. 1061) by making “a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment” (Baral, at p. 385).
“We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion
under the de novo standard and, in so doing, conduct the same two-step
process to determine whether as a matter of law the defendant met its
burden of showing the challenged claim arose out of protected activity and, if
so, whether the plaintiff met its burden of showing probability of success.”
(Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42.) The usual rules of appellate review apply: A
trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the
burden to demonstrate the trial court committed an error justifying reversal.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson).) The burden of
demonstrating error falls on the appellant even when, as here, the standard
of review is de novo. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 657, 708.)
6
II.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Defendants’
anti-SLAPP Motion
A. First Step: Plaintiffs’ Claims Arose Out of Activity Protected Under
Section 425.16(e)(4)
A claim is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion if it arises out of
constitutionally protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “A claim arises
from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the
claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.)
Section 425.16(e) identifies the following four categories of
activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute: “(1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written
or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16(e)(1)–(4).)
Plaintiffs do not directly address the first step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis. The California Rules of Court require that every appellate brief
“[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the
point, and support each point by argument.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B).) The legal discussion of Plaintiffs’ opening brief has three
point headings: (1) “Quasi-Judicial Immunity Does Not Bar the Claim
7
Against Mosier Because he Violated the Court Order to Sell the Stocks Held
in the IRA Accounts for Which He Was Terminated”; (2) “The Litigation
Privilege Does Not Apply to a Receiver Who Fails to Comply with a Court
Order”; and (3) “Plaintiffs have Demonstrated High Probability of Prevailing
on the Merits of Their Case.” All three headings concern the second step of
anti-SLAPP analysis—a plaintiff’s ability to make a prima facie factual
showing. Although the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b) can bear upon the analysis of either the first step or second
step (Osborne v. Pleasonton Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361,
375–376), Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he litigation immunity does not apply”
(italics added), which indicates they are asserting it only as to the second
step. Further, conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute does not equate
with conduct covered by the litigation privilege (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737) and, therefore, the applicability of the
litigation privilege does not resolve whether a communication is a protected
activity under section 425.16(e)(1) or (2) (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 1255, 1263).
Plaintiffs make a brief, perfunctory argument that their claims
did not arise out of protected activity. That argument is buried, however
within a lengthy section with the point heading on quasi-judicial immunity
and simply restates the assertion that Mosier’s actions are not protected by
quasi-judicial immunity.
“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be
discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.” (Pizarro v.
Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) Plaintiffs have forfeited any
argument regarding the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis and therefore
have not met their burden as appellants of demonstrating prejudicial error.
8
(Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) Nevertheless, we address the first step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis and conclude Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of
protected activity.
We start by identifying the activity underlying or forming the
basis for Plaintiffs’ claims. “[T]he focus is on determining what ‘the
defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’” (Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)
Plaintiffs alleged that Mosier failed to comply with the court’s
order to liquidate the investment accounts. Phrased in another (and more
neutral way), Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of Mosier’s decision not to liquidate
the investment accounts. 4 The damages alleged by Plaintiffs were caused by
the drop in value of the investment accounts between the issuance of
December 7, 2021 order and February 3, 2022, the date on which Mosier was
relieved of his duties as receiver. The proximate cause of the alleged damages
was Mosier’s decision regarding liquidation of the investment accounts; those
damages presumably would not have been suffered if Mosier had liquidated
those accounts.
4 Whether Mosier’s decisions about liquidating the investment
accounts constituted a violation of the December 7, 2021 order has not, to our
knowledge, ever been adjudicated.
9
Plaintiffs’ claims against Mosier arose out of conduct protected by
section 425.16(e)(4). 5 Section 425.16(e)(4) is a catchall provision protecting
“any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” (Italics added.) To be protected under
section 425.16(e)(4), the conduct must have referred to an issue of public
interest or contributed to public discussion or resolution of the issue. (Wilson
v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 900.)
Mosier’s conduct and decisions as a court-appointed receiver were
in furtherance of the exercise of a constitutional right of petition—the
criminal prosecution of Simon Semaan. As to that prosecution, Plaintiffs’
complaint alleged: “On September 8, 2021, the People of the State of
California . . . filed a felony complaint charging Simon Semaan with seven
counts in violation of Section 11760[, subdivision] (a) of the California
Insurance Code, a felony[,] for allegedly making knowingly false or
fraudulent statements to the determination of the premium rate for a
Worker’s Compensation insurance policy for the purpose of reducing the
premium, rate, or cost of said insurance.” In his declaration in support of the
anti-SLAPP motion, Mosier stated: “On or about September 8, 2021, I was
5 Plaintiffs’ claims did not arise out of Mosier’s written or oral
statements and therefore do not fall within section 425.16(e)(1) or (2). There
were, to be sure, communications made in connection with the investment
accounts: Mosier communicated with TDAmeritrade and, in his reports and
petition for instructions, to the court. But those communications were merely
incidental to Plaintiffs’ claims and did not undeerlie or form the basis for
them. (Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 312–313.) Instead,
the “core injury producing conduct” alleged by Plaintiffs (Starr v. Ashbrook
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1020), was Mosier’s decision itself not to liquidate
the investment accounts. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)
10
appointed as Receiver in the criminal case of The People of the State of
California v. Simon Semaan, which was pending in this Court under case
number 21CF2545, and wherein Plaintiff Simon Semaan was a criminal
defendant in one of the largest workers compensation insurance fraud cases
in California.” 6
The prosecution of one of the largest workers’ compensation
insurance fraud cases in California history certainly raises public issues or is
a matter of public interest that “‘could affect large numbers of people beyond
the direct participants.’” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 133, 145.) Mosier’s role as receiver and his exercise of control over
millions of dollars in assets bore a direct functional relationship to that
prosecution and its effect on the public. (Id. at p. 150.)
B. Step Two: Mosier Is Protected by Quasi-Judicial Immunity
At the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate the claims have at least “‘minimal merit’”
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061) by making “a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” Plaintiffs could not establish their
claims have minimal merit because Mosier’s actions as receiver are subject to
quasi-judicial immunity.
“Judicial immunity bars civil actions against judges for acts they
perform in the exercise of their judicial functions.” (Holt v. Brock (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 611, 620–621 (Holt).) “[Judicial] immunity is necessary in order
to have an independent and impartial judiciary. The public is best served
when its judicial officers are free from fear of personal consequences for acts
performed in their judicial capacity.” (Id. at p. 621.)
6 Plaintiffs did not object to any part of Mosier’s declaration.
11
Quasi-judicial immunity extends judicial immunity to persons
other than judges when acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. (Holt,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) Quasi-judicial immunity has been held to
apply to three classes of persons who are not judges. (Ibid.) The first class
includes persons, such as temporary judges, arbitrators, and prosecutors, who
perform functions that are usually performed by a judge or who act in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. (Ibid.) Such functions may include
investigating crimes and instituting criminal proceedings. (Ibid.) The second
class includes persons, such as arbitrators, referees, and mediators, “who
function apart from the courts but are engaged in neutral dispute resolution.”
(Id. at p. 622.)
Relevant here is the third class of persons entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity, which “includes persons connected to the judicial process
who are not public officials, arbitrators, or referees, but who serve functions
integral to the judicial process and act as arms of the court.” (Holt, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 622.) “This class includes (1) persons appointed by the
courts for their expertise, such as mediators, guardians ad litem, therapists,
receivers, Probate Code court investigators, custody evaluators, and
bankruptcy trustees; and (2) persons not appointed by the courts but whose
work product comes into the judicial process to be used by the courts, such as
probation officers who prepare presentencing reports and social workers and
psychiatrists involved in terminating parental rights.” (Ibid., italics added.)
“Without immunity, these persons ‘will be reluctant to accept court
appointments or provide work product for the court’s use. Additionally, the
threat of civil liability may affect the manner in which they perform their
jobs.’” (Id. at p. 623, quoting Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843,
857 (Howard).)
12
No California state court has squarely decided whether court-
appointed receivers are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. In Holt and in
Howard, the Court of Appeal included receivers as among nonjudicial persons
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. (Holt, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 622;
Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 855.) But in neither Holt nor Howard
was the court called upon to decide whether a court-appointed receiver
enjoyed such immunity. (Holt, at pp. 615–616, 624–625 [court-appointed real
estate broker protected by quasi-judicial immunity]; Howard, at pp. 847–848,
858–859 [psychologist who conducted evaluation of child in custody dispute
protected by quasi-judicial immunity].)
Several federal courts have decided that court-appointed
receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. In New Alaska Dev. Corp.
v. Guetschow (9th Cir. 1989) 869 F.2d 1298, 1303, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that receivers appointed by state courts are entitled to “absolute
derivative judicial immunity.” The court explained: “‘[R]eceivers are court
officers who share the immunity awarded to judges.’ [Citations.] Absent
broad immunity, receivers would be ‘a lightning rod for harassing litigation
aimed at judicial orders.’” (Ibid.) Other federal courts uniformly have
concluded that state court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial
immunity. (See, e.g., Suny v. KCP Advisory Grp., LLC (1st Cir. 2025) 152
F.4th 25, 31 [court-appointed receiver entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
because it acts were judicial in nature]; Trinh v. Fineman (3d Cir. 2021) 9
F.4th 235, 237–238 [“We conclude that the policies underlying judicial
immunity similarly support immunity for state court-appointed receivers”];
Property Management & Invest., Inc. v. Lewis (11th Cir. 1985) 752 F.2d 599,
603 [receiver immune from liability for decisions made in the course of
administering the receivership]; Brown v. Costello (N.D.N.Y. 1995) 905
13
F.Supp. 65, 76 [policy of affording quasi-judicial immunity to court-appointed
receivers is to ensure that they are able to carry out a judge’s order without
constant fear of litigation]; see Davis v. Bayless, Bayless & Stokes (5th Cir.
1995) 70 F.3d 367, 373 [“Court appointed receivers act as arms of the court
and are entitled to share the appointing judge’s absolute immunity” (italics
added)].)
We agree that court-appointed receivers should enjoy quasi-
judicial immunity. The policies and reasons for quasi-judicial immunity
support extending such immunity to court-appointed receivers. Without
immunity, receivers would be less likely to accept court appointment and the
implied threat of liability could affect their decisionmaking process. (Holt,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 623.) In the situation presented by this case, for
example, rather than liquidate when practicable, as required by the
December 7, 2021 order, a receiver might decide to delay liquidation to avoid
losses for which the receiver would be held liable. Or, a receiver, fearful of
liability for any delay in liquidation, might decide to liquidate immediately
even though ongoing settlement discussions could make liquidation
unnecessary.
The extension of quasi-judicial immunity to court-appointed
receivers leads to the question of the breadth of that immunity. Because one
reason for granting quasi-judicial immunity is “to promote uninhibited and
independent decisionmaking” (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 843,
852–853), such immunity, we conclude, is limited to discretionary
(nonministerial) acts and decisions, that is, “when they use their judgment or
discretion in performing their jobs” (id. at p. 857, citing Hardy v. Vial (1957)
48 Cal.2d 577, 582 (Hardy)). “When judicial immunity is extended to officials
other than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functionally comparable’
14
to those of judges—that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary
judgment’ as a part of their function.” (Antoine v. Byers & Anderson (1993)
508 U.S. 429, 436, fn. omitted (Antoine); see Forrester v. White (1988) 484
U.S. 219, 229–230 [judges have immunity only for decisions made as
adjudicators].) Such quasi-judicial immunity for court-appointed receivers
would not extend to nondiscretionary, ministerial acts. (See Holt, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 623 [“the court’s listing orders . . . vested an element of
discretionary authority in Brock to assist the court in resolving the dispute
between plaintiff and his sister”].) Nor would quasi-judicial immunity extend
to intentional misconduct, such as self-dealing, that is not taken in the
receiver’s quasi-judicial capacity or in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.
(Regan v. Price (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496.)
There is no question that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants
arose out of conduct falling within the scope of Mosier’s responsibilities as
receiver. Plaintiffs argue that Mosier is not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity, however, because compliance with the December 7, 2021 order to
liquidate their investment accounts was, they claim, ministerial and did not
require Mosier to make a discretionary decision. We disagree. Plaintiffs fail
to appreciate the language in the December 7, 2021 order that the receiver
liquidate the accounts “as soon as practicable.” Determining when it was
practicable to liquidate the accounts was a decision requiring Mosier to
“‘exercise a discretionary judgment’” (Antoine, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 436) in
light of the circumstances presented.
In the second petition for instructions, which was an exhibit to
Plaintiffs’ complaint, Mosier explained that settlement negotiations, which
would have eliminated the need to liquidate the investment accounts, had
occurred after December 7, 2021. In his declaration, Mosier stated he was
15
“reluctant to launch into a protracted and expensive process” of liquidating
the accounts. Mosier also explained in the second petition for instructions
that efforts to liquidate the investments accounts were paused once he was
advised Simon Semaan’s brother was selling a building that could pay all
arrearages on workers’ compensation coverage, and that TDAmeritrade had
imposed requirements on closing the accounts that would have made Mosier
the beneficial owner of the account proceeds.
Whether or not those circumstances actually made liquidating
the investment accounts impracticable is not dispositive: It is sufficient to
confer quasi-judicial immunity that Mosier, as receiver, had to make a
decision about when it was practicable to liquidate. Quasi-judicial immunity
protects both right and wrong decisions. “The justification for doing so is that
it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has
been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in
the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest
calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of
which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his
good faith.” (Gregoire v. Biddle (1949) 177 F.2d 579, 581 (Opn. of L. Hand, J.),
quoted in Hardy, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 582–583.)
Government Code section 820.2 grants public employees
immunity from liability “for an injury resulting from his act or omission
where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion
vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Because we
conclude Mosier is protected by quasi-judicial immunity, we need not decide
whether he also enjoys immunity under section 820.2.
16
DISPOSITION
The order granting Mosier’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed.
Mosier may recover costs on appeal.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
BANCROFT, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17