Moles

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DAISY JEAN MOLES, ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-01008

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

)

v. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT ANGELA ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SMITH, et al., ) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendants. )

I. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

This matter comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Reuben J. Sheperd, pursuant to N.D. OHIO L.R. 3.1(a) (Assignment of Cases), N.D. OHIO

L.R. 72.2 (Assignment and Referral of Matters to Magistrate Judges), and ECF #11 (Order of

Referral). The Report and Recommendation (ECF#29), issued on December 18, 2025, is hereby

ADOPTED by this Court, without objection.

On May 16, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Daisy Jean Moles filed a Complaint for a Civil Case,

utilizing the Form provided by the Clerk of Court for the filing of pro se complaints (ECF #1)

(“Complaint”). Her Complaint asserted two Counts of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against various persons holding positions within the Madison, Ohio Local School

District,! generally alleging “Violation of constitutional rights under the First and F ourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,” (ECF #1, p.3, PageID #4), specifically, “First

Amendment Retaliation” (Count I) and “Equal Protection Retaliation” (Count II). (ECF #1-1,

pp.4-5, PageID #10-#11). The Complaint was later amended, on July 2, 2025, to also include

the Madison Local School Board District Board of Education as a Defendant, and to assert three

additional constitutional claims of “Procedural Due Process Violation” (Count III), “Civil Rights

Conspiracy” (Count IV), and “Monell Liability” (Count V)? (ECF #12, Amended Complaint,

p.1 & pp.5-6, PageID #69 & PageID #73-#74) (“Amended Complaint”).

After the Amended Complaint was filed, all Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings, pursuant to FED. R. P. 12(c), requesting that the matter be dismissed in its

entirety. (ECF #18). Pursuant to the Order of Referral issued in this case, (ECF #11), the matter

was referred to Magistrate Judge Sheperd, under N.D. OHIO L.R. 72.1, to “issue any preliminary

orders and conduct any necessary evidentiary hearing or other appropriate proceeding, and file

with the Court a report containing proposed findings and recommendation for disposition of

case-dispositive motions.” (ECF #11, pp.1-2, PageID #67-#68) (citation omitted).

Specifically, the Complaint named as Defendants Angela Smith, Superintendent

of the Madison Local School District; Jack Whaley, Principal of Madison Middle School

(designated as Madison High School in the Complaint); Shawn Douglas, the President of

the Madison Local School District Board of Education; and Michelle Hayes, J eff

Thompson, Brian Horvath, and Jean Sency, each of whom is a Member of the Madison

Local School District Board of Education. (ECF #1, pp. 2-first and 2-second, PageID #2-

#3).

Referring to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which creates a vehicle

by which municipal bodies may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional

policies or practices.

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In his Report and Recommendation, (ECF #29), Magistrate Judge Sheperd found that

“the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts upon which relief might be granted[,] and

[f]urthermore, the facts alleged do not warrant that [Plaintiff Daisy Jean] Moles be permitted

additional amendments to her Complaint or otherwise attempt to revive her claims.” (ECF #29,

Report and Recommendation, pp.1-2, PageID #205-#206) (inserts supplied).

Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

To put into context this Court’s review of the Report and Recommendation, and its

ultimate adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s findings, a recitation of the pertinent factual

background will be helpful, drawn verbatim from the Report and Recommendation,’ with

occasional inserts added by this Court, and the citation form amended to coincide with that used

elsewhere in this Memorandum and Order.

[Plaintiff Daisy Jean] Moles is a former resident of Lake County, Ohio; she is a parent of

a student who was previously enrolled in Madison Local School District and was actively

engaged at the school. (ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.2, PagelD #70). Defendant Smith was

the Superintendent of that school district at the time of the allegations in the Complaint;

Defendant Whaley is the Principal of Madison Middle School|[;] and Defendants Douglas,

Hayes, Horvath, Thompson, and Sency were Madison School Board members.* (ECF #17,

Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, p.2, 4-6,

PagelD #98) (“Answer to Amended Complaint”). The Board is a public body organized under

See ECF #29, Report and Recommendation, pp.3-5, PageID #207-#209.

See n.1, supra, for Defendants’ full names and titles.

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Ohio law. (d., p.2, J [5], PageID #70).

Moles states that between 2021 and 2023, she was an active parent at Madison Middle

School, serving as president of the Parents and Kids (“PAK”) Group at Madison Middle School.

(ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.3, { 8, PageID #71). She organized events and fundraising,

and attended school board meetings. (/d.). Moles alleges that, starting in 2021, she voiced

concerns about the district’s transparency, administrative accountability, and student welfare,

both at school board meetings and via email correspondence. (Id., p.3, 19, PageID #71). She

also submitted public records requests under Ohio Revised Code § 149.43 regarding Board

policy, financial oversight, and school practices. (/d., p.3, { 10, PageID #71; ECF #17, Answer

to Amended Complaint, p.3, { 12, PageID #99). She alleges she engaged in lawful, civil, and

cooperative conduct and her behavior would not warrant exclusion from school events or public

meetings. (ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.3, { 12, PageID #71).

In 2022, Moles was removed from leadership in the PAK group. (/d., p.3, { 13a, PageID

#71). She alleges this was done through Defendants’ control. (/d., pp.3-4, {ff 13a & 13f, PagelD

#71-#72). Defendants maintain that the PAK group is independent of their control and admit

only that she “was removed” from leadership. (/d.; ECF #17, Answer to Amended Complaint,

pp.4-5, IF 16 & 21, PageID #100-#101).

Moles alleges, without specificity, that Defendants reported her to local police “under

false pretenses of financial misconduct.” (ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.3, { 13b, PageID

#71). She states no audit, charges, or formal complaint followed. (/d.). Defendants respond

that “the police were involved with” claims regarding Moles’ handling of school funding. (ECF

#17, Answer to Amended Complaint, p.4, | 17, PageID #100).

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Moles states that she submitted public records requests in 2024 and 2025. (ECF #12,

Amended Complaint, p.3, § 13c, PageID #71). Defendants responded to these requests but had

no responsive materials to provide, stating that records that Moles believed to exist did not exist,

or that a settlement agreement prevented disclosure; Moles characterizes these responses as

denials. (/d.). Defendants admit that they responded to the public records requests as violative

of a settlement agreement and/or were legally insufficient. (ECF #17, Answer to Amended

Complaint, p.4, | 18, PageID #100).

Moles also states she and her adult daughter (who is not a plaintiff in this suit) were

required to undergo and pay for a background check in order to chaperone a school dance. (ECF

#12, Amended Complaint, pp.3-4, { 13d, PageID #71-#72). Moles alleges that other parents

were permitted to chaperone without the same background check process. (Id.). In 2023, Moles

alleges that the Board announced a new policy that only staff would be permitted to chaperone

school events. (/d.). Despite communication with the superintendent regarding the policy,

Moles was not permitted to chaperone a school dance. (/d.). Moles’ daughters attended the

dance and were placed at a table monitored by the assistant superintendent (who is not a

defendant). (/d.). Defendants admit that it was school policy to require Moles and her adult

daughter [to] submit to and pay for a background check to chaperone a school dance. (ECF #17,

Answer to Amended Complaint, p.5, { 19, PageID #101). They also admit that the Board revised

policies regarding chaperones. (/d.).

Moles states that, during a public school board meeting in 2022, she exceeded her

speaking time, and Defendants cut her microphone, left the stage, and summoned police. (ECF

#12, Amended Complaint, p.4, { 13e, PageID #72). She states other speakers were permitted

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reasonable extensions for speaking time. (/d.). She also states she was “falsely labeled a

trespasser and the meeting was halted until she left.” (/d.). Defendants admit that “police were

called in response to [Moles] trespassing during a Board meeting.” (ECF #17, Answer to

Amended Complaint, p.5, { 20, PageID #101). They also state that Moles “violated the rules in

place for Board meetings.” (/d.).

Moles states she was not notified of her alleged wrongdoing or offered a forum to contest

the above actions. (ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.4, § 15, PageID #72).

I. FINDINGS OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge found, in his Report and Recommendation (ECF #29) that the

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (/d., p.8, PageID

#212).

As to Count I, asserting “First Amendment Retaliation,” based on Plaintiff's claims that

the Defendants conspired to retaliate against her for conduct protected by the First Amendment,

(see ECF #29, p.9, PageID #213) (citing the Amended Complaint generally), the Report and

Recommendation first sets out the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, that Plaintiff

must show that: (1) she engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) that the individual

defendants named in her Amended Complaint took adverse actions against her that caused her to

suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that

activity; and (3) the individual defendants’ actions were motivated, at least in part, by the

exercise of her constitutional rights.” (ECF #29, Report and Recommendation, p.9, PageID

#213) (citing McElhaney v. Williams, 81 F.4th 550, 556 (6" Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.

696 (2024)). The Magistrate Judge then, after carefully considering each of the facts asserted by

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Plaintiff in her Amended Complaint, found that while “at the pleadings stage and construing [the

facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint] in her favor, the Court may presume that [her]

alleged speech and her ability to make public records request[s] is protected by the First

Amendment,” (ECF #29, p.10, PageID #214), Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts sufficient

to satisfy the second and third elements of her claim, (id., pp. 11-14, PageID #215-#218). The

Court agrees with these findings.

As to Count II, asserting “Equal Protection Violation,” in which Plaintiff claims she

“was treated differently than similarly situated parents and community members,” and that this

“differential treatment lacked a rational basis and was motivated by viewpoint discrimination

and personal animus” resulting in “constitutional injury and damages,” (see ECF #29, p.14,

PageID #218) (citing ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.5, {{ 22-24, PageID #73), the Report and

Recommendation found that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint “fails to allege sufficient facts to

meet the threshold showing of disparate treatment based on viewpoint” required to assert an

equal protection claim, (ECF #29, p.16, PageID #220), as described by the Sixth Circuit in

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6" Cir. 2011), and that

her “claims of disparate treatment do not cross the plausibility threshold required at the

pleadings stage,” as required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), (ECF

#29, p.16, PageID #220). The Court agrees with this finding.

As to Count III, asserting “Due Process Violation,” based on Plaintiff's claims that the

individual defendants excluded her from civic participation, harmed her liberty interests in her

reputation and public engagement, and that she was not given notice or hearing to defend her

rights or clear her name, (see ECF #29, p.18, PageID #222) (citing ECF #12, Amended

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Complaint, p.5, §§ 25-27, PageID #73), the Report and Recommendation found that, even

reading the allegations of the Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the “due

process” claim failed to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a),

particularly with respect to her claims related to the “stigma-plus framework,” as described in

Doe v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 (6" Cir. 2007), for which, “to state a

colorable claim of procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must allege an injury to their

reputation (the stigma), coupled with the deprivation of a tangible liberty interest or property

right (the plus) without adequate process,” (ECF #29, p.19, PageID #223) (citing Printup v. Dir.,

Ohio Dep’t of Job & Fam. Servs., 654 F. App’x 781, 785 (6" Cir. 2016)). The Court agrees with

this finding.

As to Count IV, asserting “Civil Rights Conspiracy,” based on Plaintiff's claims that

“Defendants acted in concert and agreement” to violate her constitutional rights, “including

coordinated exclusions, false allegations, and weaponization of school procedures,” (see ECF

#29, p.20, PageID #224) (citing ECF #12, Amended Complaint, p.6, 1] 28-29, PageID #74), the

Report and Recommendation found that the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,” in which a

Section 1983 conspiracy claim is barred if the alleged conspiracy is by and between the

employees or agents of the same collective entity (here, the Madison Local School District

Board of Education), see Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 817-19 (6" Cir. 2019),

precluded the availability to Plaintiff of a “conspiracy claim” under Section 1983, and barred the

claim under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. (ECF #29, p. 21, PageID #225). The Court

agrees with this finding.

Finally, as to Count V, asserting “Monell Liability against the Board of Education,”

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based on Plaintiff’s allegation that the Board “maintained policies, customs, or practices that

allowed unconstitutional conduct to occur unchecked [and] . . . failed to train, supervise, or

discipline its members and administrators” which “directly caused the violations of Plaintiff's

constitutional rights,” (see ECF #29, p.22, PageID #226) (citing ECF #12, Amended Complaint,

p.6, Jf 31-33, PageID #74), the Report and Recommendation found, “[flirst, [that] Monell [v.

Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] does not impose a separate cause of action, and thus,

Count V is not a proper claim on its own,” (ECF #29, p.23, PageID #227), that even if “Monell

liability might later attach to the Board, [Plaintiff] has not provided factual support for her

theory” as “the Amended Complaint recites [only] bare legal conclusions to support Count V

regarding Monell liability,” (id.), and that “additional factual development will not bolster

[Plaintiff's] theory,” because, as described in the analysis related to Counts I through IV,

Plaintiff's constitutional claims fail, and thus “the Board has no liability where there is no

constitutional violation.” (Id.) (citing Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6" Cir. 2014))

(“There can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.”). The

Court agrees with these findings.

Based on the Magistrate Judge’s analysis on each of the five claims pled in the Amended

Complaint, the Report and Recommendation recommends that each of the claims be dismissed

on their merits, as requested in Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #18).

(See, ECF #29, p.14 [Count I], p.18 [Count Il], p.20 [Count III], p.21 [Count IV] & p.23 [Count

V], PageID #218, #222, #224, #225 & #227). In addition, the Report & Recommendation finds

that Plaintiff’s improper use of “group pleading,” with which Plaintiff asserts her claims

generally against the individual Defendants, rather than by identifying facts describing what each

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Defendant did to allegedly violate her constitutional rights, “fails to provide [the individual

defendants] sufficient notice of the alleged conduct supporting Moles’ Section 1983 claims,”

and thus recommends granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be granted as to all of

the individual Defendants. (ECF #29, p. 27, PageID #231). The Court agrees with these

findings as well.

The Report and Recommendation further addresses a defense of qualified immunity

raised by each of the individual defendants, and recommends that each of Counts I through IV

[in effect, all the Counts asserted against individual Defendants] be dismissed on qualified

immunity grounds, in addition to merits grounds (See ECF #29, pp.27-38, PageID #23 1-#242).

The Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation’s findings with respect to its analysis of

qualified immunity on these claims.

The Report and Recommendation also addresses a defense raised by the Defendants

based on statute of limitations grounds. (See ECF #29, pp. 38-42, PageID #242-#246). After

conducting a thorough analysis on the arguments raised on this issue, the Report and

Recommendation notes, “{flor the reasons given in more detail in the previous sections, Moles’

Amended Complaint does not provide sufficient factual allegations to support — or in this case,

dismiss — her claims” based on statute of limitations grounds, (ECF #29, p.41, PageID #245),

and therefore, “recommend{s] in the alternative, should the District Court disagree with the

recommendation of dismissal, that Defendants’ dismissal on statute of limitations grounds be

denied.” (Id., p.42, PageID #246). As the Court agrees with the analysis and findings of the

Report and Recommendation regarding each of the claims addressed on their merits, as well as

those based on qualified immunity grounds, the Court need not make a formal ruling on the

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statute of limitations argument in adopting the findings of the Report and Recommendation, but

hereby notes its agreement with the analysis provided therein.

Finally, the Report and Recommendation finds that permitting further amendments to the

Amended Complaint would not lead to establishment of meritorious constitutional claims, and

that the claims be dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend. (ECF #29, pp.42-44,

PageID #246-#248). Specifically, the Report and Recommendation notes:

[Mly recommendation of dismissal with prejudice is not based on inartful

pleadings. Throughout this Report and Recommendation, I have

endeavored to provide Moles her due deference as the pro se plaintiff.

With each claim, I have considered whether, through thoughtful case

management procedures and court oversight in discovery proceedings,

Moles might uncover factual support for her current allegations. At any

rate, my detailed review of the claims in the Amended Complaint, coupled

with consideration of Moles’ briefings in the case do not reveal claims that

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. With this in mind, it'does not

appear that further facts will arise to support any Section 1983 claim

against Defendants.

(ECF #29. p.44, PageID #248).

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on a full review of the arguments presented, the applicable law, and the record

before the Court, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF #29) made the

following recommendations:

Having reviewed Moles’ Amended Complaint, I conclude that she has

failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims, and further factual

development through amendment would be futile. I therefore recommend

that Counts I-IV be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on

which relief can be granted. Count V states a theory of liability and

thereby states no claims. I therefore recommend Count V also be

dismissed with prejudice. I further recommend that, because the doctrine

of qualified immunity protects the Individual Defendants from suit, Counts

I-IV be dismissed with prejudice.

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However, should the District Court disagree that Moles’ case be

dismissed, I find there are insufficient facts at the pleadings stage to

clearly demonstrate whether the statute of limitations applies. I therefore

recommend in the alternative that the District Court deny Defendants’

motion with respect to their statute of limitations defense.

(ECF #29, pp.44-45, PageID #248-#249).

Plaintiff Daisy Jean Moles has not since filed any objections to the Magistrate J udge’s

December 18, 2025 Report and Recommendation.

Vv. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court has reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation, see Ohio Citizen

Action v. City of Seven Hills, 35 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (N.D. Ohio 1999), and ADOPTS the

Report and Recommendation in its entirety as to its recommendations of dismissal based on both

failure to state claims on the merits with respect to Counts I through V, as well as on qualified

immunity grounds with respect to Counts I through IV. The Court also ADOPTS the

recommendation that these claims be dismissed with prejudice.

As the Court ADOPTS the above recommendations of the Report and Recommendation,

it need not issue a formal ruling on the alternative recommendation related to Defendants’

statute of limitations defense.

Accordingly, this matter is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONALD C. NUGENT | 2

United States District Judge

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