Jarett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

MATTHEW “REESE” JARETT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:24-cv-02151-HLT-TJJ

DAVID HARPER-HEAD,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This § 1983 excessive-force case arises out of an underage drinking party that ended badly.

Plaintiff Matthew “Reese” Jarett attended the party at his friend’s house and drank some alcohol

before falling asleep on the couch. Law enforcement believed Jarett was a suspect who had just

led an officer on a foot chase. Law enforcement tried to wake him to question him. But Jarett is a

heavy sleeper and repeatedly batted their hands away. Defendant David Harper-Head, a deputy

with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, eventually tased Jarett during a struggle to

handcuff him. Harper-Head contends that Jarett was not complying with law enforcement orders

and was being combative. Jarett counters that any movement in response to law enforcement trying

to wake him was involuntary and non-threatening.

Harper-Head asserts qualified immunity and moves for summary judgment. Doc. 96. He

argues there was no constitutional violation because his use of the taser was reasonable under the

circumstances and he did not violate Jarett’s clearly established rights. The parties disagree about

who escalated the situation and whether Jarett posed a threat to officer safety. These questions go

to the heart of whether Jarett used constitutionally excessive force. But there is another legal hurdle

that Jarett barely addresses (if at all). Jarett must identify clearly established law that Harper-Head

violated. This is where he falls short. He carries the burden for both prongs of the qualified-

immunity analysis, and he does not satisfy the second prong even when all facts and disputes are

construed in his favor. Harper-Head is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Court grants

his summary-judgment motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

The parties agree on many of the general background facts about how the underage party

was busted. They often do not agree on the inferences to be drawn from those facts. But the Court

resolves all factual disputes and reasonable inferences in favor of Jarett.

The relevant events happened late at night on April 16, 2022. Jarett was eighteen years old

at the time. He was at his friend Joshua Martin’s house. Martin’s parents were not home, and

several underage kids were drinking alcohol at the house. Martin and three others left the house at

some point and drove Martin’s golf cart onto the golf course, drinking and listening to music. Jarett

had already fallen asleep in the basement before they left. He does not recall what or how much

he drank.

Someone called the Garnett Police Department about 11:30 p.m. to report that a group of

juveniles was riding around the golf course and being loud. Officer Michael Baumgardner

responded to the area. He saw a white male wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and shorts by the

golf cart garages. He identified himself as a police officer and yelled at the male to stop. The male

ignored Baumgardner’s commands and ran. Baumgardner pursued him on foot and called for back-

up. Baumgardner lost sight of the subject and thought he entered the house at 16 Links Drive

(Martin’s house). Baumgardner rang the doorbell multiple times but no one answered. He retraced

his steps and found abandoned beer cans on the ground along the trail he had run.

1 For purposes of summary judgment, the following facts are uncontroverted or recited in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.

Meanwhile, back-up law enforcement arrived at the house. Garnett Police Department

Officer Scott Polster responded, along with Anderson County Sheriff’s Office Deputies Hayden

Seabolt and Harper-Head. Baumgardner told them what he had seen thus far. Harper-Head could

also see a large amount of alcohol on the kitchen counter through an open window shade.

Baumgardner saw Martin outside the house. Martin admitted that he lived at 16 Links

Drive, that he and several underage friends had been drinking, and that the person who ran from

Baumgardner was possibly inside the house. Baumgardner explained that he needed to contact the

person who ran from him, that he wanted to have a face-to-face discussion to investigate, and that

he planned to issue the person a citation at a minimum. Martin called his mother at Baumgardner’s

request to ask permission for law enforcement to enter the home. She gave permission.

Martin immediately tried to wake Jarett when he went inside the house. He knew Jarett

was a rough sleeper, so he “knew a cop trying to come down there to wake him up was not going

to be the—be a good thing.” Doc. 98-2 at 13. Baumgardner saw Jarett lying on the couch and

immediately remarked, “There he is,” because he thought Jarett was the person who had run from

him ten minutes earlier based on Jarett’s body type and clothing. Baumgardner later told the other

officers, “This is going to be him,” meaning he thought (albeit erroneously) that Jarett was the

person who had run from him. There is no dispute that the officers believed Jarett was the runner.

The other boys told them he was not, but the officers were operating on Baumgardner’s positive

identification of him based on seeing the suspect outside roughly ten minutes before.

Baumgardner identified himself as law enforcement to Jarett and repeatedly tried to wake

Jarett for two-and-a-half minutes. He tried sternal rubs, which involve rubbing up and down on

the sternum with the knuckles of the hand to elicit a response. Sternal rubs are meant to garner a

reaction from a subject if they are pretending to be asleep or playing possum. There was no eye

movement showing that Jarett was opening his eyes or being consciously responsive. Jarett batted

Baumgardner’s hand away several times, and Baumgardner remarked in his deposition that Jarett

“was very incoherent.” Doc. 106-3 at 13. Jarett also grabbed Baumgardner’s dominant hand.

Baumgardner told him to “stop grabbing me dude,” and Martin said, “Reese, chill” to try to get

Jarett to stop brushing Baumgardner away. Id. at 14. Baumgardner recognized that it was “not a

safe position for him to have grabbed me” by his dominant hand and “[n]ot a great situation for

me to be in at that point in time.” Id.

Baumgardner eventually walked away to clear the rest of the basement. He felt it was safe

to do so while he waited for EMS to arrive and to see if there was anyone else in the basement

needing medical assistance. Baumgardner regarded Jarett’s actions as the response of “somebody

that was asleep or not fully conscious trying to respond to a stimulus coming towards them.” Id.

at 7. He knew based on prior experience with suspects in an altered state of consciousness that

“there’s sympathetic reactions that people have when they’re not fully conscious that they’re not

necessarily in control of.” Id. at 8.

Harper-Head started trying to get Jarett up when Baumgardner walked away. Harper-Head

identified himself as law enforcement and repeatedly told Jarett to wake up. He expressed concern

that Jarett might have alcohol poisoning and asked Martin how much Jarett had to drink. Martin

responded that Jarett was a heavy sleeper and that he did not think Jarett had consumed that much

alcohol. Harper-Head thought that Jarett was playing possum and that Jarett hoped “this just goes

away if he sits there and continues to do this, which it’s not going to go away.” Doc. 106-1 at 151.

Jarett brushed Harper-Head’s hands away. Harper-Head said, “Dude, watch with your

hands.” Doc. 98-6 (Harper-Head body camera video). When Jarett batted Harper-Head’s hands

away again, Harper-Head called Seabolt (the other sheriff’s deputy) over. Harper-Head said, “He’s

going in cuffs.” Doc. 98-7 at 11. Martin told Jarett, “Don’t be doin’ stuff,” and “Reese, you don’t

want to do this, come on, just wake up.” Doc. 98-2 at 16. Martin testified that he tried to de-escalate

the situation because the officers started to get upset and more heated, and he did not want to see

it go any further.

Harper-Head testified in deposition that he wanted to handcuff Jarett because Jarett was

not following commands and had grabbed Baumgardner and batted at Harper-Head. Harper-Head

felt that Jarett was getting worse and more combative. Harper-Head tried for about one-and-a-half

minutes to get Jarett up before he and Seabolt pulled Jarett off the couch and onto the floor. They

directed Jarett to sit up (multiple times) and grabbed his arms. They attempted to secure Jarett’s

hands, and Harper-Head twice told Jarett to “stop resisting police officers.” Doc. 98-6 (Harper-

Head body camera video). Martin and/or other juveniles in the background of the video also

repeatedly told Jarett to stop. Id.

Baumgardner returned to the area when he heard the juveniles telling Jarett to calm down

and heard Harper-Head speaking with a raised voice. He then saw the deputies attempting to detain

Jarett. There was a struggle. Harper-Head was giving Jarett orders that Jarett was not following.

Polster stated in his report that Jarett was “actively resisting” being put in handcuffs. Harper-Head

testified, “[I]t can deflate your ego a little bit when you realize an 18-year-old man is giving, you

know, three police officers a good run for their money in arresting him, but he did. So, [Jarett] is

a very strong young man.” Doc. 98-7 at 9.

The record includes videos of the struggle on and off the couch. One is from Harper-Head’s

body camera and the other is from Baumgardner’s body camera (which shows only the tail end of

the struggle). It is difficult to verify from the videos what was happening during the struggle. The

scene was chaotic, made more so by the location and movement of the cameras. The audio

indicates that the deputies were telling Jarett to stop resisting and there was activity and

commotion. Harper-Head describes the struggle as being Jarett’s fault. Jarett cannot remember

anything between falling asleep and being tased, so he cannot controvert whether he resisted or

batted away officers. Doc. 98-1 at 8, 9. Harper-Head states that Jarett hit him in the upper right

thigh. But the Court assumes that Jarett did not because the video is unclear and neither

Baumgardner nor Martin saw it happen. Polster then told Jarett that he was going to get tased, and

two seconds later, Harper-Head applied his taser to Jarett’s back for a single five-second cycle in

the “drive stun” mode.

The officers were able to get Jarett handcuffed after Harper-Head tased him. They placed

him under arrest. He was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, consumption of

alcohol by a minor, and interference with law enforcement.2 Jarett was placed in a standing

position and walked upstairs and outside to a patrol vehicle. Baumgardner again stated that Jarett

was the individual who ran from him, which he believed was true at the time. Jarett’s blood alcohol

content was .091.

There were four other juveniles in the room at the time Harper-Head arrested Jarett. They

were all physically and verbally compliant and answered officers’ questions. Harper-Head did not

believe that anyone else in the room would present a hazard or danger to officers before he arrested

Jarett. Martin even affirmatively tried to help officers arouse Jarett. Baumgardner told Jarett’s

friends after Jarett was arrested that, “I don’t know what’s going to happen to him, I was just going

2 These were the initial charges, but all charges were eventually dismissed except a minor-in-possession charge. The

Anderson County District Court approved a three-month diversion agreement. Jarett fulfilled the terms of the

agreement, and the charges against him were dismissed on September 26, 2022.

to leave him for EMS but they decided to do whatever they did, so that’s between them and him.”

Doc. 98-4 (Baumgardner body camera video).3

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party

bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate that

genuine issues remain for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586-87 (1986). Courts view the facts and any reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to

the non-moving party in applying this standard. Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567,

569 (10th Cir. 1994). “An issue of material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Harper-Head seeks summary judgment on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a

powerful defense for public servants that protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law” from the burdens of lawsuits. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225

(10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A defendant may assert qualified

immunity and the plaintiff then bears the burden of showing (1) that the defendant’s actions

violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the

3 Jarett urges the Court to consider additional facts related to Harper-Head’s prior employment, discipline, and

actions. But the evidence Jarett cites in support is not relevant to the Court’s qualified-immunity discussion. First,

as discussed below, the Court resolves this case on whether clearly-established law shows that Jarett’s actions were

unconstitutionally excessive. The Court assumes Jarett has stated a constitutional violation. Second, to the extent

Jarett attempts to show that Harper-Head had malicious intent when he decided to tase Jarett, whether

Harper-Head’s action was reasonable is an objective standard. Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1126 (10th

Cir. 2010). Harper-Head’s subjective intent is irrelevant. And third, the evidence Jarett cites is evidence of a violent

propensity, to suggest that Harper-Head acted in accord with such propensity here. Harper-Head’s prior actions

are not admissible for this purpose. See Riggs v. Cory, 2013 WL 4836813, at *2 (D. Kan. 2013).

violation. Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 2018). The Court may address either

inquiry first. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011); Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116,

1122-23 (10th Cir. 2018) (assuming a constitutional violation but reversing denial of qualified

immunity because the cases cited defined the right at issue at too high a level of generality). Here,

the Court exercises its discretion to consider the second qualified-immunity prong first.

“A plaintiff may show clearly established law by pointing to either a Supreme Court or

Tenth Circuit decision, or the weight of authority from other courts, existing at the time of the

alleged violation.” Knopf, 884 F.3d at 944 (internal quotation and citation omitted). A case directly

on point is not required. Lewis, 48 F.4th at 1198. Rather, the focus is on whether “a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

739 (2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A plaintiff cannot rely on the general

existence of a right in the usual case. See Knopf, 884 F.3d at 944; see also White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.

73, 80 (2017) (“[W]e have held that [the excessive-force cases of] Garner and Graham do not by

themselves create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious case.’”).

Jarett’s brief focuses on the first prong of qualified immunity, namely whether Harper-

Head’s actions violated his constitutional right to be free of excessive force. He emphasizes how

genuine issues of material fact can preclude summary judgment in excessive force cases. Doc. 106

at 26-28. But Jarett essentially collapses the qualified-immunity inquiry into only one question; he

neglects the second prong. He discusses at length the reasons why Harper-Head’s use of force was

excessive. And, as part of that discussion, he notes a few cases indicating that tasing an unarmed

misdemeanor suspect who is not resisting an officer violates the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., id.

at 32-33 (citing Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2016); Masters v. City of Independ.,

Mo., 998 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2021). And he cites another case for the general proposition that

courts will consider whether an officer’s reckless conduct unreasonably created the need for force.

See id. at 33-34 (citing Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 840-41 (10th 1997)). But these

cases are discussed in the context of whether Harper-Head violated Jarett’s constitutional rights,

and Jarett neither connects these cases directly to the event at hand nor discusses how they

demonstrate a clearly established right. None of the cited cases address whether the limited use of

a taser to subdue a struggling suspect in an altered state of consciousness violates the constitutional

right to be free of excessive force. The Court nevertheless discusses the cases cited.

First, in Perea, police chased Perea on a bicycle and pushed him off without warning or

explanation. 817 F.3d at 1203. They then tased him ten times in two minutes (including after he

was subdued) when he had committed a traffic infraction at most. Id. They were, in fact, initially

only looking for Perea for a welfare check. Id. at 1201. Perea resisted once police pushed him off

his bicycle by thrashing while holding a crucifix. Id. Sadly, he died after the event. Id. Perea held

that it was clearly established that using disproportionate force on a non-dangerous misdemeanor

suspect is unconstitutional. Id. at 1204. The appellate court further found that officers may not

continue using force after gaining control of a suspect. Id. That said, the facts of Perea show the

use of a taser ten times. And they also show that the officers did not stop after the suspect was

subdued. Here, Harper-Head applied the taser once, for five seconds. And there is no indication

that Harper-Head continued tasing Jarett after he was under control.4

Second, Masters was a traffic stop. 998 F.3d at 832. The suspect refused to exit his car. Id.

at 832-33. Law enforcement tried to physically remove him from the car. Id. at 833. The suspect

resisted, and the officer tased him for at least twenty seconds. Id. Masters found the prolonged

4 Jarett also cites Wilkins v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 33 F.4th 1265 (10th Cir. 2022). There are two reasons Wilkins does

not represent clearly established law on point. First, Wilkins was decided after the night at issue here. The Tenth

Circuit issued Wilkins on May 3, 2022. The night of the party was April 16, 2022. Second, like Perea, Wilkins

involved continued force (pepper spray in Wilkins) after a party was subdued.

tasing for fifteen seconds longer than necessary was excessive because the plaintiff was already

subdued. Id. at 836-37. Masters is a case from the Eighth Circuit and thus falls outside the scope

of individual cases5 used to determine what is clearly established. In any event, Masters involved

use of a taser for four times as long as in this case and involved continued use of the taser after the

suspect was under control. It does not provide clearly established law on point.

Third, Allen involved officers who responded to a call about an individual threatening

suicide. 119 F.3d at 839-41. The officers found the individual sitting in a car and holding a gun.

Id. Officers approached the vehicle, but the nature of their approach was disputed. Some witnesses

said one officer ran up to the car screaming. Id. at 841. Other testimony was that the officer

approached cautiously. Id. Officers ultimately shot the suspect when he pointed the gun toward

them. Id. at 839. The Tenth Circuit held that the differences in eyewitness testimony about the

officers’ approach were material fact disputes about whether “the officers’ actions were reckless

and precipitated the need to use deadly force.” Id. at 841. But Allen is not to be used broadly to

show clearly established law in the absence of “sufficient factual symmetry.” Arnold v. City of

Olathe, Kan., 35 F.4th 778, 794 (10th Cir. 2022). There is simply no factual symmetry between

this case and Allen.

These cases do not present factual similarities sufficient to put Harper-Head on notice that

his conduct would violate Jarett’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

Baumgardner and the officers believed that Jarett was the suspect who had run from police on the

golf course. They suspected that he was faking sleep (at least at first). But they were also concerned

Jarett may have had alcohol poisoning. The videos are unclear about all that was happening. They

do make clear, however, that Jarett was resisting being woken. They show that he was taking some

5 The Court recognizes it can consider “the weight of authority from other courts.” Knopf, 884 F.3d at 944.

action with his hands and arms to bat away the officers. And the officers were not the only ones

telling Jarett to stop. Martin also repeatedly told Jarett to calm down and stop. Harper-Head

announced that Jarett was going to be handcuffed. And after additional struggles getting Jarett

handcuffed, Polster warned Jarett that he was going to be tased. Harper-Head then applied the taser

to Jarett’s back in a five-second drive-stun mode. He did not repeatedly use the taser or use it for

an extended period. He did not continue to use it once Jarett was subdued. Once they successfully

got Jarett in handcuffs, they led him upstairs. These facts bear little resemblance to the cases cited

by Jarett. And Jarett makes no effort to explain how and why the cases he cites would put a

reasonable officer on notice that Harper-Head’s actions would violate Jarett’s constitutional

rights.6

This Court previously denied Harper-Head qualified immunity when he moved to dismiss

Jarett’s complaint. At that time, Jarett’s allegations were that Harper-Head used the taser as an

alarm clock in a private home on Jarett, who was unresponsive, non-combative, unarmed, and

sleeping. The Court acknowledged that the record could change with discovery. It has. Most

notably, the record shows that Jarett was in an altered state of consciousness and that he was

reflexively responding to attempts to raise him. He was combative (even if unconsciously so) and

resistive. This is a different situation than the Court considered on Harper-Head’s motion to

dismiss. But Jarett has not come forth with any cases with similar facts.7 Of course, the Court

6 Jarett also takes no effort to satisfy this prong by citing cases or developing an argument that some violations are

so egregious a case is not required. Regardless, this does not appear to be one of those cases based on the summary-

judgment record.

7 Jarett does discuss the facts of the cases he cites. But he does so in the context of argument that Harper-Head

violated his constitutional right. He does not cogently argue that these cases are sufficiently similar to put a

reasonable law enforcement officer on notice that Harper-Head’s conduct crossed the line from reasonable force

to unreasonable force given the circumstances.

understands that a plaintiff need not produce a case with identical facts. See Patel v. Hall, 849 F.3d

970, 980 (10th Cir. 2017). But Jarett does not even attempt to tackle this prong with any meaningful

or targeted discussion. He has the burden on qualified immunity, and he has not met it. He has not

shown a triable issue on whether Harper-Head should have known as a reasonable officer that he

was violating a clearly established right.

IV. CONCLUSION

Qualified immunity provides important protection to law enforcement officials making

split-second judgments impacting their own safety and the safety of others. Once invoked, it

requires plaintiffs to carry their burden of showing a constitutional violation and that clearly

established law put officers on notice that their actions would constitute a violation of

constitutional proportion. Jarett fails to meet that burden, and Harper-Head is therefore entitled to

the protection qualified immunity offers.

THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS that Harper-Head’s motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 96) is GRANTED. Harper-Head’s motion to exclude expert testimony (Doc. 95) is DENIED

AS MOOT. The case is closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 20, 2026 /s/ Holly L. Teeter

HOLLY L. TEETER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE