Opinion

Woodlands Pride v. Paxton

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Feb 25, 2026
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Private Civil Federal
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.9%

“Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause . . . .”

How later courts described this case

  • “Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause . . . .”
  • “[W]e have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.”
  • “Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”
  • building on Roth to clarify three-part test for obscene material, including “appeal[s] to the prurient interest in sex” as one element

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 23-20480 Document: 316-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/25/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

February 25, 2026

No. 23-20480 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

The Woodlands Pride, Incorporated; Abilene Pride

Alliance; Extragrams, L.L.C.; 360 Queen Entertainment,

L.L.C.; Brigitte Bandit,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Warren Kenneth Paxton, In an official capacity as Attorney General

of Texas; Brett Ligon, In an official capacity as District Attorney of

Montgomery County; Montgomery County, Texas; James

Hicks, In an official capacity as District Attorney of Taylor County;

Taylor County, Texas; City of Abilene, Texas,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CV-2847

______________________________

Before Southwick and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.*

_____________________

*

Judge James Dennis was a member of the original panel, concurring in part and

dissenting in part from the panel opinion. See Woodlands Pride, Inc. v. Paxton, 157 F.4th 775,

789–803 (5th Cir. 2025) (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge

Dennis took inactive status from the Court on February 23, 2026, and therefore did not

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No. 23-20480

Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:

The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. The opinion issued

November 6, 2025, is withdrawn and the following is substituted in its place.

* * *

A Texas law regulates sexually oriented performances on public

property and in the presence of minors. A drag performer and others in the

drag industry brought a pre-enforcement challenge, alleging that the law

facially violates the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally void for

vagueness.1 After a two-day bench trial, the district court agreed with the

plaintiffs and permanently enjoined the appellants from enforcing the law.

We vacate that injunction and remand.

I.

A.

Texas Senate Bill 12 (“S.B. 12”) regulates “sexually oriented

performances” on public property and in the presence of minors. See Tex.

Health & Safety Code Ann. § 769.002; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code

Ann. § 243.0031; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.28. A “sexually oriented

performance” is “a visual performance” that (1) features a performer who

“is nude” or “engages in sexual conduct,” and (2) “appeals to the prurient

interest in sex.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.28(a)(2).

For the first prong, S.B. 12 defines the relevant conduct. “Nude”

means “entirely unclothed” or “clothed in a manner that leaves uncovered

_____________________

participate in this decision to withdraw and substitute the panel opinion. This case is

decided by a quorum under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

1

Plaintiffs use the word “drag” to describe their activities and they call the law

that they challenge a “drag ban.” The text of the law does not include the word “drag.”

2

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or visible through less than fully opaque clothing any portion of the breasts

below the top of the areola of the breasts, if the person is female, or any

portion of the genitals or buttocks.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §

102.051(1). “Sexual conduct” means: (1) “the exhibition or representation,

actual or simulated, of sexual acts, including vaginal sex, anal sex, and

masturbation”; (2) “the exhibition or representation, actual or simulated, of

male or female genitals in a lewd state, including a state of sexual stimulation

or arousal”; (3) “the exhibition of a device designed and marketed as useful

primarily for the sexual stimulation of male or female genitals”; (4) “actual

contact or simulated contact occurring between one person and the buttocks,

breast, or any part of the genitals of another person”; or (5) “the exhibition

of sexual gesticulations using accessories or prosthetics that exaggerate male

or female sexual characteristics.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.28(a)(1).

As for the second prong, Supreme Court precedent is instructive.2 To

appeal to the “prurient interest in sex,” material, at a minimum, must be “in

some sense erotic.” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 579 (2002).

_____________________

2

When interpreting undefined terms in state statutes, the Supreme Court of Texas

“presumes that the Legislature uses statutory language with complete knowledge of the

existing law and with reference to it.” Amazon.com, Inc. v. McMillan, 625 S.W.3d 101, 106–

07 (Tex. 2021) (cleaned up). “Prurient interest in sex” is a term of art coined by the United

States Supreme Court as one part of the “obscenity” definition. See Roth v. United States,

354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (“Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner

appealing to prurient interest.”); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (building on

Roth to clarify three-part test for obscene material, including “appeal[s] to the prurient

interest in sex” as one element). We conclude the Texas Legislature invoked the Supreme

Court’s description of a “prurient interest in sex” by using this phrase, and that

jurisprudence guides what conduct is arguably proscribed by S.B. 12. See infra Section II.A

(explaining injury-in-fact analysis for Article III standing in pre-enforcement First

Amendment challenges).

3

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B.

S.B. 12 regulates sexually oriented performances in three ways.

Section One prohibits a “person who controls the premises of a commercial

enterprise” from “allow[ing] a sexually oriented performance to be

presented on the premises in the presence of an individual younger than 18

years of age.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 769.002(a). It is

enforced by the Attorney General of Texas, see id. § 769.002(c), who is an

appellant here.

Section Two authorizes municipalities and counties to “regulate

sexually oriented performances as the municipality or county considers

necessary to promote the public health, safety, or welfare.” Tex. Loc.

Gov’t Code Ann. § 243.0031(b). In exercising this power, municipalities

and counties may not authorize a sexually oriented performance on public

property or in the presence of individuals under the age of 18. Id. §

243.0031(c). Montgomery County, Taylor County, and the City of Abilene

are the appellants to which Section Two confers authority.

Section Three establishes a Class A misdemeanor for engaging in a

sexually oriented performance either (1) “on public property at a time, in a

place, and in a manner that could reasonably be expected to be viewed by a

child”; or (2) “in the presence of an individual younger than 18 years of age.”

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.28(b). In Texas, district and county

attorneys enforce state criminal laws. See State v. Stephens, 663 S.W.3d 45,

49–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Two appellants are authorized to enforce

Section Three in their respective jurisdictions: Brett Ligon, the district

attorney for Montgomery County; and James Hicks, the district attorney for

Taylor County.

4

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II.

A.

S.B. 12 has not been enforced yet. The plaintiffs—The Woodlands

Pride, Inc.; Abilene Pride Alliance; 360 Queen Entertainment, LLC;

Extragrams LLC; and Brigitte Bandit—brought a pre-enforcement challenge

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the law facially violates the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. The district court held a two-day bench trial,

concluded that S.B. 12 is a facially unconstitutional restriction on speech, and

enjoined the Attorney General of Texas, the City of Abilene, Taylor County,

Montgomery County, and four district attorneys from enforcing it.3 See

Woodlands Pride, Inc. v. Paxton, 694 F. Supp. 3d 820, 851 (S.D. Tex. 2023).

The appellants ask us to vacate the injunction.4 Their first argument on

appeal is that the plaintiffs lack standing. We review a district court’s ruling

on standing de novo. Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. v. Strain, 65 F.4th 211, 215

(5th Cir. 2023).

Standing “is not dispensed in gross.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). Plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing for each

claim that they press against each defendant, and for each form of relief that they

seek.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 61 (2024) (emphasis added)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). When plaintiffs seek injunctive relief,

“for every defendant, there must be at least one plaintiff with standing to seek

[the] injunction.” Id. So for each appellant here, at least one plaintiff must

have “(1) an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual

_____________________

3

The district court alternatively concluded that S.B. 12 was unconstitutionally

vague.

4

Two defendants at the district court—Travis County district attorney, Delia

Garza, and Bexar County district attorney, Joe D. Gonzalez—did not appeal the district

court’s injunction.

5

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or imminent’; (2) is fairly traceable to th[at] defendant’s actions; and (3) is

likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Turtle Island Foods, 65 F.4th

at 215 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

In pre-enforcement free speech challenges, a plaintiff “need not have

experienced ‘an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action’ to

establish standing.” Barilla v. City of Houston, 13 F.4th 427, 431 (5th Cir.

2021) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)).

Chilled speech or self-censorship is an injury in fact if a plaintiff shows that

(1) he intends to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a

constitutional interest; (2) the course of action is arguably proscribed by

statute; and (3) there is a credible threat of prosecution under the statute.

Turtle Island Foods, 65 F.4th at 215–16 (citing Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S.

at 159).5

A plaintiff “must support each element of standing ‘with the manner

and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.’”

Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). When a case has

proceeded to final judgment, standing “must be supported adequately by the

evidence adduced at trial.” El Paso County v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 338 (5th

Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

_____________________

5

Although the analysis in this Section focuses on plaintiffs’ First Amendment

claims, it applies with equal force to plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claim.

In a facial vagueness challenge, chilled speech remains “a constitutional harm adequate to

satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.” Doe I v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 114 (5th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 754–55 (5th Cir. 2010)). But a

plaintiff must claim a “serious interest in engaging in a course of conduct arguably affected

with a constitutional interest but proscribed by statute.” Id. at 115 (cleaned up). For the

reasons explained herein—in the First Amendment context—plaintiffs The Woodlands

Pride, Inc., Abilene Pride Alliance, Extragrams LLC, and Brigitte Bandit do not have

standing to assert a facial vagueness challenge. Plaintiff 360 Queen Entertainment, by

contrast, has standing to do so.

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B.

We start with whether—and to what extent—each plaintiff has

standing. To make this determination, we rely on the evidence presented at

trial. See id.

1.

The Woodlands Pride, Inc. hosts an annual pride festival in

Montgomery County, Texas. Children attend the festival, which includes on-

stage drag performances. Woodlands Pride often says that its festival is “a

reflection of a family-oriented community.” It “want[s] to make sure” that

this message of “family-oriented community” is “pushed out through [the]

music that’s played, [and] through everything you see,” including “what’s

happening on the stage.” To achieve this objective, a Woodlands Pride board

member approves the music playlists and meets with all performers to “talk

about dos and don’ts.”

When asked by the district court whether the drag performances are

“specifically tailored to a family aspect,” the Woodlands Pride representa-

tive testified: “Our performances aren’t specifically tailored to a family

aspect, but they are tailored to mostly ensuring that there’s no bad language

in music and that it is a festival for everybody.” “For lack of better terms,”

the representative testified, “this is a family friendly drag performance.”

And he confirmed that this is true for all Woodlands Pride performances.

The Woodlands Pride representative also testified that he could

“confidently describe to [the drag performers] how to avoid making a

performance appear that it appeals to the prurient interest in sex.” There has

never been any nudity at any of Woodland Pride’s performances,6 no

_____________________

6

After testifying several times that there is no nudity during the performances,

including as defined by Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 102.051(1)(B), the

7

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exhibition or representation of actual or simulated sexual acts or genitals, and

no sexual gesticulations with exaggerated prosthetic penises. The performers

“do a Conga line type thing and put their hands on each other’s hips,” and

sometimes touch each other—including a “portion of their buttocks”—

while dancing, but the representative testified that it is “just a dance routine”

and does not appeal to the prurient interest in sex. He also testified that some

of the performers may “twerk.”

The Woodlands Pride festival also has vendors, including STI and

STD testing vendors who hand out condoms and sexual lubricant. The

plaintiffs argue that passing out condoms and sexual lubricant is arguably

“the exhibition of a device designed and marketed as useful primarily for the

sexual stimulation of male or female genitals.”

None of the Woodlands Pride conduct introduced at trial arguably

amounts to a “sexually oriented performance.” A vendor handing out

condoms and sexual lubricant is not “a visual performance,” nor are STD

and STI testing vendors “performers.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §

43.28(a)(2). As to the drag performances, even if making contact with

another performer’s buttocks is arguably “sexual conduct” under S.B. 12, it

is not proscribed if it does not appeal to the prurient interest in sex. None of

the trial evidence indicates that the performances are “in some sense erotic.”

See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 579. Because Woodlands Pride does not intend to

engage in conduct that is arguably proscribed by S.B. 12, it does not have

standing to seek an injunction against any of the appellants.

_____________________

representative testified on redirect that some performers exhibited nudity as defined by

S.B. 12 because the performers showed cleavage and a portion of their buttocks. Only one

exhibit introduced into evidence at trial depicts a Woodlands Pride drag performer’s outfit.

The performer is wearing what appears to be a long-sleeved leotard with fishnet tights.

8

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2.

Abilene Pride Alliance is an organization based in Abilene, Texas,

which is in Taylor County. Abilene Pride hosts various community-based and

fundraising events, including drag brunches, drag bingo, and a pride parade

and festival. There is no age restriction for Abilene Pride’s events and

Abilene Pride asks all performers to “[p]lease be age appropriate.”

There is no nudity, as defined by S.B. 12, at Abilene Pride’s drag

performances. Nor is there actual or simulated sex or masturbation. Drag

performers for Abilene Pride’s events wear a variation of sequins, big hair,

wigs, breastplates, hip pads, packers, and exaggerated jewelry.7 A typical

Abilene Pride drag performance involves “dancing, lip syncing, engaging

with the audience by hugging, kissing on the cheek, [and] sometimes

bumping hips.” A drag performer’s buttocks have “come into contact with

attendees” on a “a few occasions where the venue has been crowded and as

the entertainer was moving to engage with the crowd, they [sic] bumped into

some folks.” Performers also “[o]ccasionally” “do a hip bump with one of

the audience members.” Performers may have sat in audience members’ laps

too, but the Abilene Pride president provided conflicting testimony on this.8

Drag performers’ breasts or breastplates come into contact with attendees

only when giving front-facing hugs or during “accidental bumping.”

_____________________

7

Breastplates are prosthetic breasts. Hip pads are prosthetics that exaggerate the

appearance of the performer’s buttocks. Packers are prosthetics that drag performers wear

under clothing to create the appearance of male genitalia.

8

He testified that drag performers have never sat in the laps of attendees at any of

the events that he has attended. His written declaration, however, stated: “On some

occasions our drag performers give front-facing hugs or hip bumps to audience members or

even sit in their laps.” After the attorney read him this statement on cross-examination, he

testified that performers “usually will just sit and continue lip syncing,” and that he has

never observed lap dances.

9

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Abilene Pride’s president testified that he does not think that Abilene

Pride’s performances involve sexual gestures or gesticulations. He is

nonetheless concerned that others might think that the performances violate

S.B. 12 because Abilene Pride has had protestors at its events before and, on

one occasion, someone called the police.9 The public health department has

also attended Abilene Pride’s festival to share information and hand out free

condoms and sexual lubricant. As with the Woodlands Pride vendors who

passed out condoms and sexual lubricant, the plaintiffs contend that this is

arguably proscribed by S.B. 12.

None of the Abilene Pride conduct introduced at trial arguably

amounts to a “sexually oriented performance.” First, that people have

protested Abilene Pride’s events before has no bearing on whether S.B. 12

arguably proscribes the performances. Second, giving front facing hugs and

accidentally bumping into others are common interactions that do not

inherently appeal to the prurient interest in sex. Nor does the trial record

contain evidence indicating that under the circumstances described here,

these common interactions are “in some sense erotic.” See Ashcroft, 535 U.S.

at 579. So even if these actions constitute “actual . . . or simulated contact

occurring between one person and the buttocks, breast, or any part of the of

the genitals of another person,” they are not arguably proscribed by S.B. 12.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.28(a)(1)(D). And like the STI and STD

testing vendors at Woodlands Pride’s events, handing out condoms and

sexual lubricant is not “a visual performance,” nor is the public health

department a “performer.”

_____________________

9

The police arrived and asked questions but left without taking further action.

10

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Because Abilene Pride does not intend to engage in conduct that is

arguably proscribed by S.B. 12, it does not have standing to seek an injunction

against any of the appellants.

3.

360 Queen Entertainment, LLC is a drag production company that

books drag queens to perform on the patio of Tomatillos Restaurant & Bar in

San Antonio. Tomatillos is owned by the father of 360 Queen’s owner. The

restaurant is in a strip mall with several other businesses that can view the

patio “very clearly.” 360 Queen and Tomatillos have an agreement that on

show days, 360 Queen “controls” the patio from the morning until the show

ends. Tomatillos provides restaurant service to the audience but is not

otherwise involved. 360 Queen sells the tickets and decides who enters the

show through the patio’s primary entrance. While 360 Queen tries to restrict

restaurant customers from entering the patio via the dining room, it has “had

instances where children have run into the patio through [the] show; not

because they have any interest in watching the drag show itself, but because

there’s a field in the back where a lot of kids tend to go and play while their

parents are dining.”

360 Queen does not typically allow children to attend its shows. This

is not because the shows are “sexual in nature” or “detrimental to children,”

but rather to “create an environment where adults [can] enjoy dinner, enjoy

drinks, enjoy entertainment, but not necessarily have to do it around other

people’s kids.” It makes exceptions to this rule, however. The owner

testified: “There have been situations where there are families dining inside

and they have children with them . . . these families are very well aware of

what drag is. And they have pleaded with us to allow them to come out onto

the patio. And we have made exceptions in the past and allowed children to

observe our drag show.”

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A picture introduced at trial depicts a 360 Queen drag performer who

is fully clothed in a red dress and holding dollar bills. A different picture

shows a 360 Queen drag performer who is wearing what appears to be a

leotard. The 360 Queen owner described this outfit as “a very short leotard”

and explained that the performer is “wearing butt pads that reveal her

buttocks.” Both images also demonstrate how the public can easily view the

patio.

360 Queen performances include twerking—“a form of expression

where you put your hands on your knees essentially and move your buttocks

up and down rapidly”—and “death drops”—a dance move “where a

performer will tuck one of their [sic] feet or legs behind their [sic] butt and

then fall to the floor with the other leg extended.” When asked whether the

performers “simulate contact with the buttocks of another person,” the

owner testified that the performers sit on customers’ laps while wearing

thongs and one performer invited a “handsome” male customer “to spank

her on the butt.” When asked whether the performers “ever perform

gesticulations while wearing prosthetics,” the owner testified that in 360

Queen’s most recent show, a drag queen “wore a breastplate that was very

revealing, pulsed her chest in front of people, [and] put her chest in front of

people’s faces.”

As to whether 360 Queen performances include nudity, the owner

testified that a performer once had a wardrobe malfunction where a

breastplate fell out and that some performers “wear sort of string bikinis that

will cover the nipples but be very, very revealing around the buttocks.”

Based on the evidence introduced at trial, 360 Queen’s performances

arguably include proscribed conduct. The owner described one performance

where a drag queen, who was wearing a “very revealing” breastplate pulsed

the breastplate in front of people and put the breastplate in people’s faces.

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This arguably constitutes “the exhibition of sexual gesticulations using . . .

prosthetics that exaggerate . . . female sexual characteristics.” See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 43.28(a)(1)(E). He also described a second

performance where an audience member was invited to spank a performer’s

buttocks. This arguably constitutes “actual contact or simulated contact

occurring between one person and the buttocks . . . of another person.” Id. §

43.28(a)(1)(D). Both performances are arguably “in some sense erotic,” see

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 579, and the owner testified that minors are sometimes

present.

Because 360 Queen only holds performances in San Antonio, its

claimed injury is not traceable to Abilene, Taylor County, Montgomery

County, or the district attorney appellants. The Attorney General is the only

appellant who 360 Queen could have standing to assert its claims against.

Recall that the Attorney General enforces Section One, which prohibits a

“person who controls the premises of a commercial enterprise” from

“allow[ing] a sexually oriented performance to be presented on the premises

in the presence of an individual younger than 18 years of age.” Tex.

Health & Safety Code Ann. § 769.002(a) (emphasis added).

The Attorney General argues that 360 Queen does not “control” the

premises because a third party owns Tomatillos. Control is not necessarily

synonymous with ownership, however. See Control, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “Control” as, inter alia, “[t]o

exercise power or influence over”). Again, for a pre-enforcement First

Amendment challenge, the question is whether a plaintiff’s conduct is

arguably proscribed by the statute. Turtle Island Foods, 65 F.4th at 215–16.

“Arguably proscribed” does not require that the plaintiff’s interpretation of

the challenged law be the best interpretation. Id. at 218. The owner of 360

Queen testified that 360 Queen controls the patio on show days, sells the

tickets, and decides who enters the show through the patio’s primary

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entrance. Put otherwise, 360 Queen “exercise[s] power or influence” over

the premises. See supra Black’s Law Dictionary. That is sufficient

for this posture.10

Our determination that 360 Queen seeks to engage in arguably

proscribed conduct does not conclude the standing inquiry. It does not even

conclude the injury-in-fact inquiry. To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement,

the conduct must be arguably affected with a constitutional interest and there

must be a credible threat of enforcement. Turtle Island Foods, 65 F.4th at 215–

16. If an injury in fact is established, it must also be traceable to the Attorney

General and redressable by the injunction sought. Id. at 215. “In pre-

enforcement First Amendment challenges like this one, we assume a credible

threat of prosecution in the absence of compelling contrary evidence, so long

as the challenged law is non-moribund.” Inst. for Free Speech v. Johnson, 148

F.4th 318, 329 (5th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).

Although it “falls only within the outer ambit of the First

Amendment’s protection” and is subject to restrictions, Tex. Ent. Ass’n, Inc.

v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 509 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,

529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000)), nude dancing generally constitutes expressive

conduct, id. (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991)).

_____________________

10

In a footnote, the Attorney General asserts this same position—that 360 Queen

does not “control” Tomatillos—to argue that 360 Queen’s claims against him run afoul of

sovereign immunity. He correctly states that for Ex parte Young to apply, the defendant-

official “must have ‘some connection with the enforcement of the [challenged] act.’” Tex.

All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original)

(quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)). But the Attorney General has more

than some connection with the enforcement of Section One. He has the sole authority to (1)

recover civil penalties for Section One violations and (2) obtain injunctions to restrain

Section One violations. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 769.002(c). He

therefore has the “particular duty” to enforce—that is, to compel or constrain compliance

with—Section One, so the injunction 360 Queen seeks would prevent the purported

constitutional violation that 360 Queen fears. See Tex. All. for Retired Ams., 28 F.4th at 672.

14

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360 Queen’s performances are therefore arguably affected with a constitu-

tional interest.11 We also assume a credible threat of enforcement, given the

lack of evidence demonstrating otherwise and because S.B. 12 is non-

moribund. See Inst. for Free Speech, 148 F.4th at 329. 360 Queen has

established an injury in fact.

Traceability and redressability are the final hurdles for standing. 360

Queen satisfies these “dual elements” if its claimed injury is “fairly traceable

to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the

independent action of some third party not before the court” and it is “likely,

as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Id. at 330 (cleaned up); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–

61.

360 Queen’s claimed injury is traceable to the Attorney General, who

enforces Section One, and its desired injunction would eliminate the threat

of enforcement. See supra note 10; see also Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t

of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507, 513–14 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting

“significant overlap” between the redressability and traceability inquiries

_____________________

11

We have genuine doubt, however, that pulsing prosthetic breasts in front of

people, putting prosthetic breasts in people’s faces, and being spanked by audience

members are actually constitutionally protected—especially in the presence of minors.

While nude dancing receives some constitutional protection, “intentional contact between

a nude dancer and a bar patron is conduct beyond the expressive scope of the dancing itself.

The conduct at that point has overwhelmed any expressive strains it may contain. That the

physical contact occurs while in the course of protected activity does not bring it within the

scope of the First Amendment.” Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1253 (5th

Cir. 1995). “It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person

undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection

of the First Amendment.” Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).

Even though the performers here are not fully nude, Hang On’s reasoning is persuasive. At

a minimum, Hang On confirms that each action in a performance is not necessarily

protected even if the performance as a whole may receive some constitutional protection.

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No. 23-20480

and Ex parte Young’s application). 360 Queen therefore has standing to seek

an injunction against the Attorney General. Because one plaintiff with

standing for a given defendant is sufficient, we need not determine whether

the remaining two plaintiffs have standing to seek an injunction against the

Attorney General. See Murthy, 603 U.S. at 61.

4.

Extragrams LLC is a drag telegram company that provides drag

entertainment for celebrations, events, and parties, and hosts drag bingo.

Extragrams’ performances are primarily in Austin, Texas, but it has also

performed in San Antonio, Dallas, Houston, Fredericksburg, Round Rock,

and Pflugerville.

This list does not include Abilene. Nor are any of these cities located

in Taylor or Montgomery County. Because Extragrams does not seek to

engage in arguably proscribed conduct in Abilene, Taylor County, or

Montgomery County, its claimed injury is not traceable to these appellants

or the district attorney appellants. Accordingly, Extragrams does not have

standing to seek an injunction against the remaining appellants.

5.

The final plaintiff, Brigitte Bandit, is a drag performer who lives in

Austin, Texas, which is in Travis County.12 Most of her performances are in

Travis County but she has performed in Houston, San Marcos, San Antonio,

and Dallas. As of September 9, 2023, Bandit had performances scheduled in

_____________________

12

The district court granted this plaintiff permission to proceed under the

pseudonym “Brigitte Bandit.” See Woodlands Pride, 694 F. Supp. 3d at 829 n.3. “Bandit”

is a drag character who dresses as a female. Because the actual gender of this plaintiff is not

disclosed in the record, and “Bandit” portrays a female character, we refer to the character

“Bandit” as a female.

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No. 23-20480

Denton and Abilene.

Bandit typically performs in bars and nightclubs that are restricted to

ages 21+, but she also performs at drag brunches (that are sometimes

restricted to ages 21+ and sometimes open to all ages) and at “all-ages shows

like drag story time.” Most of Bandit’s performances are not sexual, but she

does have “some sexual shows.” She testified that she would not perform

one of her sexual shows at an all-ages event, however.

Bandit changes her performance and appearance depending on the

audience. When performing for children, she “want[s] to appeal to

something that would be interesting to kids.” She has dressed as characters

from Toy Story and The Little Mermaid, and “like a big pink princess.” She

testified that, when performing before kids, her costumes are “typically

pretty covered,” presumably meaning modest.

Bandit does not have standing to seek an injunction against the

remaining appellants. Bandit has not performed, nor expressed an intent to

perform, in Montgomery County, so her claimed injury is not traceable to

Montgomery County or its district attorney. While Bandit testified that she

had a performance scheduled in Abilene, her testimony did not include any

information about this performance. Nor does the plaintiffs’ brief reference

Bandit’s intent to perform in Abilene. Bandit’s testimony stressed that her

sexual performances are restricted to 18+ or 21+ audiences, and no evidence

indicates that an Abilene performance would be any different. Bandit’s

claimed injury therefore is not traceable to the City of Abilene, Taylor

County, or the Taylor County district attorney either.

III.

Because the plaintiffs only have standing to assert their claims against

the Attorney General, and the Attorney General only has the authority to

enforce Section One, the remaining issues on appeal are whether the

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No. 23-20480

plaintiffs have established that Section One, on its face, violates the First

Amendment or is unconstitutionally vague. Start with the First Amendment

questions.

The choice to litigate a facial challenge “comes at a cost”: facial chal-

lenges are “hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723

(2024). But this is a feature, not a bug. “Claims of facial invalidity often rest

on speculation about the law’s coverage and its future enforcement.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such claims also “threaten

to short circuit the democratic process by preventing duly enacted laws from

being implemented in constitutional ways.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The Moody framework for facial free speech challenges

safeguards the democratic will and states’ interests while still “provid[ing]

breathing room for free expression.” Id. (cleaned up).

To determine if a law, on its face, violates the Free Speech Clause of

the First Amendment, we must ask whether “a substantial number of the

law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s

plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting Ams. for

Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021)). This inquiry begins with

an assessment of the law’s scope: “What activities, by what actors,” does the

law “prohibit or otherwise regulate?” Id. at 724. We then determine which

of the law’s applications violate the First Amendment. Id. at 725. And finally,

we take the unconstitutional applications and “measure them against the

rest.” Id. The law is not facially invalid unless its “unconstitutional

applications substantially outweigh its constitutional ones.” Id. at 724. The

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district court did not conduct this analysis, nor did the parties brief the proper

standard or adequately develop the record.13

Consider, next, plaintiffs’ facial vagueness challenge. First

Amendment overbreadth and Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claims

overlap conceptually but remain distinct claims. United States v. Williams,

553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the

First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Kolender v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) (“[W]e have traditionally viewed vagueness and

overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.”). The Supreme Court

has explained two key rules concerning this conceptual overlap. First, facial

vagueness challenges are permissible when constitutionally protected

activity is implicated. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8. Second, when First

Amendment rights are implicated, courts must apply a more stringent

version of the substantive vagueness standard. Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v.

Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). A statute is

unconstitutionally vague when it “fails to provide people of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it

prohibits” or “authorizes arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Roy v.

City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). In First

Amendment contexts, we “will not hold that the ordinance is

unconstitutionally vague on its face if ‘it is clear what the ordinance as a

whole prohibits’ or if the ordinance ‘is surely valid [i.e. not vague] in the vast

majority of its intended applications.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.

703, 733 (2000)). In concluding S.B. 12 is unconstitutionally vague on its face,

_____________________

13

To be fair, the Supreme Court decided Moody after the parties briefed this appeal,

and the Attorney General promptly filed a Rule 28(j) letter to notify us of its relevance. And

while Moody espoused existing law, that existing law had frequently been overlooked. See

Moody, 603 U.S. at 743–45 (vacating judgments from this court and the Eleventh Circuit

because neither court applied the proper standard for facial free speech challenges).

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the district court failed to clearly analyze the statute in terms of this still

“daunting” facial vagueness standard. Id.

We are unequipped to undertake these tasks in the first instance, and

remand for the district court to do so. See Ficher v. Bickham, 70 F.4th 257,

260 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e are a court of review, not first view.”).

* * *

We VACATE the injunction against the appellants and REMAND.

On remand, the district court is instructed to (1) dismiss the claims against

Brett Ligon, James Hicks, Montgomery County, Taylor County, and the City

of Abilene; (2) reconsider the plaintiffs’ facial First Amendment challenges

to Section One of S.B. 12 under the Moody framework; and (3) reconsider the

plaintiffs’ facial vagueness challenge to Section One of S.B. 12 in light of Roy.

The pending motion for stay pending appeal is denied as moot.

20

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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