Darell Chancellor v. Stephen Geelhood

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 26a0053p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

DARELL DEON CHANCELLOR,

│

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

> No. 25-1424

│

v. │

│

STEPHEN GEELHOOD; CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, │

Defendants-Appellees. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 2:20-cv-11616—Linda V. Parker, District Judge.

Argued: January 28, 2026

Decided and Filed: February 25, 2026

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; STRANCH and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Christopher P. Desmond, VEN JOHNSON LAW, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for

Appellant. Josephine A. DeLorenzo, PLUNKETT COONEY, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Christopher P. Desmond, VEN JOHNSON LAW, PLC, Detroit,

Michigan, for Appellant. Mary Massaron, PLUNKETT COONEY, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan,

for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. In 2011, Officer Stephen Geelhood sought a search warrant to

investigate narcotics sales from a home in Detroit. After a magistrate judge granted the warrant,

Geelhood and a group of other officers searched the home of Janet Chancellor. There, they

found over 500 grams of cocaine. Based on this and other findings, Janet’s son, Darell

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 2

Chancellor, was arrested, prosecuted, and eventually sentenced to fourteen years and three

months in prison for possession of illegal narcotics. Seven years later, the local prosecutor’s

office vacated his conviction via a stipulated order. Chancellor then sued in federal court,

alleging that Geelhood violated his state and federal rights. The district court granted summary

judgment to Geelhood. Chancellor now appeals. We AFFIRM.

I.

In November 2011, Officer Stephen Geelhood requested a warrant to search a home in

Detroit for illegal narcotics. Geelhood signed an affidavit stating that he had received a tip from

a credible and reliable confidential informant that heroin was being sold and stored at the home.

Geelhood further stated that he had used the same confidential informant on more than three

prior occasions that had resulted in the successful confiscation of illegal drugs and firearms, with

cases pending in two local courts. Geelhood also stated that, after receiving the tip, he

personally surveilled the property and saw a black male engage in three suspected hand-to-hand

drug transactions; the person he observed was in his thirties, stood five feet eight inches tall, and

weighed 180 pounds. The warrant affidavit did not identify any person by name.

The magistrate judge approved the search warrant. That same day, Geelhood and other

members of the Detroit Police Department Narcotics Section executed the warrant at the home,

which belonged to Janet Chancellor. During the raid, Geelhood confiscated 571 grams of

cocaine from a laundry hamper full of men’s clothes located on the second floor. The cocaine

was split between four plastic baggies within a larger plastic bag. Another officer seized two

firearms from the same hamper, and a third officer found a letter from the Michigan Department

of Treasury addressed to Darell Chancellor on the table above the hamper. The officers also ran

a LEIN inquiry that listed Darell Chancellor as being registered at the home address.

A month later, a fourth officer prepared an investigator’s report, seeking a warrant for

Darell Chancellor’s arrest based on the findings from the raid. The investigator’s report included

statements from Geelhood and other officers about the raid; it did not include statements about

Geelhood’s pre-raid surveillance. The magistrate issued a warrant to arrest Chancellor for

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance,

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 3

felon in possession of a firearm, and a felony firearm second offense. Chancellor was arrested

pursuant to the warrant during a traffic stop several months later. Geelhood was not present for

Chancellor’s arrest. Chancellor was then charged with the same offenses listed in the arrest

warrant.

Chancellor had a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court. Geelhood, some of the

other officers present at the raid, and Chancellor’s parole officer testified at trial. Janet

Chancellor did not testify. Neither did her boyfriend or daughter, who also lived at the house.

Chancellor, however, did testify on his own behalf. Chancellor maintained that he was not

present on the property during the surveillance and that he did not fit the physical description of

the person Geelhood described as the seller in his affidavit. Chancellor is 5'11" and testified that

he weighed 245 pounds at the time of the search, while the search warrant identified the seller as

three inches shorter and 65 pounds lighter. Chancellor further testified that he lived at a different

property with his wife and child.

Geelhood testified that Chancellor was the person he saw engaging in the hand-to-hand

drug transactions on the night of the surveillance. He further testified that he discovered and

seized cocaine from the laundry hamper during the raid. The trial judge ultimately convicted

Chancellor of constructively possessing the cocaine found in the laundry hamper. But the judge

found insufficient proof that Chancellor had possessed the drugs with intent to distribute, so the

judge acquitted him of that charge. Chancellor was sentenced to 14 years and 3 months to 30

years imprisonment for possession of over 450 grams of cocaine. A divided panel of the state

court of appeals affirmed Chancellor’s conviction, People v. Chancellor, 2014 WL 6865488,

(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2014) (per curiam), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to

appeal, People v. Chancellor, 864 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. 2015) (mem.). Chancellor then petitioned

for habeas relief in federal court, which was denied. Chancellor v. Woods, 2016 WL 4729664, at

*1 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 12, 2016), aff’d, 2017 WL 4513125 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2017).

In 2017, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office created a Conviction Integrity Unit

(CIU). Chancellor asked the CIU to review his case in 2018. CIU investigators interviewed

Chancellor’s mother, her boyfriend and ex-boyfriend, as well as Chancellor’s ex-wife and sister.

They did not interview Geelhood or any of the other government officials involved in

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 4

Chancellor’s trial and prosecution. But the CIU ultimately concluded that Chancellor’s

conviction should be vacated because “too many of Sgt. Geelhood’s reported claims about the

events . . . cannot be corroborated or have been credibly refuted” and because “officers in this

narcotics group, including . . . Geelhood, are currently being investigated.” R.72, Memo, PageID

1640. In 2020, a state judge issued a stipulated order vacating Chancellor’s conviction and

sentence that was signed by CIU Director Valerie Newman and Chancellor’s defense attorney.

Chancellor was then released from prison after spending more than seven years incarcerated.

After his release, Chancellor sued Geelhood under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting Fourth

Amendment claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, as well as a

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for failure to comply with duties derived from Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He also brought state law claims for false arrest, malicious

prosecution, false imprisonment, and gross negligence.1 Chancellor’s federal and state claims

centered on his allegations that Geelhood lied in the search warrant affidavit and failed to

disclose that lie during Chancellor’s prosecution. Geelhood and the City moved for summary

judgment. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Geelhood was entitled to

qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claims and that there was no issue of material fact

underlying Chancellor’s Brady claim. With respect to the state law claims, the court found that

Geelhood was entitled to governmental immunity from Chancellor’s claims of false arrest,

malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment and that Chancellor had failed to state a claim for

gross negligence. Chancellor now appeals.

II.

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. Butler v. City of

Detroit, 936 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment is warranted only if there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Id. at 417 (citation modified); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In reviewing a motion for summary

1Chancellor also sued the City of Detroit under a theory of municipal liability. The district court dismissed

that claim on procedural grounds related to the City’s bankruptcy. Claims against the City form no part of this

appeal.

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 5

judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A.

On appeal, Chancellor makes two arguments based on federal law. First, he argues that

Geelhood falsified the search warrant affidavit, leading to Chancellor’s arrest, imprisonment, and

prosecution without probable cause. Second, he argues that Geelhood violated his due process

rights by withholding exculpatory evidence. We address each in turn.

1.

Chancellor argues that Geelhood lied in the affidavit supporting the search warrant,

resulting in a lack of probable cause to support the search of the home where the drugs were

found. In response to Geelhood’s assertion of qualified immunity, the district court concluded

that Chancellor had not put forth sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact on that

question. We agree.

i.

Taking the case as the parties framed it, Chancellor’s Fourth Amendment claims fail

because, as the district court concluded, Chancellor cannot show that Geelhood lied in the search

warrant affidavit. So he cannot overcome Chancellor’s qualified immunity defense.

To bring his § 1983 suit alleging misrepresentation by a police officer, Chancellor must

first overcome Geelhood’s assertions of qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity attaches when

an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018)

(citation modified) (per curiam). A facially valid search warrant is generally a complete defense

to a claim that an officer searched a premises without probable cause. Tlapanco v. Elges, 969

F.3d 638, 649 (6th Cir. 2020). But that principle yields when an officer deliberately or recklessly

makes material false representations in the warrant affidavit. Id. When a plaintiff claims in a

§ 1983 suit that a police officer lied in a search warrant affidavit, “we have distilled a specific

[qualified immunity] inquiry.” Butler, 936 F.3d at 418. In such cases, a plaintiff can overcome

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 6

qualified immunity only if (1) he can make “a substantial showing that the defendant stated a

deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth” and (2) he can show “that the

allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of probable cause.” Vakilian v.

Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003).

“Implicit in Vakilian’s demanding standard is the recognition that a police officer

swearing out an affidavit can make mistakes and yet remain protected by qualified immunity.”

Butler, 936 F.3d at 418. “We have never required that police officers be infallible to avoid

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 417. This mental state requirement makes sure that

officers are sued only for true malfeasance.

To show recklessness or deliberateness, it is often not enough for a plaintiff merely to

contradict an affidavit. See id. at 419. That’s because “even taking [the plaintiff’s] version as

true,” evidence contradicting the affidavit will often support either “a bald-faced lie” or be “just

as consistent with negligence or innocent mistake.” Id. So to overcome qualified immunity,

Chancellor must present “evidence of facts known to [Geelhood]” that show that “no reasonable

officer with access to the contradictory information would have sworn out such an affidavit.” Id.

Chancellor cannot make this showing based on the record evidence.

Start with the text of the search warrant affidavit. Geelhood stated that he received

information about the home from a credible and reliable informant who reportedly knew there

was a large amount of heroin being sold and stored at the house in question. Geelhood also

stated that he had used the same confidential informant on more than three other occasions that

had resulted in the confiscation of drugs or firearms, with criminal cases ongoing in two local

courts. In addition, he stated that he had surveilled the home himself, during which he observed

at least three persons go to the address, converse with a purported seller, and then exchange

money for suspected heroin. He described the purported seller as a black male in his thirties,

5'8", and 180 pounds. Geelhood concluded by stating that his 17 years of experience as a police

officer and 9 years in the narcotics division gave him further reason to suspect that illegal drug

activities were taking place at the house. Geelhood never identified Chancellor anywhere in the

search warrant affidavit.

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 7

On its face, the affidavit provided probable cause to search Janet Chancellor’s home.

“[P]robable cause is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)

(citation modified). It does not require a “preponderance of the evidence” or “proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (citation omitted); see also

United States v. Santiago, 139 F.4th 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2025) (noting that probable cause requires

less than a preponderance of the evidence). It requires only “the kind of fair probability on

which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Harris, 568 U.S. at 244

(citation modified). Geelhood’s affidavit provided two sources of knowledge: a confidential

informant and independent surveillance. Taken together, these sources provided probable cause

to search the house. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Knowledge

of illegal drug activities, obtained by law enforcement officials through a confidential informant

and independent surveillance, supports a district court’s finding of probable cause to support the

issuance of a warrant.”).

Chancellor, however, claims that the affidavit contains three falsehoods. He contends

that: (1) there was no confidential informant, or if there was, that he or she was not credible;

(2) Geelhood never surveilled the property; or (3) if Geelhood did surveil the property, he never

saw Chancellor sell drugs. But Chancellor does not present evidence creating a genuine issue of

material fact on these claims.

The third claim is easily dispensed with because the search warrant affidavit never

identified Chancellor as the man Geelhood saw dealing drugs. It merely said that Geelhood saw

an unidentified black man, 5'8" tall, weighing 180 pounds, engaging in three drug transactions.

To cast doubt on the latter claim, Chancellor offers the testimony of Janet Chancellor’s

boyfriend, Alvin Thomas, and an expert affidavit by law enforcement consultant Ken Katsaris.

Chancellor’s brief in this court states that Thomas, “reported being on the porch during the time

in question” and “denied observing any drug dealing.” Appellant Br. at 32. But that is not a fair

representation of Thomas’s deposition testimony. Thomas never testified that he didn’t observe

drug dealing during the time he was on the porch. He never denied seeing dealing at all. The

closest he gets is stating that he never saw anyone “bring cocaine into the house.” R. 81-19,

Thomas Dep., PageID 3374. And that statement is not at all connected to the timeframe when

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 8

Thomas was on the porch. In other words, Thomas says that he never saw any cocaine deliveries

to the house; he didn’t deny what Geelhood claims—that he saw heroin, cocaine (or some other

drug) leaving the house. What’s more, Thomas’s testimony confirms the search warrant’s claim

that there was a black man, around 180 pounds, and 5'8" on the porch that night. Thomas, who is

5'6½" tall, 185 pounds, opined that “one of the officers may have actually seen [him] on the

front porch” that night. Id. at 3379, 3383–84. And, to repeat, the affidavit never identified

Chancellor as the man Geelhood saw on the porch.

Chancellor’s expert affidavit fares no better. Chancellor’s appellate brief states that his

expert “is of the opinion” that “the lighting and Geelhood’s distance from [the home]” indicates

that “Geelhood would have not been able to identify illegal activity at the property.” Appellant

Br. at 32. But this also mischaracterizes what the witness said. Katsaris did not offer expert

testimony about whether Geelhood could have seen the porch from his vantage point that

evening. Katsaris instead stated that he had reviewed some of the testimony and exhibits in this

case. He then recited a list of facts drawn from those materials, which included Geelhood’s

statements that he had surveilled the home from “approximately 300–400 feet away . . . in the

‘late evening,’” and had witnessed three hand-to-hand drug transactions. R. 81-14, Expert Aff.,

PageID 2987. Katsaris then stated that he was of the “opinion that Geelhood’s surveillance of

the property was insufficient to give him probable cause that illegal activity was occurring at the

property.” Id. Katsaris offered no reason for reaching that conclusion. Chancellor—and his

expert—must do more than disagree with the magistrate’s ultimate finding of probable cause.

Instead, they must present “evidence” showing that “no reasonable officer with access to the

contradictory information would have sworn out such an affidavit.” Butler, 936 F.3d at 419. But

Chancellor’s expert merely puts forth his own legal conclusion. That’s not enough.

Chancellor also cannot show that Geelhood failed to surveil the home. He references

Janet Chancellor’s testimony for the proposition that she “would have been aware of [Geelhood]

if he were surveilling as he stated.” Appellant Br. at 32. But this assertion is not backed by

sufficient facts. Geelhood testified at trial that he was 300 to 400 feet away and viewing the

house with binoculars at around five or six in the evening. Janet’s testimony does not provide

sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact on those points. She maintained

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 9

that “we would have noticed” if a narcotics officer was surveilling the home. She noted that

many of the neighboring lots and homes were vacant, and she believed that if neighbors had seen

Geelhood they would have called her. R. 81-2, Janet Chancellor Dep., PageID 1991, 1993–95.

She also mentioned that there were no streetlamps, so it would have been hard to see in the dark.

But Geelhood testified that it was not pitch black when he was viewing the home. And if it were

darker, then that also would have limited Janet’s ability to see a car doing surveillance. This

does not qualify as “significant probative evidence” demonstrating more than “some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340

(6th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

As for the confidential informant, Chancellor points out that there is no contemporaneous

record of the informant’s identity, and Geelhood testified that he could not remember his name.

It may indeed be best practice to keep track of an informant’s identify, but a lack of identifying

documents, without more, is not the kind of “contradictory information” sufficient to show a

culpable mental state. Butler, 936 F.3d at 419. Chancellor’s own expert has testified that “it was

Detroit’s policy, practice, or procedure to not require its narcotics officers to document the

identities of CIs.” R. 81-14, Expert Aff., PageID 2990. In any case, information obtained from a

confidential informant can be sufficient to establish probable cause if the judge “can conclude

independently that the informant is reliable” or if “the affidavit contains corroborating

information.” United States v. Helton, 35 F.4th 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). An

informant’s tip has “greater reliability” if the affidavit “avers that the name of the confidential

informant has been disclosed to the issuing judge.” United States v. May, 399 F.3d 817, 823 (6th

Cir. 2005). But the source need not be “named in the affidavit,” Helton, 35 F.4th at 519 n.1, and

“failure to identify the informant to the issuing magistrate” does not make the warrant

“presumptively void.” May, 399 F.3d at 824. Instead, “facts that support the accuracy of the

information supplied by the informant” can still provide probable cause. Id. Sufficient

supporting facts include information that the “cooperating source has provided assistance in

unrelated drug investigation cases.” Id. at 826.

Here, Geelhood provided additional facts, id., that this confidential informant had been

used on more than three other occasions resulting in three arrests “with cases pending in [the]

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 10

36th district and 3rd circuit court,” R. 50-2, Search Warrant Aff., PageID 474; see also Butler,

936 F.3d. at 423 (stating that “the necessary proof of the informant’s reliability is in the very first

affidavit paragraph: he (or she) had previously provided reliable information in four successful

narcotics investigations”). And Geelhood’s “independent corroboration” of the informant’s tip

further establishes probable cause. United States v. Tuttle, 200 F.3d 892, 894 (6th Cir. 2000).

Chancellor also urges us to rely on the testimony of CIU Director Valerie Newman for

the general proposition that Geelhood’s identification of Chancellor “does not ring true.”

Appellant Br. at 30. But Chancellor conceded at oral argument and in his briefing here and

below, that it was not until trial that Geelhood identified Chancellor as the 5'8" 180-pound

individual Geelhood mentioned in the search warrant affidavit. Newman’s testimony about

Geelhood’s identification of Chancellor therefore assesses Geelhood’s trial testimony, not the

search warrant affidavit, which did not identify Chancellor at all. Newman did acknowledge that

“there’s no way to independently verify Geelhood’s statements in the search warrant affidavit.”

R. 81-13, Newman Dep., PageID 2782. She further stated that “nothing in and of itself . . . is the

ah-ha moment.” Id. at 2783. Instead, each little inconsistency from the entire search “pieced

together” created her belief that Geelhood lied throughout the case.2 Id. But her testimony

largely relies on the same underlying evidence that we have already found to be insufficient.

And to whatever extent Newman relies on CIU witness interviews, those interviews have not

been presented to this court. Nor can we rely on internal CIU policies in place of our own

analysis of the distinct legal question presented to us—whether Geelhood is entitled to qualified

immunity. As before, the absence of records from which we can now independently verify

Geelhood’s claims regarding the reliability of the informant in the affidavit is “just as consistent

with negligence” as with a “bald-faced lie.” Butler, 933 F.3d at 419.

2For the first time on appeal, Chancellor points to Newman’s testimony that only the Johnson family—and

thus not Chancellor—could sell drugs in Janet Chancellor’s neighborhood. But this argument also does not

contradict the search warrant affidavit, which did not identify Chancellor as the suspected dealer. In any event, this

argument was not presented to the district court, and we will not consider factual arguments made for the first time

on appeal. Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992) (“This Court will not entertain on

appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court any more readily than it will tolerate attempts to enlarge

the record itself.”) The same can be said for Chancellor’s arguments regarding other instances of officer misconduct

in Detroit.

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 11

In sum, Chancellor’s assertions about the search warrant do not show the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to overcome Geelhood’s assertion of qualified

immunity.

ii.

Having resolved this question on the grounds presented by the parties, we pause to note

our puzzlement at the parties’ framing of the issue. We have repeatedly held that “a section 1983

cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.”

Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, even if Chancellor had put

forth a triable issue on whether the search warrant lacked probable cause, it is not clear to us how

that would show a direct violation of Chancellor’s constitutional rights.

It is undisputed that police executed the search warrant at a home belonging to

Chancellor’s mother. And Chancellor’s sworn testimony at trial—indeed his entire defense—

was that he did not live at that house and was not there the night of Geelhood’s surveillance.

Chancellor has maintained that position in this § 1983 suit. That poses a problem for

Chancellor’s ability to show that he is the “a direct victim” of a constitutional tort. Claybrook,

199 F.3d at 357.

The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal

right. United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371, 374 (6th Cir. 2022). That means that “a person

who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging

evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his

Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). Because

Chancellor insists that “he did not reside at the house in question,” Appellant Br. at 10, he cannot

claim that his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches was violated, even if the

officers searched his mother’s home without probable cause, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134; see also

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1980) (noting that a defendant’s possession of a

seized good is not sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment standing).

Perhaps realizing that a claim directly challenging the constitutionality of the search

would fail, Chancellor has tried another tack. He argues that Geelhood violated Chancellor’s

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 12

own Fourth Amendment rights to be free from false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious

prosecution, each of which resulted from the illegal search of his mother’s home. But we have

doubts that this attempt to bootstrap his lawsuit to his mother’s constitutional rights can succeed

as a legal matter.

The Fourth Amendment claims Chancellor brings in this lawsuit (false arrest, false

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution) have something in common with a claim for illegal

search or seizure: each requires the plaintiff to show an absence of probable cause. Tlapanco,

969 F.3d at 652, 654. But to prove an illegal search claim, a plaintiff must show a lack of

probable cause to search the plaintiff’s person or property. Chancellor’s claims, by contrast,

require an absence of probable cause to arrest and to prosecute, respectively.3 Id. at 652 (“To

prevail on a false arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the arresting officer

lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” (citation modified)); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d

294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that a plaintiff must prove a lack of probable cause “for the

criminal prosecution”).

Chancellor tries to elide the difference. He attempts to prove the lack of probable cause

to arrest and prosecute him by arguing a lack of probable cause to search his mother’s house.

Begin with the complaint. Chancellor’s theory was that “the false claims made and sworn to

b[y] Geelhood in the search warrant affidavit led directly to the issuance of the search warrant,

the raid at [his mother’s home], the seizure of the cocaine and to [Chancellor’s] subsequent

prosecution.” R. 13, Second Am. Compl., PageID 99. And “[a]s a direct result of Geelhood’s

false affidavit, [Chancellor] was arrested in May of 2012 and held in Wayne County Jail until his

trial date.” Id.; see also id. at 102 (describing “[Chancellor’s] false arrest that arose from

Geelhood’s falsified search warrant and affidavit”). Chancellor’s response to Geelhood’s motion

for summary judgment followed the same reasoning. See R. 81, Res. to Mot. for Summ. J.,

PageID 1794 (“Simply put, the magistrate who approved the warrant in this case . . . [was] not

privy to the fact that Geelhood was lying in his search warrant affidavits.”); id. at 1795 (“[T]he

[search warrant] affidavit in this case was wholly dependent on Geelhood’s credibility, had the

3Chancellor’s false imprisonment claim “arises out of an alleged false arrest,” so we analyze that claim as

“false arrest.” Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020).

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 13

magistrate or judge been aware of Geelhood’s illegal and perjurious behavior, there is no basis to

conclude the warrant would have still been issued, evidence would not have been suppressed and

Darell would not have been convicted.”). For the most part, so does his brief on appeal.

In other words, Chancellor’s theory is that Geelhood’s allegedly falsified search warrant

affidavit led to the unconstitutional search of his mother’s house, which in turn led to his

eventual arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment for possession of cocaine. But Geelhood’s search

warrant affidavit never connected Chancellor with the house, whether truly or falsely. The

affidavit just said that a confidential informant had told Geelhood that drugs were stored and sold

at the house, and that, during surveillance, Geelhood had witnessed an unidentified man making

three hand-to-hand drug sales.

Geelhood would later testify at Chancellor’s trial that Chancellor was the person he saw

during the surveillance. But that testimony obviously came after the search, the arrest, and the

decision to prosecute, so it could not have caused those events. Other than this trial testimony,

the parties have identified no other place in the record where Geelhood identified Chancellor as

the dealer he saw during surveillance. Indeed, Chancellor conceded at oral argument that the

first time Geelhood identified Chancellor as the dealer was during Chancellor’s trial. And

Geelhood is absolutely immune for the testimony he gave at trial. Moldowan v. City of Warren,

578 F.3d 351, 390 (6th Cir. 2009).

Even though the affidavit did not name Chancellor as the suspected dealer, it is of course

true that the affidavit, and the ensuing search of Chancellor’s mother’s house, was a but-for

cause of Chancellor’s subsequent arrest and prosecution. Without the warrant, the police would

not have entered the home or found the drugs and evidence suggesting they belonged to

Chancellor. But other circuits have held that it goes too far to allow a plaintiff to recover

damages for a subsequent arrest or prosecution simply because an illegal search put the wheels in

motion; and that is true even when the plaintiff’s own property was the place illegally searched.

See Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 1999); Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154,

157 (3d Cir. 2000), as amended (Jan. 26, 2001); Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 606 (7th Cir.

2019).

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 14

These courts offer three reasons for their conclusion. First, as a product of the

exclusionary rule, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply in § 1983 cases.

Townes, 176 F.3d at 145–46; Martin, 934 F.3d at 599. Our circuit agrees. See Codrington v.

Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 895 (6th Cir. 2025). Second, the Supreme Court has suggested that

damages for constitutional violations should not extend further than the “interests protected by”

the constitutional guarantee. Hector, 235 F.3d at 157 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

265 (1978)); see also Martin, 934 F.3d at 601 (discussing Carey). Because the “evil of an

unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy,” victims of such conduct “may recover

damages directly related to” that interest—“including (where appropriate) damages for physical

injury, property damage, injury to reputation, etc.; but such victims cannot be compensated for

injuries that result from the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal

prosecution,” because no privacy interest would be served. Townes, 176 F.3d at 148; see also

Hector, 235 F.3d at 157 (“[D]amages for an unlawful search should not extend to post-

indictment legal process,” because they “are too unrelated to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy

interests.”). And finally, allowing such suits would be inconsistent with the common law, the

“starting point for inquiry under § 1983.” Hector, 235 F.3d at 155, (quoting Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)); see Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 20–

27 (1997); id. at 27 (noting that a “two-century tradition of civil damage actions in America”

shows that a plaintiff complaining of an illegal search could only recover damages from the

search, not from “[t]he factual harms of seizure, evidentiary use, conviction, and sentence”).

Whatever the wisdom of these opinions, it is certainly not clearly established that an

officer could be liable in such circumstances. Much less so here, where Chancellor seeks to hold

Geelhood liable for his arrest and prosecution that resulted from the violation of his mother’s

privacy rights.

Finally, it is important to note what Chancellor has not argued in this case. The parties

do not dispute that a facially valid arrest warrant is normally sufficient to establish probable

cause to arrest. See Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). As

with a search warrant, an arrest warrant’s presumption of validity gives way when an officer

knowingly falsifies the materials supporting the magistrate’s issuance of it. Id. at 677 n.4. But

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 15

Chancellor has not argued that the investigator’s report supporting his arrest warrant was

falsified. In his briefing to the district court, Chancellor recited the correct legal standard—“‘[a]

false arrest claim . . . requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause

to arrest the plaintiff.’” R. 81, Res. to Mot. for Summ. J., PageID 1793 (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). But, consistent with the allegations in his complaint, Chancellor attempted to

show this only by claiming that “Geelhood was lying in his search warrant affidavit[].” Id. at

1794 (emphasis added). He generally repeats that framing on appeal.

Nor did Chancellor explain what role Geelhood played in securing the arrest

warrant: other officers applied for the warrant and effectuated Chancellor’s arrest. See

Tlapanco, 969 F.3d at 652 n.2 (assuming without deciding that someone other than the arresting

officer may be sued for false arrest if the officer “was responsible for swearing out the affidavit

upon which the arrest warrant relied”). Defendants raised this point in their motion for summary

judgment, but instead of responding with facts showing false statements in the arrest warrant

application or Geelhood’s responsibility for them, Chancellor merely asserted that “it is

uncontested that it was Geelhood who[] prompted the search of the [home on] 32nd St, and

Darell’s subsequent arrest and criminal charges, which were the precipitating events of the

prosecution.” R. 81, Res. to Mot. for Summ. J., PageID 1797 (emphasis added). Likewise,

Chancellor did not point the district court to facts showing “that [Geelhood] influenced or

participated in the decision to prosecute,” as is required for malicious prosecution. Tlapanco,

969 F.3d at 655 (citation modified). Accordingly, the district court did not address any alleged

false statements in support of the arrest warrant or the prosecution; the court instead followed

the parties’ lead and trained its focus on the search warrant affidavit. Chancellor has not argued

in this court that the district court erred in this regard.

2.

Chancellor also fails to show a genuine dispute of material fact that Geelhood violated his

due process rights by failing to produce material, exculpatory evidence during the criminal

prosecution as required by Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. “A criminal defendant suffers a due process

violation when the prosecution fails to turn over favorable evidence that would materially aid in

his defense.” Est. of Andrews v. City of Cleveland, 112 F.4th 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 16

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “Police share this obligation.” Id. at 443. But their duties are complete

when they provide the information to the prosecutor; police have no duty to ensure it reaches the

defendant. D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 2014). For a Brady violation,

Chancellor must show three things: “(1) the existence of favorable evidence, either exculpatory

or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed; and (3) that the suppression resulted in

prejudice.” Hill v. Mitchell, 842 F.3d 910, 926 (6th Cir. 2016) (opinion of McKeague, J.) (citing

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)).

Chancellor fails to show that Geelhood suppressed any Brady information in this case.

He primarily argues that Geelhood was required to tell the prosecutor that he falsified

information in the search warrant affidavit. Even assuming that a Brady claim could lie in such

circumstances,4 we explained above why Chancellor has not shown a question of material fact

that Geelhood lied in the affidavit. So any Brady claim premised on failure to disclose the

alleged falsification likewise fails. Chancellor also argues that Geelhood violated his Brady

obligations by failing to turn over evidence showing that Chancellor did not match the physical

description of the man in the search warrant affidavit. But Chancellor already knew that his own

physical appearance differed from the description provided in the search warrant, and he, in fact,

based his trial defense on that discrepancy. “[T]here is no Brady violation if the defendant knew

or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in

question, or if the information was available to him from another source.” United States v.

Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

B.

Finally, Chancellor appeals the district court’s denial of his state claims for gross

negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.

4Although Chancellor frames his argument as a Brady violation, his argument more naturally fits as a

fabrication-of-evidence claim. See Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 815 (6th Cir. 2019); Clark v.

Abdallah, 131 F.4th 432, 447 (6th Cir. 2025). But even if he had brought a fabrication claim, he has not shown a

genuine dispute of material fact that “the evidence was knowingly fabricated,” so that argument would likewise fail.

Clark, 131 F.4th at 448.

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 17

1.

Chancellor’s gross negligence claim fails. Michigan law immunizes state-government

employees acting within the scope of their employment from tort liability, unless their actions

are grossly negligent. Mays v. Governor of Mich., 954 N.W.2d 139, 198 (2020) (citing Mich.

Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)). But Michigan’s “governmental immunity statute does not itself

create a cause of action called ‘gross negligence.’” Cummins v. Robinson Township, 770

N.W.2d 421, 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). Instead, the plaintiff must identify a

common-law duty. See Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 315 n.12 (Mich. 2001). When

the plaintiff has done so, showing mere negligence on the officer’s part will not subject the

officer to liability for breach. Instead, the statute requires that the officer’s conduct rise to the

level of “gross negligence.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(c).

Below, Chancellor claimed that Geelhood was grossly negligent when he “knowingly

falsified the contents” of the search warrant affidavit and “knowing[ly] executed the search

warrant.” R. 13, Second Am. Compl., PageID 106; see also R. 81, Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J.,

PageID 1810 (arguing that “Geelhood . . . intentionally fabricate[d] evidence”). But these are the

same acts underlying Chancellor’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious

prosecution. Michigan does not permit a claim for gross negligence premised on intentional acts.

See, e.g., VanVorous v. Burmeister, 687 N.W.2d 132, 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that

when a gross negligence claim is “fully premised” on intentional tort, the “plaintiff did not state

a claim on which relief could be granted” (citations omitted)) abrogated on other grounds by

Odom v. Wayne County, 760 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 2008); Hill v. City of Detroit, 2021 WL

137381, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2021) (finding plaintiff’s gross negligence claim barred

because it “relied on the same ‘wrongful conduct’ as his intentional tort claims” for false arrest

and malicious prosecution). Now on appeal, Chancellor changes tune and states that Geelhood

was grossly negligent because “[h]e spoke to no witnesses, took no notes, [and] documented

nothing.” Appellant Br. at 47. But we decline to consider this argument raised for the first time

No. 25-1424 Chancellor v. Geelhood, et al. Page 18

on appeal. See Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2007). So Chancellor’s gross

negligence claim fails.5

2.

Chancellor’s other state claims also fail. Chancellor has not provided a single state case

or state-specific argument regarding false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.

He instead rests on his “lengthy [federal] arguments regarding probable cause.” Appellant Br. at

41. So we will do the same. Above we concluded that Chancellor’s federal claims fail because

he has not shown a lack of probable cause sufficient to overcome Geelhood’s assertion of

qualified immunity. As Chancellor has framed the case, that is sufficient to dispose of his state

claims as well on state governmental immunity grounds.

***

We AFFIRM.

5The district court granted summary judgment to Geelhood because it found that Chancellor failed to

identify a specific duty under Michigan law. But “[w]e may affirm on any basis supported by the record.”

Campbell v. Riahi, 109 F.4th 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2024).