The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2501-24
SANG KIM,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
and T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
Respondents.
_________________________
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Decided February 25, 2026
Before Judges Perez Friscia and Vinci.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of
Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, Docket No. 332569.
Sang Kim, self-represented appellant.
Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney
for respondent Board of Review (Janet Greenberg
Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kevin
K.O. Sangster, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Claimant Sang Kim appeals from a January 31, 2025 final agency decision
of the Board of Review (Board), which determined Kim is disqualified for
unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to the work. We affirm.
I.
Kim was employed as a sales account executive for T-Mobile USA, Inc.
(T-Mobile) from February 22, 2021, until February 3, 2022, when he resigned.
Kim subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. On January 13, 2023, a
Deputy of the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Deputy) determined Kim
was not eligible for unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to such work and was disqualified for benefits
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
Kim appealed the Deputy's determination to the Appeal Tribunal
(Tribunal), which conducted a telephonic hearing on January 22, 2024. Kim and
a representative of T-Mobile, Larry Kiel, testified at the hearing.
Kim testified he "had been working in a toxic environment for quite some
time" and "[t]he leadership" at T-Mobile "made every effort to make [his]
presence there uncomfortable." Kim never reported his concerns to T-Mobile's
human resources (HR) department because "the bulk of this occurred towards
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the end of the year [i]n 2021, right before the new year" and he is "no HR basket
case." He is "not somebody who rocks the boat" and "did[ not] think this was
HR worthy." "This was[ not] . . . some sort of . . . prejudice or anything like
that. It was just simply, [he] knew they were ganging up on [him], but there[
was] . . . nothing [he] could prove."
Kim conceded his "performance . . . was lacking," which he attributed to
"the territory [he] worked." It, "for lack of a better word[,] . . . was a pretty
crappy territory." Kim "could have easily taken the path of least resistance and
allowed them to fire [him] and let [him] go, but [he] had no desire to do that."
Kim admitted he was warned that he was not meeting his sales quotas, and "still
had some time to improve [his] sales quotas . . . at the time that [he] quit."
Kim testified Kiel, who had only been his manager for one week when he
resigned, "suggested [he] resign" because Kim "[did not] want it on [his] record"
and "they[ were] going to let [him] go." Kim had "never been fired from
anywhere in [his twenty-]plus years out in the workforce. And [he] was[ not]
about to start with this organization." Kim was "not going to give them the
satisfaction" and was "going to resign." He "sent [Kiel his] email and that was
it." He "left quietly." He "did[ not] stir up anything, [he] did[ not] rock the
boat."
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Kiel testified that he had only been Kim's supervisor "for one day when
he . . . resigned" and Kim never discussed his resignation with him. Kiel did
recall "having a discussion with [Kim] when [he] took the role over [about]
where he stood as far as his position in the company." Kim was on a
"performance enhancing plan [(PEP)] that T-Mobile has in place." Kim's PEP
began on November 1, 2021, and was set to end on March 1, 2022.
Kiel testified "[Kim] had just finished month three of the four months of
that plan. So, [he] did let [Kim] know that he did have a month to straighten
himself out. And obviously, if he [did not] straighten himself at that
point . . . most people . . . would[ be] let go after that, which is just company
policy." Kim "still had a full month . . . that he could have straightened himself
out" and he "did[ not] take advantage of" that. Kim resigned on February 3,
2022. At the time Kim resigned, there was still work available to him because
"his territory was still assigned to him" and he could "have continued working
had he chosen to do so."
In a decision dated January 24, 2024, the Tribunal determined Kim "did
not leave the job voluntarily" and reversed the determination of the Deputy. The
Tribunal found Kiel "provided [Kim] with the option of resigning in lieu of an
imminent discharge" and Kim "opted to involuntarily resign . . . to protect his
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employment record." It found T-Mobile's "conten[tion] that they never
discharged" Kim "lack[ed] credibility" because "[i]t is difficult to fathom that
[Kim] would abandon the job during a discussion pertaining to job
performance." The Tribunal noted Kim "provided consistent testimony that he
was involuntarily separated due to an imminent discharge."
In a final decision dated January 31, 2025, the Board reversed the Tribunal
and determined Kim is disqualified for unemployment benefits because he "quit
the work without good cause attributable to the work." The Board "disagree[d]
with [the Tribunal's] credibility judg[]ment" based on the "undisputed testimony
from both parties that [Kim] resigned via a resignation letter submitted to" Kiel.
The Board found:
When placed on a [PEP], the employer is giving the
employee an opportunity to improve. Although [Kim]
blamed his failure to meet his quota on matters that he
felt were not in his control, there is no evidence that he
attempted to resolve his issues prior to leaving. The
option to remain employed or resign rested with [Kim]
who chose to resign before attempting to improve his
performance. Continuing work was available to [Kim]
at the time of his resignation. His decision to leave
because the work environment was toxic under the
leadership of his former manager was not supported by
credible evidence as he was under new supervision at
the time of his separation. As [Kim] has not
demonstrated that the working conditions were so
abnormal or adversely affected his health, he is
disqualified for benefits for leaving work voluntarily
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without good cause attributable to the work under
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Kim contends the Board's "failure to issue payment after a
reversal constitutes an abuse of discretion and undermines the appeals process."
Specifically, he argues "[t]he Tribunal reversed the [Deputy's] denial,
effectively granting [his] claim" and "[d]espite the reversal . . . the [Board]
withheld payment." He claims "[t]his approach subverts the intent of the appeal
process by effectively denying the claimant the benefit of [a] successful appeal."
Kim also argues the "failure to promptly issue benefits after reversal, combined
with inconsistent and inaccurate directions regarding certification and
verification requirements, unreasonably delayed payment." We are not
persuaded.
An appellate court's review of an administrative agency decision is
narrow. Sullivan v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 471 N.J. Super. 147, 155 (App.
Div. 2022). In matters involving unemployment benefits, appellate courts afford
deference to the Board's expertise in administrating the Unemployment
Compensation Law (UCL), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71. Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152
N.J. 197, 210 (1997). Consequently, a reviewing court will not reverse an
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agency's decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or . . . not
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." In re Ambroise, 258
N.J. 180, 197 (2024) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).
Under the UCL, employees who resign from their jobs are not eligible for
unemployment benefits unless they establish that they resigned for "good cause
attributable to" the work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). When determining whether
"good cause" exists, "courts have construed the phrase to mean 'cause sufficient
to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and
joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Brady, 152 N.J. at 214 (quoting
Domenico v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App.
Div. 1983)).
An employee who resigns bears the burden of showing he or she did so
with good cause. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c). The test for determining whether good
cause is shown is one of "ordinary common sense and prudence." Brady, 152
N.J. at 214 (quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Rev., 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52 (App. Div.
1964)). The employee's decision to leave work "must be compelled by real,
substantial[,] and reasonable circumstances[,] not imaginary, trifling and
whimsical ones." Ibid. (quoting Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 288). In other
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words, the employee's reason for quitting must be "so compelling as to give [him
or her] no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we are convinced there is no basis
to disturb the Board's decision. The record supports the Board's findings that
Kim had one month remaining on his PEP and still had the opportunity to
improve his performance as required by his employer when he resigned. Kim
voluntarily elected to resign rather than continue to do the work that was
available to him and attempt to meet his sales goals. The Board's determination
that Kim is disqualified for benefits because he left his job voluntarily without
good cause attributable to the work was based on ample findings supported by
substantial credible evidence in the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
We therefore conclude the Board's decision is supported by sufficient
credible evidence on the record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). To the extent
we have not otherwise addressed Kim's arguments, they are without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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