Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MAURICE WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

TOWN OF CLINTON, ET AL. NO. 23-00119-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 54).

The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 59). Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 69). For the

following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 54) is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged false arrest and the alleged excessive

force used on Plaintiff during the arrest. (Doc. 1).

On October 19, 2021, Officer Charles Brown was dispatched to Plaintiff’s

neighbor’s home. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 1; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 1). Plaintiff’s neighbor complained to

police that for “months,” Plaintiff’s dogs had been “constantly coming into her yard

and front door using the restroom and killing her plants.” (Id.). While there, Brown

issued a summons to Plaintiff for violating the “dogs at large” ordinance.

(Doc. 54-2 ¶ 3; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 3). The summons set a court appearance for

December 7, 2021. (Id.).

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff appeared in court as required, and there

is a discrepancy between the date listed on the summons and the correct court date

on which Plaintiff should have appeared. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 4; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 4). Defendants

admit that Brown wrote the incorrect court date on the summons but indicate that

Brown believed the date to be correct at the time and suggested confusion over a court

scheduling change. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 5). Plaintiff admits that Brown “finally made a

statement to clarify the ‘confusion’ regarding the incorrect date on the summons” but

argues that Brown purposefully wrote the wrong date on the summons.

(Doc. 59-1 ¶ 5).

The parties agree that ultimately, a judge in the 20th Judicial District Court

for the State of Louisiana issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 4;

Doc. 59-1 ¶ 4). The warrant orders Plaintiff’s arrest for “FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR

ARRAIGNMENT 3:2771 DOGS NOT TO RUN AT LARGE[.]” (Doc. 20-1 at 48).

On January 24, 2022, Brown issued a second summons to Plaintiff for violating

the “dogs at large” ordinance. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 6; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 6). On the summons, Brown

wrote: “Subject began making threats towards me[.]” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 7; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 7).

On January 28, 2022, the District Attorney called Plaintiff to inform him about

the bench warrant and instructed Plaintiff to contact the judge that issued the

warrant. (Doc. 54-2 ¶¶ 8, 10; Doc. 59-1 ¶¶ 8, 10). Plaintiff recognized the

District Attorney’s phone number because he had “worked with [the District

Attorney] on several things before.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 9; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 9). Plaintiff contacted

the judge who issued the warrant, and the judge arranged a meeting with Plaintiff

on the afternoon of March 2, 2022. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 11; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 11).

On the morning of March 2, 2022, Brown went to Plaintiff’s home to execute

the bench warrant. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 14; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 14). At the time of the arrest, Plaintiff

acknowledged the warrant to Brown, stating, “Yeah, I know. [The District Attorney]

called me Monday and I’m meeting with the judge [] this afternoon.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 12;

Doc. 59-1 ¶ 12). During the arrest, an altercation ensued.

The entire interaction took place on the front porch and at the threshold of an

exterior door to Plaintiff’s home; Brown never entered the home. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 15;

Doc. 59-1 ¶ 15). It is undisputed that at the time of the arrest: (1) Plaintiff was

barefoot and had a hard cast on his right arm; (2) Plaintiff kept two handguns in his

home; and (3) Plaintiff’s fourteen-year-old granddaughter was inside his home.

(Doc. 54-2 ¶¶ 16–19; Doc. 59-1 ¶¶ 16–19).

When Brown informed Plaintiff that he was under arrest, Plaintiff rotated

back towards his home to “grab [his] shoes.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 19; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 19). Plaintiff

asserts that he did not “make any type of offensive move towards [] Brown; all he

wanted was his shoes.” (Doc. 59-1 ¶ 20). Defendants assert that Brown initiated

contact with Plaintiff when Plaintiff made a movement to turn back inside his home.

(Doc. 54-2 ¶ 20). The initial physical contact caused Plaintiff’s face to make contact

with the door jam. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 21; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 21).

Next, Defendants assert that Plaintiff moved toward a second exterior door of

his home. (Doc. 54-1 ¶ 21). Plaintiff argues that he stepped onto the front porch of his

home to alert his granddaughter to his arrest when Brown pepper sprayed him.

(Doc. 59-1 ¶ 21).

At 9:57:18 AM, Officer Brown made an emergency radio transmission stating,

“SUBJ IS FIGHTING.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 24; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 24). At 9:57:26 AM, eight seconds

later, Officer Brown transmitted that the subject was “DETAINED.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 25;

Doc. 59-1 ¶ 25). After the arrest, Brown transported Plaintiff to the

East Feliciana Parish Jail and called for an ambulance to evaluate Plaintiff.

(Doc. 54-2 ¶ 26; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 26).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against Officer Charles Brown and

the Town of Clinton. Defendants moved to dismiss. (Doc. 10). On Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, defamation,

malicious prosecution, and punitive damages, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to

amend his Complaint. (Doc. 26).

On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, asserting the

following claims under federal law: (1) false arrest; (2) illegal seizure and excessive

force; and (3) malicious prosecution. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff also asserts the following

state law claims: (1) battery; (2) defamation; and (3) malicious prosecution. (Id.).

Now, Defendants move for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims. For

the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 54) will be GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funches v. Progressive Tractor

& Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This occurs when a party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).

For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they “must

come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the

evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,

939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the

motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material

fact, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade

the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at

1265.

Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must

offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of

evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Darden v.

City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims, arguing

the undisputed facts show that: (1) Brown’s arrest of Plaintiff was conducted

pursuant to a facially valid judicial warrant and was therefore supported by probable

cause; (2) Brown’s calibrated use of force was an objectively reasonable response to

Plaintiff’s admitted and escalating physical resistance; and (3) the official reporting

of the arrest was protected by a qualified privilege. (Doc. 54). Alternatively,

Defendants argue that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court will

address each claim in turn.

A. False Arrest Claims Under Federal and State Law.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s false arrest claims under both federal

and state law must fail because Brown conducted the arrest pursuant to a facially

valid bench warrant.

Under federal law, to establish that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights by arresting him, Plaintiff must show that the officers lacked

probable cause. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal

citations omitted). “If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then

the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.” Id.

(citing Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Under Louisiana law, “[f]alse arrest and imprisonment occur when one arrests

and restrains another against his will without a warrant or other statutory authority.

Simply stated, it is restraint without color of legal authority.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 172

(citing Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 971 (La. 1977)). “A facially valid

arrest warrant immunizes the officers from false arrest and imprisonment claims[.]”

Deville, 567 F.3d at 172 (citing Deville v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 1999-1629

(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/3/00), 762 So. 2d 641, 643, writ denied, 2000-1589 (La. 8/31/00),

766 So. 2d 1281; Rodriguez v. Deen, 33,308 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/00), 759 So. 2d 1032,

1035, writ denied, 2000-1414 (La. 6/23/00), 765 So. 2d 1049; Molette v.

City of Alexandria, 2005 WL 2445432, at *8 (W.D. La. 2005)).

This Court has found it appropriate to consider false arrest claims under both

federal and state law together, and the Court will do so here. Imani v.

City of Baton Rouge, 614 F. Supp. 3d 306, 381–82 (M.D. La. 2022) (“This Court’s

analysis to [p]laintiffs’ § 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest claims applies with

equal force to the state law claims.”) (citing O’Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 F. App’x 741, 745

n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that, because Fourth Amendment principles underpin

Louisiana law relating to false arrests, the Fourth Amendment inquiry was

applicable to both plaintiff’s federal and state law claims) (additional citations

omitted)).

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arrest, made pursuant to a facially

valid warrant, is, by definition, an arrest supported by probable cause. (Doc. 54-1 at

16). Because Brown’s arrest of Plaintiff was lawful, Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s false arrest claims must fail. (Id.).

Plaintiff admits that generally, an intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of

causation for a false arrest claim. (Doc. 59 at 11). Plaintiff asserts, however, that

Defendants may still be liable for false arrest “if the plaintiff shows that the

deliberations of the intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the

[D]efendant.” (Id.).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held: “It is well

settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent

intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks

the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” McLin v. Ard,

866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 170; Taylor v. Gregg,

36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo,

352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). “[T]he initiating party may be liable for

false arrest,” however, “if the plaintiff shows that the ‘deliberations of that

intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant.’” McLin,

866 F.3d at 689 (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 170; Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456; quoting Hand

v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988)). But, “because the intermediary’s

deliberations protect even officers with malicious intent,” a plaintiff must show that

the official’s malicious motive led the official to withhold relevant information or

otherwise misdirect the independent intermediary by omission or commission.

McLin, 866 F.3d at 689 (citing Buehler v. City of Aus./Aus. Police Dep’t., 824 F.3d 548,

555 (5th Cir. 2016); Hand, 838 F.2d at 1427).

The Fifth Circuit has held that “mere allegations of ‘taint,’ without more, are

insufficient to overcome summary judgment.” McLin, 866 F.3d at 689 (“We have

previously held that ‘mere allegations of taint, without more, are insufficient to

overcome summary judgment.’”) (quotations omitted) (citing Cuadra v.

Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., id. at 813–14

(finding no “fact issue” regarding whether appellees tainted the decision of two grand

juries to return indictments); Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456–57 (finding that plaintiffs

presented no summary judgment evidence showing that the intermediary was tainted

by the actions of the defendants); Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555–56 (finding no error in

district court summary judgment ruling that appellant “failed to show a triable issue

whether the grand jury’s findings of probable cause were obtained by false or

misleading statements by the arresting officers”)).

Rather, Plaintiff must “affirmatively show[ ]” that the defendants tainted the

intermediary’s decision. Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 (citing Craig v.

Dall. Area Rapid Transit Auth., 504 F. App’x 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2012); Shields v.

Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 2004)). To satisfy the taint exception, omissions of

exculpatory information must be “knowing[ ].” Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 (citing

Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813–14; Allen v. Jackson Cnty., 623 F. App’x 161, 162

(5th Cir. 2015)). And because the intermediary’s deliberations protect even officers

with malicious intent, that an officer “harbored ill-will toward” the defendant does

not suffice. Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 (citing Hand, 838 F.2d at 1427; Craig,

504 F. App’x at 333).

Here, Defendants argue that Brown’s deposition testimony demonstrates, at

worst, simple mistake or negligence, and “shows the opposite of knowledge,

intentionality, or reckless disregard for the truth.” (Doc. 54-1 at 18). Brown testified

as follows:

Q. Who wrote up the summons?

A. I wrote it up.

Q. Okay. Who decided to put December 7th on there?

A. I put what our court date was.

Q. You thought the court date was on December 7th; right?

A. At that time it was supposed to be.

Q. So you’re saying the judge was wrong?

A. I don’t know who was wrong.

(Doc. 57-5 at 48:22–49:6).

Plaintiff responds that Brown purposefully provided the wrong date on the

summons, based “[o]n information and belief.” (Doc. 59 at 12 (Plaintiff’s Opposition

Brief, stating: “On information and belief, Defendant Brown purposefully provided

the wrong date on the summons, which in turn resulted in the issue of the arrest

warrant.”)). The only evidence Plaintiff relies on is a November 29, 2022 transcript of

state court proceedings, in which the state court judge stated that the summons

“clearly states that [Plaintiff] was summoned to appear in Mayor’s Court on

December 7th. Mayor’s Court is not on a Tuesday; it’s on Monday. So the officer who

wrote the ticket very obviously created all this confusion by putting the wrong date

on the ticket.” (Doc. 20-1 at 30–31). As Defendants point out, this transcript, at most,

shows a mistake. Plaintiff has pointed to no other summary judgment evidence in

support of his assertion that Brown knowingly and purposefully tainted the

intermediary’s decision in issuing the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.

Without more, Plaintiff’s “mere allegations of taint” are insufficient to survive

summary judgment under Fifth Circuit precedent. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s false

arrest claims under both state and federal law are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is GRANTED

in this respect.

B. Malicious Prosecution Claims Under Federal and State Law.

Second, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claims under both federal and state law. The Fifth Circuit has

emphasized that, similar to false arrest, “the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment

claim for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful initiation of charges without

probable cause.” Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022)). Because “[t]he elements of a § 1983

malicious prosecution claim and the elements of a Louisiana state malicious

prosecution claim are coextensive[,]” the Court will simultaneously analyze whether

there has been a violation of a constitutionally protected right along with the state

law malicious prosecution claim.1 Wooten v. Harrell, No. CV 23-368-SDD-SDJ,

1 Under Louisiana law, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are:

(1) the commencement or continuation of an original criminal or civil proceeding; (2) its legal

causation by the present defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination

in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the

presence of malice therein; and (6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to

plaintiff. Deville, 567 F.3d at 173 (citing Jones v. Soileau, 448 So.2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1984)).

2024 WL 1815349, at *7 (M.D. La. Apr. 25, 2024) (citing Armstrong v. Ashley,

60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023)).

The parties’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims

mirror the arguments raised concerning Plaintiff’s false arrest claims. Plaintiff

argues that the state court judge’s finding of probable cause was tainted by Brown’s

inclusion of the wrong date on the summons. (Doc. 59 at 13). Plaintiff contends that

“whether Brown put the incorrect date on the summons due to malice or

incompetence is the role of the fact finder.” (Id.).

Defendants respond that at the summary judgment stage, after discovery is

complete, Plaintiff cannot rest on “information and belief” or bare allegations.

(Doc. 69 at 16). Instead, Defendants contend that Plaintiff must produce evidence,

but Plaintiff has produced none. (Id.).

For the same reasons discussed in Section A, supra, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by a bench warrant, and there is no summary

judgment evidence supporting Plaintiff’s argument that Brown tainted the

state court judge’s decision when issuing the warrant. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

malicious prosecution claims under both state and federal law are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is

GRANTED in this respect.

C. Excessive Force Claim Under Federal Law and Battery Claim

Under State Law.

Third, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law and battery claim under state law

because Brown’s use of force was objectively reasonable. (Doc. 54-1 at 22). Plaintiff

responds that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment because

Plaintiff and Brown have two conflicting accounts of what transpired on the morning

of March 2, 2022, such that the jury must decide. (Doc. 59 at 6–7).

i. Excessive Force.

“To prevail on an excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show (1) [an] injury,

(2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and

(3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349,

at *6 (citing Darden v. City of Ft. Wor., Tex., 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2018); quoting

Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016)). Excessive force claims are

necessarily fact intensive, and “whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’

depends on ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Wooten,

2024 WL 1815349, at *6 (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 167; quoting Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

Factors the Court should consider include “the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Id. Additionally, “[t]he extent of the injury required to demonstrate that the force

used was excessive depends on the context in which the injury occurs.” Wooten,

2024 WL 1815349, at *6 (citing Goffney v. Sauceda, 340 F. App’x 181, 184

(5th Cir. 2009); Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)). Finally, excessive

force and false arrest claims are “separate and distinct,” such that an excessive force

claim must be analyzed “without regard to whether the arrest itself was justified.”

Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349 (citing Thomas v. Gulotta, 2017 WL 379449, at *7

(M.D. La. Jan. 26, 2017); quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007)).

Because the parties dispute all material facts surrounding the altercation that

ensued during Brown’s arrest of Plaintiff, the Court cannot make the “fact intensive”

determination of whether Brown’s actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of

law on the record before it. Thus, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact

precludes summary judgment on this issue. The Court, however, will analyze

Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity below.

ii. Battery.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 220 provides, “A person shall

submit peaceably to a lawful arrest. The person making a lawful arrest may use

reasonable force to effect the arrest and detention, and also to overcome any

resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested or detained.”

La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 220. “The use of force by law enforcement officers must be

tested by the ‘reasonable force’ standard established by this article. The test

precludes ‘clearly inappropriate force.’” Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969,

972 (La. 1977) (quoting La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 220, Official Revision Comment (b)).

“The use of force when necessary to make an arrest is a legitimate police

function.” Id. “But if the officers use unreasonable or excessive force, they and their

employer are liable for any injuries which result.” Id. (citations omitted); see also

Penn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Off., 2002-0893 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/03),

843 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (stating that excessive force transforms authorized use of force

into a battery). “Whether the force used is reasonable depends upon the totality of

the facts and circumstances in each case.” Kyle, 353 So. 2d at 973. “A court must

evaluate the officers’ actions against those of ordinary, prudent, and reasonable men

placed in the same position as the officers and with the same knowledge as the

officers.” Id. “The degree of force employed is a factual issue.” Id. (citations omitted).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained further:

Several factors to be considered in making this determination are the

known character of the arrestee, the risks and dangers faced by the

officers, the nature of the offense involved, the chance of the arrestee’s

escape if the particular means are not employed, the existence of

alternative methods of arrest, the physical size, strength, and weaponry

of the officers as compared to the arrestee, and the exigencies of the

moment.

Kyle, 353 So. 2d at 973 (citations omitted).

Ultimately, “excessive force claims under both federal and Louisiana law turn

on whether the use of force was objectively reasonable given the totality of the

circumstances. This has been widely recognized by [the Fifth Circuit], Louisiana

federal district courts, and the Louisiana Supreme Court.” Shepherd on behalf of

Est. of Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2019) (collecting

cases); see Imani v. City of Baton Rouge, 614 F. Supp. 3d 306, 380–81 (M.D. La. 2022).

For the same reasons described regarding Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, the

Court cannot determine whether Brown’s actions were objectively reasonable on the

record before it. Because a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary

judgment on this issue, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is

DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s state law battery claim.

iii. Qualified Immunity.

In the alternative, however, Defendants assert the defense of qualified

immunity to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law. The doctrine of

qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Ezell v. Seal,

No. CV 23-1514-SDD-EWD, 2025 WL 3124046, at *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2025).

“In determining whether an official enjoys immunity, [courts] ask (1) whether

the plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of a clearly established federal

constitutional or statutory right and (2) whether the official’s actions violated that

right to the extent that an objectively reasonable person would have known.”

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730 (2002)). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” See

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

The assertion of the qualified immunity defense alters the summary judgment

burden of proof. Rodgers v. Edwards, No. CV 21-233-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL 9007801, at

*2 (M.D. La. Dec. 18, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,

No. CV 21-233-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL 9001282 (M.D. La. Dec. 28, 2023) (citing Michalik

v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005)). Once a defendant pleads qualified

immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who “must rebut the defense by

establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established

law and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the

official’s conduct.” Rodgers, 2023 WL 9007801, at *2. “The plaintiff bears the burden

of negating the defense and cannot rest on conclusory allegations and assertions but

must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the

officer’s conduct.” Id. (citing Michalik, 422 F.3d at 262).

Here, Defendants argue that even if a factual dispute exists regarding

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 69 at

12). In support of their argument, Defendants offer the affidavit of their use-of-force

expert, Kery Najolia, in which Najolia opines that Brown’s use of force—the hands-

on technique to prevent retreat, and the deployment of pepper spray—was consistent

with police procedures, training, and police protocols. (Doc. 54-9 at ¶ 62). Defendants

assert that “Plaintiff’s core argument—that ‘conflicting stories’ (Doc. 59, p. 6)

preclude summary judgment—misstates the qualified immunity standard.” (Doc. 69

at 12).

For Plaintiff’s part, he argues that he has “sufficiently alleged” that Brown

acted with malice, stating: “Officer Brown was motivated by evil motive or intent and

demonstrated reckless and callous indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

(Doc. 59 at 13). Plaintiff further argues that whether Brown’s actions amounted to

malice or incompetence is a question of fact for the jury. (Id. at 14).

Based on the altered burden of proof before the Court, however, Plaintiff must

offer more than a conclusory allegation that Brown acted with malice to survive

summary judgment. Instead, Plaintiff must rebut the defense by establishing that

Brown’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that genuine

issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s conduct.

Rodgers, 2023 WL 9007801, at *2. Plaintiff has not done so.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity

regarding Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law. Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is GRANTED in this respect.

D. Defamation Under State Law.

Fourth, Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor

because qualified privilege protects Brown from Plaintiff’s defamation claim under

Louisiana law. (Doc. 54-1 at 28). Plaintiff alleges that Brown defamed him by falsely

charging Plaintiff with resisting arrest and trespass, which harmed Plaintiff’s

reputation in the community. (Doc. 30 at 8).

“Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show four elements to prove defamation:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged

communication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the

publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349, at *8 (citing Bellard

v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 464 (5th Cir. 2012); Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129, 139

(La. 2004)). “If even one of the required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of

action fails.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349 (citing Costello, 864 So.2d at 139).

When “there is probable cause for [an] arrest, Louisiana law affords police

officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions related to reports of the

arrest and the charges on which the arrest was based.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349

(citing Robertson v. City of Shreveport, No. CV 17-CV-0565, 2018 WL 1769373, at *3

(W.D. La. Apr. 12, 2018); Thorn v. McGary, 684 F. App’x 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2017)).

The Fifth Circuit has held that when there is probable cause for an arrest,

“Louisiana law affords police officers a qualified privilege against defamation

actions.” Thorn, 684 F. App’x at 435 (“Indeed, we have already concluded that there

was probable cause for Thorn’s arrest, and under these circumstances, Louisiana law

affords police officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions.”) (citing

Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388 (La. 10/21/97), 703 So. 2d 552, 562–64 (holding that

police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for “report[ing]

the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being

held”); see also Roche v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 303 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct. App. 1974),

writ denied, 307 So. 2d 372 (La. 1975) (affirming dismissal of defamation claim where

officer’s arrest was supported by probable cause); Wooten, 2026 WL 299849, at *9

(When “there is probable cause for [an] arrest, Louisiana law affords police officers a

qualified privilege against defamation actions related to reports of the arrest and the

charges on which the arrest was based.”); Robertson, 2018 WL 1769373, at *3

(“If there is probable cause for arrest, Louisiana law affords police officers a qualified

privilege against defamation actions related to reports of the arrest and the charges

on which the arrest was based.”)).

Because the Court has found that Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable

cause, namely, the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, Brown is entitled to a

qualified privilege against Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

defamation claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is GRANTED in this respect.

E. Jurisdiction Over Remaining Claims.

Plaintiff’s surviving claims include the following: (1) battery under state law

against Defendant Brown; and (2) vicarious liability under state law against

Defendant the Town of Clinton. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims if the claims raise novel or complex issues of state

law, if the claims substantially predominate over the claims over which the district

court has original jurisdiction, if the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it had original jurisdiction, or for other compelling reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Here,

having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court concludes that it is appropriate

for the Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims. See Mitchell v. D.O.C., No. CIV.A. 12-0092-BAJ, 2013 WL 311440, at *6

(M.D. La. Jan. 25, 2013) (“[H]aving recommended that the plaintiff’s federal claims

asserted against the moving defendants be dismissed, the Court concludes that it is

appropriate for the Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s state law claims asserted herein.”).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment

(Doc. 54) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs false arrest claims under both

federal and state law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims

under both federal and state law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity

with respect to Plaintiff's excessive force claim under federal law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's defamation claim under state

law is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims.

Final Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 23"¢ day of February, 2026

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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