The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN SIEBER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 1:24-cv-3247 (ACR)
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Chief Judge of the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia Milton Lee Jr., former Chief Judge Anita Josey-Herring, Associate
Judges Todd Edelman and Juliet McKenna, and Chief Security Officer Thomas Hedgepeth. Dkt.
61. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute stems from a consumer protection lawsuit in the Superior Court for the
District of Columbia. See District of Columbia v. Precision Contracting Sols., LP, 2019-CA-
5047-B (D.C. Super. Ct.). In that case, the D.C. Office of the Attorney General (OAG) sued
Stephen Sieber, Derrick Sieber, and the Sieber’s home contracting company, Precision
Contracting Solutions (PCS), for unlawful business practices in violation of the D.C. Consumer
Protection Procedures Act (CPPA), D.C. Code § 28-3904. Dkt. 6-1 at 1, 4. The case went to
trial in May 2024, and the jury returned a verdict for the District. 1
Unhappy with this outcome, Plaintiffs Stephen Sieber, pro se, and his son Derrick Sieber,
represented by counsel, filed this separate action in federal court. Plaintiffs filed their original
complaint on November 18, 2024. Dkt. 1. On December 9, 2024, they filed their First Amended
Complaint as a matter of right. Dkt. 6 (First Am. Compl. (FAC)). They assert constitutional
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a civil conspiracy claim against nineteen Defendants.
Defendants are grouped as follows: (1) Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia Milton Lee Jr., former Chief Judge Anita Josey-Herring, Associate Judges Todd
Edelman and Juliet McKenna, and Chief Security Officer Thomas Hedgepeth (collectively,
Superior Court Defendants); (2) the District of Columbia, Attorney General Brian Schwalb,
former Attorney General Karl Racine, Timothy Shirey, Jennifer Jones, Adam Teitelbaum, Kevin
Vermillion, Lindsay Marks, and Margaret Ulle (collectively, District Defendants); and (3) Kevin
Spencer, Kenneth Vogel, ANGI Inc., American University, and Natalie Delgadillo. 2 Id. ¶¶ 3–22.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to violate their constitutional rights before,
during, and after the Superior Court jury trial. See generally id. In claims one through five they
allege that several provisions of the CPPA are facially unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 363–94. In
1
Plaintiffs claim that the jury “did not find that D.C. consumers had been injured, damaged, or
had sustained any losses because of the[ir] acts and omissions.” Dkt. 6 (First Am. Compl.
(FAC)) ¶ 320. That is not true. See Precision Contracting Sols., 2019-CA-5047-B (D.C. Super.
Ct. May 29, 2024) (jury verdict form). “Although on a motion to dismiss the court ordinarily
assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and decides only the legal sufficiency of
the pleadings,” a court may take judicial notice of other proceedings “when an undisputed fact on
the public record makes it clear that the plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Defendants American University and Natalie Delgadillo on
July 7, 2025. Dkt. 70.
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claims six and seven they allege that the jury instructions and verdict form are unconstitutional.
Id. ¶¶ 395–98. In claims eight and nine they allege that Defendants’ statements in press releases
published during the Superior Court proceedings are unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 399–406. In claim
ten, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights by removing PCS’s
profile from the ANGI and HomeAdvisor websites. Id. ¶¶ 407–09. In claims eleven and
fourteen they allege that Defendants denied their rights to due process and a fair jury trial. Id.
¶¶ 410–18, 430–36. Finally, in claims twelve and thirteen Plaintiffs allege Fourth and Eighth
Amendment violations that occurred during OAG’s initial investigation and Superior Court
proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 419–29.
Superior Court Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Dkt.
61. They argue that Plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred by judicial immunity, that
Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for relief, and that Plaintiffs fail to establish subject
matter jurisdiction. In their response, Plaintiffs do not attempt to rebut the substance of
Defendants’ Motion. Instead, they request leave to file a second amended complaint.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter” to
“‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007)). The complaint need not
contain “detailed factual allegations,” but requires more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.” Id. The court accepts the “factual allegations as true and
construe[s] the complaint liberally” in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). Although courts construe pro se
filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), a pro se plaintiff must plead
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enough “factual content [to] allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor,
567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
Each claim Plaintiffs assert against Superior Court Defendants arises from the rulings and
decisions Defendants made during Superior Court proceedings.
The law is settled: “Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from suits for money
damages for all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
This immunity applies even when a judge errs, acts maliciously, or exceeds their authority. See
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). It also extends to “auxiliary court personnel”
who perform acts “that are basic and integral part[s] of the judicial function.” Sindram, 986 F.2d
at 1461.
Plaintiffs’ claims target conduct that falls squarely within these protections. They fault
Judges McKenna and Edelman for striking exhibits, FAC ¶ 138, quashing subpoenas, id. ¶ 143,
limiting testimony, id. ¶ 144, imposing sanctions, id. ¶¶ 152‒55, and issuing other adverse
rulings, id. ¶¶ 170–72. Plaintiffs also challenge Judge Edelman’s courtroom management and
allege that he engaged in ex-parte communications with a U.S. Marshal, id. ¶¶ 295‒96, denied a
request for an evidentiary hearing on these communications, id. ¶¶ 328‒29, permitted Deputy
U.S. Marshals to enter the jury deliberation area without Plaintiffs’ knowledge, id. ¶¶ 302, 319,
and exercised control over the jury-instruction process and verdict form in ways with which
Plaintiffs disagreed, id. ¶¶ 179, 208‒09, 212, 228.
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Plaintiffs also take issue with how Superior Court Defendants handled their requests for
audio and video recordings. They allege that former Chief Judge Josey-Herring provided partial
audio recordings and no video, id. ¶¶ 348–51, that Chief Judge Lee failed to respond to all their
requests for additional recordings, id. ¶ 359, and that Chief Security Officer Hedgepeth declined
to produce security video and audio tapes, id. ¶¶ 353‒56.
Notably, Plaintiffs do not allege that any Superior Court Defendant acted without
jurisdiction. Rather, they challenge how Defendants exercised their authority during these
proceedings. But “[t]he well-established remedy for alleged mishandling of a prior case is not
a[n] . . . action against the judge, who enjoys absolute immunity, but an appeal or appeals in the
prior case.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 42 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up). Because
Plaintiffs challenge judicial acts or functions integral to the judicial process, their claims against
Superior Court Defendants are barred by judicial immunity.3
Plaintiffs did not respond to Superior Court Defendants’ arguments. Their failure to do
so is dispositive. “If a party fails to counter an argument that the opposing party makes in a
motion, the court may treat that argument as conceded.” Day v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer &
Regul. Affs., 191 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (D.D.C. 2002); see Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d
425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014). At the last hearing, the Court instructed counsel for Derrick Sieber to
cite case law if he believed judges “may face liability for actions taken from the bench.” Tr.
3
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ FAC is insufficiently plead, Dkt. 61-1 at 12, that
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims, id. at 16, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
Plaintiffs from relitigating Superior Court decisions before this Court, id. at 22. The Court
agrees. Even if Plaintiffs had sufficiently plead their claims, and had standing to sue, the Court
would lack subject matter jurisdiction because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “confined to
cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (cleaned up).
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(Feb. 4, 2025) at 20. Plaintiffs declined that invitation. And since Plaintiffs made no attempt
rebut any of Defendants’ other claims, the Court finds that Plaintiffs conceded the arguments
against them.
Attempting to avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs request leave to file a second amended
complaint. Their efforts are unavailing. As Defendants correctly note, Plaintiffs’ request is
procedurally improper and any amendment would be futile. Dkt. 65 at 2–4. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a) requires courts to grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” But
courts may deny leave when a party unduly delays proceedings, acts in bad faith, prejudices the
opposing party, repeatedly fails to cure defects, or proposes an amendment that would be futile.
Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548–49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). An amendment is futile if
“the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d
471, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs’ request fails for several reasons. First, they have not properly moved to amend
their complaint. Their “bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—without any
indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is sought—does not constitute a
motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995
F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). Second, Plaintiffs did not comply with the Court’s
Standing Order and this District’s Local Rules. See Standing Order 7(i); LCvR 7(i). They did
not attach a proposed amended complaint, did not identify new facts, did not describe new
claims, and offer nothing to suggest that a second amendment would differ in any meaningful
way from their prior complaints. 4 Finally, even if Plaintiffs had filed a proper motion before the
4
Plaintiffs followed these procedures in their previous request for leave to amend. See Dkt. 27.
It is unclear why they failed to do so here.
6
Court, an amendment would be futile because Superior Court Defendants are entitled to judicial
immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Superior Court Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
SO ORDERED.
Date: February 24, 2026 _________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge
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