The opinion
2026 IL App (1st) 260169-U
SECOND DIVISION
February 24, 2026
No. 1-26-0169
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
TEDORA BROWN, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
) No. 26COEL3
STATE OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD, LAURA K. )
DONAHUE, Chair, RICK S. TERVEN, SR., Vice Chair, )
JENNIFER M. BALLARD, Member, CRISTINA D. CRAY, )
Member, TONYA L. GENOVESE, Member, CATHERINE S. )
MCCORY, Member, JACK VRETT, Member, CASANDRA )
B. WATSON, Member, and BLANCA SOUDERS, Objector, ) Honorable
) Anna M. Loftus,
Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The Board erred when it invalidated Brown’s nomination papers on a ground
never raised in Souders’s petition.
¶2 Petitioner Tedora Brown appeals the circuit court’s order denying her petition seeking
judicial review of the decision of the State Officers Electoral Board (the Board) sustaining the
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objections of Blanca Souders and holding that Brown’s name shall not be certified for the March
17, 2026, general primary election ballot. Brown argues that the Board exceeded its authority
when it sustained Souders’s petition on grounds not raised in the petition.
¶3 Due to time constraints on election matters, we issued an order on February 13, 2026,
directing the Board to place Brown on the March 17, 2026, general primary election ballot. This
is our decision following that order.
¶4 On November 3, 2025, Brown filed her nomination papers as a candidate of the
Republican Party for the nomination to the office of Representative in the United States
Congress for the 11th Congressional District in the State of Illinois for the March 17, 2026,
general primary election. Her nomination papers included 151 petition sheets containing 1,018
nominating signatures.
¶5 Souders filed a petition objecting to individual signatures on Brown’s nominating papers
for a variety of reasons, including: (1) signature not genuine; (2) signer not registered at address
shown; (3) signer resides outside district; and (4) signer not a member of and affiliated with the
Republican Party. Following Souders’s petition, a records examination of Brown’s nomination
papers was conducted and a detailed report was generated by the Board. The report showed that
Souders challenged 337 signature lines and the examination overruled the objections for 106
lines and sustained the objections for 231 lines. Brown was required to submit 799 valid
signatures for her nomination and after the review, Brown was 12 signatures short of the required
number.
¶6 Following the records examination, each side is allowed to challenge the Board
examiner’s findings and request a hearing before the hearing officer. This motion is known as a
“Rule 9 motion,” pursuant to Rule 9 in the Board’s rules of procedure. State Board of Elections
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Rule 9(g)(1) (adopted Nov. 18, 2025). Brown filed her Rule 9 motion on November 26, 2025,
seeking to present evidence to rehabilitate and overturn the “sustained” results for multiple
signature lines from her nominating papers. Brown attached evidence, including certifications of
voter information for several of the contested signature lines. Relevant here, Brown has
narrowed her claim on appeal to three rejected signature lines from her nominating papers: Sheet
29, Line 5; Sheet 98, Line 2; and Sheet 98, Line 3. Souders challenged each of these three lines
as “Signer is not registered to vote at the address shown.”
¶7 For Sheet 29, Line 5, the signer provided a signature, left the optional section for a
printed name blank, and listed an Aurora street address. Brown submitted a voter information
certification from the DuPage County clerk that Adam J. Faber was registered at the address
listed on the nominating sheet across from a signature. For Sheet 98, Line 2, the signer listed an
address on “Bangor Ln” in the address box. The optional section for a printed name showed an
address on “Bar Harbour Rd” that had two lines drawn through with the signer’s name printed
above the struck address. The signer on Sheet 98, Line 3 listed the same address on “Bangor Ln,”
as indicated in the preceding Line 2. Brown submitted voter information certifications from the
DuPage County clerk for Sheet 98, Lines 2 and 3 showing both signers were registered to vote at
an address on Bar Harbour Road.
¶8 Souders filed a response, arguing, in part, that Brown’s evidence was “facially
insufficient and unsupported.” Regarding Sheet 29, Line 5, Souders asserted that Brown failed to
make a prima facie showing that the signer was registered at the address shown, stating “simply
including a certification that someone is registered to vote at an address is not sufficient to show
that the signer is registered at the address.” (Emphasis in original.) Souders’s response for both
of the remaining lines, Sheet 98, Lines 2 and 3, was that the signers’ address was listed on
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“Bangor Ln”, but the voter certification indicated an address on “Bar Harbour Rd.” Souders
maintained that Brown had failed to make a prima facie showing on these lines.
¶9 Following a hearing, the hearing officer issued its findings and recommendation to the
Board on December 17, 2025. The officer concluded, in relevant part, that Brown failed to meet
her burden regarding the three contested lines. For Sheet 29, Line 5, the officer observed that
Brown testified she did not circulate Sheet 29 and could not confirm the signature on Line 5 was
Adam J. Faber, the name on the provided voter information certification. The hearing officer
sustained an objection from Souders to Brown’s testimony about a conversation with the
circulator of Sheet 29 about the identity of the signer as improper hearsay. The hearing officer
found Brown “did not meet her burden and establish through admissible evidence that the signer
on Sheet 29, Line 5 resides at the address indicated on” the voter certification.
¶ 10 The hearing officer observed that Sheet 98, Line 2 reflected an address on “Bangor Ln”
but also referenced an address on “Bar Harbour” that was “crossed out.” The voter information
certification listed the address on “Bar Harbour Rd.” The officer stated that Brown “did not
circulate Sheet 98 and there was no testimony or evidence as to why the ‘***Bar Harbour’
address was crossed out and favor [sic] of the clearly written ‘*** Bangor Ln’ address.” The
officer found that Brown failed to meet her burden in overturning the Board’s ruling that the
signer resided at the address shown on Line 2. The hearing officer made similar findings for
Sheet 98, Line 3, noting the voter information certification listed an address on “Bar Harbour
Rd,” but the address listed on Line 3 was on “Bangor Ln.” Unlike in Line 2, there was no address
crossed out. The officer found that Brown failed to meet her burden to establish the signer
resided at the address on the voter certification.
¶ 11 At the conclusion of his findings, the hearing officer found that Brown had rehabilitated
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six signatures, giving her a total of 793 signatures. She remained six signatures below the
minimum required and the hearing officer recommended Brown’s name not be printed on the
ballot.
¶ 12 On December 18, 2025, Brown filed a motion for exceptions to the hearing officer’s
findings and recommendations with the Board. She argued, in part, that the hearing officer’s
ruling and recommendations relating to the three contested lines were “inconsistent” with the
Board’s rules and “disregarded the nature of the objector’s objection as clearly stated in the
objector’s petition, therefore, amending the objector’s petition.”
¶ 13 On January 8, 2026, following a hearing, the Board issued its decision. The Board found
sufficient evidence to rehabilitate five signatures but concurred with the hearing officer’s rulings
on the three contested signature lines. The Board held that Brown had collected and filed 798
valid signatures with her nomination papers, but she was one signature below the minimum
required number of 799. The Board sustained Souders’s objection to Brown’s nomination papers
and held that Brown’s name shall not be certified for the March 17, 2026, general primary
election ballot.
¶ 14 Brown subsequently filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court, arguing that:
(1) an objector’s petition may not be amended, (2) an objector bears and must carry the burden of
their own objections, and (3) the Board cannot sustain an objector’s petition for reasons not
stated or pled in the objector’s petition. More specifically, Brown contended that the Board
sustained Souders’s petition for the three contested signatures based on different reasons than
what was alleged by Souders in her petition. In her response, Souders maintained that she met
her initial burden of proof when the records examination sustained her objections for the
contested signature lines. She further responded, in part, that Brown failed to present sufficient
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evidence to establish that signers are who Brown represented they are.
¶ 15 The circuit court issued its written memorandum opinion and order denying Brown’s
petition for judicial review on January 30, 2026. In its order, the court found that the Board did
not exceed its authority. Regarding the signature on Sheet 29, Line 5, the court held that the
Board did not exceed its statutory authority when it considered the identity of the signer, which
did not constitute a new objection. The court also rejected Brown’s argument that the Board
considered new objections for the signatures on Sheet 98, Lines 2 and 3. For Line 2, the court
acted within its authority to determine which address was shown on the petition. For Line 3, the
signer’s name and address were properly set forth in the specified columns and that listed
address did not match the voter registration. The court ordered that Brown’s name not appear on
the ballot for the general primary election.
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 Brown raises the same argument on appeal as she asserted in her petition for judicial
review in the circuit court: the Board exceeded its authority when it sustained Souders’s petition
based on grounds not raised in the petition. More specifically, Souders challenged the three
signatures in her petition under the ground, “Signer not registered to vote at address shown,” but
the Board’s findings went beyond this basis when it rejected the certified voter information
provided by Brown.
¶ 18 Reviewing courts regard an electoral board as an administrative agency. Cinkus v. Village
of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 209 (2008). On appeal, this
court reviews the decision of the electoral board, not the decision of the circuit court. Jackson v.
Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 46. Our standard of
review depends on whether the dispute at issue involves questions of fact, law, or mixed
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questions of fact and law. Id. ¶ 46. The Board’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are
deemed prima facie true and correct and will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210. Where the historical facts are admitted or
established, but there is a dispute as to whether the governing legal provisions were correctly
interpreted by the Board, the case presents a purely legal question, which we review de novo.
Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 47. Mixed questions of fact and law are “questions in which the
historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether
the facts satisfy the statutory standard.” American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31 v. State Labor Relations Board, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577 (2005). We review a
mixed question of fact and law under the clearly erroneous standard. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211.
A decision is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. Id.
¶ 19 Brown asserts that the facts are undisputed and the issue on appeal is a question of law,
and thus a de novo standard of review should be applied, “or at least a heightened level of the
‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Souders maintains that the appeal raises a mixed question of fact
and law and the clearly erroneous standard should be employed. We determine that the issue on
appeal is a question of law subject to de novo review, but we note that our findings would be the
same under either standard.
¶ 20 For the first time on appeal, Souders asserts that Brown has forfeited issues by not raising
them before the Board or the circuit court. However, Brown’s memorandum on appeal raises the
same issues presented in the circuit court but Souders did not assert forfeiture in the circuit court.
Moreover, the trial court’s order directly addressed the same arguments raised before this court.
Thus, the record belies Souders’s claim that Brown failed to assert these claims in the trial court.
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Additionally, even if Brown failed to raise these claims before the Board, she raised them in the
trial court without an objection by Souders. A party can forfeit the opposing party’s forfeiture of
an argument by failing to raise it. Monroy-Perez v. Sentry Select Ins. Co., 2025 IL App (1st)
241711, ¶ 29. Since Souders failed to raise forfeiture in the lower court, she has forfeited this
argument.
¶ 21 Turning to the merits of Brown’s argument, the only question before this court is whether
the Board exceeded its authority in sustaining the objections for reasons not stated or pled in
Souders’s petition. Section 10-8 of the Election Code (the Code) requires that the objector’s
petition “shall state fully the nature of the objections to the certificate of nomination or
nomination papers or petitions in question.” 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2024). In a proceeding to
contest a nominating petition, the objector bears the burden of proof. Bass v. Twp. Officers
Electoral Bd. for Rich Twp., 2025 IL App (1st) 250092, ¶ 20 (citing Solomon v. Scholefield,
2015 IL App (1st) 150685, ¶ 28).
¶ 22 The Code does not allow any amendments to objections. Solomon, 2015 IL App (1st)
150685, ¶ 21; Delay v. Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 3d
206, 210 (2000). Nor does the Code authorize an electoral board to raise its own objections to
nominating petitions sua sponte. Id. (citing Delay, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 210). Additionally, the
Board’s rules of procedure specifically states, “An objection petition may not be amended once
filed.” State Board of Elections Rule 7(a)(1) (adopted Nov. 18, 2025).
¶ 23 We are guided by the principle that “access to a place on the ballot is a substantial right
that we will not lightly deny.” Elam v. Mun. Officers Electoral Bd. for Vill. of Riverdale, 2021 IL
127080, ¶ 13. “We ‘tread cautiously when construing statutory language which restricts the
people’s right to endorse and nominate the candidate of their choice.’ ” Id. (quoting Lucas v.
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Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 176 (1997)).
¶ 24 Here, the only objection raised for the three signatures was “signer not registered to vote
at address shown.” Under the Board’s rules of procedure, the review of this objection states:
“Signer Not Registered at Address Shown
The voter’s registration information shall be examined. If the address on the
voter’s registration record does not match the address opposite their name on the
petition, the objection shall be sustained. An affidavit from the voter attesting to
their registration address will be deemed insufficient to rebut voter registration
information supplied by the Board or local election authority.
NOTE: To the extent a voter may have moved during the period of time between
the beginning of petition circulation and the close of petition filing, the
programming used by [the Board] will note all addresses at which the voter was
registered during the time period in question. If the address opposite the voter’s
name on the petition matches any one of the addresses noted, the objection will be
overruled, and the burden placed upon the objector at the Rule 9 Signature
Rehabilitation/Challenge Hearing to prove that the voter did not reside at such
address on the date they signed the petition.” State Board of Elections Appendix
B(I)(B) (adopted Nov. 18, 2025).
¶ 25 Because the Board removed Brown from the ballot leaving her candidacy one signature
below the required number, we first address the single signature line from Sheet 29, Line 5. The
issue is whether the Board erred in rejecting Brown’s evidence to verify the signer was registered
at the address shown on the nominating paper. As discussed above, Sheet 29, Line 5 shows a
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signature with the optional space for a printed name left blank and then lists a street address in
Aurora. The nominating sheet was signed and sworn by a circulator. Souders did not challenge
the genuineness or legibility of the signature or that the circulator’s sworn statement was invalid.
¶ 26 To rehabilitate this signature, Brown submitted the voter information certification from
the DuPage County clerk, showing an individual named Adam J. Faber was registered to vote at
the address listed on the nominating paper. According to the Board’s rules, this certification
matching the listed address should have been sufficient to rehabilitate this signature. Instead, the
hearing officer found that Brown did not satisfy her burden to establish that the signature on Line
5 was Faber, despite the address on the voter information matching the signature line. The
hearing officer further found that Brown did not establish that the signer resided at the address
shown. These findings go beyond the initial objection raised, signer not registered at address
shown, and goes to the genuineness of the signature, which was not challenged by Souders. As
the Solomon court found, “it is improper for an electoral board to raise its own objections to a
nominating petition sua sponte.” Solomon, 2015 IL App (1st) 150685, ¶ 21. So too the hearing
officer lacks authority to raise his own objections. See id., Delay, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 210;
Mitchell, 399 Ill. App. 3d 18, 27 (2010).
¶ 27 Additionally, we review the requirements for a signer of a nominating petition under the
Code. The cardinal rule in construing a statute, to which all others are subordinate, is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 228 (2008). We
must give the statutory language its “plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning,” and
“[w]here the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given effect as written
without resort to further aids of statutory construction.” Id.
¶ 28 Section 7-10 of the Code sets forth what is necessary for a signer of a nominating
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petition.
“Such petition shall be signed by qualified primary electors residing in the
political division for which the nomination is sought in their own proper persons
only and opposite the signature of each signer, his residence address shall be
written or printed. The residence address required to be written or printed
opposite each qualified primary elector’s name shall include the street address or
rural route number of the signer, as the case may be, as well as the signer’s
county, and city, village or town, and state.” 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2024).
According to the plain language of the statute, a nominating petition requires only a signer’s
signature and his or her residential address, which was done here. Once Brown provided
evidence that the address opposite the signature matched the registered address, she had met her
burden of proof. Notably, Souders did not submit any contrary evidence to show that the signer
was not registered to vote at the address listed on the nomination sheet. Her assertion that Brown
was required to present evidence that “the unknown signer of Sheet 29, Line 5” was the
individual identified in the voter certification goes to the issue of the genuineness of the
signature. The signer was not required to print his name in the optional space. Notably, 6 of the
10 signers on Sheet 29 did not print their name, but their identity was not questioned in this
manner. Nothing in the Board’s rules of procedure suggests that Brown was required to prove the
identity of the signer, not when the only objection was to voter registration and not also to
genuineness of signature. If the objector’s point was that the person purportedly signing the
petition was not, in fact, the person registered at the relevant address, then the objector should
have made that objection. That, of course, is precisely the reason for the “signature not genuine”
objection—that the person who signed the petition isn’t the person registered at that address. As
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discussed above, the Board’s rules require only evidence that the signer was registered at the
listed address. Brown supplied the certified voter information which confirmed the listed address
and thus, she rehabilitated the sustained objection.
¶ 29 We find the decision in Bass helpful. There, after the candidate filed his nominating
papers, the objector challenged his candidacy under numerous grounds, including that the
candidate’s affidavit as circulator was false because he did not personally circulate the sheets and
witness every person sign his or her name. Bass, 2025 IL App (1st) 250092, ¶¶ 3-4. At a hearing,
the candidate testified that he personally circulated all but one of the nominating sheets. His
mother and sister assisted in printing his address before he signed the sheet before a notary. Id.
¶ 6. The objector did not present any contrary evidence. Id. ¶ 27. The election board found the
candidate was not credible and invalidated all of his nominating papers based on a pattern of
fraud. Id. ¶ 8.
¶ 30 On appeal, the reviewing court reversed the election board’s decision, observing that “[a]
finder of fact may not simply reject unrebutted testimony.” Id. ¶ 28 (citing Bucktown Partners v.
Johnson, 119 Ill. App. 3d 346, 353-55 (1983)); see Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995)
(“the fact finder may not arbitrarily or capriciously reject unimpeached testimony”). The court
pointed out that the objector, who had the burden of proof, presented no evidence that any of the
signatures contained in the petition sheets were fraudulent or forgeries or that the candidate lied
about circulating and witnessing each signature on the 76 petition sheets. Id. The Bass court
acknowledged that the county clerk had found some signatures invalid, but “there are a multitude
of reasons why a signature can be deemed invalid that are not fraudulent.” Id. ¶ 29. One such
plausible reason, as the court noted, could be “that the signers were sloppy or did not take the
time to sign in the manner that they normally sign.” Id. The court concluded that the objector
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failed to prove a pattern of fraud and the election board’s decision to strike the sheets was clearly
erroneous. Id. ¶ 32.
¶ 31 In this case, Brown presented evidence demonstrating that the signer’s address listed
across from the signature matched the exact address in the certification of the voter information
from the DuPage County clerk. Souders failed to offer any evidence to the contrary but instead
asserted a new objection, that Brown needed to prove who the signer was. The hearing officer
erred in finding that Brown was required to establish that the signer resided at the address on the
certified voter information. This went beyond the objection that signer was not registered to vote
at the address shown and instead raised a question as to the genuineness of the signature. The
Board then adopted this flawed finding and rejected the unrebutted evidence establishing that the
signer of Sheet 29, Line 5 was indeed registered to vote at address shown. We find the hearing
officer and the Board exceeded their authority when their review of the signature required Brown
to prove the unraised issue of the genuineness of the signature. See Delay, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 210
(finding that the election board exceeded its authority by invalidating the candidate’s nomination
papers on a ground never raised in the objection). Accordingly, Brown sufficiently rehabilitated
the signature on Sheet 29, Line 5 and this valid signature should be counted toward her total.
¶ 32 With the inclusion of the signature of Sheet 29, Line 5, Brown now has the required
minimum number of signatures (799) to qualify for her name to be placed on the ballot as a
Republican candidate for the office of Representative of the 11th Congressional District in
Illinois. Since we have found that Brown has the required number of signatures, we need not
consider her claims related to the signatures on Sheet 98, Lines 2 and 3.
¶ 33 Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Board’s decision finding Brown’s nomination
papers insufficient. We therefore order that the candidate’s name, Tedora Brown, be certified and
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included on the ballot for the March 2026 general primary election.
¶ 34 Circuit court reversed; Electoral Board reversed. Mandate to issue instanter.
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