Aaron Mitchell v. Township of Willingboro

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1496-24

AARON MITCHELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO,

and TOWNSHIP OF

WILLINGBORO ZONING

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,

Defendants-Respondents.

_____________________________

Argued December 4, 2025 ‒ Decided February 24, 2026

Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-2063-24.

Talbot B. Kramer, Jr. argued the cause for appellant

(Freidel & Kramer, PC, attorneys; Talbot B. Kramer,

Jr., on the briefs).

Eric J. Riso argued the cause for respondents (Zeller &

Wieliczko, LLP, attorneys; Eric J. Riso, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Aaron Mitchell appeals from an order entered by the Law

Division on December 12, 2024, which dismissed his complaint in lieu of

prerogative writs against the Township of Willingboro Zoning Board of

Adjustment (Board) and the Township of Willingboro (Township) (collectively,

the Township defendants). The trial court determined Mitchell's complaint,

which challenged the Board's October 5, 2022 decision, was precluded by the

first-filed doctrine because a federal complaint based on the same set of facts

had already been filed. Additionally, the court held the complaint was barred

under Rule 4:69-6(b)(3), as Mitchell filed his complaint more than forty-five

days after receiving notice of the Board's decision—both via email and

publication in the local newspaper. We affirm the trial court's decision.

I.

We briefly summarize the relevant facts and procedural history. Mitchell

and his wife are the owners of a single-family residence in the R-2 residential

zoning district in Willingboro. His residence is a "relatively" small, single-story

ranch without a basement and with a small garage that is insufficient for storing

his outdoor lawn equipment, vehicles, and a water treadmill used for therapeutic

purposes. Mitchell is a disabled veteran who suffers from spinal impairments

that cause pain, weakness, numbness, and significant difficulty with walking

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and movement. As a result of these disabilities, he requires the use of mobility

aids including a cane, walkers, and, at times, a wheelchair.

In 2017, Mitchell submitted a use variance application to the Board to

construct a larger accessory unit on his property to store materials, as he

intended to use his garage for parking. He stated he required additional space

to safely enter and exit his vehicles when using a mobility device. However, he

later withdrew the application.

In April 2022, Mitchell submitted a new use variance application for the

accessory structure. Following a Board hearing, on May 4, 2022, the Board

denied Mitchell's application.

Mitchell submitted a third application in August 2022 to construct an

approximately 870 square foot detached accessory structure in the northwesterly

corner of his lot. This new application was more detailed and provided

additional information regarding Mitchell's disability and the necessity for the

two bulk variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2): one to permit

construction of the detached accessory structure exceeding 200 feet, and another

to allow impervious lot coverage of 39.86%, which exceeded the maximum

allowed coverage of 35%. Mitchell published notice of the hearing in the local

newspaper and sent notices to the neighboring property owners.

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On September 29, 2022, the Board notified Mitchell the hearing would be

held via Zoom on October 5, 2022. Mitchell, however, contended the Board did

not publish notice in the local newspaper, nor did it notify the property owners

regarding the change in the format of the meeting. After the October 5 hearing,

the Board again denied Mitchell's application. Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2, Mitchell's

appendix does not include a copy of the transcript of the Board hearing, Board

resolution, or his applications.

Mitchell alleged the Board failed to comply with the requirements of the

Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -171. Specifically, he

asserts the Board did not abide by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g)(2), which provides

"[t]he [Board] shall provide the findings and conclusion through: . . . [a]

memorializing resolution adopted at a meeting held not later than [forty-five]

days after the date of the meeting at which the [Board] voted to grant or deny

approval." Additionally, he contends the Board did not comply with N.J.S.A.

40:55D-10(h), "[a] copy of the decision shall be mailed by the [Board] within

[ten] days of the date of decision to the applicants or, if represented, then to his

attorney . . . "

Mitchell contended the Board published notice of the May 4, 2022 denial

on October 23, 2022, and emailed a copy of the resolution regarding the May 4,

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2022 hearing. He further asserted the Board did not pass a resolution regarding

the October 5, 2022 denial by November 18, 2022, nor did it serve him with a

copy of the resolution by November 28, 2022, as required by the statutory

timeframe. Rather, on November 26, 2022, the acting Township clerk emailed

Mitchell a copy of the proposed order for publication in the local newspaper

regarding the October 5, 2022 hearing. Later, Mitchell confirmed the Board

published notice of the October 5, 2022 hearing on November 20, 2022;

however, the published notice stated the Board memorialized their decision on

November 9, 2022.

Mitchell then filed a notice of default approval on December 23, 2022,

concerning the October 5, 2022 hearing in the local newspaper. Approximately

one year later, Mitchell began constructing his accessory structure. However,

in January 2024, the Township required him to cease construction and issued

citations.

On June 20, 2024, Mitchell filed a complaint in the Federal District Court

against the Township defendants asserting violations of the Fair Housing Act of

1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHA), 42

U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3619; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213; the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD),

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N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50; the MLUL; and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

He sought a declaratory judgment and compensatory and punitive damages. On

September 10, 2024, Mitchell amended his federal complaint to add two

Township employees as defendants: Zoning Officer Theodore Evans and

Construction Official Steve Buchhofer.

Mitchell claimed he did not receive notice of the Board's October 5, 2022

resolution until August 21, 2024, when the Township defendants moved to

dismiss the federal complaint. Consequently, over three months later, on

October 4, 2024, Mitchell filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the

Law Division against the Township defendants, challenging the Board's October

5, 2022 denial of his application for the two N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) bulk

variances. He alleged violations of the MLUL; the Fourth Amendment; the

FHA; the ADA; and the NJLAD. Mitchell also asserted the Board's adoption of

the resolution was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Mitchell sought a

declaratory judgment and injunction against the Township defendants, and

compensatory and punitive damages.

The Township defendants moved to dismiss the Law Division complaint.

Mitchell opposed the motion. On December 12, 2024, the trial court granted the

Township defendants' motion and dismissed Mitchell's complaint. In its

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accompanying statement of reasons, the court noted at the outset the state

complaint was based on the "same exact facts" as the federal complaint. Relying

on governing law, the court analyzed the first-filed doctrine and reasoned, "the

state complaint [wa]s substantially similar, and in terms of the parties and the

counts in the complaint, [wa]s in every way a subset of the federal complaint."

It determined Mitchell "failed to overcome the presumption favoring the first-

filed action."

The court also found the complaint was time-barred under Rule 4:69-

6(b)(3), which governs actions in lieu of prerogative writs, because forty-five

days began to run from the Board's publishing of notice or the mailing of notice

to Mitchell, whichever was later. It explained the Township defendants had

provided "more than sufficient evidence," as Mitchell received an email of the

Board's decision with the resolution concerning the October 5, 2022 hearing on

November 26, 2022. Moreover, Mitchell did not rebut he was present with

counsel at the October 5, 2022 hearing, and notice was published in the local

newspaper on November 20, 2022. The court also noted none of the three bases

for enlarging the forty-five-day window to file an appeal, as set forth under the

MLUL, were present in this case.

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II.

Mitchell raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends the first-

filed doctrine does not bar his state action. Second, he asserts his state complaint

was timely filed. Lastly, Mitchell argues the forty-five-day filing period should

be relaxed due to the conduct of the Township defendants.

We first address Mitchell's contention the first-to-file doctrine does not

bar his action in lieu of prerogative writs. He asserts the doctrine is not

applicable because there are substantial differences between his state and federal

actions. In particular, he claims his federal action seeks primarily monetary

relief, while his state court action is directed primarily at injunctive relief. He

further argues, even if the doctrine were to apply, special equities exist that

overcome the presumption favoring the first-filed case. However, Mitchell's

contentions are belied by the record.

The first-filed rule is a doctrine of comity, which we review under an

abuse of discretion standard. Sensient Colors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J.

373, 390 (2008). "The determination of whether to grant a comity stay or

dismissal is generally within the discretion of the trial court." Ibid.; see also

Gosschalk v. Gosschalk, 48 N.J. Super. 566, 579 (App. Div. 1958) (concluding

a trial court's decision will be sustained absent a clear showing that its authority

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has been abused). "A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made

without rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or

rested on an impermissible basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021)

(quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)).

"New Jersey has long adhered to the 'general rule that the court which first

acquires jurisdiction has precedence in the absence of special equities.'" Platkin

v. Smith & Wesson Sales Co., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 476, 487 (App. Div. 2023)

(quoting Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 386). "[A]ny comity analysis should begin

with a presumption in favor of the earlier-filed action." Sensient Colors, 193

N.J. at 387. Under the doctrine of comity, "'the court which first acquires

jurisdiction [over a dispute] has precedence in the absence of special equities,'"

Id. at 386 (quoting Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321, 324 (1978)),

which are "reasons of a compelling nature that favor the retention of jurisdiction

by the court in the later-filed action." Id. at 387.

In order to dismiss a New Jersey action on the basis of comity, the moving

party bears the burden to establish "(1) that there is a first-filed action in another

[court]; (2) that both cases involve substantially the same parties, the same

claims, and the same legal issues; and (3) that [the] plaintiff [in the second-filed

action] will have the opportunity for adequate relief in the prior jurisdiction."

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Id. at 390 (third alteration in original) (quoting Am. Home Prods. Corp. v.

Adriatic Ins. Co., 286 N.J. Super. 24, 37 (App. Div. 1995)).

It is unrebutted Mitchell's federal action was filed more than three months

before the state action. The trial court properly concluded the Township

defendants presented sufficient credible evidence to establish the three elements

of Sensient Colors. On its face, both complaints substantially overlap.

Specifically, each complaint asserts the Board published notice of its October 5,

2022 decision on November 20, 2022, regarding the denial of Mitchell's

application. However, Mitchell argues he did not receive formal notice of the

resolution until August 21, 2024, during the pendency of the Township

defendants' motion to dismiss the federal complaint. The record reflects both

complaints advance the same claims: they challenge the Township defendants'

October 5, 2022 denial, allege undue delay in publishing notice and in emailing

Mitchell regarding the denial, and seek similar forms of relief. Mitchell's

amended complaint—adding two Township employees in both their individual

and official capacities—does not cure this fundamental defect.

"If the party seeking relief 'satisfies those prerequisites, then the burden

shifts to the other party, [who] must demonstrate special equities ' that weigh in

favor of retention of jurisdiction by the court in the second-filed action." Van

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Den Ende v. Reynolds, 482 N.J. Super. 507, 516 (2025) (alteration in original)

(quoting Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 390-91). A special equities analysis is

fact-intensive and centers on the question of whether "a first-filed action may

not do full justice to a party." Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 392. Special equities

include: forum-shopping; bad faith filing to preclude another party's filing in a

more favorable jurisdiction; significant state interests or public policy of the

forum state; and significant hardship or inconvenience for a party. Id. at 387-

89.

Mitchell asserts "[his] federal and state complaints request different relief

and that only . . . [a] state court can provide [adequate] injunctive relief."

However, this contention does not satisfy his burden to overcome the first-to-

file presumption. Accordingly, the presumption favoring the first-filed case

remains undisturbed. See Platkin, 474 N.J. Super. at 486-88.

The trial court also correctly determined the state action was time-barred.

The Board first published its decision on November 20, 2022, and emailed

Mitchell the publication on November 26, 2022. Pursuant to Rule 4:69-6(b)(3)

Mitchell was required to file his complaint no later than January 4, 2023.

However, Mitchell did not file his complaint until October 4, 2024, nearly two

years later. Thus, under a strict application of the rule's time restrictions, the

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complaint was untimely. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in not

extending the forty-five-day statute of limitations in the interests of justice.

Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Mercer, 169 N.J.

135, 152 (2001) ("Rule 4:69-6(c) . . . authorizes enlargement 'where it is

manifest that the interest of justice so requires.'").

Based on the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

To the extent not addressed, Mitchell's remaining arguments lack sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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