Sullivan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARRELL SULLIVAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-CV-00177-SPM

DORS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on a Complaint (Doc. 3), a Motion for Leave

to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 4), and a Motion for Recruitment of

Counsel (Doc. 5) filed by pro se Plaintiff Darrell Sullivan. Plaintiff Sullivan’s form

Complaint contains a single sentence stating that he wants “money back from not

watching a video/training that was demanded.” (Doc. 3, p. 6).

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A federal court may permit an indigent party to proceed without pre-payment

of fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Nevertheless, a court can deny a qualified plaintiff

leave to file in forma pauperis or can dismiss a case if the action is clearly frivolous

or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). When assessing a motion to proceed IFP, a

district court should inquire into the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, and if the court

finds them to be frivolous, it should deny leave to proceed IFP. Lucien v. Roegner, 682

F.2d 625, 626 (7th Cir. 1982). The test for determining if an action is frivolous or

without merit is whether the plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or

facts in support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Corgain

v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1983). The analysis of a complaint pursuant

to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) “is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Jones v. Lumpkin, No. 23-

CV-4644, 2023 WL 8879767, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted)) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184

F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).

When assessing the plaintiff’s complaint, the Court accepts the factual

allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels, however,

are not enough. Id. The complaint must allege enough facts to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.

2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). That means “a plaintiff must do better

than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might

suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nstead, the plaintiff

must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that

holds together.” Id. at 404.

“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d

753, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f) states that “[a]ll

pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” “Moreover, ‘[a] litigant

who appears pro se should not be treated more harshly for negligent errors than one

represented by an attorney. Otherwise, only those wealthy enough to be able to afford

an attorney would be able to insulate themselves from the consequences of an

occasional human error . . . .’” Sanders v. Melvin, 25 F.4th 475 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Schilling v. Walworth Cnty. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 805 F.2d 272, 277 n.8 (7th Cir.

1986)).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). Additionally, Rule 8 requires that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise,

and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 10 further requires “each

claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . be stated in a separate

count or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). These rules, while not setting a high bar at

the pleading stage, do require that plaintiffs abide by them at risk of pleading

themselves out of a case. That may occur “where the lack of organization and basic

coherence renders a complaint too confusing to determine the facts that constitute

the alleged wrongful conduct.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011);

see Mohammed v. Prairie State Legal Servs., Inc., No. 20-2419, 2021 WL 4962988 at

*1 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (“unintelligibility justifies dismissal.”). Further, these rules

exist “to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds

supporting the claims.” Stanard, 658 F.3d at 797; see Intercom Ventures, LLC v.

FasTV, Inc., No. 13 C 232, 2013 WL 2357621 at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2013) (“First, a

complaint must describe the plaintiff’s claims and the ground supporting them in

‘sufficient detail to give the defendants fair notice’ of the claim alleged against

them.”).

ANALYSIS

First, examining Plaintiff Sullivan’s Complaint in the light most favorable to him,

assuming facts as true, and drawing any reasonable inferences, it is evident that his

Complaint does not state a claim, disregards Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and

10, and appears to assert claims against a single Defendant with little to no factual

support. (See Doc. 3). Plaintiff Sullivan does not provide any information about

Defendant “DORS,” his claims, or his injuries apart from stating that stating that he

wants “money back from not watching a video/training that was demanded.” (Id., p.

6). While he checked the box stating that he seeks injunctive relief from a government

agency custom or policy that has violated his rights (id., p. 2), his request for “money

back” indicates that he seeks damages, not an injunction (id., p. 6). Overall, Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails to follow Rule 8’s requirements that he make a short and plain

statement for relief and simple, concise, and direct allegations. (See Doc. 3).

Furthermore, his Complaint also fails to comply with Rule 10 because he does not

allege any facts whatsoever, much less allege how the facts underlying his claim

applies to the Defendant. (See id.).

Second, while Plaintiff did use the appropriate form for his IFP Motion (Doc.

4), he does not include any employment information in Question 2 and does not

provide details of his “other income” as required by Question 3. Additionally,

Plaintiff’s form Motion for Recruitment of Counsel merely states that Plaintiff is “not

sure what’s going on” and lists several prescription medications he is taking. (Doc. 5,

p. 2). Recall that “[a] federal court is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) to permit

an indigent party to proceed in a civil action without prepaying the filing fee if the

party ‘submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets [he] possesses

[showing] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.’” Lidy

v. Stevens Indus., No. 3:19-CV-1266-MAB, 2020 WL 12880835, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan.

30, 2020). Seventh Circuit caselaw states that:

When confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel,

the district court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent

plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively

precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,

does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319,

32122 (7th Cir. 1993))). This first prong is a “threshold question the district court

must ask before ruling on a § 1915(e)(1) motion.” Pruitt at 655.

However, this Court notes that a showing of indigency is required before

reaching the Pruitt analysis. See Lidy, 2020 WL 12880835, at *1. Plaintiff Sullivan

has not offered any evidence to prove that he has attempted to recruit counsel on his

own or that he is indigent. Thus, because this Court has not found Plaintiff to be

indigent, it does not have the discretion to recruit counsel for him. Id. (citing Navejar

v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1))).

Considering the above, both Motions must be denied for failure to provide the

minimum amount of information this Court requires in order to determine whether

or not Plaintiff is indigent.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) expressly states that “the court shall dismiss the case at

any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal” either “is frivolous or

malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The Seventh

Circuit has defined “frivolous” as “lack[ing] an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Felton v. City of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). That being said, in the interest of justice, this

Court will provide Plaintiff Sullivan with an opportunity to submit an amended

complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) as well as a

renewed IFP motion that complies with this Court’s requirements. Plaintiff’s new

pleadings shall comply with Rules 8 and 10 and shall cure all of the defects noted in

this Order. Plaintiff’s renewed IFP Motion must clearly establish his indigency.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, Plaintiff Darrell Sullivan’s Complaint (Doc. 3) is DISMISSED

without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)

(Doc. 4) and Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 5) are both DENIED without

prejudice. Plaintiff Sullivan may file an amended complaint and a renewed motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis no later than March 11, 2026. To clarify, the

Court must receive these documents no later than March 11, 2026. Failure to do so

will result in dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute in accordance with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); see also James v. McDonald’s

Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 2005); Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir.

1997); Lucien v. Breweur, 9 F.3d 26, 29 (7th Cir. 1993).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 18, 2026

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge