Meeks

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TERRY MEEKS and AMY MEEKS,

individually and on behalf of their minor

daughter, A.M.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 3:25-CV-1137-NJR

TERRY HRONEC, INANNA WELLER,

and CLAY COUNTY,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss Counts III and IV of the

amended complaint filed by Defendants Terry Hronec, Inanna Weller, and Clay County.

(Doc. 17). Plaintiffs Terry Meeks and Amy Meeks, individually and on behalf of their

minor daughter, A.M., filed a response in opposition (Doc. 20). For the following reasons,

the motion to dismiss is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts from the amended complaint are taken as true for the purposes

of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs’ family dog, Creedence, got loose from their yard on October 18, 2024.

(Doc. 6, ¶¶ 11–12). He wound up at the home of Tina and Brad Briscoe. Id. ¶ 13. They

weren’t worried Creedence was dangerous, but they did want him off their property.

See id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 21, 25. After calling Clay County Animal Control and Shelter, the

Briscoes fed and watered Creedence. Id. ¶ 14. They waited, but Animal Control didn’t

show up. Id. The next day, October 19, the Briscoes called Animal Control again, hoping

for help with Creedence. Id. ¶ 19. This time, Animal Control sent someone. See id. ¶ 17.

Enter Defendant Inanna Weller. It was Weller’s first official day as an officer with

Clay County Animal Control and Shelter, so she was sent to the Briscoes’ for Creedence.

Id. ¶¶ 17–18. But Weller had not received any formal training on animal control

procedures—which might explain why she didn’t bring any equipment to the Briscoes’

home that day. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.

Without a catchpole or the other accoutrements of an animal control officer, Weller

found herself unequal to her task. Id. ¶ 17; see id. ¶ 19. Realizing she was out of her depth,

Weller sought help from an unlikely corner: elected Clay County Board member Terry

Hronec. Id. ¶¶ 7, 19. Defendant Hronec may not have had any animal control certification

from Clay County, but don’t worry—he also hadn’t had any formal training. Id. ¶¶ 20,

26.

Despite Hronec’s seemingly total lack of animal control qualifications, he soon

arrived at the Briscoes’ property. Id. ¶ 20. Hronec brought with him the tools Weller had

apparently forgotten: a catchpole, a tranquilizer gun, tranquilizer darts, and medication

(all property of Clay County Animal Control and Shelter). Id. He also brought a gun. Id.

While Weller (the actual animal control officer, though untrained) looked on, Hronec (not

an animal control officer, and also untrained) began doing Weller’s job for her.

Hronec began by shooting Creedence twice with the tranquilizer gun. Id. ¶¶ 22–

23. Given time, the sedatives in the tranquilizer darts would have rendered Creedence

immobile. See id. ¶ 22. But Hronec didn’t feel like waiting. Id. ¶ 22; see id. ¶¶ 23–24.

Though Creedence was already disoriented and slowed, Hronec caught him with

the catchpole and dragged him to the center of the yard. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. Hronec asked Ms.

Briscoe, then present, if he could shoot the restrained and increasingly sedated

Creedence. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Ms. Briscoe assented, so Hronec took his firearm and shot

Creedence in the head. Id. By the time Plaintiffs contacted Clay County Animal Control

and Shelter to report Creedence missing, he was already dead. Id. ¶ 28.

At some point after the shooting, Weller and Hronec decided to hide what had

happened from Plaintiffs. See id. ¶¶ 29–32, 49–51. Hoping to prevent the facts from

getting out, they agreed not to file a report about Creedence’s death. Id. ¶ 51. They agreed

they would not tell the family how Hronec had put a bullet through Creedence’s head.

Id. ¶ 49. And, perhaps realizing that a bullet-hole might be a giveaway, they agreed to try

to convince Terry and Amy Meeks that Creedence should be cremated, thereby

destroying the evidence of their deed. Id. ¶ 50.

Weller and Hronec’s plan started off smoothly. As agreed, neither Weller nor

Hronec filed a report. Id. ¶ 31. When Weller told Terry and Amy Meeks what had

happened, she omitted the shooting from her version of events, successfully leading them

to believe Creedence had died from the effects of the tranquilizers. Id. ¶ 29. But their plan

hit a snag when Terry Meeks came to pick up the body. Weller tried to persuade him to

cremate Creedence and even offered to take care of it herself. Id. ¶ 32. But Terry declined

her offer. See id. ¶¶ 32–33. Left with no choice, Weller turned over Creedence’s body. See

id. Plaintiffs discovered the truth, and this lawsuit followed. Id. ¶ 34.

Terry and Amy Meeks assert eight claims against Hronec, Weller, and Clay

County: illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), failure to intervene under § 1983 (Count II), civil conspiracy

under § 1983 (Count III), Monell liability for Clay County under § 1983 (Count IV), and

four related state-law claims (Counts V–VIII). (Doc. 6). Hronec, Weller, and Clay County

filed an answer as to Counts I, II, and V–VIII (Doc. 16) but moved to dismiss Counts III

and IV for failure to state a claim (Doc. 17).

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests whether the complaint states a

claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637

(7th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations

and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture,

LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff only

needs to allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed

factual allegations, but must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Count III: § 1983 Civil Conspiracy

Defendants first assert that Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid civil conspiracy

claim. (Doc. 17, at 3). Their argument, however, is precisely one sentence long: they list

the elements of civil conspiracy under Illinois law and say only that Plaintiffs failed to

plead facts sufficient to allege those elements.

This argument is wholly deficient. First, Plaintiffs bring their civil conspiracy claim

under § 1983, not state law. (Doc. 20, at 2). Though the elements are similar, they are not

the same. See, e.g., Pena v. Ortiz, 521 F. Supp. 3d 747, 750–51 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Even setting

that aside, Defendants do not explain which of the elements of civil conspiracy Plaintiffs

have failed to plead or why this Court should consider those elements unpled. “It is not

the responsibility of the Court to research and construct parties’ arguments” for them.

Rocklane Co. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., No. 17-cv-2158, 2020 WL 1320963, at *4

(S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2020). Because “[p]erfunctory and undeveloped legal arguments are

waived,’” the Court considers Defendants’ first argument waived for the purposes of this

motion. Id. (quoting Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607

(7th Cir. 2016)); accord United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We

repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and

arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived . . . .” (quoting United

States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991))); see also Rose v. Haney, No. 16-cv-

5088, 2017 WL 1833188, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017) (where defendant entirely failed to

develop their argument that plaintiff failed to allege an element of their claim, that

argument was waived).

Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim should be dismissed

under the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine. (Doc. 17, at 3). This argument, a scant four

sentences long, is barely more developed than their first. The argument’s first sentence

quotes Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 1999),

for the proposition that “[a] conspiracy cannot exist solely between members of the same

entity.” (Doc. 17, at 3 (alteration in original)). The second sentence asserts that Weller and

Hronec were both “serving in their respective capacities as employees and/or agents of

Clay County,” and that “a conspiracy cannot exist between employees and/or agents of

Clay County.” Id. The last two sentences merely state that Count III is consequently

“insufficient in law” and that Defendants’ motion should accordingly be granted as to

Count III. Id.

Even assuming that this argument is sufficiently developed to avoid waiver, it is

unclear whether the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine applies to claims brought under

§ 1983. Smith v. City of Chicago, 785 F. Supp. 3d 356, 396–98 (N.D. Ill. 2025). The Seventh

Circuit has applied the doctrine to civil conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. But

the Seventh Circuit has not yet extended it to claims under § 1983, e.g., id.; Thomas v. City

of Blue Island, 178 F. Supp. 3d 646, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2016), and most district courts in this

circuit decline to do so. E.g., Liggins v. City of Chicago, No. 20-cv-4085, 2021 WL 2894167,

at *5 & n.3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2021) (collecting cases).

Even if the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine does extend to suits under § 1983, it

very well might not apply on these facts. The doctrine “applies only when the agents of

a corporation or government entity act within the scope of their employment in joint

pursuit of the entity’s lawful business.” Harris v. City of Chicago, No. 20 cv 4521,

2020 WL 7059445, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2020) (first citing Travis v. v. Gary Cmty. Mental

Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); and then citing Payton v. Rush-

Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 1999)). Here, Plaintiffs allege

that Hronec and Weller attempted to cover up their illegal seizure by tricking them into

allowing Creedence to be cremated, which would have destroyed a significant piece of

evidence. They also allege that Hronec and Weller intentionally failed to document their

alleged misdeed. It is hard to see how these actions could be within the scope of their

employment, or Clay County’s “lawful business.” Cf. Newsome v. James, No. 96 C 7680,

2000 WL 528475, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2000) (“The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine

was created to shield corporations and their employees from conspiracy liability for

routine, collaborative business decisions that are later alleged to be discriminatory.”).

Even if the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine limits suits under § 1983, Plaintiffs

have alleged facts that could very well take this case out of the doctrine’s ambit. Because

“[i]t would be premature to dismiss the conspiracy Count[] before facts governing the

applicability of these exceptions to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine have been

ascertained,” Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III is denied without prejudice.

Liggins, 2021 WL 2894167, at *5 (first citing Weston v. City of Chicago, No. 20 C 6189,

2021 WL 2156459, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2021); and then citing Harris, 2020 WL 7059445,

at *5).

II. Count IV: Monell

Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a Monell

claim against Clay County. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pursuing a Monell

theory of liability must typically allege one of the following three types of municipal

action: “(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a

widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or

practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with

final policymaking authority.” Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524

(7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019)); see also

Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that

municipalities “cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts

of their employees; for the [municipality] to be liable, a municipal policy or custom must

have caused [a plaintiff’s] constitutional injury” (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978))).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs only alleged “boilerplate legal conclusions that do

nothing more than regurgitate the elements of a Monell claim.” (Doc. 17, at 4). Because

“legal conclusions or elements of [a] cause of action . . . may be disregarded on a motion

to dismiss,” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–82 (2009)), Defendants insist Count IV should be dismissed.

In response, Plaintiffs counter that they are relying on a different theory of

municipal action than the three recounted above: a failure-to-train theory under the

Supreme Court’s decision in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). (Doc. 20, at 6).

Under Canton, Monell liability can be predicated on municipal inaction “‘in a narrow range

of circumstances’” where a “violation of rights is a ‘highly predictable consequence’ of a

failure to provide officers what they need to confront ‘recurring’ situations.” J.K.J. v. Polk

County, 960 F.3d 367, 380 (2020) (en banc) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).

To establish Monell liability in a Canton claim, a plaintiff must show the

constitutional violation was “caused by a municipality’s deliberate indifference to the

risk of such violations.” Id. at 381. Deliberate indifference, in turn, could be established

either through the municipality’s knowledge of a pattern of past similar violations or

“from evidence of a risk so obvious that it compels municipal action.” Id. at 380–81;

see also Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2021); Woodward v. Corr.

Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927–29 (7th Cir. 2004) (absence of prior suicides does

not preclude Monell liability for failure to train employees on suicide prevention because

prison does not “get a one free suicide pass”).

Here, at the pleading stage, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have failed

to plausibly allege a Monell claim. They aver that Weller, an official animal control officer,

was never formally trained on animal control procedures or the use of lethal force in

animal control. (Doc. 6, ¶¶ 18, 56). They similarly allege that Hronec—who was not an

animal control officer but was nevertheless apparently permitted to take and use Clay

County Animal Control and Shelter’s equipment during an animal control operation—

never received any certification or training on animal control procedures or the use of

lethal force in animal control. Id. ¶¶ 20, 56. These allegations are not boilerplate

recitations of the elements of a Monell claim but instead describe a total lack of training

on when lethal force is appropriate in the animal control context.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accepting their allegations as

true, the Court declines to dismiss Count IV. Plaintiffs have alleged a lack of training on

animal control procedures in general and on lethal force in particular. If animal control

officers receive no training on when it is appropriate to kill someone’s pet, it seems

extremely foreseeable that on occasion pets will be killed. See Flores, 997 F.3d at 734 (“The

law does not require the death or maiming of multiple victims before a city must institute

proper training.”). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged Clay

County’s deliberate indifference to “a risk so obvious that it compels municipal action,”

960 F.3d at 380-81, and therefore have plausibly stated a claim under Monell.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) filed by Defendants

Terry Hronec, Inanna Weller, and Clay County is DENIED.

Further, the parties were required by this Court’s Order (Doc. 25) to file their

stipulation selecting a mediator by December 23, 2025. No such stipulation has been filed.

Accordingly, the parties shall file that stipulation on or before February 25, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 18, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |

United States District Judge

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