Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

ANNE YERED, MD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23-cv-00284-SDN

)

EASTERN MAINE HEALTHCARE )

SYSTEMS and NORTHERN LIGHT )

EASTERN MAINE MEDICAL CENTER, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Dr. Anne Yered’s objection to the

Magistrate Judge’s discovery order. On December 23, 2025, the Magistrate Judge denied

Plaintiff’s motion to compel the medical records of a nonparty minor patient. ECF No.

107 (“the Discovery Order”). On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed an objection, arguing

the Magistrate Judge erred when he determined she was not entitled to the records. ECF

No. 108. The Court has reviewed the Order and finds it is neither clearly erroneous nor

contrary to law. The Discovery Order is AFFIRMED.

I. Background1

In June 2017, Defendants Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems and Northern Light

Eastern Maine Medical Center hired Dr. Yered as a pediatric critical care physician in the

pediatric intensive care unit (“PICU”). ECF No. 1-1 at 3. At that time, the hospital

employed four pediatric intensivists; three (including Dr. Yered) held board certifications

1 These facts are drawn from the Complaint, ECF No. 1-1. See Plourde v. Lewis, No. 1:23-CV-00323, 2025

WL 2723554, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 24, 2025).

in pediatric critical care. Id. at 5. The fourth, Dr. P., is board certified in pediatrics but not

in pediatric critical care. Id.

In September 2019, Dr. Yered responded to the hospital in the middle of the night

after an error occurred during the treatment of a pediatric patient that endangered the

child’s life. Id. at 8. Upon arrival, she engaged in a verbal altercation with two male

doctors at the patient’s bedside. See id. at 9. Dr. Yered alleges one doctor “verbally

assaulted” her and called her names. Id. Afterwards, Dr. Yered emailed Dr. W., the senior

lead physician, and Dr. P., the PICU’s medical director, voicing concerns about the “poor

quality of medical care” and alleging the male doctors’ treatment of her constituted sex

discrimination. Id. She again complained to supervisors in March 2020 regarding a

proposal for pediatricians to care for critically ill adult patients. Id. at 11.

In July 2020, the PICU sought candidates for the role of Chief of Service. Id. at 12.

Dr. Yered and another female doctor applied, but the hospital selected a male doctor. Id.

In a meeting with two senior physicians, Dr. Yered alleged gender influenced the

selection. Id. at 12–13. She requested that the hospital convene an anti-discrimination

panel to examine any biases underlying the selection. Id. at 13. She also reported that Dr.

P.’s lack of board certification in pediatric critical care endangered patient safety. Id. at

14.

Dr. Yered argues Defendants retaliated against her for these complaints by altering

her schedule, threatening her employment, mocking her appearance, and denying her

request for part-time hours. Id. at 14–16. She continuously reported these actions to

human resources (“HR”) as well as her superiors. Id. at 15. She asserts these complaints

constitute protected activity under the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), 5 M.R.S.

§ 4551, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Maine

Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (“WPA”), 26 M.R.S. § 833, et seq. ECF No. 1-1 at 10.

In June 2021, the hospital retained an attorney to investigate the allegations. Id. at

18. Dr. Yered declined an in-person meeting but sent the attorney an email describing her

allegations. Id. at 19–20. On July 15, 2021, the hospital terminated Dr. Yered, citing in

part “inappropriate communications” with colleagues and HR and her refusal to

participate in the investigation. Id. at 21, 23. Dr. Yered alleges this characterization

constitutes a tacit admission that she was terminated for protected whistleblowing

activity. Id. at 24. On July 21, 2024, Dr. Yered brought suit. Id. at 1.

On October 31, 2025, Dr. Yered moved to compel disclosure of medical records and

incident reports regarding a child who had died in the PICU in 2017.2 ECF No. 99 at 1.

She alleges the records would prove the truth of her whistleblower claim that Dr. P.

endangered patients in part because he is not board certified in pediatric critical care. Id.

at 2. She also requested a qualified protective order for in camera review or de-identified

production of the records. Id. at 4–5. Defendants opposed disclosure of the records,

arguing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), 42

U.S.C. § 1320d-6, and Maine law, 22 M.R.S. § 1711-C(2), protect the records. ECF No. 103

at 5–6. They also contend the records are irrelevant because Dr. P. was not the patient’s

attending physician, Dr. Yered did not claim misconduct regarding the patient’s death,

and Dr. Yered did not know about the death at the time she complained to the hospital

about her concerns. See id. at 8–9.

2 Specifically, Dr. Yered sought physician orders and nursing notes, vital signs and monitoring records,

imaging and diagnostic test results, medication administration records, a death summary and notes,

incident reports and internal reviews involving the patient’s care, and “[a]ny and all documentation leading

up to and including the child’s arrest and including the code event.” ECF No. 105-3 at 1.

On December 23, 2025, the Magistrate Judge denied Dr. Yered’s motion to compel.

ECF No. 107. The Magistrate Judge questioned the relevance and probative value of the

records, in part because “Plaintiff does not allege that she reported concerns about the

patient’s care as part of her protected whistleblower activity.” Id. at 2. Dr. Yered now

objects, claiming the Discovery Order is clearly erroneous and misapplies HIPAA and the

relevancy standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. ECF No. 108 at 1.

II. Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), for non-dispositive orders, the district

court “must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that

is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The “clearly erroneous”

standard requires the Court to accept the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings unless, after

reviewing the record, the Court is left with a “strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has

been made.” Green v. Cosby, 160 F. Supp. 3d 431, 433 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Phinney v.

Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999)). The Court reviews pure

questions of law de novo, see PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir.

2010), and questions of fact for clear error, Phinney, 199 F.3d at 4. Mixed questions of

law and fact require a “sliding standard” of review: the level of deference increases as the

question becomes more fact-intensive. In re IDC Clambakes, Inc., 727 F.3d 58, 64 (1st

Cir. 2013).

Dr. Yered contends the Magistrate Judge erroneously used HIPAA as a categorical

bar rather than utilizing a qualified protective order to order production of the discovery.3

3 Pursuant to HIPAA’s regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1) provides that “covered entit[ies]” such as

Defendants “may disclose protected health information” in response to “an order of a court” or in response

to a “discovery request” if they “receive[] satisfactory assurance . . . from the party seeking the information

that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to secure a qualified protective order.”

ECF No. 108 at 2. HIPAA does not create a federal hospital-patient or physician-patient

privilege, however. See Polk v. Swift, 339 F.R.D. 189, 195 (D. Wyo. 2021) (collecting

cases). Because HIPAA is procedural, it does not override the rules of civil procedure. See

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Lafarge Sw., Inc., No. CIV 06-1076, 2008 WL 11322949, at *5 (D.N.M.

May 9, 2008). Plaintiff’s request is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which

permits discovery 0f any nonprivileged, relevant, and proportional matter. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(1).

To prevail on a claim under the WPA,4 the Plaintiff must show she engaged in

protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and that a causal link exists

between the two. Theriault v. Genesis HealthCare LLC, 890 F.3d 342, 349 (1st Cir. 2018).

The Discovery Order properly doubted the relevance of the records because Plaintiff “does

not allege that she reported concerns about the patient’s care as part of her protected

whistleblower activity,” “did not witness and has no personal knowledge of the care

administered to the patient,” and was not yet employed at the hospital in 2017 when the

patient’s death occurred. ECF No. 107 at 2. In rejoinder, Plaintiff notes that “senior

physicians discussed the death with her during onboarding,” “a specialist allegedly stated

the case was mismanaged,” and her general safety concerns involved leadership and a lack

of mortality reviews. ECF No. 108 at 4.

This case does not concern the merits of patient care; the issue is whether

Defendants retaliated against for Dr. Yered for her whistleblower complaints. However,

Plaintiff fails to show the relevance of the discovery. See In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531

F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory comm. note—2000

4 Neither the Discovery Order nor the Plaintiff’s objection discuss the MHRA and Title VII claims; thus, the

Court does not address them here.

amend.) (“[W]hen an objection arises as to the relevance of discovery,” it becomes the job

of the court “to determine whether the discovery is relevant to the claims or defenses and,

if not, whether good cause exists for authorizing it, so long as it is relevant to the subject

matter of the action.”). Whether Dr. P. mishandled the patient’s care does not dictate

whether Plaintiff satisfies the elements of a whistleblower claim. Dr. Yered seeks

“production for the limited purpose of confirming involvement [of PICU leadership],

escalation decisions, consults, and review documentation.” ECF No. 108 at 4. That

justification undermines her argument for relevance; it indicates that the records are

intended to substantiate a claim of medical mismanagement rather than to ascertain

whether Dr. Yered engaged in protected activity. In a retaliation claim, the inquiry focuses

on whether the Plaintiff’s beliefs were “reasonably held” based on information known to

her at the time of the complaint. Selassie v. United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., No. 05-

CV-0207, 2005 WL 8170806, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2005). As the Magistrate Judge

explained, the patient’s records have minimal probative value because Plaintiff’s

complaints did not rely on that alleged misconduct. To the extent Plaintiff argues the

records help to establish her claim that Dr. P. provided substandard medical care, the

Complaint alleges numerous reports to her superiors predicated on his lack of board

certification. See ECF No. 1-1 at 14. It does not, however, contend she complained about

Dr. P.’s actions on the night of the patient’s death—despite knowing about the child’s

death and Dr. P.’s role as the attending physician prior to her employment at the hospital.5

See ECF No. 104-1 at 37:1–15.

5 While the Court agrees that a whistleblower need not personally witness reported misconduct, see ECF

No. 108 at 3, no evidence suggests her reports were predicated on this patient’s death.

In evaluating the disclosure of patient records under HIPAA, courts prioritize

patient privacy when evaluating HIPAA disclosures. See, e.g., Hussein v. Duncan Reg’l

Hosp., Inc., No. CIV-07-0439, 2009 WL 10672479, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 28, 2009)

(“Strict limitations are necessary here because the patients in question could not have

anticipated that their records would be produced in the circumstances of this

action . . . .”); Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004) (“It is clear

there is strong federal policy in favor of protecting the privacy of patient medical

records.”). Proportionality requires the Court to consider if the information is available

through less burdensome sources. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Other courts have

rejected disclosure of patient records where the plaintiff failed to address whether they

could obtain material supporting their claim “without reference” to HIPAA documents.

Mawulawde v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 105-099, 2006 WL 8429928,

at *10 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2006). Courts also deny such requests when a plaintiff could

“narrow the scope through less intrusive means” such as depositions of other medical

professionals or the hospital’s HR director, or reviews of personnel files. Kapp v. Jewish

Hosp., Inc., No. 09-CV-949, 2011 WL 2669457, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 7, 2011).

The Discovery Order found Plaintiff’s discovery requests were disproportionate.

ECF No. 107 at 1. Even if Dr. P.’s care was relevant to Dr. Yered’s whistleblower claim,

non-HIPAA protected documents, such as Dr. P.’s performance reviews, would more

appropriately serve the inquiry.6 Where disclosure of private information outweighs

potential benefits, the Court must deny a motion to compel. See Polk, 339 F.R.D. at 200.

6 Dr. Yered argues the Discovery Order applied an erroneously heightened relevancy standard by stating

“[w]here the privacy rights of another individual are implicated, more than a mere suspicion must be

present to establish the relevance of the records.” ECF No. 107 at 3. But Plaintiff also admits courts must

“consider least-intrusive alternatives” and “narrower[] protective mechanisms” where sensitive patient

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge’s Discovery Order, ECF

No. 107, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, ECF No. 99.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

information is implicated. ECF No. 108 at 2–3. As explained above, a narrower alternative exists through

access to non-HIPAA protected documents. The Magistrate Judge did not err by finding that Plaintiff failed

to demonstrate appropriate relevancy and proportionality.