Lewis v. Walley

Case: 24-60379 Document: 92-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/23/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-60379

____________ FILED

February 23, 2026

Stephen Lewis, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Whitney Walley, Detective, in her official and individual capacity

as a Southaven Police Department Detective,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:23-CV-336

______________________________

Before Smith and Richman, Circuit Judges. *

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:

Stephen Lewis sued Detective Whitney Walley under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district

court denied defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for the

Fourth Amendment search claim, thus denying Walley’s defense of qualified

immunity (“QI”). Walley appeals, and we reverse and render a judgment of

_____________________

*

Judge Dennis was a member of the panel that heard this case but took inactive

status after the case was submitted. This matter is decided by a quorum under 28 U.S.C.

§ 46(d).

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No. 24-60379

dismissal.

I. Background

On November 1, 2020, an individual reported to the police that a debit

card had been stolen from his car and that bank records indicated that the

card had been used to purchase goods at a Best Buy store in Southaven, Mis-

sissippi. The Southaven Police Department (“SPD”) responded to inves-

tigate. Best Buy produced a receipt documenting the allegedly fraudulent

purchase and reviewed security tape for footage of the suspect who made the

purchase. Though the SPD did not immediately identify a suspect, it con-

tinued to investigate.

On November 13, in Greenville, Mississippi, 150 miles away, the

Washington County Sherriff’s Department (“WCSD”) arrested Lewis for

an unrelated automobile burglary. The investigator, Cory Weatherspoon,

searched Lewis’s phone for evidence pertinent to that investigation. Weath-

erspoon did not obtain a search warrant before conducting the search of

Lewis’s phone. During the search, Weatherspoon discovered evidence of

receipts from a Best Buy store in Southaven.

Weatherspoon called the SPD, informed the SPD that the WCSD

“had someone in custody for auto burglary and in the course of their inves-

tigation they located evidence of multiple fraudulent purchases with illegally

obtained credit cards including a receipt from Best Buy for a large amount.”

Walley of the SPD contacted Weatherspoon about the receipt. Weather-

spoon informed Walley that Lewis was arrested for automobile burglary and

that Weatherspoon had conducted a search of Lewis’s cell phone per a search

warrant, though Walley did not know that a warrant had not actually been

issued before the search. Weatherspoon confirmed that the phone contained

pictures of receipts from the Best Buy.

Weatherspoon emailed the images to Walley. Walley reviewed the

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No. 24-60379

images that contained a receipt that matched the date, time, items, and

amounts of the items purchased on the stolen credit card.

Based on the images of the receipt, along with copies of receipts pro-

vided by Best Buy, Walley prepared an arrest warrant for Lewis. Although

Lewis was indicted, the charges were eventually remanded to the file in 2022.

Lewis filed numerous constitutional claims against Walley. The dis-

trict court dismissed all but one. In the remaining claim, at issue on appeal,

Lewis alleged that Walley’s review of the photographs sent by Weatherspoon

constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Walley moved for judgment on the pleadings, alleging there was no Fourth

Amendment violation and that she was entitled to QI.

The district court denied the motion. First, the court held that Wal-

ley’s review of the photographs constituted a Fourth Amendment search of

Lewis’s phone. Because the search occurred without a warrant, the court

held there was a constitutional violation. Second, the court held that the vio-

lation was clearly established because “the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rec-

ognized that under the Fourth Amendment an officer must generally obtain

a warrant to search the digital contents of a person’s cell phone.” Walley

appeals.

II. Standard of Review

The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review final

judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because Lewis’s claims arise under § 1983,

and the denial of QI is a “final decision” under § 1291, 1 this court has juris-

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“[A] district court's denial of a claim of [QI], to the extent that it turns on an issue

of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwith-

standing the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

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diction over Walley’s appeal.

We review the denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings

de novo. Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017). “The standard

for Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings is identical to the stan-

dard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Waller

v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,

528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). To survive a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). “These standards are the same when a motion to dismiss is

based on [QI]. So, a complaint survives dismissal if it pleads facts that, if

true, would permit the inference that defendants are liable under § 1983 and

would overcome their [QI] defense. Thus, it is the plaintiff's burden to dem-

onstrate that [QI] is inappropriate.” Benfer v. City of Baytown, 120 F.4th

1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1313 (2025).

III. Analysis

Walley appeals the denial of her QI defense for the Fourth Amend-

ment search claim. We first handle Lewis’s assertion that Walley forfeited

the defense.

A. Forfeited Arguments

“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance

in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal.” Rollins v.

Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021). A defendant’s broad

invocation of QI is sufficient to prevent forfeiting the argument. See Terrell

v. Allgrunn, 114 F.4th 428, 440 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that an officer

asserting QI, even in passing, before the district court is sufficient to raise a

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QI defense on appeal).

Lewis asserts that Walley’s QI defense cannot succeed because Wal-

ley has forfeited it. But Walley raised QI in her motion for judgment on the

pleadings, asserting that “[a]ll of Lewis’s federal law claims fail because Det.

Walley is entitled to [QI].” Further, Walley explicitly invoked that defense

for each claim, including the Fourth Amendment search claim.

Lewis contends that Walley’s invocation of QI is not sufficient be-

cause “[a]t no point in the district court did Detective Walley dispute that

she conducted a Fourth Amendment search on Mr. Lewis’s cell phone.”

Lewis misapplies the burden in QI cases. Where a defendant raises QI, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a specific constitutional violation,

instead of the defendant’s having to disprove affirmatively every element of

a constitutional claim. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323

(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Thus, Walley need only have pleaded the QI

defense before the district court. Walley’s general assertion of QI, along with

her specific assertion that “[t]here was no wrongful search and seizure of

Lewis’s cellphone,” is sufficient to continue her QI defense for the Fourth

Amendment claim in full. See Terrell, 114 F.4th at 440.

B. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of [QI] protects public officials from liability for civil

damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-

tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pear-

son v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Where a defendant asserts QI,

“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.”

Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015).

“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome [QI] must show: (1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

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established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Carmona v. City of

Brownsville, 126 F.4th 1091, 1096 (5th Cir. 2025). “Therefore, to succeed in

opposition to QI asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, even where

plaintiff adequately pleads the violation of a federal right, plaintiff still must

adequately plead that defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in

light of clearly established law.” Id. (cleaned up). We “have discretion to

skip the first inquiry and resolve a case solely on clearly established grounds.”

Sims v. City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)

(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 240).

A government official “violates clearly established law when, at the

time of the challenged conduct, the contours of the right are sufficiently clear

that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing

violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (cleaned

up). Although a case does not have to be “directly on point for a right to be

clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or con-

stitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104

(2018).

Whether it was clearly established that Walley violated Lewis’s

Fourth Amendment rights turns on two issues: (1) the state of clearly estab-

lished Fourth Amendment law at the time of the alleged violation and (2) the

reasonableness of Walley’s conduct in light of that clearly established law.

1. Fourth Amendment Law at the Time of the Alleged Violation

Lewis alleges that it was clearly established that Walley’s conduct

violated the Fourth Amendment because “a search occurs when an officer

scrutinizes or reviews the digital contents or data on an individual’s cell

phone.”

Lewis primarily relies on Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), in

which the Court analyzed searches of smart phones under the Fourth

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Amendment. In Riley, police seized defendant’s phone subject to his arrest

under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement. Id at 379. Officers then searched the digital contents

of the phone, in which they found incriminating evidence. Id. The Court

held that though the physical seizure of the phone fell under the search-

incident-to-arrest exception, the officer’s first-hand search of the digital

contents of the phone did not. Id. at 386. Thus, the officer needed a warrant

before searching the phone. Id. at 403.

Lewis avers that Riley clearly established that Walley’s conduct was a

Fourth Amendment violation. But the Court in Riley did not analyze what

constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 395 n.1. The

issue was whether a first-hand search of a cell phone’s digital contents quali-

fied for the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Id. at 401. Though the Court

recognized a general privacy right in the contents of cell phones that out-

weighed the justification for the search-incident-to-arrest exception, it did

not clearly establish that an extraction and subsequent viewing of contents from

a cell phone constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Indeed, the Court

explicitly said that Riley did not “implicate the question whether the collec-

tion or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under

other circumstances.” Id. at 395 n.1.

The one case to which Lewis points in which this court explicitly rec-

ognized that an extraction and subsequent viewing of cell phone contents

constituted a “search” does not relate to the Fourth Amendment’s defini-

tion of a search. In United States v. Gallegos-Espinal, 970 F.3d 586 (5th Cir.

2020), we held that a defendant’s written consent to “a complete search” of

his phone included a subsequent inspection by other officers. But we focused

on the ordinary meaning of the term “complete” as included in the terms of

the consent, not on the meaning of “search” in the Fourth Amendment. Id.

at 592. It can hardly be said that Gallegos-Espinal “clearly established” Wal-

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ley’s conduct to be a Fourth Amendment violation when “the only issue pre-

sented . . . concern[ed] the scope of Gallegos's consent.” Id. at 593.

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define

clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). But

Lewis does just that. According to him, “a [Fourth Amendment] search

occurs when an officer scrutinizes or reviews the digital contents or data on

an individual’s cell phone.” Lewis does not point to a case in which this court

or the Supreme Court recognized that such a right extended to second-hand

viewings of individual pieces of information taken off a phone by a different

officer. As a result, such conduct is not a clearly established Fourth Amend-

ment violation.

2. Reasonableness of Walley’s Conduct

Lewis must “adequately plead that defendant's conduct was objec-

tively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Carmona, 126 F.4th

at 1096 (cleaned up). Lewis avers that Walley was objectively unreasonable

in relying on Weatherspoon’s statements indicating the presence of a

warrant.

First, Lewis claims that a reasonable officer would understand “that

search warrants are limited authorizations confined to a particular scope, not

open-ended authorizations that officers may interpret at their discretion.”

He avers that Walley failed to act reasonably when she did not ensure the

search was authorized by a warrant.

That assertion fails. It was not clearly established that Walley con-

ducted a Fourth Amendment search, and thus needed a warrant, in the first

place, for the reasons described above.

Second, Lewis posits that Walley acted unreasonably because Weath-

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erspoon did not state that a warrant had been issued, but merely that one had

been “completed.” Not so.

Weatherspoon informed Walley that Lewis was in custody for auto-

mobile burglary, that Weatherspoon had located several electronic devices,

had “completed a search warrant,” and had searched Lewis’s phone. Based

on Weatherspoon’s statements indicating a warrant and the chronology of

events, it was reasonable for Walley to believe that Weatherspoon’s search

was made per a warrant.

Lewis cannot point to any authority indicating that such reliance is

unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Lewis invokes Groh v.

Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004), which explains that “[i]t is incumbent on

the officer executing a search warrant to ensure the search is lawfully author-

ized and lawfully conducted.” According to Groh, when an officer does not

“have in his or her possession a warrant particularly describing the things he

or she intendeds to seize, proceeding with a search is clearly ‘unreasonable’

under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (cleaned up). But Groh does not render

Walley’s actions sufficiently unreasonable, as it is not clearly established that

Walley was “executing a search warrant” or “conducting a search” at all.

Because Lewis has not shown that Walley’s conduct was unreasonable

in light of clearly established law, he has not overcome Walley’s defense of

QI. See Carmona, 126 F.4th at 1096. Because Lewis fails to show a clearly

established constitutional violation, we do not reach the other prong of the

QI test.

*****

Walley has not forfeited her defense of QI, and the defense succeeds.

Lewis has not shown that Walley’s conduct was a clearly established Fourth

Amendment violation. The judgment accordingly is REVERSED, and a

judgment of dismissal is RENDERED.

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