STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRIS GREEN

02/23/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

December 18, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRIS GREEN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hawkins County

No. 22CR145 John F. Dugger, Jr., Judge

___________________________________

No. E2025-00289-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

The Defendant, Chris Green, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of

robbery and facilitation to commit aggravated assault, for which he received an effective

sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender. The trial

court also ordered the Defendant to pay $7,500 in fines as part of his sentence. On appeal,

the Defendant argues the trial court erred by classifying him as a Range III, persistent

offender because the State failed to prove he had received five qualifying prior felony

convictions and because the trial court conducted an unconstitutional factual inquiry into

the nature of the underlying offenses. The Defendant also argues the trial court failed to

make sufficient findings to support its imposition of fines. Following our review, we

reverse the Defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing consistent with this

opinion. Because we conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proof regarding

the Defendant’s sentencing range, we do not address the Defendant’s constitutional claim.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;

Judgments of the Criminal Court Reversed; Case Remanded

STEVEN W. SWORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREENHOLTZ and

KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

William W. Gill, Assistant Public Defender – Appellate Division, Tennessee District

Public Defenders Conference (on appeal); Todd Estep, District Public Defender; and

Roland Cowden, Assistant District Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Chris

Green.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Deputy Attorney

General; Dan E. Armstrong, District Attorney General; and Paul J. Hornick, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 3, 2022, a Hawkins County grand jury returned a two-count indictment

charging the Defendant with one count of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated

robbery and one count of especially aggravated robbery. On September 15, 2023, the State

filed a notice of its intent to seek enhanced sentencing, arguing that the Defendant qualified

as a Range III, persistent offender, citing a series of convictions in North Carolina between

1978 and 1985 and two convictions in South Carolina in 1988 and 2002. On August 12,

2024, a Hawkins County grand jury returned a two-count superseding indictment charging

the Defendant with one count of robbery and one count of aggravated assault.

A. TRIAL

The Defendant proceeded to trial on October 22, 2024. The evidence adduced at

trial established that the Defendant, along with his nephew, Thaddeus Johnson, called the

eighty-two-year-old victim to ask about purchasing a vehicle the victim was selling. The

vehicle was parked on the victim’s property near the road. The victim met the Defendant

and Mr. Johnson, permitted them to inspect the vehicle, and rode with them as they took

the vehicle for a test drive “around the block.” The Defendant drove the vehicle, the victim

sat in the front seat, and Mr. Johnson sat in the back seat. At some point during the test

drive, Mr. Johnson wrapped a belt-like “strap” around the victim’s throat, choking him.

The victim heard Mr. Johnson tell the Defendant to “get in his front pocket,” and the victim

believed he saw the Defendant reach inside his front pocket before he lost consciousness.

Shortly after the victim regained consciousness, the Defendant drove the vehicle

back to the victim’s property and instructed the victim not to leave the vehicle. The victim

watched the Defendant and Mr. Johnson exit the vehicle, enter their own vehicle, and drive

away. Thereafter, the victim exited the vehicle and discovered that his cell phone and the

cash he carried in his wallet in his front pocket, totaling between $2,200 and $2,300, were

missing.

Upon this proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of robbery, a Class C felony, and

affixed a fine of $5,000. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(b). The jury also convicted the

Defendant of facilitation to commit aggravated assault, a Class D felony, as a lesser-

included offense of aggravated assault and affixed a fine of $2,500. Tenn. Code Ann. §§

39-11-403(b), -13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv), (d)(1)(A)(i)(a). The trial court approved the jury’s

verdict and scheduled a sentencing hearing for December 12, 2024.

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B. SENTENCING HEARING

On November 21, 2024, the State filed a motion seeking consecutive sentencing and

arguing that the Defendant qualified as a Range III, persistent offender under Tennessee

Code Annotated section 40-35-107. In support of this latter argument, the State alleged

that the Defendant had previously been convicted of the following offenses:

Offense Offense Conviction Date Jurisdiction Case Number1

Date

First degree December 6, June 3, 1985 Columbus 1985CRS001476

arson 1984 County, North

Carolina

Armed December 2, February 16, Horry County, 89-GS-26-423

robbery 1988 1989 South Carolina

Armed November April 14, 2004 Horry County, 03-GS-26-0023

robbery 19, 2002 South Carolina

Common law December March 1, 1982 Columbus 81CRS11455

robbery 16, 1981 County, North

Carolina

Larceny May 6, 1983 May 17, 1983 Columbus 83CR003892

County, North

Carolina

The State further alleged that under Tennessee law at the time the offenses were committed,

the Defendant’s conviction of first degree arson qualified as a Class A felony; his

convictions of armed robbery qualified as Class B felonies; his conviction of common law

robbery qualified as a Class C felony; and his conviction of larceny qualified as a Class D

felony.

The State attached certified packets of information from both the South Carolina

Department of Corrections (“SCDOC”) and the North Carolina Department of Public

Safety (“NCDPS”)2 as exhibits to its motion. As relevant to this appeal, the South Carolina

1

This table lists the case numbers for the offenses the State alleged the Defendant had committed

in the manner the State listed them. The record indicates several slight inconsistencies in these case

numbers, either due to the parties’ abbreviating the case numbers or to scrivener’s error. To avoid

misconstruing the parties’ and the trial court’s respective intents, we will hereafter use quotation marks to

identify their references to the relevant case numbers.

2

The pertinent documents contained within the North Carolina packet were compiled and file-

stamped by the NCDPS’s Combined Records Section, but they pertain to the Defendant’s incarceration in

the North Carolina Department of Correction (“NCDOC”). For clarity, we note that in 2012, the North

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packet included photographs of the Defendant’s face with his SCDOC inmate number; the

judgment of conviction for the Defendant’s guilty-pled conviction of armed robbery in case

number “03-GS-26-0023”; and a verdict form noting the Defendant’s February 16, 1989

conviction of armed robbery following a jury trial in case number “89-GS-26-243.” The

North Carolina packet included a copy of the Defendant’s fingerprints taken on March 4,

1982, upon his admission to the NCDOC following his March 1, 1982 conviction of

common law robbery in case number “81CRS11455”; another copy of the Defendant’s

fingerprints taken on June 6, 1985 upon his admission to the NCDOC following his June

3, 1983 convictions of “Safecracking; B&E; Larceny; [and] Arson” in case numbers

“85CRS1474, 1475, 76”; another copy of the Defendant’s fingerprints taken on June 30,

1978 upon his admission to the NCDOC following his June 27, 1978 convictions of

“Misd[.] Break[]&[]Entering” and two convictions of “Misd[.] Larceny” in case numbers

“78CR5685” and “78CR5954”; and an NCDOC “inmate summary record” listing the

Defendant’s convictions of first degree arson in case number “85001474” and common

law robbery in case number “81011455.”

The Defendant filed a response to the State’s motion on December 12, 2024, in

which he requested concurrent sentencing “within the minimum of the ranges” and argued

that only one enhancement factor and several mitigating factors applied. He did not object

to the State’s argument that he should be classified as a Range III, persistent offender. The

trial court held a sentencing hearing that same day.

At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that “the presentence

report has been done” and that an amended presentence report had also been prepared to

correct a “typographical error.”3 The trial court approved the fines assessed by the jury

and made the following findings.

[F]or this case, we tried this case and the jury came back with guilty on the

principal charge of robbery and they imposed a $5,000 fine. That will be the

fine in the case on Count One. In Count Two[,] he was charged with an

aggravated assault[,] but the jury came back with a lesser[-]included offense

of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony[,] and they imposed a

fine of $2,500[,] so that will be the fine. He has $7,500 in fines. And the

State – I’m going to let the State go from there.

Carolina General Assembly consolidated the NCDOC along with several other state departments to

establish the NCDPS. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-600(a)(1) (2012).

3

Because this “typographical error” is not germane to our resolution of the appeal, we refer to the

amended presentence report simply as the “presentence report” throughout this opinion.

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The State then argued that the trial court should impose maximum within-range sentences

and align the sentences consecutively, yielding an effective sentence of twenty-seven

years’ incarceration.

The State argued that the Defendant qualified as a Range III, persistent offender

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107. Relying upon the presentence

report, the State contended that the Defendant was convicted of common law robbery in

1981; larceny in 1983; “arson, burglary, safecracking[,] and larceny” in 1984; armed

robbery in 1988; and armed robbery in 2002. The Defendant did not object to this

argument. Both the Defendant and the State devoted the remainder of their arguments to

the applicable enhancement and mitigating factors and to the appropriateness of

consecutive sentencing.

Following arguments, the trial court made the following findings:

First, the [c]ourt finds that you are a persistent offender. I’ve studied

this and found typos in the report, just little dates and things . . . which have

now been corrected. But for your prior convictions, the first one that I’m

going to – I have to find five separate convictions that occurred on different

– at different times.

On offense date November the 19th, 2002, there was an armed

robbery in South Carolina, Horry County. In Tennessee[,] that’s equivalent

to an aggravated robbery, Class B felony. You were sentenced to 18 years

and there’s a violation of probation pending on that case. . . . [S]o that’s one

conviction right there. I have got to have five separate ones.

The next one the [c]ourt has considered was on – the offense date was

December the 2nd, armed robbery in South Carolina, Horry County. It’s

equivalent to the robbery statute in Tennessee of 1988, Class B felony[,] and

you were sentenced to 25 years on that. The first one, the armed robbery in

2002, you’ve got 18 years. The one in 1988[,] you were sentenced to 25

years[,] and that was case number 89-GS0-26-423.

And then there’s a series of convictions of different – they’re all on

the same date, series of offenses. These occurred on the offense date of

December 6th of 1984. There were, looks like, three separate convictions.

First degree arson in North Carolina, Columbus County. Equivalent to an

aggravated arson in Tennessee, a Class A felony. And that was case number

85CR51476. And then the second one on that December 6, 1984, date was

breaking and entering in North Carolina, Columbus County. That’s

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equivalent to a third degree burglary in Tennessee in 1984. And that would

be equivalent to a Class D felony. And then another case is a safecracking

in North Carolina on December the 6th, 1984, and that’s equivalent to

Tennessee safecracking in 1984. This was Columbus County. A Class D

felony in 85CRS – or CR51474.

And the next one the [c]ourt considers is on May the 6th, 1983, a

larceny in North Carolina, a D felony, Columbus County, equivalent to grand

larceny in case number 83CR3892.

And then lastly, the fifth conviction the [c]ourt considers was on

December the 16th, 1981, common law robbery in North Carolina, Columbus

County. That’s equivalent to robbery in Tennessee, a Class C felony. And

that’s 81CRS511455. And so[,] that’s five convictions.

The [c]ourt finds that you are a persistent offender by having five or

more prior felonies within the next two lower felony classes[.]

The trial court further found that multiple enhancement factors applied and that no

mitigating factors applied. It imposed within-range sentences of fifteen and ten years’

incarceration for the Defendant’s convictions of robbery and facilitation to commit

aggravated assault, respectively. The trial court aligned the Defendant’s sentences

consecutively, yielding an effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration.

The Defendant filed a timely, but unsuccessful, motion for a new trial. This timely

appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by classifying him as a

Range III, persistent offender because the State failed to prove he had received five

qualifying prior felony convictions and because the trial court conducted an

unconstitutional factual inquiry into the nature of the underlying offenses. The Defendant

also argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support its imposition

of fines. We address these issues in turn.

A. RANGE CLASSIFICATION

The Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in classifying him as a Range

III, persistent offender. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to adduce sufficient

proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt his 1983 conviction for larceny and that,

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accordingly, the trial court erred by considering it a qualifying prior felony conviction

under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107. He also asserts that the trial court

conducted an unconstitutional factual inquiry into the nature of the underlying offenses by

examining one of his December 6, 1984 convictions as a qualifying prior felony. On the

former argument, the State concedes error.

As the parties note in their respective briefs, the Defendant did not present either

claim to the trial court. In his December 12, 2024 response to the State’s request for

enhanced punishment and consecutive sentencing, he did not oppose the State’s argument

that he qualified as a Range III, persistent offender; rather, he requested that the trial court

impose sentences “within the minimum of the ranges” in consideration of several

mitigating factors and align the sentences concurrently. Indeed, our review of the transcript

of the sentencing hearing reveals that the parties devoted the majority of their arguments

to the applicable enhancement and mitigating factors and the appropriate alignment of the

Defendant’s sentences. The State’s argument regarding the appropriate sentencing range

and the trial court’s analysis thereof were comparatively brief, and at no point did the

Defendant object to either. The Defendant also did not raise this issue in his motion for a

new trial. Therefore, this claim is waived and is reviewable only for plain error. See Tenn.

R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to

a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably

available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”).

A defendant may only receive relief under plain error review if he or she proves all

five of the following prerequisites:

(1) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (2) a

clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (3) a substantial

right of the accused must have been violated; (4) the accused must not have

waived the issue for tactical reasons; and (5) consideration of the issue is

necessary to achieve substantial justice.

State v. Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d 235, 255-56 (Tenn. 2021) (citing State v. Martin, 505 S.W.3d

492, 504 (Tenn. 2016)). If a defendant fails to prove any one of the five plain error factors,

then he or she is not entitled to plain error relief, and the appellate court is not required to

analyze the remaining factors. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Tenn. 2007). In

order to qualify as plain error, “[t]he magnitude of the error must have been so significant

that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 354 (quoting State v. Adkisson,

899 S.W.2d 626, 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see

also Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

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Where the record supports the trial court’s sentencing determination and that

determination reflects that the trial court properly applied the purposes and principles of

sentencing, we view the trial court’s decision as presumptively reasonable and review it

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). Under that

standard of review, “[a] sentence should be upheld so long as it is within the appropriate

range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the

purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709-10. A trial court abuses its discretion

when it “(1) applies an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaches an illogical or unreasonable

decision, or (3) bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” State

v. Mangrum, 403 S.W.3d 152, 166 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312

S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)).

Our statutes provide for sentencing by range, and a defendant’s appropriate

sentencing range is determined by his or her offender classification and by the classification

of the offense for which he or she is convicted. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112; State v.

Menke, 590 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Tenn. 2019). Offender classification determinations are

made, in large part, by reference to a defendant’s prior felony convictions, if any exist. See

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-105(a), -106, -107, -108, -109, -120. As relevant to this appeal,

a defendant qualifies as a Range III, persistent offender if he or she has received “[a]ny

combination of five (5) or more prior felony convictions within the conviction class or

higher or within the next two (2) lower felony classes[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

107(a)(1). A persistent offender is sentenced as a Range III offender. Tenn. Code Ann. §§

40-35-107(c), -112. The State bears the burden of proving the fact of a defendant’s

qualifying prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vick, 242 S.W.3d

792, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). In this case, the Defendant was convicted of robbery,

a Class C felony, and facilitation to commit aggravated assault, a Class D felony. Because

there is only one felony class lower than a Class D felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

110(a), the State bore the burden of proving that the Defendant had received five or more

prior felony convictions, regardless of their classification.

The requirements for plain error review are met in this case. The record clearly

establishes what occurred in the trial court, and the State does not assert that the Defendant

waived this issue for tactical purposes. Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d at 255-56; State v. Smith, 492

S.W.3d 224, 239 (Tenn. 2016) (holding that “an absence of indicia in the trial record that

a defendant has waived an issue for tactical reasons is sufficient to satisfy [that] criterion

of plain error.”). Moreover, a criminal defendant “has a right to be sentenced within the

law applicable to him, his circumstances, and his record.” State v. Gordon, No. W2021-

01190-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2375707 at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2023), no perm.

app. filed. In its September 15, 2023 notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment, the

State argued that the Defendant “should be sentenced as a persistent/career offender” based

upon his prior felony convictions. Among these prior felony convictions, the State alleged

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that the Defendant committed larceny on May 6, 1983, for which he was convicted on May

17, 1983, in North Carolina case number “1983CR003892.” The State reiterated this

request following the Defendant’s trial in its November 21, 2024 request for enhanced

punishment, in which the State argued that the larceny conviction4 qualified as a Class D

felony under equivalent Tennessee law. At the Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the State

again argued that the Defendant was convicted of larceny in 1983, and following

arguments, the trial court found that the Defendant committed larceny in North Carolina in

“case number 83CR3892” and that the conviction was “equivalent to grand larceny.”

The trial court’s conclusion that the Defendant was convicted of larceny in 1983 is

not supported by the record. The North Carolina packet, attached as an exhibit to the

State’s November 21, 2024 request for enhanced punishment, identifies numerous

convictions, but it does not identify, let alone reference, any conviction of larceny in 1983.5

Further, although the trial court noted that it had considered the Defendant’s presentence

report, the only reference contained therein was in the context of a recitation of the State’s

September 15, 2023 notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment, in which the State

identified the conviction as a prior conviction it intended to rely upon to argue that the

Defendant “should be sentenced as a persistent/career offender.” In its recitation of the

Defendant’s prior criminal record, however, the presentence report listed a May 17, 1983

North Carolina conviction of “break and enter” in docket number “1983CR003892.” The

presentence report further identified the offense date as May 6, 1983.

In sum, the State alleged that the Defendant should be sentenced as a Range III,

persistent offender because he had received five qualifying prior felony convictions;

namely, two convictions of armed robbery, first degree arson, common law robbery, and

larceny. In doing so, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the

fact of each of those prior felony convictions, including the alleged larceny conviction.

Vick, 242 S.W.3d at 796. Because there was no evidence of any larceny conviction as

identified by the State in the record, the State failed to carry that burden of proof.

Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that the Defendant qualified as a Range III,

persistent offender is unsupported by the record and amounts to a clearly erroneous

assessment of the evidence. See Mangrum, 403 S.W.3d at 166. This conclusion resulted

in the Defendant receiving a Range III sentence, although the evidence presented at the

4

The State listed the larceny conviction’s case number alternatively as “1983CR003892,”

“83CR003892,” and “83CR3892.”

5

While the North Carolina packet references two misdemeanor larceny convictions in case

numbers “78CR5685” and “78CR5954,” it also indicates that the Defendant was convicted for those

offenses on June 27, 1978. Moreover, as misdemeanor offenses, these convictions would have been

irrelevant to the Defendant’s classification as a Range III, persistent offender. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

107.

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sentencing hearing and in the State’s filings supported only a Range II sentence.6 See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a) (providing that a “multiple offender is a defendant who has

received . . . [a] minimum of two (2) but not more than four (4) prior felony convictions

within the conviction class, a higher class, or within the next two (2) lower felony classes”);

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(c) (providing that “[a] defendant who is found by the court

beyond a reasonable doubt to be a multiple offender shall receive a sentence within Range

II.”). The error, therefore, resulted in a breach of a clear and unequivocal rule of law,

adversely affecting the Defendant’s substantial right to receive a sentence within the

appropriate range based upon the evidence, and we conclude that consideration of this error

is necessary to achieve substantial justice.

Following our plain error review of this issue, we conclude that the trial court based

its conclusion that the Defendant was a Range III, persistent offender on a clearly erroneous

assessment of the evidence. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Range III sentence requires

reversal.

Included in his argument that his sentence requires reversal, the Defendant also

contends that the trial court erred in its foreign-conviction analysis of his 1983 conviction.

However, because we conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proving the

conviction, we do not address this aspect of the argument. Relatedly, the Defendant

contends that he is also entitled to a reversal of his Range III sentence because the trial

court conducted an unconstitutional factual inquiry into the nature of the underlying

offenses by treating one of his December 6, 1984 convictions as a qualifying prior felony.

The Defendant relies upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Erlinger

v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Having already concluded that the Defendant’s

Range III sentence must be reversed because there was insufficient proof of his having

received five qualifying prior felony convictions, we decline to address the Defendant’s

constitutional claim. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (“If issues in a

case can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds, courts should avoid deciding

constitutional issues.”).

Moreover, both in their briefs and oral arguments, the parties agreed that the

Defendant should appropriately be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, and our

review of the record supports this conclusion. These convictions are identified in the

relevant packets and the presentence report, and it is well established that a trial court may

rely on a presentence report as reliable hearsay in determining range classification. State

v. Sexton, No. M2018-00874-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 5700889, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Nov. 5, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020). Because the record demonstrates

6

As explained below, the parties agree that the Defendant would be properly classified as a Range

II, multiple offender, and our review of the record supports that conclusion.

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that the Defendant would be properly classified, based upon these prior felony convictions,

as a Range II, multiple offender, consideration of the Defendant’s claim regarding his

December 6, 1984 convictions would be irrelevant to determining his appropriate range.

The Defendant’s sentence is reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing as a Range

II, multiple offender.

B. IMPOSITION OF FINES

The Defendant also argues that his sentence must also be reversed because the trial

court failed to make sufficient findings to support its imposition of $7,500 in fines.

Although the State again concedes error, it argues that the record supports the trial court’s

imposition of fines and, therefore, that this aspect of the Defendant’s sentence should be

affirmed following a de novo review.

The Tennessee Constitution provides that all fines in excess of fifty dollars must be

affixed by a jury as the trier of fact. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 14. During a defendant’s

sentencing hearing, the trial court “shall impose a fine, if any, not to exceed the fine fixed

by the jury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-301(b). In imposing a fine, the trial court must

consider the purposes and principles of sentencing, as well as a defendant’s “prior history,

potential for rehabilitation, financial means, and mitigating and enhancing factors that are

relevant to an appropriate, overall sentence.” State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Tenn.

2002) (citing State v. Blevins, 968 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). The trial

court must also consider the seriousness of the offense and a defendant’s ability to pay the

fine. See Taylor, 70 S.W.3d at 723. However, a defendant’s ability to pay is not a

controlling factor, and “a significant fine is not automatically precluded just because it

works a substantial hardship on a defendant—it may be punitive in the same fashion

incarceration may be punitive.” State v. Marshall, 870 S.W.2d 532, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145 (Tenn. 1999). As

with other aspects of the trial court’s sentencing determinations, we review the imposition

of fines for an abuse of discretion. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707.

As the Defendant notes in his brief, he did not object to the trial court’s imposition

of fines, so our review of this issue is limited to plain error. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)

(“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible

for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or

nullify the harmful effect of an error.”). However, the requirements for plain error review

are met in this case. The record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court, and the

State does not argue that the Defendant waived this issue for tactical purposes. Rimmer,

623 S.W.3d at 255-56; Smith, 492 S.W.3d at 239. The trial court made no findings in

support of its imposition of the Defendant’s fines in this case; instead, it noted the jury’s

fines for both of the Defendant’s convictions and stated that the Defendant would owe

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$7,500 in fines. It is well-established that a trial court must consider whether the jury-

assessed fine is justified and may not merely approve the fines without further factual

inquiry. State v. House, No. M2008-00032-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 5130451, at *7 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2008) (citing Blevins, 968 S.W.2d at 895), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

Apr. 27, 2009). Therefore, the trial court’s imposition of fines in this case breached a clear

and unequivocal rule of law and deprived the Defendant of his right to have the fines

affixed by the jury assessed before their imposition, and we conclude that consideration of

this issue is necessary to achieve substantial justice. Rimmer, 623 S.W.3d at 255-56.

As the State notes in its brief, this court may conduct a de novo review of the trial

court’s imposition of fines. However, we are mindful that “the factors to be considered

and weighed in imposing a fine require a fact-intensive inquiry” to which the trial court is

better suited. State v. Climer, No. W2024-00023-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4948973, at *6

(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2024), no perm. app. filed. Additionally, “[w]hen the trial court

fails to place on the record any reasoning to support its sentencing decision, the most

appropriate remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration.” State v.

Oliver, No. E2023-01623-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1014382, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.

4, 2025) (emphasis in original) (citing Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705, n.41), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. Sept. 10, 2025). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of fines in this

case and remand for further findings in consideration of the relevant factors.

III. CONCLUSION

Following our review of the record and based on the foregoing analysis, we reverse

the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with

this opinion.

s/ Steven W. Sword

STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE

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