Opinion

Tameka Pickett v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Feb 20, 2026
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 38.8%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TAMEKA NICOLE PICKETT, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DA-0752-24-0125-I-1

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: February 20, 2026

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jason Vernard Loftis , Bonham, Texas, for the appellant.

Mikayla Megan Martinez-Rhodes , Esquire, Arlington, Texas,

for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman

James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained her removal for misconduct. Generally, we grant petitions such as this

one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner

has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for

review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial

decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

The appellant was a GS-13 Psychologist for the agency’s Veterans Health

Administration. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 21. On October 4, 2023, the

agency proposed the appellant’s removal on charges of failure to follow

instructions and failure to follow policy. IAF, Tab 12 at 66-73. Under the failure

to follow instructions charge, the agency alleged that, on 33 separate occasions,

between April 10, 2023, and May 19, 2023, various agency officials instructed

the appellant to evaluate, see, or otherwise contact certain veterans, but the

appellant failed to do so. Id. at 66-68. Under the failure to follow policy charge,

the agency alleged that, in December 2022 and January 2023, the appellant

accessed the electronic health records of several veterans without authorization.

Id. at 68. After the appellant responded, the deciding official sustained both

charges and removed her effective November 11, 2023. IAF, Tab 10 at 21, 27-31.

The appellant filed a Board appeal, raising affirmative defenses of harmful

error, whistleblower reprisal, and a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(2) (soliciting or considering certain types statements in connection

with a personnel action). IAF, Tab 1, Tab 74 at 3. She waived her right to a

hearing. IAF, Tab 81.

After the close of the record, the administrative judge issued an initial

decision sustaining the removal. IAF, Tab 91, Initial Decision (ID). She found

that the agency proved each element of its case, including both charges, that the

removal penalty was reasonable, and that the appellant did not prove any of her

affirmative defenses. Id.

The appellant has filed a petition for review, accompanied by several

documentary exhibits, disputing the veracity of certain agency witness

declarations. 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-3, 5. The agency has filed

a response. PFR File, Tab 9.

ANALYSIS

Timeliness

As an initial matter, there is a question as to whether the petition for review

should be dismissed as untimely filed. The deadline for filing the petition for

review was December 4, 2024, ID at 29, but the appellant filed her petition via

e-Appeal, and it reflects a date stamp of December 5, 2024 at 1:02 a.m. Eastern

Time, PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. The agency argues that the petition for review should

be dismissed as untimely filed without good cause shown for the delay. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 8-9; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g).

All pleadings filed via the Board’s e-Appeal system are stamped with

Eastern Time, but the timeliness of a pleading is assessed based on the time zone

from which the pleading was submitted. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14( l)(1). It appears

from the record that the appellant filed her submission from the Central Time

Zone, and thus, the submission was filed on January 5, 2025, at 12:02 a.m.—

2 minutes past the deadline. Nevertheless, in the interests of judicial efficiency

After the deadline for filing the petition for review had passed, the appellant filed an

identical copy of the original petition, except this time signed and notarized. Petition

for Review File, Tab 7. We appreciate the appellant’s efforts to place her petition in

the correct form. However, there is no requirement that a petition for review be

notarized, and we find that the original petition is sufficient to constitute a declaration

under penalty of perjury.

and fairness, the Board will not waive its timeliness requirements in the absence

of good cause, no matter how minimal the delay. Smith v. Department of the

Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 433, ¶ 6 (2007). To establish good cause, the appellant must

show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence in the particular

circumstances of the case. Quarles v. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, 47 M.S.P.R. 636, 638 (1991).

In this case, the record shows that the appellant began the filing process

before the midnight deadline. PFR File, Tab 4 at 4-6. However, she did not

complete it in time, in part because she was attempting to address system prompts

asking her to explain her untimely filing even though it was not yet, in fact,

untimely. Id. Considering that the filing delay was minimal and largely

attributable to the appellant’s confusion over the system prompts, and in light of

her pro se status at the time and the lack of any prejudice to the agency, we find

good cause to waive the deadline. See Moorman v. Department of the Army,

68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62 63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table)

(setting forth the factors that the Board will consider in a good cause analysis).

Charges and Penalty

In an appeal of an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, the agency

bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that its action was taken

for such cause as would promote the efficiency of the service. MacDonald v.

Department of the Navy, 4 M.S.P.R. 403, 404 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)

(ii). To meet this burden, the agency must prove its charge, establish a nexus

between the charge and the efficiency of the service, and demonstrate that the

penalty imposed was reasonable. Pope v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144,

1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, even if the agency carries this burden, the

action may not be sustained if the appellant shows harmful error in the

application of the agency's procedures in arriving at its decision, or that the

decision was based on a prohibited personnel practice described in 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b). 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A)-(B); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C).

To prove a charge of failure to follow instructions, an agency must prove

that the appellant (1) was given proper instructions, and (2) failed to follow the

instructions, without regard to whether the failure was intentional or

unintentional. Powell v. U.S. Postal Service, 122 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 5 (2014). In this

case, the parties stipulated that the appellant did not follow the instructions that

the agency specified in its notice of proposed removal. IAF, Tab 82 at 5-7.

However, the appellant argued that the instructions were not proper because

neither of the officials who gave her the instructions was her clinical supervisor.

IAF, Tab 86 at 4. Nevertheless, the administrative judge found no indication that

the appellant was only required to follow the instructions of her direct clinical

supervisor, and based on the declarations of these two officials, she found that

their instructions were proper. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 85 at 14-18. She therefore

sustained the charge and all 33 specifications. ID at 6. The appellant does not

dispute this charge on review, and we agree with the administrative judge that the

agency proved it. ID at 4-6.

To prove a charge of failure to follow policy, we find that the agency must

show that an applicable agency policy existed and that the appellant failed to

follow it. In this case, the administrative judge found that agency policy requires

that employees access patients’ protected health information “in only the

minimum amount required to perform their specific job functions and to

accomplish the intended purposes of the access.” ID at 8; IAF, Tab 13 at 245.

Agency policy further provides that “employees shall access records containing

personally identifiable information “only when the information is needed to carry

out their official duties.” ID at 8-9; IAF, Tab 14 at 241, 223-48. The

administrative judge found that the appellant failed to follow these policies when

she accessed the health records of nine different individuals between

December 2022 and January 2023, despite not having any clinical duties during

that time or otherwise having any authorization to do so. ID at 7-8. She further

found that the appellant gave no credible explanation of her reasons for accessing

these records. Id. The administrative judge therefore sustained both

specifications of the charge. ID at 8.

On petition for review, the appellant disputes her first-level supervisor’s

declaration, in which she states that the appellant “refused to see patients” during

December 2022 and January 2023. IAF, Tab 85 at 18. The appellant asserts that

she did not see patients during this time period because she was suspended (or

believed that she was suspended) from clinical practice—not because she refused.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. However, whatever the case, the fact remains that the

appellant had no job-related need to access patient records during that time, and

that she violated agency policy by doing so.

The appellant alleges, for the first time on review, that her use of the

agency’s computerized patient record system was legitimate in the course of her

temporary administrative duties because she was using it to double-check patient

names on handwritten forms. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12. Under 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first

time with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the

close of the record below despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S.

Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980). The appellant could have offered

this explanation for her actions at any time below, but she did not. We decline to

consider these late-raised allegations on review. 3 For the reasons explained in the

initial decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved

this charge. ID 6-9.

Regarding penalty, the appellant disputes the deciding official’s account of

what transpired during the oral reply. The deciding official stated that the

appellant requested that she “not be subject to clinical oversight moving forward”

and that the appellant refused to return to patient care. IAF, Tab 85 at 6. On

This is not to imply that the appellant’s allegations, if true, would warrant reversing

the charge; the appellant’s temporary supervisor stated that the appellant’s use of the

patient record system went beyond cross-checking names and included opening and

viewing patient files. IAF, Tab 85 at 20-21.

review, the appellant denies requesting exemption from clinical oversight; she

states that she merely told the deciding official that “following the instructions of

[her] supervisory chain in the mental health service was a threat to [her]

professional license and livelihood.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. If this is what the

appellant told the deciding official, we think that he reasonably interpreted it as a

request to be relieved of clinical oversight. As for her alleged refusal to return to

patient care, the appellant states that, when the deciding official asked her to

propose an alternative sanction, she suggested reassignment to an administrative

position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. We agree with the appellant that her openness to

an administrative assignment was not tantamount to refusing to return to patient

care. However, her refusal to accept supervisory oversight was. In any event, for

the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the administrative

judge that the deciding official considered all the relevant penalty factors and

arrived at a penalty determination within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.

ID at 26-29; see Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981).

Affirmative Defenses

As far as affirmative defenses are concerned, the appellant does not contest

the administrative judge’s analysis of her defense under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2).

We agree with the administrative judge that this subsection pertains to statements

and recommendations by outsiders like senators or congressmen that could taint

personnel actions with partisan political influence—not to messages between

agency officials that concern an employee’s job-related misconduct. ID at 24-25;

see Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 11 (2016).

Regarding the appellant’s whistleblower defense, to prove an affirmative

defense of whistleblower reprisal, an appellant must prove by preponderant

evidence that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity and

that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action at

issue. Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 49. If the

appellant meets this burden, the agency will have the opportunity to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the

protected disclosure or activity. Id. In this case, the appellant claimed that her

removal was in retaliation for various disclosures covered under 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8) and activities covered under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) and (D). IAF,

Tab 74 at 3. The administrative judge found that the appellant did not engage in

activity protected under subparagraph (b)(9)(D), and although she engaged in

activity protected under subparagraph (b)(9)(C), she did not prove that this

activity was a contributing factor in her removal. ID at 19-22. The

administrative judge found that the appellant made one disclosure protected under

paragraph (b)(8), but that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence

that it would have removed her notwithstanding the disclosure. ID at 14-19,

22-24.

On review, the appellant directly contests only the administrative judge’s

analysis of her (b)(9)(C) claim. The administrative judge found that the appellant

engaged in activity protected under that subparagraph when she filed a police

report with the agency’s police service. ID at 19-20; IAF, Tab 67 at 13-19.

However, she found that the appellant did not prove that this activity was a

contributing factor in her removal. ID at 20-22. She found that the proposing

official could not have retaliated against the appellant for this activity because the

proposal notice was issued before the appellant filed her police report. ID

at 20-22. As for the deciding official’s knowledge of the police report, the

administrative judge recognized competing accounts of the matter: In a sworn

declaration, the deciding official specifically denied knowing about the police

report prior to issuing his decision, but in her own sworn declaration, the

appellant specifically stated that she informed the deciding official of her police

report during the oral reply. IAF, Tab 53 at 20, Tab 85 at 7. Finding the

evidence in equipoise, the administrative judge determined that the appellant did

not meet her burden of proving contributing factor under the knowledge/timing

test of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). 4 ID at 21; see Cook v. Department of the Army,

105 M.S.P.R. 178, ¶ 19 (2007) (holding that, where evidence is in equipoise, the

party with the burden of persuasion has failed to meet that burden).

On review, the appellant submits a declaration from her union

representative to corroborate her account and tip the balance of the evidence in

her favor. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 2. The union representative explains that he

did not submit the declaration previously because he was unaware that he could

do so. PFR File, Tab 2 at 4. He states, “In other MSPB cases, the Agency’s

attorneys stated that my role should be clear and singular, a witness or a

representative.” Id. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board generally will not

consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a

showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed before the

administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R.

at 213-14. We find that the appellant’s representative’s misapprehension is not a

sufficient basis to waive the Board’s regulatory requirements for newly submitted

evidence and argument. An appellant is responsible for the actions or inactions

of her chosen representative. Ivy v. U.S. Postal Service, 36 M.S.P.R. 350, 351

(1988). We therefore find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s

contributing factor analysis. For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we

agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not prove her

affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal. ID at 13-24.

The appellant also argues that, contrary to his written declaration, the

deciding official was aware of an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

If an appellant fails to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board must consider

other evidence, such as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s

reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally

directed at the proposing or deciding official, and whether those individuals had a

desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Chambers v. Department of

Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 15. The administrative judge considered such

evidence as appropriate and found that it did not support a finding of contributing

factor. ID at 21-22.

that she had filed prior to the removal decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. To the

extent that the appellant is attempting to raise an affirmative defense of

retaliation for EEO activity, she may not do so at this stage of the appeal. See

Payne v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 646, 649-50 (1996). To the extent that

the appellant’s argument goes to the deciding official’s credibility, we find

insufficient basis to conclude that the deciding official was not credible. The

deciding official did not deny knowing about the appellant’s EEO complaint; he

merely stated that he did not recall her discussing it specifically during her oral

reply. IAF, Tab 85 at 7. As for the deciding official’s statement that he was

unaware of any disclosure that the appellant made that could be interpreted as

evidencing a violation of law, rule or regulation, this was a reference to a

disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and not to any EEO complaint. See

Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 10-17 (affirming

longstanding Board precedent that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) does not cover

disclosures of violations of antidiscrimination laws).

The appellant also raised an affirmative defense of harmful error under

various theories. To prove that an agency committed harmful error under

5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A), the appellant must show both that the agency

committed procedural error and that the error was harmful. Parker v. Defense

Logistics Agency, 1 M.S.P.R. 505, 513 (1980). The administrative judge

considered the appellant’s claims but found that she variously failed to prove

procedural error, or harm, or both. ID at 9-13.

On petition for review, the appellant disputes the deciding official’s

statement that she had an adequate opportunity to respond to the instructions

provided her and to explain her access to veteran health records. IAF, PFR File,

Tab 1 at 6; Tab 85 at 6. However, the appellant seems to be talking about her

opportunity to participate in the pre-proposal investigation, whereas the deciding

official seems to be talking about the appellant’s opportunity to respond to the

notice of proposed removal. In any event, to show harmful error, an appellant

must prove that any procedural errors by the agency prejudiced her substantive

rights by possibly affecting the agency’s decision; harmful error cannot be

presumed. Stephen v. Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991).

We agree with the administrative judge that, because it is undisputed the

appellant engaged in the conduct underlying the charges, she has not shown that

her further involvement in the investigation would likely have led the agency to

reach a different decision. ID at 11.

The appellant raises numerous other arguments in connection with her

harmful error claims. For instance, the appellant argues that she informed the

proposing official about “the inconsistencies between the CCR and the

assignments that [she] was being instructed to perform.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.

She disputes the agency’s account of what happened during her focused

professional practice evaluation and ongoing professional practice evaluation. Id.

at 7-8. She asserts that various agency officials committed improper acts such as

bullying her, attempting to make her sign a falsified document, attempting to

make her perform difficult work too quickly after returning to clinical duties,

conducting an improper investigation, making inaccurate statements, and

completing a performance appraisal incorrectly. Id. at 8-14. She states that these

actions caused her to lose trust in agency management. Id. at 5-6, 8, 13.

However, we agree with the administrative judge that this alleged

“compounding series” of procedural errors did not harm the appellant’s

substantive rights in connection with the removal action. Procedures unrelated to

the processing of appellant’s removal cannot be challenged under the harmful

error analysis. Livingston v. Department of the Air Force, 26 M.S.P.R. 273, 275

(1985). Furthermore, the appellant’s complaints about agency management, even

if well-founded, did not give her license to repeatedly disregard the lawful orders

of her superiors, and they certainly did not give her license to access sensitive

patient information without authorization.

For the reasons stated in the initial decision, the removal is sustained.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following

address:

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following